Issues Involving the Korean Peninsula

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Examining the Korean Government’s Claims with Regard to Sovereignty over Takeshima: A point-by-point analysis of the official publicity pamphlet “Dokdo, Beautiful Island of Korea” *

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Introduction

In 2005, Shimane Prefecture enacted an ordinance declaring an official “Takeshima Day,” and set up the Takeshima Issue Research Group. Increasing numbers of people both in Japan and the Republic of Korea have unearthed historic materials and are reexamining previously known documents relating to the issue. Between 1953 and 1962, the two governments exchanged diplomatic documents several times detailing their positions regarding their grounds for territorial rights over the island¹, and today both countries use information pamphlets and websites to promote these views, incorporating a number of updates based on the results of recent research.

This paper aims to look at the claims of the Korean government as set out in a pamphlet published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the title “Dokdo, Beautiful Island of Korea,”² (Henceforth, this pamphlet is referred to as “the pamphlet.”) Dokdo is the Korean name for Takeshima) and to examine whether these claims have any proof to support them in light of the facts and international law. The pamphlet is made up of four sections: 1. The Korean Government’s Basic Position on Dokdo, 2. Geographical Recognition of Dokdo and Relevant Historical Evidence, 3. The Ulleungdo Dispute between Korea and Japan and Confirmation of Korea’s Sovereignty over Dokdo, and 4. The Empire of Korea’s Sovereignty over Dokdo and its Restoration, as well as a supplementary 15-part Q&A on Dokdo based on historical materials. In the following, I will quote from each of the four sections of the pamphlet and consider them in turn. I have published several papers on important issues relating to Takeshima in the past, considering the island in connection with the San Francisco peace treaty, measures taken after its incorporation into Japanese territory, and the historical sources of territorial sovereignty.³ The interested reader is directed to these previous papers for more detailed discussion of particular

* The original of this article was published in Japanese as 墻本孝「竹島領有権をめぐる韓国政府の主張について——政府広報資料『韓国の美しい島、竹島』の逐条的検討」『東海法学』52 (2016.9) 73-97 頁, and was translated into English by Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting (March 2017). The footnotes are abbreviated in this publication by permission of the author and the translator.

² Available online at: http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/jp/pds/pdf.jsp
³ Several papers have been published in the journal Review of Island Studies and are available online in English at https://www.spf.org/islandstudies/
1. The Korean Government’s Basic Position on Dokdo (quoted from p.4 of the pamphlet)

Dokdo, the easternmost island in the East Sea, is an integral part of Korean territory historically, geographically, and under international law. No territorial dispute exists regarding Dokdo, and therefore Dokdo is not a matter to be dealt with through diplomatic negotiations or judicial settlement.

The Government of the Republic of Korea exercises Korea’s irrefutable territorial sovereignty over Dokdo. The Government will deal firmly and resolutely with any provocation and will continue to defend Korea’s territorial integrity over the island.

1.1 Integral part of territory

The Korean government claims that Takeshima is an integral part of Korean territory historically, geographically, and under international law. It is not certain what is intended by the expression “integral part of Korean territory” in this context. The appeals to history and geography presumably refer to the claims made in Section 2 to the effect that Takeshima is part of Ulleungdo, and that it has been recorded since the fifteenth century in Korean documents as Usan (Usando). The reference to international law presumably refers to the claim in the second paragraph of Section 1 that the government exercises sovereignty over Takeshima and the claim in Section 4 to the effect that Korea governed the island as part of Uldo-gun (Uldo county) prior to the island’s incorporation into Shimane prefecture and that the Japanese incorporation of the island into its territory was therefore null and void. This would seem to be fundamentally the same as merely claiming that Takeshima is part of Korean territory historically, geographically, and under international law. The word “integral” can probably be understood as primarily emphatic. In any case, what I aim to do in this paper is to examine the claims themselves. Is it really true that the island is a part of Ulleungdo, that it was historically called Usan, and that it was controlled by Korea prior to its incorporation into Japanese territory?

1.2 Existence of a dispute

The government of the Republic of Korea argues that no territorial dispute exists regarding Takeshima, and that the island is not to be subject to diplomatic negotiations or judicial settlement. However, the mere fact that one country denies the existence of a dispute is not sufficient proof that no such dispute exists. This is a question that needs to be decided objectively, as has been shown by a decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the advisory opinion of March 30, 1950 (first phase) regarding the interpretation of peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, the ICJ ruled that: “Whether there exists an international dispute is a matter for objective determination. The mere denial of the existence of a dispute does not prove its non-existence.” This was confirmed in the judgment of June 11, 1998 on preliminary

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4 The term “inherent part of the territory of Japan” is used by the Japanese government to describe Japan’s position on the Northern Territories occupied by Russia, but in this case the term carries a somewhat specific (legal) sense. The term relates to the principle of “no territorial aggrandizement” laid out by the Allies in the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration during World War II, and underlines the fact that the islands in question were not taken by force in war or other act of aggression, and also that they have never belonged to any other country.

objections (Preliminary Objection 5) in the case concerning the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria.\(^6\)

In January 1952, a dispute arose (came to the surface) between the Japanese and Korean governments with regard to territorial sovereignty over Takeshima. On January 18 that year, the Korean government declared the establishment of the so-called Syngman Rhee Line outlining its claims over neighboring maritime waters, including Takeshima. The Japanese government on January 28 protested this attempt to establish control over the high seas and announced that it did not recognize Korea’s claim of sovereignty over Takeshima. As noted above (in the introduction), between 1953 and 1962 the two governments exchanged several diplomatic communications detailing their respective claims over Takeshima and the evidence that purportedly supported these claims. In 1954, Japan proposed referring the dispute to the ICJ, but this was refused by Korea.\(^7\) There were protests and counter-protests regarding actions that Korea had taken—firing on Japanese patrol vessels, a maritime notification that it had established a lighthouse on the island, and issuing stamps showing pictures of Takeshima, among other provocations. These protests and counter-protests continue to the present day. In one recent example, Japan repeated its suggestion that the issue should be referred to the ICJ in 2012, but this too was rejected by Korea.\(^8\) Taking these factors into account, it is objectively clear that a dispute does exist.

In Q14 of the Q&A section of the pamphlet, the Korean government comments on its refusal to refer the issue to the ICJ in the following terms: “The proposal of the Japanese government is nothing but another attempt disguised in the form of judicial procedures. Korea has the territorial rights ab initio over Dokdo and sees no reason why she should seek the verification of such rights before any international court. . . . Dokdo was the first Korean territory which fell victim to the Japanese aggression. Now, in view of the unreasonable and persistent claim of the Japanese government over Dokdo, the Korean people are seriously concerned that Japan might be repeating the same course of aggression. To Korea, Dokdo is not merely a tiny island in the East Sea. It is the symbol of Korean sovereignty.” But this rhetoric provides no explanation. It is merely an insistence that despite the evident existence of a territorial dispute, Korea has no need to prove its claim because the island belongs to Korea: Takeshima is sovereign Korean territory, and that is it. If Korea wants to argue that Takeshima fell victim to Japanese invasion, Korea needs to prove that it had been a part of Korean territory prior to that. This question represents the true crux of the matter that we need to address.

1.3 Exercise of sovereignty

The Korean government argues that the Republic of Korea exercises territorial sovereignty over Takeshima. Following the establishment of the Syngman Rhee Line in 1952 (and the inclusion of Takeshima on the Korean side of the line), a battle of wills continued for a time, with Japan and Korea repeatedly erecting boundary markers on the island and these being repeatedly removed. Eventually, in 1954 Korea stationed armed personnel on the island. Korea subsequently built a

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\(^7\) See note 1.


number of structures on Takeshima, carried out surveys and drew up maps, and in recent years has constructed a wharf and heliport. In the pamphlet, Q15 of the Q&A section asks: “How is the Republic of Korea exercising its sovereignty over Dokdo?” The answer includes references to a police force stationed on the island, Korean military defense of the skies and waters around the island, the application of various laws and regulations, establishment and operation of a lighthouse and other government facilities, and Korean civilians residing on the island. Legally speaking, however, the crucial question concerns which country controlled the territory at time of the “critical date,” that is to say at the time when the dispute broke out (or became crystallized or became manifest at the government level). Korea’s actions were all taken after the dispute broke out (measures taken in an attempt to strengthen Korea’s legal position). They therefore do not represent evidence of effective occupation, and it is not possible to establish Korean sovereignty by such means (as long as the Japanese government continues to protest). In Takeshima, the Republic of Korea is occupying territory by military means, refusing a proposal for a judicial settlement, in the hope of establishing a fait accompli by de facto control.9

2. Geographical Recognition of Dokdo and Relevant Historical Evidence (pp.5–6)

A. Dokdo has been recognized geographically as a part of Ulleungdo. (p. 5)

On a clear day, Dokdo is visible to the naked eye from Ulleungdo (Ulleung Island), the island which lies in closest proximity (87.4 km) to Dokdo. Given its geographical location, Dokdo has historically been considered to be a part of Ulleungdo.

This is well evidenced in early Korean documents. For instance, the Joseon (Korean) government publication *Sejong Sillok Jiriji* (Geography Section of the Annals of King Sejong’s Reign) (1454), which provides a geographical record of Korean territory, states, “Usan [Dokdo] / Mureung [Ulleungdo] . . . The two islands are not far apart from each other and thus visible on a clear day.”

While there are numerous adjacent islands surrounding Ulleungdo, Dokdo is the only one visible to the naked eye from Ulleungdo on a clear day.

2.1 Records in early Korean documents (Part 1)

The Korean government claims that Takeshima has long been regarded as “geographically” part of Ulleungdo, and that from its geographical characteristics, Takeshima has been recognized “historically” as part of Ulleungdo. The geographical characteristics cited are the fact that the closest place to Takeshima is the Korean island of Ulleungdo (87.4 km away), and the fact that Takeshima can be seen from Ulleungdo on a clear day. However, this is given not as a reason why Takeshima is “geographically part of Ulleungdo,” but as part of the background to the claim that in early Korean documents Takeshima appears under the name Usan together with Ulleungdo (in other words that it was historically regarded as part of Ulleungdo). The following paragraphs look more closely at whether the historical record as it exists in early Korean documents actually supports the Korean government’s claims.

9 For a recent study on the critical date issue, see Masahiro Miyoshi, “The ‘Critical Date’ of the Takeshima Dispute,” *Review of Island Studies*, 3-2 (April 2014), pp. 28–49. [Note: This study is available online in English. See note 3.] In recent decisions, for example in the case between Indonesia and Malaysia regarding sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, the ICJ in the judgment of December 17, 2002 did not accept Malaysia’s recent development of tourist resorts on Sipadan as constituting evidence of sovereignty. Case concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 625–686, in particular, paras. 130–145, pp. 679–684. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/102/7714.pdf
One of the documents the Korean government cites is *Seso Jitsuroku Chiri-shi* (the *Sejong Sillok Jiriji* (Geography Section of the Annals of King Sejong's Reign)) (1454), which it claims says: “Usan (Dokdo) / Mureung (Ulleungdo). The two islands are not far apart from each other and thus visible on a clear day.” The original text says simply that “Usan, Mureung. The two islands are situated in the sea directly east of the prefecture. They are not far apart, and on clear days with wind, they are visible. During the Silla period this was called Usan-guk. It is also called Ulleungdo.”

The first thing we should note here is that the place name Dokdo first occurs in the 20th century, and the *Sejong Sillok Jiriji*, a text compiled in the 15th century, does not make mention of a place called “Usan (Dokdo).” The identification of Usan with Dokdo (Takeshima) is merely the interpretation of the Korean government. This interpretation seems to be based on the following argument. 1. It is built on the premise that the two islands situated in the sea to the east of the “prefecture” mentioned in the text, i.e. Uljin Prefecture of Gangwon Province, are Ulleungdo and “Dokdo,” and that therefore the “two islands of Usan and Mureung” must refer to these two islands. 2. *Shinzo togoku yochi shoran* (*The Sinjeung Dongguk Yeoji Seungnam* (Revised and Augmented Edition of the Survey of Geography of Korea)) (1531) records that Ulleungdo is also called Mureung [Q1 in the Q&A section of the pamphlet]; this means that the other island (Usan) must be Dokdo. 3. There are numerous adjacent small islands in the surrounding vicinity of Ulleungdo, but Dokdo is the only one of these that can be seen only on clear days (the other surrounding islands are much closer and can therefore be seen discerned even when the weather is not clear) [Pamphlet 2-A]. 4. In *Togoku bunken biko* (*the Dongguk Munheon Bigo* (Reference Compilation of Documents on Korea)) (1770) and other documents, it is recorded that Usan is what Japan refers to as Matsushima [Pamphlet 2-B].

However, this interpretation is problematic for a number of reasons. The claim made in point 1 that Ulleungdo and Takeshima are situated in the Sea of Japan is based on today’s more precise and detailed geographical information. As for the record in the *Sinjeung Dongguk Yeoji Seungnam*, saying “Usando/Ulleungdo: Also called Mureung or Ureung, the two islands are located in the middle of the sea due east of the prefecture,” in point 2, this is followed by another sentence that says “on a clear day when there is wind, the trees on the mountain peaks and the shores at the foot of the mountains can be clearly seen; with a following wind it can be reached in two days. Some people say that Usan and Ulleung are the same one island. The area is 100 ri square (100 ri was approximately 40 kilometers).”

The trees on the mountains and the beaches below them can be seen on a sunny day. In other words, this text is saying that Ulleungdo can be seen from the mainland of the prefecture (the Korean Peninsula), and not that Takeshima can be seen from Ulleungdo. (Takeshima is a rocky island where no trees grow.) Under the heading “Usando/Ulleungdo” in the *Sinjeung Dongguk Yeoji Seungnam*, only Ulleungdo is mentioned. There is no information about Usando, and this is why there is an explanation that some people argue that Usan and Ulleung are originally one island. This makes it quite possible that the Usan mentioned in the *Sejong Sillok Jiriji* is also a reference to Ulleungdo (the same island with a different name). Point 3 follows from an assumption based on points 1 and 2 that Usan is the place now known as Dokdo. We therefore need to consider the possibility that the reference in the *Sejong Sillok Jiriji* to visibility is a reference not to Usan’s being visible from Mureung but to the distance from the

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prefecture.\textsuperscript{12} I will consider point 4 later on in this paper, in Section 2.3.

And even if we did read the lines in the \textit{Sejong Sillok Jiriji} as saying that Usan and Mureung are not far apart and that one can be seen from the other, and even if we accepted the premise that Usan is indeed Takeshima, we should remember that simple proximity itself does not constitute evidence to support claims of sovereignty. The arbitration award of the Island of Palmas case rejected geographical proximity as evidence for a territorial sovereignty claim.\textsuperscript{13} In the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, the ICJ decided that since the island of Meanguera was part of the sovereign territory of El Salvador, the small islet adjacent to it was also part of the same country's sovereign territory as a dependency of the larger island.\textsuperscript{14} But it is not possible to regard Takeshima, 87.4 km distant, as part of Ulleungdo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Korean government publications record that Korea has long recognized Dokdo as Korean territory and exercised effective control over the island. (p. 6)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the Joseon (Korean) government publication \textit{Sejong Sillok Jiriji} (Geography Section of the Annals of King Sejong's Reign), 1454, it is recorded that Ulleungdo (Mureung) and Dokdo (Usan) are two islands that are part of Joseon's Uijinhyeon (Uijin prefecture). It is also recorded that the two islands had been territories of Usan-guk (Usan State), which was subjugated to Silla (former kingdom of Korea) in the early 6th century (AD 512), indicating that Korea's effective control over Dokdo dates back to the Silla period. Consistent records pertaining to Dokdo are also found in other government publications, including \textit{Sinjeung Dongguk Yeoji Seungnam} (Revised and Augmented Survey of the Geography of Korea), 1531; \textit{Dongguk Munheon Bigo} (Reference Compilation of Documents on Korea), 1770; \textit{Man‘gi Yoram} (Manual of State Affairs for the Monarch), 1808; and \textit{Jeungbo Munheon Bigo} (Revised and Augmented Reference Compilation of Documents on Korea), 1908. Particularly noteworthy is the record in the volume “Yeojigo” in \textit{Dongguk Munheon Bigo} (Reference Compilation of Documents on Korea), 1770, which states, “Ulleung [Ulleungdo] and Usan [Dokdo] are both territories of Usan-guk [Usan State], and Usan [Dokdo] is what Japan refers to as Matsushima [the old Japanese name for Dokdo].” This passage makes it evident that Usando is the present-day Dokdo and that it is Korean territory.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

\textbf{2.2 Records in early Korean documents (Part 2)}

The Korean government claims that the \textit{Sejong Sillok Jiriji} (1454) says that “Ulleungdo (Mureung)

\textsuperscript{12} See the explanation of the concept of “\textit{kishiki (kyusik)}” by Professor Masao Shimojo. See Masao Shimojo, \textit{Takeshima wa nikkan dochira no mono ka} [Is Takeshima Japanese or Korean?] (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2004) (Bunshun Shinsho 377), pp. 162–166. \textit{Kishiki} is a set of rules for compiling geographic records that was issued to provinces by the central government, and has been passed down to the present recorded in books such as the \textit{Gyeongsangdo sokchan jiriji} (Renewed compilation of geography of Gyeongsangdo Province). \textit{Kishiki} is quoted in the preface of this book, which reads: the description of oceanic islands shall include their location, meaning the direction from the principal city of the prefecture and distance along the sailing route; their area, including the distance around the island; and the area of their fields, population, and other factors. (Reprinted by the Government General of Korea, \textit{Keishodo chirishi / Keishodo zokusen chirishi} [Compilation of geography of Gyeongsangdo Province and Renewed compilation of Geography of Gyeongsangdo Province] (1938).

\textsuperscript{13} Island of Palmas case (Netherlands, USA), April 4, 1928, \textit{Reports of International Arbitral Awards}, Vol. 2, pp. 829–871, in particular, p. 854. Reports can be consulted on the UN website (http://legal.un.org/riaa/).

and Dokdo (Usan) are two islands that are part of Joseon’s Uljinhyeon (Uljin prefecture),” and that “it is also recorded that the two islands had been territories of Usan-guk (Usan State), which was subjugated to Silla (former kingdom of Korea) in the early 6th century (AD 512), indicating that Korea’s effective control over Dokdo dates back to the Silla period.” However, as I have explained in Section 2.1 above, the original text makes no mention of the name of Dokdo, merely saying that: “The two islands of Usan and Mureung are situated in the sea directly east of the prefecture. They are not far apart, and on clear days with wind, they are visible. During the Silla period [this was] called Usan-guk. [It is] also called Ulleungdo.” The equivalence between Usan and Dokdo (Takeshima) is merely the interpretation of the Korean government. As I have said, this interpretation falls apart as a result of the record in the Sinjeung Dongguk Yeoji Seungnam, and it is likely that Usan is Ulleungdo (different in name only). Here, I will consider the contention that in the Sejong Sillok Jiriji, “it is also recorded that the two islands had been territories of Usan-guk (Usan State), which was subjugated to Silla (former kingdom of Korea) in the early 6th century (AD 512).”

In the original text of the Sejong Sillok Jiriji, there is nothing that corresponds to this claim. This interpretation takes the single line of text reading “during the Silla period [this was] called Usan-guk,” and interprets the subject of this sentence to be “the two islands of Usan and Mureung” (based on the premise that Usan is Takeshima and that Mureung is Ulleungdo). Then, this interpretation reinterprets the note that “during the Silla period [this was] called Usan-guk” to mean that two islands belonged to Usan-guk territory at that time. However, there is a source for this line in Sangoku shiki (the Sejong Sillok Jiriji: a line in the Samguk Sagi (History of the Three Kingdoms)) (1145), in Shiragi hongi (the Silla Hongi (History of Silla)), Part 4, Year 13 of the reign of King Ijjeung, where it says, “Usan-guk is on an island in the sea to the east of Myeongju, another name is Ulleungdo, the area is 100 ri square.” In other words, the text says that in the Silla period Usan-guk was on the island of Ulleungdo (Usan-guk = Ulleungdo), and not that Ulleungdo and Usando together were called Usan-guk. It is certainly not possible to read this line to mean that Ulleungdo and Dokdo were territory belonging to Usan-guk. In fact, this is something that appears in the Dongguk Munheon Bigo (Reference Compilation of Documents on Korea) (1770), a later document mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 2-B of the pamphlet (see Section 2.3 below), and is not something that is recorded in the Sejong Sillok Jiriji.

2.3 Records in early Korean documents (Part 3)
The Korean government claims that “consistent records pertaining to Dokdo are also found in other government publications, including Sinjeung Dongguk Yeoji Seungnam (Revised and Augmented Survey of the Geography of Korea), 1531; Dongguk Munheon Bigo (Reference Compilation of Documents on Korea), 1770; Man’gi Yoram (Manual of State Affairs for the Monarch), 1808; and Jeungbo Munheon Bigo (Revised and Augmented Reference Compilation of Documents on Korea), 1908.” It mentions as particularly noteworthy a mention in the Dongguk Munheon Bigo and other sources that: “Ulleung [Ulleungdo] and Usan [Dokdo] are both territories of Usan-guk [Usan State], and Usan [Dokdo] is what Japan refers to as Matsushima.” Let us consider this mention in the Dongguk Munheon Bigo (and the same sentence in Manki yoran (Man’gi Yoram); Q1 in the pamphlet’s Q&A section). Zoho bunken biko (The Jeungbo Munheon Bigo) is a 20th-century source, and it only says, “Usando and Ulleungdo . . . Of these two islands, one is Usan. They have now become Uldo-gun (Q1 in the pamphlet’s Q&A section).”

The original text of the Dongguk Munheon Bigo reads: “In the second year of the reign of Seongjong, there was a person who gave a report of an island called Sambongdo. Park Jong-
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won was sent to go and inspect, but the seas were rough and he was not able to reach the island. One of his boats stopped at Ulleungdo and collected samples of large bamboo and abalone. They reported to the king that the island was uninhabited. (Interpolated note) According to Yochishi (the Yeojiji), it is said that Ulleung and Usan are both lands in Usan-guk and Usan is what the Japanese refer to as Matsushima. In the seventh year of the reign of Gwanghaegun . . .

This document too makes no mention of ‘Usan (Dokdo).’ Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea uses this line as evidence to support its following argument. 1. The document records that “Usan is what the Japanese refer to as Matsushima.” Matsushima was a name used in Japan during the Edo period to refer to Dokdo (Takeshima). Therefore, Usan equals Dokdo. 2. It is also said that Ulleung and Usan (Usando) are both lands in Usan-guk.

Claim 1 depends on Shukuso jitsuroku (the Sukjong Sillok (Annals of King Sukjong’s Reign)) (1728), which recorded the narrative of An Yong-bok, a key figure during the Genroku Takeshima Incident (known in Korea as the Ulleungdo Dispute). (For a detailed discussion on the Genroku Takeshima Incident, see Section 3.1 below.) In the Edo period Ulleungdo was known in Japan as Takeshima, and during the 17th century the Oya and Murakawa families of Yonago were granted permission by the shogunate for many years to carry out abalone fishing and other activities on the island.17 When retainers of the Oya household visited Ulleungdo (traditionally Takeshima) in 1693, they encountered Korean fishermen on the island, and took two of them back to Japan as hostages (to explain why they had not been able to gather abalone as planned). The two Koreans (one of whom was An Yong-bok) spent time at the Oya family residence, then moved to Tottori, Nagasaki, and Tsushima before eventually being returned home. With this event, diplomatic negotiations began between Japan and Korea regarding fishing in Takeshima (Ulleungdo). After a series of twists and turns, during the first month of the ninth year of Genroku (1696) the shogunate eventually placed a prohibition on the Oya and Murakawa families traveling to Ulleungdo. Meanwhile, in 1696, An Yong-bok, who had been brought to Japan as a hostage in 1693, returned to the Tottori domain, this time by his own volition. Following his return to Korea, An Yong-bok was interrogated by the Bibyeonsa, a government body. The account he gave at that time is recorded in the Sukjong Sillok as follows:18

The Bibyeonsa interrogated An Yong-bok, who said that [when he went to Ulleungdo], “Many Japanese ships were moored there. My companions were afraid, but I yelled at them, saying ‘Ulleungdo belongs to Korea. Why do you Japanese dare cross the border and intrude into foreign territory? We’ll have you arrested.’ The Japanese replied that they lived on Matsushima and had just happened to be on the island for fishing, adding they were now heading back home. I retorted, ‘Matsushima is Jasando and it, too, belongs to Korea. How dare you live there?’”

An Yong-bok said that he chased the Japanese and proceeded via Oki to Tottori, where he had negotiations. His story of having shouted at the Japanese fishermen is a fabrication because no Japanese fishermen sailed to Ulleungdo that year. But nonetheless, that An Yong-bok recognized Matsushima as Jasando, and that he traveled to Japan and made an appeal of some kinds are true. However, the same document (Sukjong Sillok) tells us that the Korean government of the time did not share his view of the islands, and did not endorse his conduct.19 According to this record,

16 The Dongguk Munheon Bigo (Yeojigo, Gwanbang, Haebang, Donghae, Uljin) can be consulted in facsimile (Seung Jung Jun edition) at the National Diet Library (request number W941-37).
Dongraebu official Yi Sejae said to the king that an emissary from Tsushima is asking whether a person who crossed over to make an appeal last year did so on orders from the Court. Yi Sejae said, “If there is something we need to say, we will dispatch an interpreter to Edo; we have no reason to send a noisy fisherman.” The Bibyeonsa official emphasized: “The Court has nothing to do with the actions of a foolish commoner who has drifted ashore.” After this discussion of the reply that ought to be given to the Tsushima envoy, the king gave his approval.

Research by Professor Masao Shimojo (Takushoku University) has shown that the interpolated note in the Dongguk Munheon Bigo, which records that “Ulleung and Usan (Usando) are both lands in Usan-guk” (Claim 2), was originally copied from an explanatory note (opinion of the author) found in another text. According to Professor Shimojo, in Shin Gyeong-jun’s Kyokai ko (Ganggyego (Study of national boundaries)) (1756), it says: “I believe in the Yeojiji it says that according to one theory Usan and Ulleung were originally one island. However, considering various charts, it should be two islands. One of these must therefore be the one known as Matsushima, while both islands probably belong to Usan-guk.” In the Dongguk Munheon Bigo, this part, which the author of the Ganggyego clearly notes is his personal opinion, was added as an interpolated note. This note claims that: “According to the Yeojiji, it is said that Ulleung and Usan are both lands in Usan-guk and Usan is what the Japanese refer to as Matsushima.” But this contradicts the original source of the note.

An Yong-bok thought that “Matsushima is Jasando,” presumably because he had formed an association in his mind between the information he obtained about Matsushima during his time at the Oya residence in Japan in 1693 and the traditional mentions of Usan in Korea (though An Yong-bok called the island Jasando rather than Usan). He stated this view to the Bibyeonsa, but the Korean government considered his actions and statements those of a foolish commoner and denied any responsibility for them. In later years, based on the record of An Yong-bok’s account in the Sukjong Sillok, it came to be written that “Ulleung and Usan are both lands in Usan-guk and Usan is what the Japanese refer to as Matsushima.” But this was originally a note that was nothing more than the personal view of the editor of an old text. Therefore, the record in the Dongguk Munheon Bigo (1770) cannot be used as evidence that Takeshima was Korean territory at the time (i.e. in the 18th century). It goes without saying that it is not possible to claim on the same basis that the Usan (Usando) mentioned in older documents such as the Sinjeung Dongguk Yeoji Seungnam (16th century) and the Sejong Sillok Jiriji (15th century) referred to Takeshima, or still less to claim that Korea’s exercise of control over Takeshima can be traced back to the Silla period because Usan-guk swore allegiance to Silla.

3 The Ulleungdo Dispute between Korea and Japan and Confirmation of Korea’s Sovereignty over Dokdo (pp. 7–8)

A. Korea’s territorial sovereignty over Ulleungdo and its ancillary, Dokdo, was confirmed through the diplomatic negotiations between the Korean and Japanese governments

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20 The same message was also conveyed in a written message from Yi Seon-bak, Deputy Vice-Minister for Protocol, to the daimyo of Tsushima. “As for the man who drifted ashore last year, coastal residents use boats for a living and they may be carried over the border into your country should they meet strong winds. If the man made an appeal, he should be charged with the crime of fabrication.” Takeshima kiji [Records of Takeshima], vol. 5, available in (Dai ikki) Saishu hokokusho, shiryo hen [Final report of the research study on the Takeshima issue (first series), Document part], published by the Takeshima Mondai Kenkyukai of Shimane Prefecture (2007), p. 213. This report can be viewed on the website run by Shimane Prefecture (Web Takeshima Issue Research) at http://www.pref.shimane.lg.jp/admin/pref/takeshima/web-takeshima/takeshima04/

21 Masao Shimojo, op. cit., pp. 100–103 (see note 12).
(Ulleungdo Dispute) in the 17th century. (p.7)
In the 17th century, while illegally fishing on Ulleungdo, a territory of Joseon (Korea), the Oya
and Murakawa families of the Tottori-han (feudal clan of Tottori) of Japan had a run-in with
Korean fishermen, one of which was An Yong-bok, in 1693.
The two Japanese families petitioned the Japanese government (Edo shogunate) to prohibit
Koreans’ passage to Ulleungdo. The Edo shogunate ordered Tsushima to negotiate with the
Joseon government. Thus began the negotiations between the two countries, which is known
as the “Ulleungdo Dispute.”
The Edo shogunate sent an inquiry to the Tottori-han on December 25, 1695. Upon receiving
a reply that neither Takeshima (Ulleungdo) nor Matsushima (Dokdo) belonged to the Tottori-
han, the Edo shogunate issued a directive on January 28, 1696, prohibiting all Japanese from
making passage towards Ulleungdo.
The dispute between Korea and Japan thus came to a close. Through the Ulleungdo Dispute,
Ulleungdo and Dokdo were confirmed to be Korean territory.

3.1 The Genroku Takeshima Incident

The Korean government claims that the negotiations between the two governments in the 17th
century (the Genroku Takeshima Incident, or the Ulleungdo Dispute as it is known in Korea)
led to a recognition that Ulleungdo and its ancillary island Dokdo (i.e. Takeshima) were Korean
territory. The pamphlet claims that the shogunate made inquiries to the Tottori domain and
confirmed that Matsushima (present-day Takeshima) did not belong to the Tottori domain, and
thereafter prohibited all Japanese from “making passage towards Ulleungdo.” The negotiations
between the two governments in the 17th century were sparked by the fishing dispute in
Ulleungdo mentioned in Section 2.3 above. In 1693, the Oya family of Yonago brought back
two Korean fishermen from Ulleungdo, known as Takeshima in Japan at the time, as proof that
they had not been able to fish for abalone. After these men were sent back to Korea through
Tsushima, the Tsushima domain, having received orders from the shogunate, issued a request
to Korea to put a stop to Korean fishermen’s traveling to “Takeshima” for fishing. The Korean
government replied that Takeshima was Ulleungdo, and that since Ulleungdo was listed with its
produce in the Dongguk Yeoji Seungnam (Survey of Geography of Korea), the island belonged
to Korea. In 1695, Tsushima proposed to the shogunate that it should wind up the negotiations.
The shogunate asked the Ikeda family of the Tottori domain, which governed the two provinces
of Inaba and Hoki, to provide information on the question of when “Takeshima” had become
attached to these two provinces. In its response, there was the view of Tottori domain that
Takeshima or Matsushima did not belong to either Inaba or Hoki. Following this, in 1696 the
shogunate ordered the Tottori domain to place a prohibition banning the Oya and Murakawa
families from traveling to “Takeshima” for fishing, and instructed Tsushima to inform Korea of
this decision. The statement that was passed to the Korean envoy in Tsushima was as follows.23

Several years ago, Governor of Tsushima made a request regarding “Takeshima” by
sending an envoy to your country. The envoy told us what had been conveyed to him by
your representative when he came back to this country. I explained the content of what

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22 For the development of this case, see Kenzo Kawakami, op. cit. (see note 17). For more detail, see
Takeshima kiji, vols. 1–5, op. cit. (see note 20).

23 Takeshima kiji, vol. 4, available in (Dai iki) Saishu hokokusho, shiryo hen, published by the Takeshima
Mondai Kenkyukai, op. cit., p. 83 (see note 20).
I had heard to the member of the council of elders in Edo. That island does not belong to Inaba or Hoki; we did not make it Japanese; people from Hoki merely travel there for fishing because it is an uninhabited island. However, in recent years Koreans have traveled to the island and fishermen from the two countries confront each other. This is the reason why we sent the message. Now, the Edo government says the island is close to Korea and far from Hoki, so it will issue an order that no fishermen from this country should travel to the island. In view of this, you should be grateful to the shogunate for its sincerity.

The first thing to note is that there is no record of any discussion having taken place on the subject of present-day Takeshima (Dokdo) during the negotiations with Korea that were conducted via the So daimyo family of Tsushima. The statement to the Korean envoy quoted above also makes no mention of present-day Takeshima (The “Takeshima” mentioned in the message was the name used in Japan during the Edo period for Ulleungdo). No dispute existed over present-day Takeshima at that time, not least because the Korean side had no awareness of today’s Takeshima at the time. Usan is not the island known today as Takeshima (See my argument in Section 2 above). There are no records in Korea of Koreans traveling to and landing on present-day Takeshima. (For travelers from Japan, Matsushima (present-day Takeshima) was on the route toward the island traditionally known as Takeshima, but for Koreans there would have been no reason to travel beyond Ulleungdo to land on a bare rocky islet. The only person who may possibly have visited the island is An Yong-bok.) The Korean government goes on to say that through the Ulleungdo Dispute, Ulleungdo and “its ancillary”, Dokdo, were confirmed to be Korean territory, and that the shogunate issued a directive prohibiting all Japanese from making passage “towards” Ulleungdo. But as we have seen, the argument that Takeshima (Dokdo) is an ancillary dependency of Ulleungdo does not stand up, either on the grounds of “proximity” or on the grounds that certain historical documents supposedly say that “Ulleung and Usan are both lands in Usan-guk” (see Sections 2.1 and 2.3). Also, in the statement quoted above, the shogunate places its prohibition on travel to the island because “in recent years Koreans have traveled to the island” and because it is worried that trouble might arise when “fishermen from the two countries confront each other.” No such problems arose regarding present-day Takeshima, and the island to which travel is prohibited must therefore be the island traditionally known as Takeshima (Ulleungdo); it is not possible to read the prohibition on “passage towards Ulleungdo” to include today’s Takeshima.

The Korean government claims that the shogunate sent “an inquiry to the Tottori-han” and received “a reply that neither Takeshima (Ulleungdo) nor Matsushima (Dokdo) belonged to the Tottori-han.” It is true that Masatake Abe, Lord of Bungo and one of the members of the shogun’s council of elders, wrote to the Tottori domain’s official residence in Edo on the 24th day of the 12th month, the eighth year of Genroku (January 27, 1696 in the Western calendar) to ask “when the appertaining island of Takeshima of the Inaba and Hoki provinces became a part of either of these two provinces,” and whether “any other islands besides Takeshima are attached to these provinces.” The following day, Heima Yoshida, the representative of Tottori domain in Edo, replied to say that “Takeshima does not belong to either Inaba or Hoki,” and that “Takeshima, Matsushima, and other islands do not belong to either province.”24 However, even if the shogunate did place a prohibition on travel to “Takeshima” (traditional Takeshima, Ulleungdo) after receiving information that Matsushima (present-day Takeshima) did not belong to either Inaba or Hoki, this would not mean that the shogunate had acknowledged that

24 Letters 2 and 3 included in Takeshima no kakitsuke [Documents concerning Takeshima], now stored at the Tottori Prefectural Museum. Images of the correspondence are available in section (3), “Tottori hansei shiryo” [Documents on Tottori domain administration], of (Dai ikki) Saishu hokokusho, shiryo hen, published by the Takeshima Mondai Kenkyukai. See note 20.
Matsushima (present-day Takeshima) was Korean territory, or that it had handed over the island to Korea. In the case contesting the legal status of Eastern Greenland, the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled on April 5, 1933, in favor of Denmark, which had claimed sovereignty over the whole of Greenland and had sued Norway for occupying and claiming parts of Eastern Greenland as *terra nullius*. One factor that led to the judgment was a remark by the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs that “the Norwegian Government would not make any difficulties in the settlement of this question” in reply to a question by a Danish diplomatic representative, as Denmark sought to extend its political and economic interests throughout Greenland. In a dispute between Singapore and Malaysia regarding the sovereignty over the island of Pedra Branca (Malay name Pulau Batu Puteh) and other nearby islands in the Singapore Straits, the fact that the Acting State Secretary of Johor (now part of Malaysia) had previously written in reply that “the Johore Government does not claim ownership of Pedra Branca” was one of the reasons for the ICJ’s decision in favor of Singapore. Clear statements of position made to another country can therefore come to have great significance. As I have repeatedly shown, however, Japan’s statement to Korea in 1696 merely said that because encounters between fishermen from the two countries around the island traditionally known as Takeshima (the name in Japan at the time for Ulleungdo) were becoming a problem, Japan would henceforth order its fishermen not to travel to the island. The statement makes no reference to the island known as Takeshima today. The statement of the Korean Court that they did not endorse or take responsibility for the conduct and statement of An Yong-bok (see Section 2.3 above) is surely more significant in this regard.

**Addendum**

Recently Satoshi Ikeuchi, a Japanese scholar, has revealed the existence of an old document (*Murakawa ke bunsho* (Murakawa family document), stored at the Yonago City Library) that suggests that the shogunate’s ban on sea travel for fishermen in 1696 actually did apply to both traditional Takeshima and Matsushima (present-day Takeshima). (The paper in question is “Kokkyo miman” [Something Short of a National Border], *Nihonshi kenkyu* [Journal of Japanese history], no. 630 (February 2015), pp. 4–23, in particular pp. 16–18.) The ban on sea travel to Takeshima and Matsushima mentioned in this document did not constitute a statement to a foreign country and therefore does not materially affect my argument here. Nevertheless, this is an important document and I will make a few brief comments.

The document in question concerns a record whose title can be translated as “Petition to Edo during the fifth month of the first year of Enkyo [1744]: Kyuemon Oya, a merchant of Yonago, in the province of Hoki” (*Murakawa ke bunsho*, folios 43–55). In this document, the phrase “since the ban was passed on sailing to Takeshima and Matsushima” (or similar) occurs three times. The first deals with when Kyuemon Oya (the seventh Kyuemon, Katsufusa) petitioned the Jisha-bugyo (magistrate of temples and shrines) in the fourth month of the fifth year of Genbun (1740) (folio 44), the second when he submitted a petition to the Kanjo-bugyo (commissioner of finance) in the second month of the sixth year of Genbun (1741) (folio 50), the third involved his petition to the Nagasaki-bugyo magistrate in the sixth month of the first year of Kanpo (1741) (folio 54). In the second and third instances, the phrase in question was contained in the words of Kyuemon Oya (Katsufusa), and therefore it reflects the Oya family’s understanding of the situation. Ikeuchi’s paper argues that in the first instance, the phrase was included in the words of the Jisha-bugyo,

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Tadasuke Ooka, Lord of Echizen, (in the form of a question to Kyuemon Oya), and therefore
it represents the opinion of the shogunate. But the original text can be read as follows. “Next,
he asked: It is written in the petition that since the ban was passed on sailing to Takeshima and
Matsushima, the castle lord of Yonago in Hakushu has taken pity on you, and you now rely on
him for your living. Does this mean you receive a stipend?” In other words, the phrase “the ban
was passed on sailing to Takeshima and Matsushima” could be a quotation from the petition
submitted by Kyuemon Oya. If this is the case, then this too reflects the understanding not of the
shogunate but of the Oya family. Folio 51 of the Murakawa family documents says: “In the eighth
year of Genroku, a letter from the king of Korea saying that Takeshima [Ulleungdo] has been
controlled by Japan since ancient times was received during the time of Joken-in, the late shogun
Tsunayoshi.”27 Another reference is found in Takeshima tokai yuraiki nukigaki (Extract from an
account of a voyage to Takeshima), which is related to the Oya family documents, in the Okajima
family papers in the archives of the Tottori Prefectural Museum, where it is written: “Having
received this official communication from the governor of Hoki, we have regrettably accepted the
ban on travel by sea to Takeshima. This case began some time ago after the Korean man who had
been brought here from the island was sent back to his country, at which time communications
were received from Korea eagerly insisting that Takeshima [Ulleungdo] was Korean land. But [after
negotiations] an understanding was reached and an official communication was received from
the king of Korea admitting that Takeshima [Ulleungdo] has been controlled by Japan since long
ago. In this condition, the custody of the island was handed to Korea, and a ban on our traveling
by sea to Takeshima was imposed.”28 In other words, even if the Oya family recognized that the
ban had been passed on sailing to Takeshima and Matsushima, this recognition was based on the
understanding that the island traditionally known as Takeshima was under Japanese control.

B. Until Japan’s attempt at incorporating Dokdo in 1905 through Shimane Prefecture Public
Notice No. 40, the Japanese government itself had consistently acknowledged that Dokdo was
non-Japanese territory, as evidenced by the Dajokan Order of 1877 and other official Japanese
government documents. (p. 8)

Until the Meiji period (1868–1912), the Japanese government had consistently acknowledged
that Dokdo was non-Japanese territory ever since the Ulleungdo Dispute, through which it was
confirmed that Dokdo was Korean territory. This is corroborated by the absence of Japanese government documents citing Dokdo as
Japanese territory prior to Japan’s attempt to incorporate Dokdo in 1905 through Shimane
Prefecture Public Notice No. 40. Moreover, there are even official Japanese government
publications that plainly state that Dokdo is not Japanese territory.

Most significant is an 1877 directive issued to the Ministry of Home Affairs by the Dajokan
(Grand Council of State), Japan’s highest decision-making body during the Meiji period.
In it, the Dajokan determines that it was confirmed through the negotiations between the
old government [Edo shogunate] and the Joseon [Korean] government that the Ulleungdo
(Takeshima) and Dokdo (Matsushima) do not belong to Japan. Thus the Dajokan sent a
directive to the Ministry of Home Affairs stating as follows: “Regarding Takeshima [Ulleungdo]

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27 Almost the same is recorded in folio 65 of Oya-shi kyuki [Old records of the Oya clan], in the collection
of the Historiographical Institute of the University of Tokyo. “Fourth month of the fifth year of Genbun
Petition to the shogunate and documents regarding travel to Takeshima / a merchant of Yonago, in
the province of Hoki / Ichibei Murakawa / Masataro Oya,” Oya-shi kyuki, section 3, folios 55–71.

28 Transcription of Takeshima tokai yuraiki nukigaki by Yoichi Oshima, p. 4. Section (4), “Okajima ke
shiryo” [Okajima family documents], of Dai ikki Saishu hokokusho, shiryo hen, published by the
Takeshima Mondai Kenkyukai. See note 20.
and one other island [Dokdo] . . . bear in mind that our country [Japan] has nothing to do with them.” The [Meiji] Ministry of Home Affairs had attached Isotakeshima Ryakuzu (Simplified Map of Isotakeshima—Ulleungdo was referred to as Isotakeshima by Japan) as a reference in its inquiry to the Dajokan. Ulleungdo and Dokdo are shown together on the map, elucidating the fact that the “one other island” aforementioned in “Takeshima [Ulleungdo] and one other island” is Dokdo.

3.2 The Dajokan Order of 1877

The Korean government is of the view that in 1877 the Dajokan (Great Council of State) of Japan admitted that “it was confirmed through the negotiations between the old government [Edo shogunate] and the Joseon [Korean] government that the Ulleungdo (Takeshima) and Dokdo (Matsushima) do not belong to Japan,” and emphasizes that regarding “Takeshima [Ulleungdo] and one other island [Dokdo]” the Dajokan instructed the Home Ministry to “bear in mind that our country [Japan] has nothing to do with them.” This supposed directive issued refers to the following incident. In October 1876, Shimane Prefecture submitted an inquiry to the Home Ministry about the compilation of a land registry with regard to the island of Takeshima and another island in the Sea of Japan. In March 1877, the Ministry sent a request to the Dajokan, saying: “A request (attached) was submitted by Shimane Prefecture regarding the jurisdiction of Takeshima [Ulleungdo]. Having investigated the matter, it appears that since Koreans entered the island in the fifth year of Genroku [1692], as described in the summary on the documents attached, it has been said that the island does not belong to our territory, as evidenced by the following sequence of events: 1. A decision was taken following deliberations of the former government in the first month of the ninth year of Genroku [1696], 2. A communication to that effect was delivered to an envoy, 3. A communication from the country in question [Korea] came, and 4. Written and verbal replies were given by this country . . . Nevertheless, since the treatment of territory is an important matter, I submit the relevant documents for your consideration and beg your opinion and confirmation on the matter.” In the same month, the Dajokan (Udaijin (the Minister of the Right)) gave instructions to instruct Shimane Prefecture that “regarding the inquiry, you may understand that Takeshima and the other island have no connection to our country.”

The Takeshima that is the subject of the inquiry from Shimane Prefecture is the island known by that name in the Edo period (Ulleungdo), and it is clear from the explanations and pictorial map attached to the letter that the other island mentioned is Matsushima. Shimane Prefecture’s intention to compile a land registry on Takeshima and another island as land belonging to the prefecture is based on the understanding of the Oya family already mentioned in the addendum to Section 3.1 above, which was that Takeshima (the island traditionally known by that name) was “controlled by Japan.” The explanatory notes attached to the inquiry contain similarly phrased claims to this effect, saying that “following deliberations within the shogunate, it granted fishing rights to Korea since a letter was submitted agreeing that the island was under Japanese control.” However, the Home Ministry decided that as a result of the Genroku Takeshima Incident, Takeshima (i.e. the island traditionally known by that name) had no connection to Japan. As quoted above, the Ministry noted that since it had received an inquiry from Shimane Prefecture regarding “the jurisdiction of Takeshima”, it had investigated the background to the affair, and decided that since Koreans entered the island in the fifth year of Genroku, it had been understood

29 For documents related to the incident, see “Nihonkai nai takeshima hoka itto chiseki hensan kata ukagai” [Inquiry regarding the land registration of Takeshima and another island in the Sea of Japan], Kobunroku [Records of the Meiji government], part 1 of the Home Ministry section (March 1877). The document can be consulted in the digital archive of the National Archives of Japan.
that the island did not belong to Japan. But it does not touch anywhere on “the other island” (that is to say Matsushima). Matsushima is also not mentioned in the documents attached to the inquiry submitted by the Home Ministry to the Dajokan. I have already explained that the island of Takeshima (present-day Takeshima, the island called Dokdo in Korea) was never the subject of discussions between the two countries during the Genroku era. That Korea nevertheless argues that it was confirmed through the ‘Ulleungdo Dispute’ that Ulleungdo and ‘Dokdo’ do not belong to Japan is presumably based on the shogunate’s decision to place a travel ban following the reply from Tottori domain to the effect that Takeshima and Matsushima did not belong to either Inaba or Hoki. It presumably also assumes that since Matsushima is shown on the pictorial map attached to the inquiry submitted by Shimane Prefecture, and since the documents along with the map sent by Shimane were also attached to the inquiry submitted by the Home Ministry to the Dajokan, the Dajokan’s directive that “Takeshima and the other island” had no connection to Japan naturally might refer to these two islands.

However, it is important to remember the circumstances in which the directive was issued. The Home Ministry asked the Dajokan for an executive decision to a query received from Shimane Prefecture. The directive therefore reflects an exchange of communications within government circles, including the government of Shimane Prefecture. With regard to the phrase “Takeshima and the other island” in the directive, it is possible, as I will explain below, that “the other island,” i.e. Matsushima, referred not to the island known by that name in the Edo period (present-day Takeshima) but to the island known as Matsushima in the Meiji era (present-day Ulleungdo). But even if we assume for now that the document was indeed referring to the island known as Takeshima today, this was not a declaration made to an external, international audience. Neither was it widely distributed within Japan. Accordingly, nothing said in this directive creates any difficulty in terms of the government’s deciding to adopt a different position at a later date. In this respect, it differs fundamentally from the statement given by the Norwegian foreign minister regarding Greenland and the reply given by the acting state secretary of Johor regarding the status of Pedra Branca (discussed in Section 3.1 above).

As it happens, on March 1, 1883, the Dajokan (Dajodaijin (the head of the Dajokan)) issued a directive to the Home Ministry (the Home Minister) as follows.30 “Regarding the island located at 37 degrees 30 minutes north and 130 degrees 49 minutes east, with the Japanese name Matsushima (also known as Takeshima), the Korean name Ulleungdo, a preexisting agreement exists between the former government of Japan and the government of Korea, and nationals of Japan are prohibited from traveling to and landing on the island without proper authorization. The Home Ministry should tell local magistrates and governments in all regions to take steps to ensure that this is widely known and understood. We hereby notify you of this matter through internal organization.”

This directive specifically refers to “an island called Matsushima or Takeshima in Japan and also called Ulleungdo in Korea”, and therefore makes clear that Matsushima is the Japanese name for Ulleungdo. At the time of this directive, therefore, it is clear which island is being discussed: an island, its location clearly specified in terms of latitude and longitude, known as Matsushima in Japan and Takeshima (the name traditionally known locally in Shimane) and as Ulleungdo in Korea. This was the island to which travel had been prohibited following diplomatic negotiations during the Edo period, and the directive now instructs the Home Minister to tell the prefectural governors to convey this to the people so that they do not sail to and land on the island without

30 “Chosenkoku shozoku utsuryoto e waga kokumin toko kinshi no ken” [Regarding a ban on our citizens traveling to Ulleungdo, belonging to Korea], Kobunroku, vol. 13 (1883), Ministry of Foreign Affairs section for March–April, 1883. This document can be viewed on the digital archive of the National Archives of Japan. (The quoted extract is from frame 21.)
permission. After receiving the directive, the Home Ministry then passed on the contents of the directive to the prefectures. The directive of 1883 was intended to be conveyed to the entire country, and therefore carries a greater weight than the directive issued by the Dajokan (Minister of the Right) in 1877. Also, the directive of 1877 was issued in response to an individual inquiry, and was not a legal decree. But both directives were issued by the Dajokan to the Home Ministry; if there is any discrepancy in their content, therefore, the directive of 1883 overrides that of 1877 on the principle of “lex posterior derogat priori” (a later law “repeals” an earlier law).

It was under the influence of Western maps that Ulleungdo came to be known as Matsushima in Japan during the Meiji era. On Western maps, Ulleungdo was shown as “Dagelet Island/Matsushima”—with another, imaginary Ulleungdo often depicted to the west of Dagelet Island. This fictional island was called “Argonaut Island/Takashima”, while today’s Takeshima was marked as “Liancourt Rocks” or “Hornet Rocks”. Western maps entered Japan in considerable numbers during the final years of the Edo period and around the time of the Meiji Restoration, and before long maps showing Ulleungdo as Matsushima were being produced in Japan. A classic example is Kaishu Katsu’s “Dai nihon koku enkai ryakuzu (Concise map showing the coastal areas of Great Japan)”, published in 1867. The map is now to be found in the Cabinet Library (Naikaku bunko) of the National Archives of Japan (request number 178-0064), where its catalogue records show that it was previously owned by the Topography Department of the Dajokan Seiin (the head office of the Grand Council of State), the Topography Department of the Geographical Bureau, and the Geographical Bureau of the Home Ministry. The map is stamped with the ownership seal of the Topography Department of the Dajokan Seiin, but with or without a seal, the map is a printed publication that is likely to have been widely referred to at the time. Western maps in the Cabinet Library of the National Archives of Japan that carry a seal identifying them as having come from the collections of the Dajokan include, [Black’s] General Atlas of the World (1870) (request number E006776), Map 34 China, 1871 ed. (E000722), Map 34 China, 1873 ed. (E000710), Map 34A Japan (it shows Argonaut Is. and Dagelet Is. in the 1870 and 1871 editions, and in the 1873 edition just the dotted outline of the island marked as Argonaut, Matsu Sima (Dagelet I.), and Hornet Is.), and The Royal Atlas of Modern Geography (1876), Map 34 China and Japan (Argonaut dotted, Dagelet or Matsusima).

As a rule, when confronted with an unfamiliar place name, the first resource to which people turn is maps. The people responsible in the Home Ministry and the Dajokan would naturally have carefully consulted “Takeshima kiji”, which is the records of the Tsushima domain relating to the Genroku Takeshima Incident, and “Isotakeshima jiryaku (Isotakeshima oboegaki)”, which is essentially a summary of the content of Takeshima kiji and mentions also the reply from Tottori domain to the effect that Takeshima and Matsushima do not belong to either Inaba or Hoki. But at the same time they surely also must have consulted Kaishu Katsu’s map and Western maps. And on these, what was shown as Matsushima was Ulleungdo. With regard to the directive of 1877, although the reference to “Takeshima and the other island” in the inquiry from Shimane Prefecture indeed referred to the island known as “Takeshima” in the Edo period (Ulleungdo) and “Matsushima” (present-day Takeshima), it is highly likely that the central authorities understood “the other island” to be the island known as “Matsushima” in the Meiji era (despite their separate names, in fact, both Takeshima and Matsushima referred to the island known today as Ulleungdo).

31 Ulleungdo came to be marked on Western maps as Matsushima with Siebold’s maps of Japan. Kenzo Kawakami, op. cit. (see note 17).

32 Isotakeshima jiryaku (Isotakeshima oboegaki) is also available in (Dai ikki) Saishu hokokusho, shiryo hen, published by the Takeshima Mondai Kenkyukai. See note 20.
4. The Empire of Korea’s Sovereignty over Dokdo and its Restoration (pp. 9–11)

A. Through Imperial Decree No. 41 in 1900, the Empire of Korea placed Dokdo under the jurisdiction of Uldo-gun (Uldo county), and Dokdo came to be administered by a county magistrate. (p.9)

On October 27, 1900, the Korean Empire issued Imperial Decree No. 41, proclaiming the renaming of Ulleungdo as Uldo and the promotion of the post of inspector to county magistrate. In the second article of the same decree, it is provided that “all of Ulleungdo as well as Jukdo and Seokdo [Dokdo] shall be placed under the jurisdiction of [Uldo-gun (Uldo county)].” On March 28, 1906, a Japanese survey team comprised of officials and civilians from the Shimane Prefecture visited County Magistrate Shim Heung-taek of Uldo-gun and notified that Dokdo had been incorporated into Japanese territory. Subsequently Shim Heung-taek submitted a report to the acting governor of Gangwon-do (Gangwon province) the very next day, on March 29, 1906. The phrase “Dokdo, which is under the jurisdiction of this county” in his report clearly demonstrates that Dokdo was indeed a part of Uldo-gun as per Imperial Decree No. 41 of 1900.

On April 29, 1906, Yi Myeong-rae, the county magistrate of Chuncheon-gun (Chuncheon County) and the acting governor of Gangwondo, reported the matter in the “Special Report” to the Uijeongbu (State Council of the Empire of Korea), Korea’s highest decision-making body at the time. Thereupon, on May 10, 1906, the Uijeongbu issued Directive No. 3, repudiating the claim that Dokdo had become Japanese territory. This clearly demonstrates the fact that the county magistrate of Uldo-gun had continued to govern Dokdo and exercised Korea’s territorial sovereignty over Dokdo pursuant to Imperial Decree No. 41 issued in 1900.

4.1 Korean Imperial Decree No. 41 (1900)
The Korean government argues that Imperial Decree No. 41, issued in 1900, states that “all of Ulleungdo as well as Jukdo and Seokdo [Dokdo]” shall be placed under the jurisdiction of Uldo-gun (Uldo county). However, the original text refers only to “Seokdo”, and it is just the Korean government’s insistence to connect this island to Dokdo (Takeshima). The pamphlet does not give any reason for assuming that Seokdo (which in Chinese characters means “stone island”) is equivalent to the island known as “Dokdo” in Korea today, but the Korean government has claimed that “in the dialect of Gyeongsang Province, ‘dok’ means ‘stone’ or ‘rock. ‘Dokto’ therefore means ‘stone or rock island,’ and this is the same as the pronunciation of the current name of Dokdo.” The argument, in other words, runs like this: The indigenous Korean word for “stone, rock” is “dol,” which in some dialects is pronounced as “dok.” And Takeshima is a rocky island without trees, and the pronunciation coincides with the official Korean name of Dokdo, which in Chinese characters means “solitary island.” But this is merely an explanation of the way of reading [pronunciation] of the island’s name, and it does not explain why the island cited in the Imperial Decree is Seokdo. After all, the Korean government has elsewhere insisted that Takeshima was traditionally known in Korea as “Usan (Usando).” In Section 2-B of the pamphlet, the Korean government cites the Jeungbo Munheon Bigo’ as one of its pieces of evidence for the contention that consistent records pertaining to Usando have existed throughout the years. This was published in 1908, eight years after Imperial Decree No. 41, and makes no mention of any

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33 See the Korean government’s response of September 9, 1953, to the Japanese government’s view on Dokdo (Takeshima) dated on July 13, 1953. See note 1. The Jukdo mentioned in Imperial Decree No. 40 (1900) is believed to be a separate small island located 2 km east of Ulleungdo (the island was marked as Chikusho in the marine charts produced by the Hydrographic Department of the Imperial Japanese Navy).
Next, the Korean government maintains that when a survey team from Shimane Prefecture visited Ulleungdo with news that Takeshima had been incorporated into Japanese territory, Uldogun County Magistrate Shim Heung-taek wrote a report to the acting governor of Gangwon-do that included the line “Dokdo, which is under the jurisdiction of this county” which the Korean government today interprets as having clearly demonstrated that Dokdo was a part of Uldogun as recorded in Imperial Decree No. 41 of 1900. Also, it claims that when the Uijeongbu (the top decision-making body in Korea) received the report from Gangwon-do, it promptly issued Directive No. 3 denying Japan’s claim to Dokdo (the Shim Heung-taek report and Directive No. 3, on Q10 of the Q&A section of the pamphlet). This 1906 report by Shim Heung-taek is the first occurrence of the name Dokdo in a Korean document. But in order to argue that the line in the Shim Heung-taek report clearly demonstrates that “Dokdo” was a part of Uldogun “as recorded in Imperial Decree No. 41”, it is necessary to explain why the county magistrate did not write Seokdo, “as recorded in Imperial Decree No. 41”, and why the Uijeongbu also did not use the same name (Seokdo) in Directive No. 3. Without any logical explanation for this discrepancy, it is hard to avoid the doubt that the island of Seokdo mentioned in the Imperial Decree of 1900 was not present-day Takeshima and that the Shim Heung-taek report of 1906 was not based on the 1900 decree. Rather, the name “Dokdo” arose spontaneously as a local name for the island when residents from Ulleungdo joined Japanese expeditions to hunt sea lions on Takeshima shortly before or after its incorporation into Japanese territory in 1905. This would mean that the Uijeongbu’s directive also had nothing to do with Imperial Decree No. 41, and the Uijeongbu merely used the same wording used in the report from Gangwon-do.

Even if the reference to Seokdo in the Imperial Decree No. 41 of 1900 was a reference to Takeshima (Dokdo), the mere fact that the Korean government issued a decree which placed the island within the jurisdiction of Uldogun is not sufficient to make it Korean territory. (Takeshima has never been historically Korean territory, either.) The Korean government argues that “this clearly demonstrates the fact that the county magistrate of Uldogun had continued to govern Dokdo and exercised Korea’s territorial sovereignty over Dokdo pursuant to Imperial Decree No. 41 issued in 1900.” Let us assume for now that the Imperial Decree did indeed define the island as lying within the jurisdiction of Uldogun, that the county magistrate said it belonged to his county, and that the Uijeongbu agreed with this. These facts would perhaps be sufficient to demonstrate the intention of the Korean Empire to acquire and retain sovereignty over the island. But in order for the exercise of sovereignty to be used as a claim for territorial rights, effective occupation is necessary—what the decision of the arbitral court in the Island of Palmas case refers to as a “peaceful and continuous display of state authority.”34 Korea has not demonstrated that it ever exercised such sovereignty at this time (For a discussion on Japan’s claims on this point, see Section 4.2 below).

B. Japan’s attempt at incorporating Dokdo in 1905 through Shimane Prefecture Public Notice No. 40 was executed in the process of and as part of its occupation of Korea. This was an illegal act, infringing on Korea’s sovereignty over the island, thus null and void under international law. (p. 10)

Japan attempted to incorporate sovereignty over the island in 1905 through Shimane Prefecture Public Notice No. 40.

At the time, Japan was at war with Russia over its interests in Manchuria and the Korean

34 Island of Palmas case (Netherlands, USA), 4 April 1928, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. 2, p. 867. Effective occupation is also described as “continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty” (ibid., p. 839). See note 13.
peninsula. Japan had forced the Korean Empire to sign the Korea-Japan Protocol in February 1904 to secure unlimited access to Korean territory in the course of the Russo-Japanese War. Japan’s attempt at turning Dokdo into Japanese territory was also aimed at meeting its military needs in the face of possible maritime clashes with Russia.

Japan had also coerced the Korean government to appoint Japanese and other non-Korean nationals as advisors through the First Korea-Japan Agreement in August 1904. In effect, Japan had been systematically implementing its plan to take over Korea even before the forced annexation in 1910.

Dokdo was the first Korean territory to fall victim to the Japanese aggression against Korea. Japan’s attempt at incorporating Dokdo in 1905 through Shimane Prefecture Public Notice No. 40 was not only an illegal act that infringed upon Korea’s long-standing and undeniable sovereignty over the island, but also null and void under international law.

4.2 Incorporation into Japanese territory (1905)

The Korean government maintains that Japan’s incorporation of Takeshima into its territory in 1905 was an illegal infringement of Korea’s sovereignty and therefore null and void. It argues that Japan attempted to incorporate Takeshima based on an assessment that the island might have military value in the event of confrontation in the Sea of Japan during its war with Russia, that Japan had been implementing its plan to take over Korea in stages from before the annexation of Korea in 1910, and that Takeshima was the first part of Korean territory to fall victim to Japan’s aggression against Korea. But these claims (as I explained in Section 1.2 above) are all based on the assumption that Takeshima was a Korean territory in the first place. But historically Takeshima never belonged to Korea (Sections 2.1–2.3), and did not become Korean territory as a result of the Imperial Decree of 1900 (Section 4.1). As a result, this line of arguments is based on a false premise and therefore it is not possible. The argument (in more explicit terms on Q9 of the Q&A section of the pamphlet) that Japan attempted to incorporate the island into its territory by military aims during its war with Russia depends on an account by Yozaburo Nakai in later years. Nakai was a resident of Oki who traveled to Tokyo in 1904 and submitted a request to the government that the island be incorporated into Japanese territory and be leased to him in order to facilitate the hunting of sea lions on the island. The document which records Nakai’s account has a number of lines that call into question the document’s credibility as a reliable record of historical facts, for example, Nakai came to Tokyo with the aim of submitting his petition to the Residency-General of Korea (Tokanfu), but the Tokanfu did not exist in 1904. In any case, since Takeshima was not a Korean territory, there is little to be gained by arguments linking the island’s incorporation into Japanese territory with the international political situation at the time.

Even if we assumed that the Seokdo mentioned in the Korean Imperial Decree of 1900 was Takeshima, the lack of effective occupation means Korea lacks any claim to territorial sovereignty. Japan, on the other hand, having decided to incorporate the island into its territory at a cabinet meeting in January 1905, gave notice of this intention to Shimane Prefecture and had Shimane Prefecture issue a public notice in February that year, and from then on had exercised effective administrative authority and control over Takeshima.

For example, as a result of Shimane Prefectural Order No. 18 of April 14, 1905, revisions were made to the “Fishing Industry Control Regulations” enacted in 1902 (Shimane Prefectural Order No. 130), and sea lion hunting on Takeshima was added to the list of fishery activities that

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required the permission of the prefectural governor. Permission to hunt sea lions on Takeshima was granted on June 5, 1905 to Yozaburo Nakai and three others. Following this, the Fishing Industry Control Regulations were amended by Shimane Prefectural Order No. 48 in June 1908, which prohibited any industrial fishing activities except sea lion hunting within 20 cho (about 2.2 km) of Takeshima. In April 1921, Shimane Prefectural Order No. 21 revised the Shimane Prefecture Fishing Industry Control Regulations (defined by Shimane Prefectural Order No. 54 in 1911), so that those with a license to hunt sea lions were (officially) allowed to collect nori and wakame seaweed from the vicinity of Takeshima. After World War II, fishing for seaweed around Takeshima was licensed by the governor of Shimane Prefecture to the Oki Islands Federation of Industrial Fishing Cooperative Associations on June 18, 1953, as a fishing right under the regulations of Article 10 of the Fisheries Act (Law No. 267 of 1949), and this has been renewed every ten years and continues to the present.

From 1906, the people who received the grant of licenses to hunt sea lions were required to pay a “lease” (usage fee) for their use of government-owned property. The amount of this lease was 4 yen 20 sen (100 sen = 1 yen) a year. From 1916, this increased to 4 yen 70 sen a year. On August 17, 1940, Takeshima was requisitioned for the naval use, but the sea lion hunt was allowed to continue and from October 1, 1941 to March 31, 1945, the annual fee for the use of naval property was set at 4 yen and 70 sen a year.

In addition to the licenses for fishing, Takeshima was also mentioned in other official documents. For example, in May 1905, it was added to the “ledger of state-owned land in the Counties of Suki, Ochi, Ama and Chibu, Oki Province”: “1. Takeshima, location: . . . north latitude, area: 23 cho 3 tan 3 sebu [approx. 0.231 km²], listed following the recommendation by the governor of the Oki Islands on May 17, 1905, notice: . . .” After this, on August 17, 1940, Takeshima was requisitioned for naval use, as noted above. After the war, on November 1, 1945, it was taken over by the Ministry of Finance as national property. On August 19, 1905 an inspection of Takeshima was carried out by the governor of Shimane Prefecture, Bukichi Matsunaga, while on March 27, 1906, a survey team visited the island. The team included Oki Islands Magistrate Bunsuke Higashi as well as specialists in fisheries, agriculture, hygiene, and chartered surveying, and was headed by Yoshitaro Jinzai, director of the third department, Shimane Prefecture.

By means of such continuous and peaceful exercise of administrative authority, Japan made it certain that it has territorial sovereignty over Takeshima.

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38 Tamura, ibid., pp. 73–80.

39 Tamura, ibid., pp. 53–56, 64.

40 Shimane ken shozo gyosei bunsho 1, op. cit. (note 36) p. 160. The ledger itself is kept in Shimane Prefecture.


C. Dokdo was restored as Korean territory after World War II, and the Government of the Republic of Korea exercises legislative, administrative and judicial jurisdiction over Dokdo. (p. 11)
The Cairo Declaration of 1943, on Japan’s unconditional surrender and Korea’s independence, states that “Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.” The Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 confirms that “the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out.”
Furthermore, the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers excluded Dokdo from those territories controlled and administered by Japan through its instruction in SCAPIN (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Index Number) 677 in January 1946 and in SCAPIN 1033 in June 1946.
Accordingly, Dokdo was restored as an integral part of the territory of the independent Republic of Korea after World War II, as was reaffirmed by the Treaty of Peace with Japan of 1951.
The Government of the Republic of Korea exercises Korea’s irrefutable territorial sovereignty over Dokdo. The Government will deal firmly and resolutely against any provocation with respect to Korea’s sovereignty and will continue to defend Korea’s sovereignty over Dokdo.

4.3 World War II and the legal status of Takeshima
The Korean government argues that Dokdo (i.e. Takeshima) reverted to being Korean territory after World War II, and cites as evidence the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, SCAPIN 677 and SCAPIN 1033, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, all of these documents in fact demonstrate rather that the legal status of Takeshima as Japanese territory was not affected by WWII.

The Cairo Declaration (released by the United States, United Kingdom, and China on December 1, 1943) mentions various territories in connection with Japan’s eventual defeat:
“Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914,” . . . “all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China,” . . . “Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed,” . . . “in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” But Takeshima does not fit into any of these categories. Since it was never Korean territory in the first place, it was never taken from that country, and therefore does not fall within the territorial sphere of an independent Korea. The Potsdam Declaration (made by the United States, United Kingdom, and China on July 26, 1945, later endorsed by the Soviet Union) says in its eighth article that: “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.” The important thing here is that the small islands that will remain Japanese territory after the war are defined as those “as we [i.e. the United States, Great Britain, and China] determine.” Depending on the decision of “the United States, Great Britain, and China”, therefore, the possibility existed that any territory other than those specifically mentioned in the Cairo Declaration, including territories that had not been “seized, stolen, or taken by violence or greed”, might be detached from Japan. In these circumstances, the two directives were issued: SCAPIN-677 (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction Note no. 677) “Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan”, January 29, 1946, and SCAPIN-1033 “Area Authorized for Japanese Fishing and Whaling”, June 22, 1946. SCAPIN-677 ordered the Japanese government to cease exercising political and administrative authority over the following places (in addition to numerous other territories outside the Japanese home islands): “Utsuryo (Ullung)
Island, Liancourt Rocks (Take Island) and Quelpart (Saishu or Cheju) Island.” However, Paragraph 6 of this same directive made clear that: “Nothing in this directive shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration.”

SCAP-IN-1033 directed that “Japanese vessels or personnel thereof will not approach closer than twelve (12) miles to Takeshima . . . nor have any contact with said island.” But this directive too made clear in Paragraph 5 that: “The present authorization is not an expression of allied policy relative to ultimate determination of national jurisdiction, taken from that country, and therefore does not fall within the territorial sphere of an independent Korea, international boundaries or fishing rights in the area concerned or in any other area.”

The decision regarding which territories would remain under Japanese jurisdiction and which would be separated from Japan was made under the Treaty of Peace with Japan (San Francisco Peace Treaty), which was signed on September 8, 1951 and came into force on April 28, 1952.

The provisions dealing with the renouncement of Korea come under Article 2 (a): “Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title, and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.” On July 19, 1951, around two months before the signing of the treaty, the Korean ambassador to the United States, Yu Chan Yang, visited John Foster Dulles, advisor to the Secretary of State working on the draft treaty, and submitted a note to the Secretary of State raising certain points (in fact, suggesting changes) regarding the Peace Treaty with Japan. In Paragraph 1 of the note, the Korean government requested that Takeshima be added to the list of islands over which Japan was to renounce sovereignty. Specifically, the ambassador requested: “My Government requests that the word ‘renounces’ in Article 2 (a), should be replaced by ‘confirms that it renounced on August 9, 1945, all right, title and claim to Korea and the islands which were part of Korea prior to its annexation by Japan, including the island Quelpart, Port Hamilton, Dagelet, Dokdo and Parangdo.’” The United States government reply to the Korean request for amendment was made in writing to the Korean ambassador on August 10, 1951. In the letter, Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, refused the Korean request on behalf of the Secretary of State in the following terms. “…the United States Government regrets that it is unable to concur in this proposed amendment. The United States Government does not feel that the Treaty should adopt the theory that Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on August 9, 1945 constituted a formal or final renunciation of sovereignty by Japan over the areas dealt with in the Declaration. As regards the island of Dokdo, otherwise known as Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks, this normally uninhabited rock formation was according to our information never treated as part of Korea and, since about 1905, has been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture of Japan. The island does not appear ever before to have been claimed by Korea.”

These facts make clear that no alteration in the status of Japan’s territorial rights over Takeshima occurred as a result of World War II.

46 NARA: RG59, Lot54 D423, Box 8, Korea / Microfilm (ibid.) / FRUS 1951, Vol. 6 Pt. 1, p. 1203, note 3.
Conclusion

As I have discussed in the various sections of this paper, even an overview survey of the claims of the Korean government in its pamphlet brings numerous questions to the fore. Many of the Korean contentions contradict the facts or fail to demonstrate evidence sufficient to stand as proof of territorial sovereignty under international law. On the other hand, it is possible that similar doubts would emerge regarding the claims of the Japanese government if these were subjected to the same kind of point-by-point analysis. Indeed, numerous books and magazine articles critical of the Japanese government’s claims have already been published and a lively and diverse debate continues to today (particularly in Japan rather than Korea). In an interview with a journalist from the San-in Chuo Shimpo newspaper, former Malaysian foreign minister Syed Hamid Albar, who was a key figure on the Malaysian side during the dispute before the ICJ between Malaysia and Singapore regarding Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh (decided against Malaysia, judgment May 23, 2008), said: “We did come in for some criticism regarding the result, but I think the decision was a mature one in the context of aiming for a peaceful solution. It’s not all about winning and losing.”

In the course of a long history, it is not unusual for disputes to arise between neighboring countries. Mature societies are able to resolve these disputes not by force but by law. If Japan and the Republic of Korea are prepared to recognize the weaknesses in their own claims and to address them, and in the course of doing this help to bring new depth to the legal discussions of these matters, they will be able to contribute to realize a mature international community in which disputes are resolved by judicial means.

47 Ryukyu Shimpo and San-in Chuo Shimpo, Meguri no umi: Takeshima to senkaku kokkyo chiiki kara no toi [People around the ocean rim: Takeshima and Senkaku, questions from the border regions] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2015), p. 133.
Korean Coal and Metal Mineworkers Mobilized in Wartime Japan: The Question of Wages and Ethnicity-Based Disparities

Lee Woo-Youn

I. Introduction

When one takes the position that mobilized Korean workers were forcibly removed and coerced into providing labor in wartime Japan (1937-1945), issues such as the wages paid to the mobilized workers and wage disparities with Japanese workers end up not being discussed, and become blind spots for researchers. Prior research that approaches the subject exclusively from a perspective of “forced removal of workers and forced labor” simply brushes away the issues considered in this paper by labeling them as the products of “slave labor and slave-like living conditions,” even though they deserve to be examined in connection with the subject of mobilized labor.

Almost all published research on wartime-mobilized labor approaches the subject under the two assumptions of “forced removal of workers and forced labor” and “slave labor and slave-like living conditions.” These assumptions create a significant obstacle for researchers trying to recreate what the work and daily lives of the Korean laborers must have been like. Researchers end up failing to look at the aspects of workers’ lives in which the laborers demonstrated autonomy, as well as the wide-ranging and highly diverse events of daily life that may not accord with the narrative of “slave labor” and “slave-like living conditions.” Perspectives of this type have consistently contributed to narrow the spectrum of subjects and topics in research on the history of wartime mobilized labor.

The following questions are examined in this paper to bring more clarity to the subject of mobilized Korean workers in wartime Japan. To what extent were wages actually paid to Korean mineworkers who were working in coal and metal mines? How were their wages determined? How large was the disparity in wages with Japanese workers? What was the trend in wartime wage disparities and how did wartime disparities compare to prewar wage disparities? By shedding light on these questions, this paper seeks to eliminate the obstacles that stand in the way of understanding the lives of mobilized Korean workers. However, as explained in this paper, research on the wages paid to Korean workers must cope with the critically important issues of remittances to family in Korea and forced saving. Specifically, were remittances to family being handled properly, and were workers able to withdraw money from their savings on their own discretion? If remittances and withdrawals from savings were being made against the will of the workers, the payment of high wages would prove to be meaningless. This matter shall be

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addressed in a future paper.

The present writer would like to point out that most of the materials used in this paper were compiled by researchers who adhere to the viewpoint of “forced removal of workers and forced labor.” In Section II, an attempt will be made to examine the wage levels of Korean mineworkers (including those who worked at metal mines), and to see if, as widely believed, the miners were working for basically no wages or for a pittance. Section III will explain the formulas used for calculating wages by using examples from mines. Section IV compares the wages of Koreans and Japanese and will examine if discrimination in the payment of salaries based on ethnicity existed, as is commonly believed. Section V builds on the previous section’s discussion and examines how wage disparities between Koreans and Japanese evolved during wartime, as well as contrasting the changes with disparities in the prewar period. The conclusion summarizes the points made in this paper and presents topics that deserve to be examined in future research.

II. Wage Levels

Labor mobilization and relocation of Korean workers to Japan began in September 1939 with the start of the “recruitment” of laborers. While it is frequently assumed that “wartime mobilized labor” was unpaid, this is not true. Wages were in fact paid under the mobilization program and continued to be paid under the “conscription” program launched in October 1944. The mineworkers examined in this paper were no exception, which leads to the questions of how and how much they were paid.

In 1940, shortly after the start of the mobilization of Korean workers, the Japan Mining Association [Nihon Kozan Kyokai] conducted a survey of Korean workers in 78 major mines (comprising both coal and metal mines; hereafter referred to as mines) throughout Japan. The survey covered such matters as “Instruction and Training Facilities” for civic education, “Work Conditions” of Korean workers, including wages, and “Remittance and Savings.” The findings were published as a massive 300-page report entitled Survey Report of Workers from the Korean Peninsula (Hanto-jin rodosha ni kansuru chosa hokoku). (Japan Mining Association 1940; Pak Kyong-Sik, ed., 1981, Vol. II, pp. 1-300) Table 1 presents data from the 46 mines that provided a full response on average monthly wage, and average savings and remittances per worker. The monthly cost of food was calculated by multiplying the daily cost by 31. For mines that did not provide information on the cost of food (indicated by an asterisk), the monthly cost of food was assumed to be 18.60 yen, calculated using the highest daily cost of food of any mine, which was 0.60 yen. The figures in the “Difference” column were calculated by subtracting savings, remittances and food costs from the average wage. The exclusion of food costs yields a high degree of dispersion, which indicates that wages, savings and remittances varied significantly among the

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2 Regarding the wages of conscripted workers, the following explanation is given in Kokumin choyo no kaisetsu [Explanation of the national conscription system] (Yoshio Morita ed., Government-General of Korea, Mining Bureau, Labor Section, editorial supervision). “Question: Roughly, how much are conscripted workers paid? Answer: In the Japanese homeland, wages for respondents [persons responding to conscription] are controlled. Workers are categorized by type of work, region and age, and basically the same rate applies to workers in the same category. For example, in shipbuilding, about 60 yen is paid per month during the first three months. After three months, the rate rises to above 100 yen. In coalmining, excavators generally earn a maximum of about 6 yen [per day], a minimum of 3 yen, and an average of 4.50 yen. The rate does not fall below 2.50 yen even during the training period. Wages for respondents working in Korea are set to be somewhat higher than the general level of wages. It should be noted that all wages for conscripted workers in both the Japanese homeland and Korea are subject to the approval of the Government-General of Korea.” (Kokumin Soryoku Chosen Renmei, 1944, pp. 42-43)
mines surveyed. While this implies that the averages may be of somewhat limited significance, these figures will be used here, as no other data is available.

One point should be made at the outset regarding calculations. “Monthly average remittance” is not the average amount for all employed workers or workers who worked at the mine for at least one day in that month, but rather signifies the average amount for workers who actually made remittances. For example, consider the data from the Mitsui Sunagawa Coal Mine in the Sapporo District. As of the end of July 1940, the mine employed 622 miners, and an average of 279 miners made remittances during the four months between March and June (pp. 30-32). Calculating based on these figures, 44.7 percent of the miners remitted an average amount of 32.34 yen. Although it does not appear in Table 1, another notable case is the Akenobe Mine in the Osaka District. The response from this mine shows the average monthly number of miners working at this mine during the first six months of 1940 and the average monthly number of miners making remittances, indicating that 71.8 percent were remitting funds (pp. 98-101). Similar data is available for the Ikuno Mine, also in the Osaka District, showing that 72.8 percent were remitting funds (pp. 153-155). The response from the Takaya Mine in the Sendai District provides the average monthly number of miners and remitters during the months between March and July, indicating that 70.1 percent were remitting funds (pp. 54-54).4 A somewhat different picture emerges from a report compiled by the Institute for Science of Labor [Rodo Kagaku Kenkyu-jo] entitled Survey Report on the Working Conditions of Workers from the Korean Peninsula [Hanto romusha kinro jokyo ni kansuru chosa hokoku] (hereafter Survey Report). According to this, only 34.0 percent of the miners working at a coalmine in Hokkaido in 1941 were making remittances to their family in Korea. (Institute for Science of Labor 1943a; Pak Kyong-Sik ed., 1982, Vol. 1, pp. 373, 482) It is also reported that among miners working at the Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine in Hokkaido in early 1943, only 20 to 30 percent were remitting funds. (Tadashi Kosho 2011, p. 358) It may be possible to explain the differences in the ratio of remitters as follows. The data in Table 1 was gathered immediately after the start of wartime labor mobilization, implying that the Korean workers were still unfamiliar with their work and work conditions and were easily pressured by employers to make remittances. By contrast, the lower ratios reported in the Survey Report and by Kosho reflect the possibility that workers were rejecting the solicitation of employers and were remitting funds on their own.

It is well known that the cost of food, as well as savings, were withheld from wages. Moreover, because savings mostly constituted forced savings, it is very likely that the amounts of savings appearing in Table 1 were withheld from wages. When remittances are subtracted, the average remaining balance (difference) comes to 18.50 yen, which is equivalent to 25.7 percent of the average monthly wage of 71.95 yen. While the balance is obtained by subtracting savings, the cost of food, and remittances from monthly wages, other amounts were also being deducted for such items as taxes, utilities, rationed goods, clothing and monthly installment payments. According to data for 1944, amounts deducted for these items came to about 16.7 percent of wages. (Table 2) To summarize these figures, 18.6 percent of wages were withheld as savings, 21.2 percent for the cost of food, 16.7 percent for taxes and other items, and 25.7 percent for remittances. Thus, a total of 56.5 percent was being withheld or deducted from wages, meaning that any miner making remittances was doing so out of the remaining 43.5 percent. Furthermore, the data for 1940 shown in Table 2 indicates that remitters were sending the equivalent of 34.5 percent included in the remaining 43.5 percent and were spending the equivalent of 9.3 percent on personal

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3 Wages for Korean coalminers also varied significantly among mines during the 1920s. See Chong Jin-Song (1989).

4 As the number of participants in forced saving programs is thought to be roughly equal to the number of employees or workers on payrolls, this issue can be ignored.
expenditures. On the other hand, it can be calculated that those who did not remit funds retained 43.5 percent of their wages for spending at their own discretion.

Although the above estimates are based on fragmentary information, they do not differ significantly from materials published in the past. The following can be confirmed from the information summarized in Table 2. There is very little difference in the ratio of monthly wages saved and remitted by workers at the Hitachi Mine in Ibaraki Prefecture between 1940 and 1941. The figures for 1944 depict the breakdown of expenditures for an average coalminer in the Kyushu District, whose daily wages ranged between 7 and 8 yen and monthly wages amounted to 150 yen. A comparison between 1940 and 1944 points to a slightly lower remittance ratio and a higher balance ratio. Other than that, there are almost no differences in deducted amounts and other ratios. The figures for 1945 are based on materials from the Sumitomo Inaushi Mine that report on wages earned, deducted amounts and remittances made by 44 Korean workers during a four-month period. Average amounts for these three items are shown in Table 2. It is notable that here again, no significant difference can be found in the breakdown of expenditures between 1940 and 1945.5

In other words, although Table 2 was compiled from different sources, the consensus is that even after subtracting forced savings, food costs and other expenses, workers were left with at least 40 percent of their wages as disposable income. Because workers were keeping more than 40 percent of their wages as disposable income, employers pressured workers to make remittances to their families. However, many Korean workers did not comply, simply because they preferred to spend their money locally. It is believed that decisions on fund remittances were the subject of very intense arguments between workers and on-site personnel managers who doubled as the dormitory masters where the workers were housed. The abovementioned Survey Report that investigated 14 mines touches on this matter in a section entitled “Promoting Savings,” which contains the following entry regarding “Coalmine B.” “Monthly wages are paid by the dormitory master. The practice is to reach an agreement on how much would be saved and remitted, whereupon workers are handed their remaining balance.” (Pak Kyong-Sik ed. 1982, Vol. 1, p. 471)

Prior research states that workers received nothing or very small amounts of “pocket money” because all or most of the wages were withheld for forced savings, various types of installment

5 Table 2 was compiled to examine the breakdown of wages and expenditures, but this table cannot be used in discussing trends in wartime wages. Coal and metal mining wages were continuously rising. The “Price Freeze Order” of September 19, 1939 prohibited any further increase in prices, rents, charges, transportation charges, wages and salary. Thereafter, the order was renewed every year. (Cohen 1949, pp. 358-359) Wages were controlled after March 1939. However, due to chronic labor shortages, businesses found other ways to raise wages to attract workers. That is, aside from controlled wages, businesses paid a wide array of allowances that included temporary allowance, family allowance and long-term employment allowance to effectively raise wages. (Akira Hara 1976, p. 242) Wages were raised to retain workers and, as a result, the average daily wage for men increased from 3.08 yen in 1940 to 5.676 yen in 1944. (Cohen 1949, p. 166)

6 Another example can be found in Coalmine A where records state, “Wages are paid through the dormitory master, but no more than 10 yen per month is handed to workers. Workers are made to save or remit the remainder. (Interest on company savings is 6.5 percent per annum.) In some cases, workers have returned home at the end of their two-year contract with 1,300 yen in savings. The 10 yen of pocket money is mostly spent on food, drink and gambling. Some workers purchase clothes.” Another example is Coalmine C where records state, “All wages were paid through the dormitory master. As a rule, pocket money was kept within 10 yen per month, and the remaining money was allocated to savings and remittance (as a rule, remittance amounted to no more than 20-30 yen.) The “10 yen rule” was regularly applied to workers with a positive attitude toward remitting funds, but the company probably had nothing it could do with workers who did not remit money. On the other hand, Table 1 shows that the upper limit of the “rule” on remittances was also not always obeyed.
savings, food costs and other expenses, and concludes that workers had no possibility of making remittances.\(^7\) However, more than 40 percent of wages remained in the hands of workers after the deduction of forced savings and other items. Of this remaining amount, workers made remittances to their families either on their own discretion or under pressure from personnel managers, or otherwise spent the money locally. On July 19, 1939, *Particulars Concerning Implementation of Above Guidelines* [Migi no yoko toriatsukai ni kansuru saimoku (*Above Guidelines*)] was announced. From this date onward through the end of the war, the general rule was that “with the exception of minimal amounts, all wages must be remitted or saved.” (*Particulars Concerning Implementation of Above Guidelines*) [Chosen-jin Kyosei Renko Jittai Chosa Hokokusho Henshu Iinkai] ed. 1999, p. 43). However, due to the resistance of Korean workers, this rule was not enforced. Deductions included the costs of work clothes and food, but rent was not charged to those who lived in the dormitory for single workers. Money remaining after the deduction of necessary living expenses and savings, if not remitted, was spent on such items as clothes, various food items, gambling, alcohol and tobacco. Details of such expenditures will be discussed in a future paper.

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\(^7\) Pak Kyong-Sik quotes the account of a worker who was mobilized in 1941. “When I arrived at my work after being conscripted, I found that my wage was 1.30 yen, which was only half the amount advertised. My plans immediately fell through. There was no way I could think about remitting funds because I barely had enough to feed myself.” (1965, p. 87) Shigeru Nagasawa writes in his study of the Joban Coalmine in Fukushima that little money was left after the cost of food and other expenses were deducted. “After paying for daily necessities and after money was withheld for the company’s forced savings, there was absolutely no room left for the Korean workers to send money home. And if there was some money left, it was a very small amount.” (1977, p. 131) In his study of the same region, Shoji Yamada writes, “Wages were withheld for forced saving and the workers only received a small amount of pocket money. The intent was to prevent workers from escaping to distant places.” (1978, p. 650) Eidai Hayashi claimed, “Out of the wages that they received, workers paid for food (0.60 – 0.65 yen per day), bedding, cigarettes, alcohol and soap. The rest was taken away for Patriotic Savings, savings for retirement, normal savings, national bonds and forced savings. As a result, not a single cent was paid to the workers.” (1991, p. 36) Cook and Cook also quote the account of a mobilized worker. “Wages? They didn’t pay us anything. When we were coming from Korea, they told us we would receive 1.50 yen. But we weren’t paid even for a single day of work.” (1992, p. 196) Kim Moon-Young takes a more flexible position than the foregoing researchers and says that, after various expenses were deducted, “Not much was left to be paid to the workers. Not very many workers were able to remit more than the remittable amount of 15 yen.” (1995, pp. 86-87) While there is evidence of restrictions being placed on remittance amounts, it remains unknown whether such restrictions were commonplace. Kim In-Dok writes, “Rarely did workers receive any money from their employers. It appears this was the general rule... Even if monthly wages were received, the amounts were extremely small. Generally speaking, workers only received a small amount of pocket money from their employers.” (2002, pp. 49-50) Chon He-Gyon quotes the account of a mobilized worker as follows. Regarding monthly wages, “What was paid to us was so little it would be finished with a single day’s outing.” Based on this he writes, “It can be concluded that they received a small amount of pocket money each month.” (2006, p. 171) Ho Kan-Mu directly quotes the oral account of a Korean worker. “The monthly wage was no more than pocket money. So, we could not even think about sending money home.” (2014, p. 64) Unlike the foregoing researchers, Chon Gi-Ho expresses doubts about whether the remittances made by Korean workers were properly paid to their families. (2003, pp.113-114) I San-Wi proposes the theory that remittances that had not been made were included in the unpaid amounts held in deposit after the end of the war. (2014, p. 61) As noted above, the present writer plans to address issues related to remittances to families in Korea and unpaid amounts in a future paper.
III. Methods for Calculating Wages

The methods used in calculating wages are discussed in this section with a focus on coalmines. As attested to by Eidai Hayashi, “While wages differed among mines, extremely complex methods were used for calculating the wages of miners.” [Hayashi 1991: Bibliography [Kaidai], p. 34] The most detailed explanation of wage calculation methods is provided by the Institute for Science of Labor (1943b) in Korean Peninsula Workers in Coalmines [Tanko ni okeru hantojin romusha], the contents of which can be summarized as follows. First of all, “new arrivals” underwent “three months” of training during which they were paid a flat daily amount. At the end of this period, workers were assigned to such tasks as excavating, tunneling, loading and hauling. For these tasks, wage rates were normally based on the value of group output. Finally, workers were paid a flat daily amount for such tasks as machine operation, machining, coal washing and miscellaneous tasks. Output-based wage calculation for excavating, tunneling and related tasks is explained below.

(1) Determining the total wage pool: For excavating, the total wage amount was calculated by multiplying a per-ton value by the net tonnage of coal produced. For tunneling, the total wage pool was calculated by multiplying a per-tsubo (approx. 3.3 m²) value by the total area cleared (in tsubo). (2) Adjusting the total wage pool: A fixed bonus amount was added for every cart exceeding a previously determined production norm. When miners performed any another task, the relevant amount would also be added to the total wage pool. When a decline in production tonnage was anticipated due to the assignment of National Labor Volunteers [Kinro Hokoku Tai] or new recruits, a certain amount was added to the total wage pool under the heading of “Compensation for Diminished Skill.” Additions were also made to the total wage pool when large numbers of Korean workers were mixed into the teams, or allowances were added to the wage pool for training or accompanying newly recruited unskilled miners. (3) Determining the per-ton value: Starting with the valuation on the labor portion of per-ton production cost, various factors were taken into consideration in determining the per-ton value of coal produced. First, consideration was given to maintaining a balance with wages paid for other tasks. Second, consideration was given to seasonal factors that made mining more difficult. Third, consideration was given to diminished output when excavation reached a poor-quality working face or vein. (4) Determining the production tonnage: Production tonnage was calculated based on the number of coal-filled carts removed from the mine. The weight of coal per cart was estimated by sight. (It is reported that estimation by sight varied very little from actual measurement.) A fixed-rate downward adjustment was made in the number of carts when the loads contained large amounts of inferior-grade “waste.” (It should be noted that some Korean workers suspected that the carts were not being properly counted.) (5) After calculating the total wage pool using the

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8 Between 1939 and 1945, a total of 144,004 Korean workers were mobilized and assigned to mines. Of this number, 121,574 workers (84.4 percent) worked in coalmines. It is reported that, among such coalminers, a great many of them worked inside the mines as excavators. (Lee Woo-Youn 2015, p. 6)

9 In Japanese, this system is referred to as dantai dekidaka-barai seido. Following the example of Chon Jin-Song, dekidaka-barai seido has been rendered as seisangaka chinsein seido [output-based wage rate] in this paper. The term dantai has been added because, as outlined below, the aggregate wage for the entire work group was first determined, and this aggregate amount was then allocated among individual workers.

10 According to the Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans (1999, p 299), wages at metal mines were as follows. Wages for workers working inside the mines were determined on a contract basis (output-based wage rate), while flat-rate wages were paid to those working outside the mines. These arrangements applied to both Korean and Japanese workers. During the training period, a “temporary employment” wage was paid, amounting to 1.20–1.30 yen. After the end of the training period, performance pay was added according to the type of work assignment.
above methods, wages were allotted to individual workers based on fixed ratios that took into consideration each individual’s skill level and work assignment. The ratios calculated by on-site supervisors were referred to as buritsu, or “rate.” For instance, assume that rates ranged from a minimum of 10 to a maximum of 16. Each worker was then given a rate, and the individual’s wage was calculated based on his rate. (Institute for Science of Labor 1943b, pp. 769-770)

The calculation process can be shown using the following example. Assume that on the day of measurement, output came to 247 carts with a per-cart value of 0.75 yen. A total of 20 carts were deducted for “waste”, 1.9 carts were deducted for carrying less than the specified load, and 0.6 carts were added for carrying more than the specified load. As a result, net output equaled 226.15 carts (243 - 20 - 1.9 + 0.6), so that the total wage pool came to 162.83 yen (0.75 x 226.15). Assuming that National Labor Volunteers were working in the mines on this day, compensation is made for diminished productivity at the rate of 0.20 yen per cart. Hence, the total compensation amount for diminished productivity comes to 45.20 yen (0.20 x 226.15). Next, a training allowance of 0.30 yen is paid per inexperienced National Labor Volunteer, so that a training allowance of 5.40 yen (0.30 x 18 volunteers) is added to the wage pool. After deducting 21.42 yen for the cost of explosives used on this day, the total wage pool comes to 192.01 yen. This total amount was divided among the workers based on the following calculation method. Assuming that a Japanese worker, 16 to 18 years old with at least one month of experience, has a skill level of 10 points, the worker with the lowest skill level who worked on this day is given a skill score of 11.5 points and the worker with the highest skill level is given a skill score of 16.0 points. Adding the skill points for all workers yields 588.4 points in total. Based on this, the wage payable per skill point is 0.328 yen (192.01 ÷ 588.4). Hence, the least skilled worker with a skill score of 11.5 points received 3.77 yen (0.328 x 11.5), and the most skilled worker with a skill score of 16.0 points received 5.25 yen (0.328 x 16.0). (Institute for Science of Labor 1943b, pp. 770-771)

While the same wage scale was applied to both Korean and Japanese workers, this complicated calculation method potentially gave rise to misunderstandings. In addition, the assessment (calculation) of the rate and other factors created room for ethnic discrimination.11 A review of disputes arising between Korean workers and their employers shows that wage disputes occurred frequently during 1939 and 1940, but decreased to nearly zero after 1941. (Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans 1999, p. 254) On the other hand, food-related disputes increased as dietary conditions deteriorated.12 According to Hokkaido and Korean Workers [Hokkaido to Chosen-jin rodosha] compiled by the Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans (1999), wage calculations were complex, and its structure gave rise to suspicions that wages were subject to ethnicity-based discrimination. (p. 253)

11 According to Hokkaido and Korean Workers, with the passage of time, Korean workers “came to understand” that wages differed depending on “diligence” and “capability” (the individual’s muscle power). (p. 254) It can be judged that this was not so much the result of gaining a better understanding of the wage system, but rather reflected the development of a certain relation of trust between Korean workers and their employers on matters related to wages. Another cause of wage disputes was that recruiters had quoted the highest standards of pay to prospective recruits. But once they arrived at their work, they found that wages were output-based or were flat daily rates. (Ministry of Justice, Criminal Affairs Bureau 1941, p. 1,233) According to Hokkaido and Korean Workers, during January–December 1944, there were 134 cases of labor disputes in Hokkaido involving immigrant Korean workers (10,166 participants). The largest number (48 cases) pertained to labor management issues (of which 24 involved use of violence). The second largest number (27 cases) pertained to contract extension issues and return to Korea (of which 23 involved opposition to contract extension). Also tied for second (27 cases) were cases pertaining to food and medical issues. (p. 1,593) Wage-related disputes were frequent during the beginning of this period, but totaled only 7 cases (200 participants) in 1944. (p. 326)
General of Korea and the Japanese government were aware of these issues. On February 13, 1942, the “recruitment” system of labor mobilization was replaced by “government-mediated recruitment.” At this time, the Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry of Labor issued *Guidelines on Training and Treatment of Incoming Workers* [Inyu romusha kunren toriatsukai yoko], which contained the following provision. “Workers shall be made to fully understand in advance that individual wages will differ according to individual efficiency and diligence.” (Ministry of Welfare and Ministry of Home Affairs 1942, p. 77) *Guidelines on Mediated Recruitment of Workers Relocated to the Homeland* [Naichi inyu assen yoko] dated February 20, 1942 and issued by the Government-General of Korea contains the following provision. “In particular, terms of employment shall be thoroughly communicated... Have workers fully understand and accept that individual wages will naturally differ according to ability.” (Maeda 1943, p. 51)¹³

Yutaka Nishinarita makes the following statement based on materials from the Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine in Hokkaido for 1942. “Non-payment of wages was by no means the exception.” (Nishinarita 1997, p. 277) The material used by Nishinarita is reproduced here as follows.

**Letter**

Date: July 8, 1942
From: Kiyoji Kimura, Chief Administrator of Gongju-gun, Mokdong-myeon,
To: Director of Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine
Re: Request on Payment of Worker’s Wages

… This is in regard to a complaint filed by the worker named below who was employed by your company on March 22, 1940 and departed your company at the end of his term of employment on April 27, 1942, at which time he returned to his place of origin. The complaint states that his wages could not be precisely determined and paid at the time of his departure due to the hassle, and that he was given verbal assurances by the personnel manager during his voyage back that unpaid wages for 24 days would be remitted to him at a later date. Although two months have passed since his return, he has yet to receive any remittance. The worker has on several occasions requested that this matter be pursued. While knowing well that you are busy, we request that you investigate this matter and inform us of your findings.

Worker in question:
Chungcheong-do, Gongju-gun, Mokdong-myeon, Iin-ri
Che Geum-Ok

Nishinarita takes the above description “wages could not be precisely determined and paid” as proof that “wages payable to Korean workers were very sloppily managed.” However, it should be noted that the above case involves the settlement of outstanding wages after the end of the term of employment, and is not a problem that arose during the period of employment in the mine. It is also important to note that, since the start of the mobilization of Korean workers in 1939, employers were required to file monthly reports with local government authorities regarding the work performed by Korean workers, living conditions, wages and other matters related to labor

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¹³ Accounts from mobilized workers also contain statements that, “The more you worked, the more you were paid.” (Nittei Kyosen-ka Kyosei Doin Higai Shinso Kyumei linkai [Investigative Committee on Victims of Forced Mobilization under Occupation by Imperial Japan; hereinafter, Investigative Committee] 2005, p. 287; 2007a, pp. 109, 159, 551; 2009, p. 164)
management. This requirement came into effect pursuant to a directive dated July 29, 1939 issued jointly by the Vice Ministers of the Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Entitled *Guidelines on Recruitment of Korean Workers* [*Chosen-jin rodosha bosho yoko*], the directive was forwarded to all local authorities. Concurrent to this directive, *Particulars Concerning Implementation of Guidelines* [*Toriatsukai ni kansuru saimoku*] (Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans, 1999, p. 44) and *Procedures for Recruitment of Korean Workers* [*Chosen-jin rodosha bosho tetsuzuki*] (Investigative Group on the Truth of Forced Removal of Koreans ed. 1974, p. 622) were issued, which specified the obligations of employers. On the same day, *Administrative Procedures for the Immigration of Korean Workers to the Homeland* [*Chosen-jin rodosha naichi iju ni kansuru jimu tetsuzuki*] was issued, which required all employers to file monthly reports with the local chief of police regarding work conditions, wages, savings, remittances and other matters. (Sumitomo Utashinai Mine 1940, pp. 15-16) Under these conditions, it would have been impossible to systematically avoid payment of wages to Korean workers.14

It is also important to note that Che Geum-ok, the Korean worker in the case cited above, went to the local government office to complain that his wages had not been remitted to him, whereupon the local administrator issued a formal letter explaining the background of the case and sought a response from the employer. Yoshihiko Moriya refers to a case where remittances from Japan had not reached family members, which resulted in an exchange of letters between the local government office and the Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine (1996, pp. 134-135), leading one to believe that in this instance also, a response was received from the mining company. Because employers were obligated to file monthly reports with local government authorities on the payment of wages to Korean workers, it can be said that an established procedure was in place for resolving problems related to the non-payment of outstanding wages. The case cited by Nishinarita should not be interpreted to mean that wages payable to Korean workers in Japan “were sloppily managed.” Instead, the case should be taken as evidence that the payment of wages was systematically managed and implemented. The marks of systematic management can also be seen in a survey conducted in 1942 of Korean workers employed in a certain mine. Asked what they looked forward to, the leading response was “payday.” [Sangyo Rodo Chosasho 1942, p. 18] Given the materials currently on hand, this would be the most rational interpretation. The discovery of new materials related to coal and metal mines may very well enable us to more accurately describe the diverse conditions that existed.

Due to changes in the war situation, all gold mines were closed in 1943, and the Korean workers employed at the above-mentioned Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine were relocated to coal mines in the Kyushu area. Chon He-Gyon has focused on matters related to wages in the context of this relocation. Chon pointed out that wages, allowances and savings ranging across 18 to 20 items were settled and paid to the workers, and argued that the regulations related to wages and other matters during the process of relocation prove that there was “coercion.” [2011, pp. 574-575] This argument is difficult to understand as it provides no basis for why the settlement and payment of these amounts could be proof of “coerced labor.” It is quite clear that this case, too, should be interpreted as evidence of systematic management of wage payment as was the case described above. For example, Moriya points out that Korean and Japanese workers were treated

14 The following is an account of a worker relocated to Sakhalin in 1941. “Question: Did you receive your unpaid wages when you were leaving? Answer: Where I was working, if you did your work, they would pay you for that month. They paid the monthly amount, and never failed or refused to pay. Question: Were you paid for all the work you did? Answer: Yes, for every month that I worked, I was basically paid in the same month.” (Investigative Committee 20071, p. 159)
equally in the settlement of wages, allowances and savings in the process of relocation, with the exception that Korean workers received a relocation allowance equal to three months' wages that was paid as a severance allowance, as well as leave pay, food and drink allowances, and parting gifts. [1991, p. 29]

IV. Wage Disparities Between Korean and Japanese Workers

Wages were paid to Korean workers throughout the entire period of the mobilization and relocation of Korean workers to Japan. This began with “recruitment” in September 1939 and continued through “government-mediated recruitment” introduced in February 1942 and “conscription” instituted in September 1944. Rules pertaining to “recruitment” were set down in the directive dated July 29, 1939 issued jointly by the Vice Ministers of the Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry of Home Affairs and addressed to all local government authorities under the title of Policies Pertaining to the Immigration of Korean Workers to the Homeland [Chosen-jin rodosha naichi iju ni kansuru hoshin] (Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans 1999, p. 493) This document instructs Japanese employers to “avoid as much as possible any discrimination in the treatment of Korean workers as compared to homeland workers.”

The mobilization of Korean workers through “government-mediated recruitment” was announced in the Cabinet decision of February 13, 1942 entitled Policies Pertaining to the Employment of Korean Workers [Chosen-jin romusha katsuyo ni kansuru hoshin] (pp. 24-25), which contains the following directive. “At all levels, there shall be no difference in the treatment of such workers as compared to homeland workers.” Finally, the same can be said for the rules on “conscription,” which emphasized that “There is absolutely no discrimination between homeland and Korean workers in wages and in all other matters.” (Kokumin Soryoku Chosen Renmei 1944,

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15 On the same day, a joint directive was issued by the vice-ministers of the Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry of Home Affairs to local government authorities. Attached to Guidelines on Recruitment of Korean Workers [Chosen-jin rodosha boshu yoko], this directive was entitled Administrative Procedures for the Immigration of Korean Workers to the Homeland [Chosen-jin rodosha naichi iju ni kansuru jimuyutsu]. Article 13 of this directive instructs that, “There must be no manner of discriminatory treatment compared to homeland workers.” (Hajime Maeda 1943, p. 31) The same phrase (“There must be no manner of discriminatory treatment compared to homeland workers”) is repeated in Particulars Concerning Implementation of Above Guidelines [Migi no yoryo toriatsukai ni kansuru saimoku] attached to Guidelines on Recruitment of Korean Workers [Chosen-jin rodosha boshu yoko]. (Chosen-jin Kyosei Renko Jittai Chosa Hokokusho Henshu linkai ed. 1999, p. 43) Guidelines on Recruitment of Korean Workers was issued in September 1939, and included the provision that there must be “no discriminatory treatment compared to homeland workers.” (Investigative Group on the Truth of Forced Removal of Koreans ed., Chosen-jin kyosei renko kyosei rodo [Forced removal and forced labor of Koreans] 1974, p. 621)

16 The same is repeated in Guidelines on Training and Treatment of Incoming Workers [Inyu romusha kunren toriatsukai yoko], issued by the Ministry of Welfare on the same day, and in Guidelines on Mediated Recruitment of Workers Relocated to the Homeland [Naichi inyu assen yoko] that was issued by the Government-General of Korea on February 20, 1942. These documents both state, “Due attention shall be paid to avoid any sense of discrimination.” (Shigeru Nagasawa 1992, Vol. 2, p. 76; Pak Kyong-Sik ed. 1976, Vol. 4, p. 1,254)
Reports also can be found from individual mines stating that no wage discrimination existed between Korean and Japanese workers. A total of 52 mines responded to the *Survey Report of Workers from the Korean Peninsula* outlined in the preceding section. (pp. 1-300) Among these, a total of 21 mines either responded explicitly that “no difference whatsoever existed between the treatment of Korean workers” and Japanese workers, or stated that the “same treatment” was accorded to Korean and Japanese workers. Needless to say, this means that both groups were subject to the same wage schedule, and not that everyone received the same amount. The 1940 *Notice on Terms of Employment* [Shugyo annai] of the Sumitomo Utashinai Mine (coalmine) states that, “wages shall be based on performance [output level].” (Sumitomo Utashinai Mine 1940b, p. 22) The *Rules of Employment* [Shugyo kisoku] of the Iwaki Mine contains the following: “3. Factors determining wages (1): Wages… shall be calculated based on predetermined unit value and output… Wages for jointly performed tasks shall be calculated proportionately.” (Shigeru Nagasawa 1987, p. 168) The point that the above *Notice on Terms of Employment* and *Rules of Employment* have in common is that no distinction is made between Japanese and Korean workers. The fact is that no document exists to show that the two groups of workers were treated differently. According to the Sumitomo Utashinai Mine’s *Terms Requested and Answer to the Terms Requested (Collection of Occupation Forces-related Materials)* [Shinchu-gun kankei tsuzuri], Korean workers who went on strike after the end of the war demanded that they be paid an additional 0.50 yen to compensate for the fact that they were receiving 0.50 yen less than Japanese workers during the war.” The company responded to this demand by stating that no difference in wages existed between Korean and Japanese workers, and that wages were calculated on the basis of experience, skill, and amount of work performed. (1945, pp. 415-417) Following this response, this matter was never brought up again.

Materials of the Tokyo District Mining Association regarding the Sado Mine (metal mine) state that the mine, “in compliance with government policy, adopted a non-discrimination policy in the treatment of Korean and Japanese workers.” The treatment of Korean workers is stated to be the same as “homeland workers.” [p. 147] The method for calculating wages is explained as follows. “Most of the workers from the Korean Peninsula work at jobs inside the mine. As is the case with homeland workers, wages for Korean workers working inside the mine is calculated based on output volume and a unit value that is calculated in advance based on such factors as age, experience, type of task performed and difficulty of task. The few Korean workers working outside the mine are paid a flat wage.” (p. 150) Writing in the same year, Hajime Maeda, the head of the personnel department of the Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship Company, reported that there was no wage disparity between Japanese and Korean workers, and that wages were determined based on levels of diligence and skill. (1943, p. 149)

Documents of the Japanese government, the Government-General of Korea and individual mines all state that there was no wage discrimination based on ethnicity. But were these claims accurate? Is it possible that Korean workers were being paid less than their Japanese counterparts for performing the same tasks? The first researcher to give an unambiguous answer to this question was Pak Kyong-Sik. (1965) His work continues to be regarded in academic circles

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18 Letter of Shigeru Nagasawa cited by Munehiro Miwa.
Lee Woo-Youn

as representing the mainstream of research and constitutes the generally accepted theory. Pak Kyong-Sik draws his conclusions from the information summarized in Table 3, which outlines the distribution of wages (monthly wages) by ethnicity in a Hokkaido coalmine. The source of this information is the survey conducted by the Institute for Science of Labor between January 15 and February 7, 1942, the results of which were published as Survey Report of Working Conditions of Korean Peninsula Workers. The information used by Pak Kyong-Sik is drawn from page 90 of the Survey Report, which provides data on Coalmine D. (Pak Kyong-Sik ed., 1982, Vol. 1, p. 90)\(^1\)

Table 3 shows that 82.3 percent of the Japanese workers received wages exceeding 50 yen, while 75.0 percent of the Korean workers earned less than 50 yen. Based on this information, Pak Kyong-Sik concluded that Korean workers received about half the amount received by Japanese workers and argued that this was proof of “ethnic discrimination.” This table is cited again in the “Summary Table” [Sokatsuhyo] appearing on pages 173-174 of the Survey Report. However, immediately before this table, “Korean Workers: Number of Years Employed” [Chosen-jin kinzoku nensu] and “Japanese Workers: Numbers of Years Employed” [Naichi-jin kinzoku nensu] appear on pages 169 – 170. Based on this information, Table 4 shows distribution of years employed among workers at Coalmine D.

In the case of Korean workers, 89.3 percent had been employed for less than two years, and only 10.7 percent had been employed for more than two years. In the case of Japanese workers, the corresponding figures were 42.8 percent and 57.2 percent, respectively.\(^2\) As can be surmised from Table 4, Korean workers were highly concentrated in the wage range of below 50 yen, while Japanese workers were concentrated in the relatively high wage range of above 50 yen. However, this skewed wage distribution reflects differences in work efficiency resulting from differences in years of employment. Shigeru Nagasawa presented a survey conducted at the Iriyama Coal Company in the Joban coal district that estimates differences in work efficiency resulting from differences in the composition of work teams. According to this study, in the case of a team consisting of four Japanese and three Korean workers, the average measure of tunneling advance per worker was 0.8 shaku (about 24 cm). The corresponding figure for a team consisting of eight Korean workers with two years of experience was 0.51 shaku (about 15 cm: equivalent to 63.8 percent of the previous mixed Japanese-Korean team). Moreover, a team of eight Korean workers who had just completed three months of training achieved only 0.25 shaku (about 8 cm). (Shigeru Nagasawa 1987, p. 28 citing Collected Papers on the Forced Removal of Koreans [Chosen-jin kyosei renko ronbun shusei] 1993, p. 170) This data indicates that the number of years of employment, or

\(^1\) The survey covered the following 20 sites: 6 coalmines in Hokkaido, 3 metal mines in Honshu, 5 coalmines in Kyushu, 3 construction companies in Honshu, 2 factories in Honshu, and 1 factory in Kyushu. The survey addressed production management, labor management and worker welfare facilities. (Institute for Science of Labor [Rodo Kagaku Kenkyu-jo] (1943a), pp. 3-8)

\(^2\) There is also a significant difference between Korean and Japanese workers with less than one year of experience. The vast majority of Koreans had worked for less than one year. The standard term of labor contracts was two years, which applied to both “recruitment” and “government-mediated recruitment.” Employers made various efforts to retain Korean workers at the end of their contract period. For example, mining companies defrayed the cost of several types of options, which included bringing family members from Korea, paying for a temporary visit to Korea, or paying a contract extension bonus. This was done because the experience and skills gained by a Korean coalminer during the two-year period of his contract were considered by the employers to constitute extremely valuable assets.
the accumulation of work experience, was the determining factor in work efficiency.\footnote{21}

The abovementioned *Survey Report* contains two more surveys that report on distributions by ethnicity and work experience, and the distribution of wages. Table 5 summarizes the information from Coalmine B, which was located in Hokkaido as in the case of Coalmine D.

In terms of years of employment, unlike in the case of Coalmine D, the Korean workers were concentrated in the 1–2 year range, while 42 percent of the Japanese workers were new hands with less than one year of experience. On the other hand, Korean workers with more than two years of experience accounted for 23.0 percent, while Japanese workers with more than two years of experience accounted for a much higher proportion, or 42.3 percent. These two differences balanced each other out so that, in comparison with Coalmine D, the distribution of wages among Korean and Japanese workers was very close to being identical. Thus, Korean and Japanese workers earning less than 50 yen accounted for 20.8 percent and 21.7 percent, respectively. The corresponding figures for Korean and Japanese workers earning more than 50 yen were 79.2 percent and 73.8 percent, respectively.

In the case of Metal Mine I, there were no Korean workers with more than two years of work experience, while 46.2 percent of the Japanese workers had been employed for more than two years. As a result, the distribution of wages shows that Korean and Japanese workers earning less than 50 yen accounted for 35.0 percent and 17.1 percent, respectively. Conversely, a substantially higher proportion of Japanese workers earned more than 50 yen than their Korean counterparts. It can be seen that the conclusions Pak Kyong-Sik reached regarding the presence of “ethnic discrimination” in wages is based on a one-sided interpretation of the data. As previously noted, wartime wages of Korean and Japanese workers were basically determined by the level of work efficiency. Judging logically, it is clear that wages were determined by work performance (coal output or metal ore output) and that work performance was directly and significantly affected by years of employment. This fact is borne out by data from Coalmine B and Metal Mine I on the distributions of work experience and wages. Looking at this important material collected, collated and later compiled by Pak Kyong-Sik himself, it seems that, instead of looking at the entire body of information available, Pak Kyong-Sik extracted certain portions of the information and arrived at hastily formulated conclusions.\footnote{22}

For more than 50 years, the assertions made by Pak Kyong-Sik were never critically examined. Consequently, these errors have survived to the present and have been repeated time and again. For example, Kim Moon-Young uncritically adopted Pak Kyong-Sik’s wage distribution from Coalmine D in Hokkaido and added some fragmentary statements from witnesses to say that the wages paid to Korean workers were one-half of those paid to Japanese workers, or slightly exceeded one-half. (1995, pp. 138-141) Chon Gi-Ho used data from 18 mines operated by Nippon Mining Company (known for its gold mines) to argue that “ethnicity-based wage discrimination” existed. (2013, pp. 102-104) The salient points of his research are summarized in Table 7, consisting of the average wages of laborers working inside the mines and those working outside the mines as of March 1943.

According to Chon Gi-Ho, wages paid to Koreans working inside the mines were equivalent to

\footnote{21}{In the prewar period, wages paid for principal mining tasks such as excavating and tunneling were output-based. Chong Jin-Song (1989) points out that, when the details of the wage determination system are taken into consideration, it is difficult to identify the existence of ethnicity-based wage differentials even during the 1920s.}

“75–85 percent of the wages paid to Japanese workers.” Having re-tabulated and re-calculated the data used by Chon Gi-Ho, the present writer found that Korean wages were actually equivalent to 86.8 percent of Japanese wages. It is questionable whether this level of disparity can be fairly labeled to constitute ethnic discrimination. Moreover, very substantial variations are seen among mines. Thus, the ratio of Korean to Japanese wages ranges from a low of 73.6 percent to a high of 112.2 percent. Instances of high Korean wages are found at the Bajo and Onoyama gold mines. As for workers employed outside the mines, Korean wages amounted to 94.1 percent of Japanese wages. Notably, Korean wages exceeded Japanese wages at seven mines, including the Hokuryu Mine. A comparison of mines indicates that the range of wage differentials was larger among those working outside the mines than among those working inside the mines. Thus, in the case of workers employed outside the mines, the ratio of Korean to Japanese wages ranges from a low of 67.8 percent to a high of 129.7 percent.

As has been noted, among workers employed outside the mines, Korean wages exceeded Japanese wages in certain instances. Chon Gi-Ho has attempted to explain this phenomenon in the following manner. “The number of Japanese male workers employed outside the mines decreased, and the number of Japanese female workers and temporary workers employed outside the mines increased, resulting in an overall decline in Japanese wages. As a result, wages for Korean workers employed outside the mines became relatively higher.” This is a plausible explanation. However, as previously stated, the nominal wages of both Korean and Japanese workers continued to climb throughout the war years, and there are cases where Koreans working inside the mines were being paid more than their Japanese counterparts. In other words, there is a possibility that wages for Koreans working inside the mines for the Nippon Mining Company were higher than those of their Japanese counterparts because Korean wages rose faster than Japanese wages, and not because the wages of Japanese workers employed outside mines declined. If this explanation is correct, it can then be argued that the figures in Table 7 do not really suggest a significant disparity in wages based on ethnicity, but rather that they reflect the relatively small difference in labor efficiency that existed between Korean and Japanese workers. This is a highly significant conclusion that leads to another question. Did the composition of Japanese mining teams change in a manner that lowered the productivity of Japanese workers, or did Korean wages rise relatively faster than that of Japanese workers? An effort must be made to determine which of these two possibilities more accurately reflects the course of events. To answer this question, it is necessary to examine data on changes in the wages of specific workers, such as may be found in “payroll ledgers.” While this information does exist, unfortunately it has not been made public.

The assertion that ethnicity-based wage discrimination did not exist in wartime Japan in a systematic and organized fashion, at least on an institutional level as indicated in the rules of employment of individual mines, is not necessarily new. The problem is that this position has been ignored in Korean academic circles. Shigeru Nagasawa has written concerning the Joban Mine that the wages of Korean workers were based on a subcontracting system where wages were calculated according to output, and that this arrangement applied to Japanese workers as well. Furthermore, Nagasawa explains that the calculation of individual wages was based on the following three factors: total output of the relevant work area, the proportional rate assigned to each individual worker (11 points for a highly skilled veteran front-line coalminer known as an osakiyama; 10 points for a only slightly less skilled front-line miner known as a sakiyama; 9.0 – 9.5 points for a back-end miner known as an atoyama; 7.5 – 8 points for a new hand), and the number of days worked. (Nagasawa 1977, p. 101 citing Collected Papers on the Forced Removal of Koreans 1993, p. 130) Nagasawa affirms the existence of the same arrangement in a paper published in 1987. Specifically, he notes that the wages of coalminers working in the Joban Mine were based on a contracted unit value and production tonnage, and that, as in the case of Japanese workers,
wages were calculated according to collective output. He adds that a fixed daily wage applied to other tasks, and that wages differed by type of work performed but not by ethnicity. Nagasawa concludes that a reading of “Terms of Wages” alone does not point to ethnic discrimination, and asserts that the same can be said about other companies as well. (Nagasawa 1987, citing Collected Papers on the Forced Removal of Koreans 1993, pp. 168-169)

Hiroshi Ichihara has argued that wages were determined based on productivity and type of job performed, and asserts that wage-related disputes occurred because it was difficult to properly explain this arrangement to Korean workers. Ichihara concludes that this should not be taken as evidence of ethnic discrimination, and interprets this to have been a problem that originated in the shortcomings of worker relocation organizations in Korea. (Ichihara, 1997, p. 25) The problem was that worker relocation organizations failed to properly inform Korean workers of why wages differed among individuals. Ichihara points out that the Government-General of Korea was not responsible for this misunderstanding and that the problem should be attributed to the personnel departments of Japanese coal and metal mines that were recruiting workers in Korea.

Kazumasa Aizawa is notable for his research on metal mines. When explaining the wage system of the Mukuromi Gold Mine in Iwate Prefecture, Aizawa states that wages for Korean workers were based on a grading system, which was also applied to calculating wages for Japanese workers. Aizawa explains that equal pay was paid for equal work because the purpose of recruiting Koreans was not to boost profits through payment of low wages, but to supplement the workforce and overcome labor shortages. (1988, p. 242) Although pursuing higher profit rates and supplementing the workforce are not mutually exclusive, Aizawa should be credited for correctly recognizing that the primary purpose of Korean recruitment was to supplement the workforce and overcome the general shortage of labor. On the other hand, Nishinarita concluded that, although Korean wages were slightly lower than those of their Japanese counterparts, this essentially reflected differences in skill levels and did not mean that the wage system discriminated based on ethnicity. However, Nishinarita states that the amounts received by Korean workers were actually very small due to forced savings, and that this is proof of exploitation. (1997, pp. 274-277)

Hiroshi Ichihara’s research on coalminers in Hokkaido reveals that in 1940, Korean workers at the Sumitomo Utashinai Mine were earning 30 percent less than Japanese workers. However, he explains that the disparity was due to the lower efficiency of Korean workers resulting from the language barrier and lower skill levels. (1991, p. 103) According to Hokkaido and Korean Workers [Hokkaido to Chosen-jin rodosha] compiled by the Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans, work at the coalmines operated by the Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship Company was conducted on a contract basis and, in accordance with the company’s internal regulations, there was no discrimination in wages between Korean and Japanese workers. That is, he writes that “wage differentials” resulted from differences in experience (years of employment) or, in other words, differences in work efficiency. (1999, pp. 248-251) Among more recent researchers, Brandon Palmer concludes that Korean workers were subject to the

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same wage system as Japanese workers. (2014, p. 300). In this connection, the following witness accounts are noteworthy. Accounts from Kyushu coalmines recount that workers were told, “Work more and earn more; work less and earn less.” (Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans 2006b, p. 177) In the case of Hokkaido, this became, “Load more and wage will increase; load less and wage will decrease.” (Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans 2006b, p. 153)

V. Trends in Wage Differentials

What trends can be identified in wartime wage differentials between Korean and Japanese workers? Did prewar wage differentials increase or decrease in wartime? While it is not easy to answer these questions, the purpose of this section is to sketch a rough outline based on published materials. Table 8 presents data from the Meiji Mining Company’s Akaike Coalmine located in Fukuoka Prefecture. The data covers the period between July 1944 and October 1945, and records the average daily wages of coalminers and installers (workers in charge of installing structures to prevent collapse in mineshafts and other work areas) by ethnicity. Most of the Korean workers employed in wartime coalmines worked inside the mines and, among these, the largest number worked as excavators. (Lee Woo Youn, 2015) As important as the information in Table 8 is, as the only source covering this period, and notwithstanding the fact that it was published in 1991, this data has never been used by researchers. As previously noted, a complex array of charges was withheld from wages, including forced savings and food costs. This has given rise to the generally accepted theory that a mere pittance was paid in wages after the deduction of these considerable sums, and that very serious ethnic discrimination existed in wages. It is likely that these assumptions have clouded the vision of researchers and prevented them from using this available material.

The following can be surmised concerning wage differentials between Korean and Japanese workers during a 14-month period leading to the end of the war. First, with regard to excavators, the wage differential ranged between 0.8 and 5.0 percent. With regard to installers, after excluding an exceptionally high differential registered in March 1945, the wage differential ranged between 1.4 and 5.0 percent. This differential is far too small to be identified as evidence of ethnic discrimination, and should be interpreted to reflect differences in work efficiency. It is also notable that Korean wages exceeded Japanese wages during certain periods. For excavators, this occurred during May and June 1945, and in November 1944 for installers. For the whole of 1944, wages for Korean excavators were 2.9 percent lower than their Japanese counterparts. However, in 1945, this relation was reversed to give a slight advantage to Korean excavators. During 1944, wages for Korean installers were 2.1 percent lower than their Japanese counterparts. The differential increased to 4.2 percent in 1945. As of September 1943, of the total number of Korean workers working inside coalmines, 54.2 percent were employed as excavators, 54.2 percent were employed as excavators and 8.9 percent as installers. (Sekitan Tosei-kai Romu-bu 1943, p. 317) Taking these figures into consideration, it is possible to theorize that ethnicity-based wage differentials in the Akaike Coalmine were lower in 1945 than in 1944.

Forced savings also applied to Japanese workers. This is because this system was adopted as a policy measure to counter wartime inflation. During the war years, Korean workers were able to normally withdraw their savings at the end of their term of employment. However, immediately after the end of the war, some workers hurriedly returned home before being able to settle accounts and withdraw their savings. This matter will be addressed in detail in a future paper.

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In the following paragraphs, an attempt is made to sketch a rough outline of trends in ethnicity-based wage differentials using the fragmentary data that is available. First, a series of other available sources shall be introduced. According to data covering 1942 from the Hitachi Coalmine in Ibaraki Prefecture, monthly average wages for Korean and Japanese workers were 52.96 yen and 59.46 yen, respectively, indicating that Japanese workers were paid more. However, the average number of workdays per month came to 21.9 days and 24.9 days, respectively, indicating that the Japanese workers worked three more days than their Korean counterparts. This data can be used to calculate the average daily wage for the two groups, which indicates that Korean workers earned 2.42 yen and Japanese workers earned 2.39 yen. That is, this calculation shows that Korean workers were earning slightly more per working day than their Japanese counterparts. (Rodo Jijo Chosasho, 1942, p. 90) At this point, it cannot be determined whether this differential reflects differences in labor efficiency or some other factor. However, among some Japanese labor managers, there was an understanding that this situation resulted from the “special economic treatment” accorded to Korean workers. For this reason, there was considerable dissatisfaction among some Japanese that they were being treated the “same as Koreans who had just completed their training period.” (Masaru Tonomura 2012, p. 67) In a survey of an unnamed coalmine located in Hokkaido, the Institute for Science of Labor found that Korean wages were higher in all of the categories of excavators, installers and mechanics working inside the mine, and that Japanese wages were higher for transporters, operators and miscellaneous tasks. (1943c, Pak Kyong-Sik ed., 1981, Vol. I, p. 19) Commenting on these examples, E.W. Wagner has written, “Koreans were paid the standard wage scale for Japanese workers.” (1951, p. 46) R. Mitchell points out that in certain instances, Korean workers “were not being treated worse than Japanese conscripts, and that in some cases they were being treated better.” (1967, p. 85)

The following material from the Joban Coalmine in Fukushima Prefecture also seems to have never been used before. In December 1944, the company adopted a plan to raise wages in the following year and estimated the increase in costs. The average daily labor cost used in these calculations is presented in Table 9. First, it is noted that the wage differential is larger than that at the Akaike Coalmine. Once again, it can be assumed that the reason for the disparity lies in the difference in the distribution of the number of years employed. Unfortunately, no data can be found in this material to prove this inference. As a proxy for years of employment, Table 10 summarizes the age structure of the miners working at the Joban Coalmine.

There is a significant difference in age distribution data available for the Iwaki Coalmine and the Joban Coalmine. First, the data from the Iwaki Coalmine includes both Korean as well as Japanese workers, who were in the majority, and presents the distribution for the entire workforce. Second, it should be noted that a comparison of the age distributions of Korean and

The following excerpt is from a document of Sumitomo Mining Company. “Workers from the Korean Peninsula undergo three months of training upon recruitment. The Government-General of Korea shows a particularly strong interest in the treatment of workers and their training and education during this period. This interest goes to the extent of becoming meddlesome. Regarding wages, the Government-General of Korea demands certain assurances. From the perspective of the labor managers of this mine, these matters constitute special treatment (preferential treatment that generally exceeds what is economically rational) accorded solely to workers from the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, such workers must be treated separately from the other workers.” (Sumitomo Konomai Mining Company 1941, cited in Yoshihiko Moriya ed. 1991, III The Koreans [Chosen-jin] Vol. 2, p. 1,483)

Tonomura cites the November 1940 issue of Tokudaka Monthly [Tokudaka geppo] as his source.

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Japanese workers indicates that the age of Korean workers does not correspond to their years of employment, and merely indicates the age at which they were mobilized and relocated to Japan. Korean workers were employed under two-year contracts, very few extended their contract at the end of two years and a very large number of Korean workers escaped before the end of their two year contracts. In contrast, Japanese coalminers mostly consisted of “on-site conscripts (gen-in choyo)” who were originally hired by the employer but later assigned as national conscripted workers in the same workplace. Therefore, the age distribution of Japanese workers more closely corresponds to their years of employment. Table 10 shows that 62.1 percent of the Korean workers at the Joban Coalmine were in their twenties. Compared to this high level of concentration, the data from the Iwaki Coalmine depicts a far more even age distribution. In other words, the Koreans working at the Joban Coalmine were less experienced and less skilled than their Japanese counterparts because far fewer of them had several years of actual experience in the mines. For this reason, the disparity in wages between Korean and Japanese workers shown in Table 9 can be interpreted to reflect the relatively lower productivity of Korean workers.

Table 9 also shows that the wage differential decreased between 1944 and 1945. Moriya has reached the following conclusion using data from Sumitomo’s Konomai Mine in Hokkaido. “On the grounds that Korean workers were less productive, wage increases were implemented six months to one year later than for Japanese workers. However, in the latter stage of government-mediated recruitment, this discriminatory treatment was gradually removed, beginning with the most skilled workers. Moreover, in the conscription stage, all discrimination was basically eliminated.” (2009, Vol. 3, pp. 37-38) While the implication is that ethnic discrimination gradually decreased during wartime, it is not possible to generalize this conclusion based on currently available information. Efforts must be made to discover new materials, and at the same time to carefully examine any data that is found.

Another important challenge is to identify the characteristics of wartime wage differentials between Korean and Japanese workers by comparing prewar wage disparities with wartime disparities. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to undertake such comparisons based on the information available at this time. The primary reason is the general paucity of wage data from both the prewar and wartime periods. As previously noted, data available from the Nippon Mining Company only covers March 1943, while data from the Meiji Mining Company’s Akaike Coalmine is the only time-series data that covers a period of more than one year. Prewar data on wage differentials by ethnicity at coal and metal mines in Japan is also extremely scarce. In light of the scarcity of information, it is the hope of the present writer that the following observations on trends in wage differentials may provide future researchers with valuable hints to be pursued.

First, Pak Kyong-Sik has written that, in 1921, the wages of Korean coalminers were equal to 60 percent of the wages of Japanese coalminers. (1956, p. 35; 2008, Hangul edition, p. 39) If this is correct, it would mean that wage differentials decreased substantially during the war years. However, because Pak Kyong-Sik inexplicably fails to cite any sources for his calculation, this line of inquiry cannot be pursued further. Second, the following can be found in materials prepared by the Osaka Municipal Government’s Department of Social Affairs, Survey Section. Wages for coalminers are presented by ethnicity in a list that divides wages into the three categories of “highest, standard and lowest” as of June 1923. Wages for Korean workers are lower than those of Japanese workers by 23.3 percent in the highest category, 16.0 percent in the standard category and 11.1 percent in the lowest category. This level of disparity is significantly larger than what was
observed at the Akaike Coalmine during the war years. However, compared with data for wage differentials during the war period from the Joban Coalmine of the Nippon Mining Company, the level of disparity is roughly the same. This makes it difficult to discuss whether disparities were growing or narrowing.

The third relevant source is entitled Work Conditions of Korean Workers in the District [Kannai Chosen-jin rodo jijo] and was compiled by the Fukuoka District Employment Agency (1929). Already cited in the research of Chong Jin-Song, this source states that “in 1928, wages for Korean coalminers were 20–30 percent lower than Japanese coalminers.” (Chong Jin-Song1989, p. 208)

As the previously mentioned Akaike Coalmine was also located in Fukuoka Prefecture, a reduction in the wage differential between Korean and Japanese workers during the war years can be ascertained by comparing data from the two mines. The fourth source again comes from Osaka and contains October 1930 wage data for manufacturing and construction jobs, which belong to job categories very similar to mining. This data affirms a sizeable disparity, with wages for Korean construction workers and manufacturing workers amounting to only 67.1 percent and 70.2 percent, respectively, of wages for corresponding Japanese workers. A comparison of these figures with wartime coalmining wages points to a narrowing of ethnicity-based wage differentials. It should be noted, however, that manufacturing wages represent wages for craftsmen (skilled workers), so that direct comparison with coalmining wages would not be appropriate. Due caution must be exercised in undertaking such comparisons. The fifth and final source of information is entitled Conditions of Korean Workers [Chosen-jin rodosha ni kansuru jokyo] (1924), which was compiled by the Ministry of Home Affairs’ Department of Social Affairs, Section 1. This is the only comprehensive survey that covers the Japanese homeland in its entirety. The publication contains information on coalmine and mining wages for July 1924. The information on mining wages is excerpted and reproduced in Table 11.

The job categories in Table 11 consist of “extraction and metallurgy,” “extraction,” and “mining,” suggesting that the nationwide survey was not conducted using a common set of criteria. Fukushima and Ibaraki Prefectures neighbor each other and sit astride the Joban coalfield, one of Japan’s three largest coalfields. Unlike Ibaraki Prefecture, there is hardly any evidence of ethnicity-based wage disparity in Fukushima. Data for Hokkaido also points to either no disparity or higher wages for Korean workers. While it is difficult to explain this result, what can be deduced from this table is that wages for Korean and Japanese workers differed significantly among individual coal and metal mines. This means that any effort to observe the trends in ethnic wage disparities between the 1920s and 1945 will ultimately have to await the publication of wage-related data from individual companies, analysis of which will allow us to verify whether prewar wage differentials decreased during the war years. However, two additional points must be taken into consideration. As mentioned before, the first point to bear in mind is the impact of changes in the composition of Japanese workers on wage differentials with their Korean counterparts. Second, if a trend is actually identified for this relatively short period of time, it will be important to determine the implication of such a trend. With these points in mind, it can be said that research on wartime ethnic wage disparity and trends in this disparity has just started.

According to Naoki Tanaka, the payroll ledgers [chingin daicho] of the Nitchitsu Emukae Mining Company were archived at Kyushu University’s Research Institute on Industrial Labor. (1978, p. 609) Payroll ledgers consisted of separate sheets entered and kept for each individual worker, and covers both Korean and Japanese workers. Each sheet contains detailed monthly records of work performed, wages paid and various allowances paid. It is presumed that this material is currently held at Kyushu University’s archives. It is believed that large volumes of this type of information exist. However, these have yet to be published.
As Japan mobilized its resources for total war, the most important objective was to increase output. To achieve this purpose, workers had to be incentivized. Employers on the other hand, were flush with cash that came from the wartime increase in money supply and government support for war industries. Putting these two factors together, it can be inferred that there was no monetary rationale for employers to pay discriminatory wages to Korean workers for reasons unrelated to labor productivity. In fact, discriminatory wages would have had a negative impact on the immediate objectives of managing Japan's wartime systems.

VI. Conclusion
Using materials published by researchers who have taken the position of “forced removal of workers and forced labor,” we have observed that wartime wages paid to Korean coal and metal mine workers in Japan were high enough to allow a degree of choice in allocating earnings between remittances to family in Korea and local expenditure. We were able to confirm that the assertion made in prior research that “wages were either never paid, or amounted to a mere pittance” is not supported by the available empirical data. Furthermore, we found that the wages of Korean coal and metal mine workers were not significantly different from the wages paid to Japanese workers. Thus, we have shown in this paper that the assertion of "ethnicity-based wage discrimination" found in prior research cannot be proven to be correct. In addition, various research and empirical data exist suggesting that the wage differential between Korean and Japanese workers actually decreased during the war years. Progress in research on this topic must await the publication of new materials from individual companies.

It has been the contention of prior research that a very large part of receivable wages was withheld through a system of forced savings. If this contention is accurate, it inevitably leads to the question of whether such savings were equitably paid back to Korean workers. Similarly, it must be determined whether remittances made to family members were properly delivered to the intended recipients. Although these are questions that cannot be avoided and must be answered in considering the wages paid to Korean workers, the fact is that they have never been subjected to rigorous and thorough research. This indeed is the area that the present writer hopes to examine in future research. Parallel to a re-examination of remittances and forced savings, the features and characteristics of “forced removal” of workers must be identified. Moreover, acts of Korean resistance, including escape and disputes with employers, must be studied, and a better understanding of the everyday life of Korean workers must be attempted by assessing the purchase of a wide range of consumer goods and examining such behavior as drinking, gambling, use of holidays, and excursions. Such research will allow us to more accurately re-create the everyday life of Korean coal and metal miners who were mobilized to work in wartime Japan. These are the challenges that the present writer looks forward to addressing in future research.
### Table 1: Wages and Expenditures at Major Mines in 1940

(Units: yen, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Average monthly wage</th>
<th>Average monthly savings</th>
<th>Average monthly remittance</th>
<th>Cost of food</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sapporo District</td>
<td>Utashinai Coalmine</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>84.29</td>
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<td>41.50</td>
<td>18.6*</td>
<td>17.44</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sorachi Coalmine</td>
<td>Coal</td>
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<td>25.78</td>
<td>13.95</td>
<td>23.50</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yubetsu Coalmine</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>71.39</td>
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<td>24.92</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harutori Coalmine</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>99.06</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>18.6*</td>
<td>50.46</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Yubari Coalmine</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>68.89</td>
<td>8.18</td>
<td>26.10</td>
<td>14.57</td>
<td>20.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mitsu Sunagawa Coalmine</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>80.37</td>
<td>20.16</td>
<td>23.49</td>
<td>13.95</td>
<td>22.77</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Toyoha Mine</td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>85.00</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>45.00</td>
<td>18.6*</td>
<td>-13.60</td>
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<td>Shizukari Mine</td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>80.04</td>
<td>20.17</td>
<td>24.93</td>
<td>16.28</td>
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<td>Konomai Mine</td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>85.46</td>
<td>36.78</td>
<td>31.94</td>
<td>17.05</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sendai District</td>
<td>Takadama Mine</td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>51.34</td>
<td>13.55</td>
<td>16.78</td>
<td>12.40</td>
<td>8.61</td>
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<td>Hosokura Mine</td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>58.42</td>
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<td>Funauchi Mine</td>
<td>Metal</td>
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<td>6.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>18.6*</td>
<td>-4.60</td>
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<td>Tokyo District</td>
<td>Sado Mine</td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>66.77</td>
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<td>21.16</td>
<td>12.40</td>
<td>21.77</td>
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<td>Kawazu Mine</td>
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<td>18.6*</td>
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<td>Shirataki Mine</td>
<td>Metal</td>
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<td>23.04</td>
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<td>10.85</td>
<td>14.21</td>
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<td>Kishu Mine</td>
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<td>4.20</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>15.50</td>
<td>41.29</td>
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<td>Ooya Mine</td>
<td>Metal</td>
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<td>17.00</td>
<td>18.6*</td>
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<td>Wanibuchi Mine</td>
<td>Metal</td>
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<td>3.70</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>13.95</td>
<td>6.45</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Imade Mine</td>
<td>Metal</td>
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<td>3.00</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>13.95</td>
<td>23.05</td>
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<td>Besshi Mine</td>
<td>Metal</td>
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<td>19.40</td>
<td>29.00</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>4.41</td>
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<td>Fukuoka District</td>
<td>Sanyo Anthracite Mine</td>
<td>Coal</td>
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<td>38.13</td>
<td>57.28</td>
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<td>Iizuka Coalmine</td>
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<td>21.13</td>
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<td>19.79</td>
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<td>32.33</td>
<td>18.6*</td>
<td>18.17</td>
</tr>
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<td>Location</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Average monthly wage</td>
<td>Average monthly savings</td>
<td>Average monthly remittance</td>
<td>Cost of food</td>
<td>Difference</td>
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<td>15.50</td>
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<td>75.64</td>
<td>12.73</td>
<td>16.72</td>
<td>12.40</td>
<td>33.79</td>
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</table>

| Average Ratio (%) | 71.95 (100.0) | 13.37 (18.6) | 24.84 (34.5) | 15.24 (21.2) | 18.50 (25.7) |

Table 2: Breakdown of Wages and Expenditures

(Units: yen, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amounts withheld</th>
<th>Remitted</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Food</td>
<td>Savings</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Sub-total</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>15.24 (21.2)</td>
<td>13.37 (18.6)</td>
<td>11.78 (16.4)</td>
<td>40.39 (56.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.50 (Cannot be computed)</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.52 (Cannot be computed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>18.00 (12.0)</td>
<td>45.00 (30.0)</td>
<td>25.00 (16.7)</td>
<td>88.00 (58.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td>67.16 (53.8)</td>
<td>36.88 (29.6)</td>
<td>20.75 (16.6)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Sources: Data for 1940 is from Japan Mining Association (1940), pp. 1-300. Data for 1941 is from Rodo Jijo Chosa Jo (1941), p. 90. This source provides no data on monthly average income, savings and remittance for 1941. Data for 1944 is from Sekitan Tosei Kai Kyushu Chibu (1945), p. 209, and data for 1945 is from Yoshihiko Moriya (1996), p. 128.

Table 3: Wage Distribution by Ethnicity at Coalmine D in Hokkaido

(Units: number of individuals, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Less than 30 yen</th>
<th>30-50 yen</th>
<th>50-70 yen</th>
<th>70-90 yen</th>
<th>90-110 yen</th>
<th>110-130 yen</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>32 (3.6)</td>
<td>123 (14.0)</td>
<td>187 (21.3)</td>
<td>194 (22.1)</td>
<td>181 (20.6)</td>
<td>160 (18.2)</td>
<td>877 (100.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>117 (36.1)</td>
<td>126 (38.9)</td>
<td>40 (12.3)</td>
<td>22 (6.8)</td>
<td>7 (2.2)</td>
<td>12 (3.7)</td>
<td>324 (100.0)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Table 4: Distribution of Years Employed by Ethnicity at Coalmine D in Hokkaido

(Units: number of persons, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Less than 1 year</th>
<th>1-2 years</th>
<th>2-3 years</th>
<th>3-4 years</th>
<th>4-5 years</th>
<th>5 years or more</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>273 (74.8)</td>
<td>53 (14.5)</td>
<td>39 (10.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>365 (100.0)</td>
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<td>Japanese</td>
<td>276 (29.6)</td>
<td>123 (13.2)</td>
<td>106 (11.4)</td>
<td>101 (10.8)</td>
<td>42 (4.5)</td>
<td>285 (30.5)</td>
<td>933 (100.0)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: See text
Table 5: Years Employed and Wages at Coalmine B

(Units: number of persons, %)

A: Years employed

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<tr>
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<th>Less than 1 year</th>
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<th>2-3 years</th>
<th>3-4 years</th>
<th>4-5 years</th>
<th>5 years or more</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>(20.8)</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>524</td>
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<td></td>
<td>933 (100.0)</td>
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<td>448</td>
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B: Wages

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<th>90-110 yen</th>
<th>110 yen or more</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>1,179</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td>5,076 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6: Years Employed and Wages at Metal Mine I

(Units: number of persons, %)

A: Years employed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Less than 1 year</th>
<th>1-2 years</th>
<th>2-3 years</th>
<th>3-4 years</th>
<th>4-5 years</th>
<th>5 years or more</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>(33.8)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>188</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>284 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>654 (31.9)</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2,053 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B: Wages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Less than 30 yen</th>
<th>30-50 yen</th>
<th>50-70 yen</th>
<th>70-90 yen</th>
<th>90-110 yen</th>
<th>110-130 yen</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>(14.6)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>73 (4.2)</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>1,722 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Wages at Nippon Mining Company

(Units: wages in yen, differential in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Mine</th>
<th>In-mine workers</th>
<th>Outside workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hokuryu</td>
<td>3.435</td>
<td>4.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyoha</td>
<td>4.207</td>
<td>5.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eniwa</td>
<td>3.534</td>
<td>4.327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogane</td>
<td>3.806</td>
<td>5.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamikita</td>
<td>3.631</td>
<td>4.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akaishi</td>
<td>3.395</td>
<td>3.493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanawa</td>
<td>3.127</td>
<td>4.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otani</td>
<td>3.050</td>
<td>3.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takadama</td>
<td>2.342</td>
<td>3.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitachi</td>
<td>3.112</td>
<td>4.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikko</td>
<td>3.231</td>
<td>2.797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mikawa</td>
<td>3.031</td>
<td>3.801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minegasawa</td>
<td>2.804</td>
<td>2.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogoya</td>
<td>3.394</td>
<td>4.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirataki</td>
<td>3.614</td>
<td>4.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajo</td>
<td>3.660</td>
<td>3.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onoyama</td>
<td>3.170</td>
<td>2.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasuga</td>
<td>2.696</td>
<td>2.880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chon Gi-Ho (2003), p. 103, based on data contained in Nippon Mining Company, Showa 17 nen shimohanki jīgyō gaikyo [Summary of operations during second half of Showa 17 (1942)].

Note: Wage differential in Tables 7 and 8 are computed as follows: (Japanese wages – Korean wages) x 100 / Japanese wages.
### Table 8: Average Daily Wages at Meiji Mining Company’s Akaike Coalmine

(Units: wages in yen, differential in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Excavators</th>
<th>Installers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>4.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>4.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>4.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>4.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>4.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>4.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>4.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>4.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>4.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>5.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>5.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>4.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Meiji kogyosho romu geppo* [Meiji Mining Company monthly labor report], various issues, as cited in Eidai Hayashi (1991), pp. 1153-1220.

### Table 9: Daily Wages at Joban Coalmine

(Units: wages in yen, differential in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>In-mine male workers</th>
<th>Outside male workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old average daily wage</td>
<td>4.127</td>
<td>4.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New average daily wage</td>
<td>4.947</td>
<td>5.743</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Joban Coalmining Company (1944), p. 382.
Table 10: Age Distribution of Coalminers

(Units: number of persons, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Korean workers (Joban Coalmine)</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>Total all workers (Iwaki Coalmine)</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-20</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25</td>
<td>1,587</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30</td>
<td>1,365</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-35</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-40</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-45</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-50</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-55</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 and over</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,754</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5,212</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Data as of October 31, 1944 for Joban Coalmine and October 31, 1943 for Iwaki Coalmine

Table 11: Mining Related Wages

(Units: wages in yen, differential in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture and Job</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Highest</th>
<th>Normal</th>
<th>Lowest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka: Extraction and Metallurgy</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wage differential</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saga: Extraction</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wage differential</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamaguchi: Extraction</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wage differential</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukushima: Extraction and Metallurgy</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wage differential</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibaraki: Mining</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wage differential</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hokkaido: Extraction and Metallurgy</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wage differential</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Social Affairs, Section 1, Chosen-jin rodosha ni kansuru jokyo [Conditions of Korean workers], pp. 489-529.
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I am grateful to Professor Munehiro Miwa for his guidance on matters related to notation and citation.
During the past quarter century, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) nuclear problem has posed an intermittent threat to the international community. The crisis in the early 1990s and that in the early to mid-2000s are respectively labeled the first and the second nuclear crisis, followed by the ongoing third nuclear crisis, but the structure and dynamics of these crises are not uniform. The third nuclear crisis has come with issues that could not be resolved in the two earlier crises.

I. Regional Nonproliferation Treaty Arrangements: Adopting NPT Regime Norms

North Korea’s attempt to conclude a bilateral peace agreement to replace the 1953 Military Armistice Agreement with the United States – excluding Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and China – has been fairly consistent since the middle of the Cold War. The United States has refused to accept the offer, regarding it as a means to render the US-South Korea alliance impotent through the disbanding of the United Nations Command in Korea, a legacy of the Korean War, and as a means to provoke the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. Breaking this precedent of no US-DPRK bilateral talks was what followed the declaration by North Korea in 1993 to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The declaration was made in defiance of the request by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for special inspections to the sites where North Korea was suspected to be extracting plutonium for develop nuclear weapons. With a looming fear of North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, the Clinton administration, after some hesitation, decided to hold US-North Korea talks that were limited exclusively to nuclear proliferation issues, attempting to prevent the declaration from coming into effect. These were not initially seen as a venue for talking about regional security issues on the Korean Peninsula, and the proposed US-North Korea bilateral peace agreement was off the agenda.

One more indication of this focus can be seen. In response to North Korea’s declaration, US State Department analyst C. Kenneth Quinones met with Li Yong Ho, the Deputy Director of the International Organization Bureau at the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for informal talks in New York. A central aspect of these talks was Negative Security Assurances (NSA), the norm provided to Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) under the NPT that Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those states. The Clinton administration, after some hesitation, decided to hold US-North Korea talks that were limited exclusively to nuclear proliferation issues, attempting to prevent the declaration from coming into effect. These were not initially seen as a venue for talking about regional security issues on the Korean Peninsula, and the proposed US-North Korea bilateral peace agreement was off the agenda.

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North Korea, however, did not share this US position. While Li Yong Ho, who attended the
informal discussions with the United States, was affiliated with the International Organization Bureau, the head of the DPRK delegation at the formal talks was Kang Sok-ju, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was responsible for US affairs. Now that the bilateral talks North Korea had been seeking since the Cold War were finally realized, North Korea attempted to raise diplomatic and military issues inherent to US-DPRK relations.

The joint statement by the United States and North Korea was adopted on June 11, 1993, the day before the North Korea’s NPT withdrawal declaration was to come into effect. The United States, in the statement, granted assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons (emphasis added). Of note is that the US added the word “including” in the statement on the threat and use of force. This can be interpreted as meaning the United States and the DPRK had agreed on the principle of no use of any kind of force, not just nuclear weapons. Assuming the United States did not possess biological and chemical weapons, the United States confirmed that it would not threaten to use or actually use not only nuclear weapons but conventional weapons as well, providing a comprehensive security guarantee that transcended the NSA. While this was largely due to North Korean demands, it should be underlined that what North Korea promised was a unilateral moratorium of the withdrawal declaration, not a retraction of the declaration. North Korea perceived that the assurances by the United States were not sufficient for retracting the declaration. For North Korea, the US-DPRK joint statement was no more than a provisional agreement.

What North Korea demanded more than anything from the United States was an exclusive US-DPRK peace agreement that would replace the Military Armistice Agreement. A clear indication of this, even before the issuing of the joint statement, was North Korea’s expulsion of Czech representatives from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) at Panmunjom in an attempt to disband the military armistice mechanism. However, as chronicled in detail by Quinones, who was deeply involved in the US-North Korea informal talks, while North Korea proposed a US-DPRK peace agreement, the United States refused to raise the issue. What the United States gave North Korea instead was a more robust security assurance. A precedent for this was the trilateral NSA provided along with Russia to Ukraine in January 1994, when nuclear weapons left behind in Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union were transported to Russia.

As North Korea was escalating the crisis by removing nuclear fuel rods without IAEA supervision, the United States attempted to keep North Korea in the NPT by substituting a bilateral security assurance for the assurances given in the trilateral agreement on Ukraine. In October 1994, the Agreed Framework was signed between the United States and North Korea. Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea consented to a freeze on nuclear activities, eventual dismantling of nuclear facilities, and acceptance of IAEA special inspections. North Korea was in the unprecedented position of declaring its withdrawal from the NPT while simultaneously putting on hold its withdrawal. In this regard, under the inherent concept of “continuity of safeguard,” measures were taken whereby IAEA personnel would have the role of “monitoring” nuclear facilities to ensure the freeze was in effect.

In the security assurance, the United States provided North Korea with an independent NSA, adding the adjective “formal” for the first time ever. The United States may have intended to make the NSA more binding, thinking that this would allow it to undo the assurance regarding conventional weapons indicated in the earlier US-North Korea joint statement.

Furthermore, the Agreed Framework was compatible with the US-South Korea alliance and the US-Japan alliance, and left the Armistice Agreement unchanged. The Agreed Framework did not prevent either US forces or UN forces from retaliating against North Korea with conventional weapons if North Korea were to conduct a non-nuclear armed attack against South Korea or Japan. The Agreed Framework in conjunction with the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) responsible for putting it into practice were in effect regional arrangements.
from the NPT. The only regional features in the agreement were promises that US-North Korea relations would be improved in phases as North Korea halted its nuclear activities, eventually leading to normal diplomatic relations between the two countries as well as support for inter-Korean dialogues.

North Korea, however, did not have the same understanding of the Agreed Framework as did the United States. Rather than being just a regional NPT arrangement, North Korea regarded this document as a regional arrangement that would lead to the dismantling of the US-South Korea alliance through improved relations with the United States, North Korea attempted to lure the US into renewed talks in areas that were not stipulated in the Agreed Framework.

One such area was the establishment of a peace regime. Even after the Agreed Framework, North Korea continued to threaten South Korea while deliberately dismantling the military armistice mechanism. North Korea intended to exclude South Korea in the process of establishing a peace regime, and to legitimize an exclusive bilateral peace agreement between the United States and North Korea. The Four-party Talks that President Bill Clinton and President Kim Young-sam jointly proposed in response at their summit meeting on Jeju Island on April 16, 1996 envisioned a peace agreement with North and South Korea as the primary signatories, with the involvement of the United States and China. This constituted a counter-proposal to the US-DPRK peace agreement proposed by North Korea. If a peace regime were to be established, one of the remaining Cold War structures on the Korean Peninsula would be dismantled. The United Nations Command in Seoul, the operational command during the Korean War, would be disbanded and, in accordance with the 1954 Status of Forces Agreement for UN forces, some of the US bases in Japan would no longer be designated as UN bases, including UN Rear Headquarter. As this would sever the nexus linking Japan, the United States, and South Korea since the Korean War, it became all the more important to strengthen the deterrence capabilities of the US-South Korea alliance and the US-Japan alliance. Even if the Four-party Talks had failed to establish a peace regime in line with US and South Korean expectations, it would still necessitate maintaining the links among Japan, the United States, and South Korea.

The “US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security,” issued by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in Tokyo on the day after the US-South Korea summit where Clinton and Kim had proposed the Four-party Talks, manifested these imperatives. It also paved the way to an “updating” of the US-Japan alliance through the revision of the Guidelines on US-Japan Defense Cooperation, shifting the weight of the US-Japan Security Treaty from Article V, regarding an armed attack on Japanese territory, to Article VI, maintaining “international peace and security in the Far East.” It also led Japan to amend its own legal framework by enacting a law called the Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. The attempts to establish a peace regime, regardless of their success or failure, could not be allowed to damage the US-South Korea and US-Japan alliances.

The ballistic missile issue was another area not stipulated in the Agreed Framework by which North Korea attempted to lure the United States into a new arrangement. North Korea had already started deployment of the Nodong medium-range ballistic missile, which was capable of reaching Japan. In June 1998, North Korea acknowledged that it was exporting missiles, which it had previously disavowed, and flaunted its ballistic missile development. North Korea also offered the idea of conducting asymmetrical trades—ceasing missile exports in exchange for lifting economic sanctions, and suspending development in exchange for establishing a peace regime. In August 1998, North Korea fired the Taepodong-1 missile over Japanese air space as part of what was viewed as the start of a renewed policy to the United States.

The United States was not about to nullify the Agreed Framework on account of this problem, thereby ending the nuclear freeze and freeing North Korea to pursue nuclear weapons development. In September 1999, the United States and North Korea issued the Berlin
Agreement, whereby North Korea would retain from further launches of “long-range missiles” while talks with the United States were underway. The missile issue encompasses subjects that include the export, development, deployment, and launching of missiles but, in all of the negotiations with the United States, the only time an agreement was reached with North Korea was on the subject of launching missiles. North Korea seems to have thought that by retaining “long-range” missile launches, it would lead the United States into bilateral talks and the eventual conclusion of a bilateral peace agreement with the United States.

During this period, three channels for dialogue were at work between the two countries: the US-North Korea Agreed Framework on freezing nuclear activities, multilateral Four-party Talks on a peace regime, and the US-North Korea Berlin Agreement on missiles. By the end of the Clinton administration, only the US-DPRK Agreed Framework and the US-DPRK Berlin Agreement remained in effect. The Four-party Talks were stalled due to North Korea’s insistence on a bilateral peace agreement with the United States. Following the inter-Korean summit in June 2000, a US-North Korea Joint Communiqué was released when North Korean Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok visited Washington. This document stated that the two sides “agreed that there were a variety of available means, including Four-party Talks,” toward establishment of a peace regime. Whereas the United States, in keeping with the concept of the Four-party Talks proposal, insisted on a North-South peace regime with the involvement of the US and China, North Korea adhered to its demand for a bilateral peace agreement with the United States. The statement failed to hammer out a single method of establishing a peace regime, and rather exposed the division between the two sides.

II. Regional Alternative to the UN Security Council: Six-Party Talks Joint Statement and Alliance

The Bush administration’s call for “preemption” was the antithesis of the approach taken by the Clinton administration. The difference was all the more evident when North Korea, having been labeled part of the “Axis of Evil” by President Bush following the 9/11 terror attacks, proposed a US-North Korea non-aggression pact. The proposal showed that North Korea’s distrust of the NSA in the Agreed Framework in conjunction with the US’ call for preemption had prompted North Korea’s decision to later leave the Agreed Framework. Although North Korea did not then possess the ballistic missiles that would allow it to ask for a “mutual” non-aggression pact with the United States, the United States would be legally restricted, if it were to accede to this proposal, to retaliating against North Korea only in the event that South Korea and/or Japan were under attack.

Diplomacy regarding the Bush administration’s preemption policy initially went through Japan. In September 2002, the first steps toward having North Korea acknowledge that it had abducted Japanese citizens and normalizing Japan-DPRK diplomatic relations were taken at the Japan-North Korea summit meeting with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Prime Minister Koizumi succeeded in convincing Kim Jong-il to promote the normalized relations between Japan and North Korea on the same conditions that were given when South Korea established diplomatic ties with Japan in 1965. North Korea also effectively abandoned its demand for “post-war reparations” in the Three-party Joint Declaration made when Japanese lawmaker Shin Kanemaru visited North Korea in the early 1990s. The Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration signed on Koizumi’s visit urged North Korea to comply with international agreements on the nuclear issue while also urging the United States to comply with the Agreed Framework. Koizumi intended to utilize North Korea’s desire for normalizing Japan-DPRK diplomatic relations to resolve the nuclear and abduction issues, and advancing relations with the US and Japan concurrently. Kim Jong-il, in the Pyongyang Declaration, agreed to extend the moratorium on "missile launches" in the Berlin Agreement, which implicitly included medium-range ballistic
missiles such as the *Nodong*.

North Korea’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, revealed by the United States in October 2002, completely changed the dynamics of the situation. Already at the time of the Japan-North Korea summit meeting, the United States was convinced that North Korea had an HEU program. If the United States had revealed the program after confirming that North Korea had fulfilled its obligations in the Agreed Framework to dismantle its nuclear facilities and accepted IAEA special inspections, the United States might have been able to at least restrain North Korean attempts at plutonium-based nuclear development. However, the Bush administration revealed the HEU program before full compliance by North Korea with the Agreed Framework. North Korea reacted not only by resuming plutonium-based nuclear development but also by secretly continuing with the HEU program.

When North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003, leaving North Korea alone as it sought to withdraw from the Agreed Framework was not an option for the United States. It became clear that drawing North Korea back to the NPT just by taking the original approach leading to the Agreed Framework — that of adopting NPT norms — would have limited success. As noted earlier, North Korea had proposed to the Bush administration a bilateral non-aggression pact. The proposal gave the United States much food for thought on making a commitment not to use forces in addition to the NSA in convincing North Korea to abandon its nuclear programs and return to the NPT.

Moreover, the Bush administration was about to wage a war in Iraq and was keen to avoid escalating tensions in Northeast Asia. Had the Security Council deliberated when the IAEA reported to the UN Security Council that North Korea’s nuclear development could no longer be regarded as being for peaceful use, it would have had to impose economic sanctions in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter. North Korea would have most likely countered these sanctions by proceeding with nuclear development. The United States, through informal talks with China, decided to avoid imposing economic sanctions by not deliberating on the matter in the Security Council. The United States instead chose regional talks as a way of inducing North Korea to abandon its nuclear development program. The United States intended to take regional measures that the Security Council was unable to take, including normalizing diplomatic relations and providing economic aid. The Six-party Talks that emerged as a result were multilateral talks in which the United States and China cooperated to enable a regional alternative to the Security Council and to “internalize” North Korea.

Moreover, the regional approach included an issue inherent to the Korean Peninsula—the establishment of a peace regime. China also favored this approach. Even as North Korea continued its demand for a US-DPRK peace agreement, the Four-party Talks with the involvement of China as a de-facto signatory to the Military Armistice Agreement were an effective framework, even though they had temporarily stalemated. The Four-party Talks were the original concept proposed in US-South Korea summit talks, which made it easy for South Korea to consent to them. Recalling that the Four-party Talks were compatible with both the US-South Korea and US-Japan alliances, it was natural to include both South Korea and Japan in the multilateral talks. The Bush administration preferred the regional approach to handling the second nuclear crisis. The US representative in the second crisis was James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, whereas in the first nuclear crisis it was Robert L. Gallucci, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. This difference in the officials’ titles is further suggestive of the Bush administration’s regional approach.

In light of the regional approach, the form of the security assurance in the Six-party Talks joint statement (September 19, 2005) is worth noting. With all the parties referring to “peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and all of Northeast Asia” and to “mutual respect,” North Korea committed itself to “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.” In response,
the United States affirmed that it had “no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons,” providing not only NSA but also security assurances with regard to conventional weapons. As seen in North Korea’s proposal for a bilateral non-aggression pact with the United States, the security assurances addressed North Korean security concerns. However, the statement was consistent with the US’ security commitments in its alliance with South Korea and Japan. If North Korea proceeded with its nuclear development program or conducted an armed attack against South Korea or Japan, harming the “peace and stability of all of Northeast Asia,” the US would deem the joint statement to be violated and would be able to retaliate against North Korea. As far as the joint statement was adopted in the multilateral talks including Japan and South Korea, a violation of the joint statement by North Korea could be seen as invalidating a security assurance.

The features of the regional approach in the joint statement are most clearly evident in the peace regime issue. The document states that “the directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate forum.” Whereas the other items in the joint statement begin with “the six parties” as the subject, this is the only item with “the directly related parties” as the subject. Assuming that “an appropriate forum” indicates replacing the Military Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement, “the directly related parties” would refer to North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and China, which were all related to the Military Armistice Agreement. The phrase “negotiate a permanent peace regime” suggests Four-party Talks. So long as both the United States and South Korea were involved, the peace agreement would be concluded between North and South Korea as the primary signatories, with the United States and China also involved. It could not be a bilateral US-North Korea agreement that excluded South Korea and China.

The biggest problem with the document is that, unlike the Agreed Framework, it failed to freeze North Korea’s nuclear programs using either plutonium or HEU. Three years had passed since North Korea restarted its nuclear facilities, and its nuclear activities were not suspended even with the adoption of this joint statement. The price of adopting the statement without imposing a nuclear freeze became clear as soon as the deal was reached. In response to the imposition of financial sanctions, North Korea again began launching ballistic missiles. In July 2006, North Korea test-fired several ballistic missiles, and declared that the US-DPRK Berlin Agreement was no longer valid. Included in the series of launches were Nodong and Taepodong-2 missiles that, even if the latter was unsuccessful, were capable of striking Japan. With these launches, North Korea was in violation of the moratorium on launching ballistic missiles that was part of the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. North Korea also ended its self-imposed halt on launching medium-range missiles that it had been observing since the Pyongyang Declaration.

Just three months later, in October, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. This would not have been possible unless North Korea had been extracting plutonium while participating in the Six-party Talks. These talks ended up granting North Korea additional time to extract plutonium. The only freeze on both nuclear activities and ballistic missile launches was in effect for a mere three years, from September 1999 to the fall of 2002.

Assuming that the Six-party Talks were regional alternatives to the UN Security Council on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, when North Korea proceeded not only with ballistic missile test-fires but a nuclear test as well, there was no alternative but to have the Security Council deliberate the issues. The Six-party Talks included as participants the United States, China and Russia, which were all permanent members of the Security Council. Conducting a nuclear test despite its commitment in the joint statement on “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs,” North Korea was breaking its promises to China and Russia, and could not expect those countries to stand up for it. North Korea was also aware of this. In response to North Korea’s nuclear test, the Security Council voted unanimously, including China
and Russia, to impose economic sanctions as provided for in Chapter VII: Article 41 of the UN Charter (non-military measures). As long as North Korea ran counter to its pledge in the joint statement to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, the security assurances to North Korea in the document lost their effect. While the US-North Korea talks took place after the nuclear test, the US did not grant either NSA or security assurances with respect to conventional weapons. Now that North Korea had violated the document, the United States believed it would be justified in using nuclear or conventional weapons to retaliate against any use of force by North Korea directed at South Korea or Japan.

III. Divergence and Convergence over Coercive Approaches: UN Charter Chapter VII

Even as North Korea repeatedly conducted nuclear tests and ballistic missile test-launches, the UN Security Council did not necessarily strengthen its sanctions aimed at “externalizing” North Korea. Article 41 of the UN Charter stipulates that members are allowed to sever economic or diplomatic relations. The UN resolutions adopted by the Security Council thereafter, even while citing this article, were limited to prohibiting exports of luxury items and materials needed for WMD and military development. This is due to China’s blocking of attempts by the United States and other countries to expand the sanctions to North Korea’s civilian sector. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China was in a position to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. However, China was concerned about the threat to the lives of North Koreans from sanctions imposed on the civilian sector, and about political disruption in North Korea. Such regional considerations by China were reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions.

Against this backdrop, US President Barack Obama took office in 2009 and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il died in 2011. Kim Jong-un, who had been groomed to succeed his father during the last years of Kim Jong-il’s life, became the new North Korean leader. At a time when it would have been normal to be in mourning— as Kim Jong-il was after the death of his father Kim Il-sung— Kim Jong-un consolidated his power base and undertook a diplomatic offensive. What later became known as the 2012 Leap Day Agreement was widely expected to mark the first diplomatic achievement of the Kim Jong-un regime with the United States. In this agreement, the United States was to provide 240,000 metric tons of food aid with the prospect of additional assistance. In exchange, North Korea would agree to accept IAEA personnel to monitor nuclear activities (including uranium enrichment activities) at Yongbyon, as well as a moratorium on nuclear tests and long-range missile launches. In addition, North Korea promised compliance with the Military Armistice Agreement. This promise to observe the Military Armistice Agreement had great significance for South Korea, which had seen its corvette Cheonan sunk and Yeonpyong Island shelled by North Korea’s armed forces in 2010. Not long after, North Korea, citing its “right to the peaceful use of space,” attempted to launch a satellite with its Unha-3 rocket. North Korea must have expected the United States would protest that it was a violation of the agreement, but it also believed the United States could not readily abandon the agreement so long as nuclear tests and the Military Armistice Agreement were being held “hostage.” The United States, however, regarded the Unha-3 launch as a violation of the Leap Day Agreement, which ended after a brief lifespan of one-and-a-half months.

“Strategic patience,” the approach adopted by the Obama administration, meant that the United States would not engage in talks with North Korea until economic sanctions persuaded North Korea to change its course to denuclearization. The failure of the Leap Day Agreement had the effect of hardening the Obama administration’s stance. As a result, the Leap Day Agreement was the only US-DPRK agreement during the eight years of the Obama administration.

After the collapse of the Leap Day Agreement, the Kim Jong-un regime set out to develop a new policy with the United States. The North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated
in July 2012 that it would be undertaking a “full review of the nuclear issue,” which resulted in the North demanding a peace agreement with the United States while continuing to refuse denuclearization. During the rule of Kim Jong-il, as seen in the Six-party Talks, it had been argued that denuclearization was a condition for the establishment of a peace regime. The Kim Jong-un regime broke this conditional relationship by asking for a peace agreement with the US while continuing to possess nuclear weapons. Since then, North Korea has asserted that the Six-party Talks were “dead.”

The success of the Obama administration relative to North Korea was not in US-DPRK relations but in Japan-South Korea relations. Under the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan adopted a new interpretation of its right to collective self-defense, and the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation were revised, and South Korea’s Park Gyeun-hye administration was brought into the updating of the US-Japan alliance. This paved the way for the drafting of Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security that broadened the scope of actions that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces could take in joint response to an emergency on the Korean Peninsula.

Meanwhile, the Obama administration did not come up with a workable policy toward North Korea. While “strategic patience” meant the United States would not resort to using force, the stance also meant dependence on China, which had the biggest influence on how economic sanctions would be applied to North Korea. In other words, “strategic patience” was close to being a form of “strategic outsourcing” to China. However, while criticizing North Korea each time it conducted a nuclear test, China attempted to limit economic sanctions to the military realm, as noted above. A change to this stance only came in 2016.

In response to North Korea’s fifth nuclear test on September 9, 2016, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2321, which it had been hesitant to pass. Whereas an earlier resolution on the export of coal, iron, and iron ore exempted transactions for “livelihood purposes” that were unrelated to the funding of nuclear and ballistic missile programs, this new resolution added a condition on the import of coal by member states. The Chinese Commerce Ministry thereafter announced measures to suspend imports of coal from North Korea, saying the imports had hit the limit mandated by Resolution 2321.

The Trump administration came into office against this background. US President Donald Trump, while distancing himself from “strategic patience”, began by working with China to apply the principles of Article 41 of the UN Charter. President Trump sat down for talks with Chinese leader Xi Jinping both in Florida and Beijing in 2017. More than just regional talks on the North Korean problem, these were talks on collective security about extending the scope of the sanctions under Article 41 to the civilian sector. The US-China talks were the equivalent of moving summit-level talks from the UN Headquarters in New York to Florida and Beijing.

The Trump administration was also applying military pressure by sending multiple aircraft carrier strike groups near the Korean Peninsula. While such pressure may have been necessary, it would be naïve to think that alone would persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. There are no known examples of a NNWS that gave into economic sanctions and abandoned its nuclear weapons after having reached the breakout stage for possessing such weapons. Admittedly South Africa abandoned the nuclear weapons it once held and joined the NPT as a NNWS, but it would be hard to conclude this shift resulted from economic sanctions. South Africa was persuaded to abandon its nuclear weapons following regime change, in which white minority rule was replaced by a black majority administration. Other contributing factors to South Africa’s decision was the end of the Cold War and the winding down of the Angolan civil war, which eliminated a threat from a northern neighbor. Another possible example is Ukraine, where nuclear weapons were left over following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it should be recalled that the weapons belonged to the Soviet Union, not Ukraine. It is difficult
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to think North Korea would be the first to break this empirical rule. All of the examples where economic sanctions were successful in controlling nuclear development, including the recent US-Iran agreement, were countries that had yet to reach the breakout stage for possessing nuclear weapons. Moreover, the successes were not brought about by economic sanctions alone, but required US commitment.

In the past, North Korea adhered to its nuclear development despite pressure from China to abandon its program, and demanded talks with the United States. If North Korea had yielded to Chinese pressure and abandoned its nuclear weapons, North Korea’s policy toward the United States would have collapsed. Without a doubt, China’s expansion of economic sanctions to the civilian sector had an effect on North Korea. In 2017, North Korea’s official organs the Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central News Agency began criticizing China for the first time since the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. Despite Chinese pressure, North Korea is likely to stick to a policy of creating a fait accompli by possessing nuclear weapons and to keep its policy toward the United States unchanged. Only the United States will be able to change North Korea’s foreign policies, and the dynamics of collective security are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to bring about the change. The relationship between the United States and North Korea is the sole hope left for bringing about change in North Korea’s foreign policies.

North Korea will no doubt make the same requests as those on the agenda in previous nuclear crises, including requests for granting an NSA or some other type of security assurance and concluding a peace agreement with the United States. As noted above, the Kim Jong-un regime has abandoned attempts at trading its nuclear weapons for security assurances. Moreover, North Korea has amassed nuclear weapons and is no longer the same country that began testing nuclear weapons in 2006. When North Korea in 2002 asked the United States to sign a non-aggression pact, it was basically asking for a special exemption from the Bush doctrine of preemption, in the form of a promise by the United States not to use force against North Korea. In contrast, when the North Korean National Defense Commission called for a non-aggression pact with the United States in June 2013, it referred to securing the “safety of the US mainland.” While still asymmetrical in nature, North Korea’s request for a non-aggression pact with the United States was moving closer to a request for a mutual non-aggression agreement.

Moreover, North Korea may come to demand not only security assurances but the dismantling of the Cold War structures on the Korean Peninsula. On July 6, 2016, North Korea through a governmental statement made five proposals for the actions that the United States and South Korea should take for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Along with the demand that the United States “commit itself to neither intimidating the DPRK with nukes or through an act of nuclear war nor using nukes against the DPRK in any case,” it added the demand that “the withdrawal of the US troops holding the right to use nukes from South Korea should be declared.” As a possessor of nuclear weapons, North Korea still continues today to demand security assurances from the United States and the dismantling of Cold War structures at the same time.

The Trump administration is unlikely to share the preference of the Bush administration for multilateral talks. The Trump administration may see multilateral talks as a framework that restricts its own ability to act. Moreover, the time frame the Trump administration has for solving international issues, not just the North Korea issue, is shorter than for past US administrations.

With US-DPRK relations marked by a lack of common ground, it is no surprise that the United States attempted to get North Korea to halt its repeated launches of ballistic missiles so as to prevent the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of hitting the US mainland. It is also no surprise that, in exchange for a freeze on ballistic missile launches, North Korea would ask for a halt to US-South Korea joint military exercises, since North Korea has been demanding their suspension each time they are held, on the grounds that they are a
manifestation of hostility toward the North.

This pair of demands is in fact close to the “double suspension” concept proposed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in March 2017. Under this “double suspension” proposal, the United States would suspend “large scale military drills” in exchange for a freeze on “nuclear activities” by North Korea. Such a proposal was also made by North Korea’s National Defense Commission in January 2015. According to this proposal, while North Korea was suspending its “nuclear activities,” the United States and South Korea would suspend their drills. The longer this “double suspension” lasted, the greater the damage to the US-South Korea alliance. Seen in this light, it would be hard to imagine the Wang concept gaining currency in the long term. Moreover, halting ballistic missiles launches did not lead to a halt in missile development. One example would be the 1999 Berlin Agreement. Although the Agreement was maintained for seven years, it ended up being scuttled by missile test-firings, including the failed launch of the newly developed Taepodong-2 missile.

According to Wang Yi, this “double suspension” was the first step toward a “dual track” approach, by which the establishment of a peace regime and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula would proceed in parallel. This is exactly what was attempted in the Four-party Talks in the latter half of the 1990s. Here China did not call the peace regime a US-North Korea bilateral peace agreement. As in the Four-party Talks, China has called for a multilateral peace framework in which China is also involved. The failure of the Four-party Talks, however, has demonstrated North Korea’s insistence on a US-North Korea bilateral peace agreement.

The freezing of North Korean ballistic missile launches, even if through a “small package” agreement bringing about only temporary benefits, would have a negative impact on the ability of the United States to manage alliances in the Asia-Pacific. The only occasions when the United States had agreements with North Korea that halted its ballistic missile launches were the Berlin Agreement toward the end of the Clinton administration and the Leap Day Agreement during the Obama administration. In both cases, the class of ballistic missiles restricted by the agreements was “long-range” missiles but not medium-range missiles. With North Korea being close to completing the development of ICBMs, if an agreement on the suspension of North Korean ballistic missile launches was reached that was limited to long-range missiles as in past agreements, leaving medium-range ballistic missiles unquestioned, North Korea would have succeeded in its attempt to rupture the US-Japan alliance.

Unlike during the administration of Prime Minister Koizumi, when North Korea attempted a breakthrough in the relations with Japan, North Korea no longer has any incentive to halt its launches of medium-range missiles. The United States must not sacrifice its security arrangements with Japan and South Korea as it attempts to provide North Korea with security assurances.

With the prospects for a solution on the diplomatic front being elusive, it is not surprising that the Trump administration would shift to a military solution, which had been ruled out in previous nuclear crises. The Trump administration’s refusal to rule out the use of force shows more clearly than anything else the break with the “strategic patience” of the Obama administration. Military pressure, however, is not the same as a military solution. Although military pressure is necessary, it is, as with collective security, a necessary but insufficient condition for a diplomatic solution. What military pressure leads to is a diplomatic solution, not a military solution. A military solution, no matter how limited, will inevitably invite retaliation by North Korea. While the option that was briefly considered of giving North Korea a “bloody nose” might be deemed by the United States to be a “limited” use of force, North Korea would not see it that way. North Korea would perceive such action as the start of an all-out war and would at the very least retaliate against South Korea. The notion heard among some in the United States that North Korea would refrain from full-fledged retaliation in an attempt to avoid an all-out war that would mean the end
of its regime is based on wishful thinking.

An alliance is generally a means for maintaining the status quo by deterring the use of military force by a hostile nation. If the United States were to attempt to disrupt the status quo by use of force, and if the country that was attacked were to retaliate, perhaps with the use of nuclear weapons, US allies would be subject to intolerable damage. The US-South Korea alliance was supposed to be an agreement to maintain the present Military Demarcation Line (MDL) by deterring the use of force by North Korea. The alliance also allowed the United States to prevent South Korea’s independent use of force by taking wartime operational control of the South Korean armed forces. For the United States to invite a counterattack by North Korea through its own use of force would not only entrap South Korea and drag it into this use of force but also leave South Korea devastated and abandoned. If a North Korea counterattack using nuclear weapons were to harm Japan, the US alliance with Japan, which was supposed to have provided Japan with a protective “nuclear umbrella,” would have instead invited a nuclear attack on Japan. After Japan had undergone a nuclear attack, would the US-Japan alliance continue to be maintained? Would the United States still be able to maintain its bases in Japan, where its biggest network of military bases in the Asia-Pacific are located?

The Asia-Pacific is not the only region where the United States has alliances. The use of force by the United States in this region would cause alliance partners in other areas to fear that they might be entrapped or abandoned. American alliance partners might fear that they would be entrapped in the use of force by the United States, and abandoned after being devastated by a hostile nation. Such outcomes would make it extremely difficult for the United States to maintain its global alliance commitments.

Just as the US security assurances to North Korea must not expose Japan and South Korea to danger, the use of force must not entrap either Japan or South Korea in a military conflict.

### Conclusion

In the US-DPRK Agreed Framework, the United States, by employing NPT norms, gave North Korea its own independent NSA. North Korea in exchange suspended its nuclear activities for eight years, at least with respect to plutonium, with “continuity of safeguard” monitoring to be conducted by the IAEA. The joint statement of the Six-party Talks provided North Korea a comprehensive security assurance and incorporated a number of regional measures that included the establishment of a peace regime. Although North Korea was to abandon “all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear plans,” the agreement proved unable to freeze North Korea’s nuclear activities – either using plutonium or uranium – and allowed North Korea to later conduct nuclear tests. While these agreements were framed so as to be compatible with both the US-Japan and US-South Korea alliances, the situation deteriorated to the extent that North Korea was able to improve its nuclear arsenal and the United States became less able to restrain North Korea’s nuclear activities. The Leap Day Agreement during the Obama administration did encompass a nuclear testing moratorium, a halt of long-range missile launches, and observance of the Military Armistice Agreement, but it came to an end in only a month and a half.

The launching of ballistic missiles scuttled all of these deals. While North Korea had refrained from test-firing missiles for nearly seven years after the 1999 Berlin Agreement, disputes about financial sanctions led to a succession of missile launches, including of Taepodong-2, which eventually paved the way to nuclear weapon testing. The test-launches were also in violation of the terms of the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, in which North Korea had tacitly agreed to refrain from testing medium-range missiles. The Leap Day Agreement allowed North Korea to launch Unha-3 by calling it a satellite-launching rocket, since that “agreement” was vague in its definition of “long-range missiles.” There is currently no agreement in effect that prevents North
Korea from launching missiles.

In the midst of what may be called the third nuclear crisis, the Trump administration confronts North Korea while burdened with the liabilities accumulated since the Clinton administration. What is different from past nuclear crises is that North Korea is now in the position of being able to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles without being restrained by any agreements on such activities, whether bilateral or multilateral in nature.

With North Korea having a nuclear weapons capability and refusing denuclearization, it would be hard to believe that diplomacy can take away the North’s capabilities in a single stroke. Even if we were to assume that the Trump administration were to apply a short time frame for dealing with North Korea, so long as it aims for a diplomatic solution, it will have to “coexist” with the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Both economic sanctions and military pressure would be needed, but these are only necessary conditions for a diplomatic solution and are not ends in and of themselves.

For now, North Korea is refraining from taking military action. The United States cannot conduct a first strike on North Korea because such an attack could provoke a second strike by North Korea against a US alliance partner or the US mainland. This reality, while extremely asymmetrical in nature between the United States and North Korea, shows that mutual deterrence is at work. Even if North Korea were to deploy ICBMs, for example, it would not disrupt this situation of mutual deterrence. While North Korea is attempting to use the threat of ICBMs to decouple the US-South Korea alliance from the US-Japan alliance, North Korea will not launch nuclear attacks on South Korea and Japan or mount an all-out attack on Seoul. Losing Seoul would be equivalent to losing the Republic of Korea. North Korea is aware that US-South Korea Combined Forces would mount retaliatory strikes on Pyongyang, no doubt devastating North Korea. The choice for the United States would be a coupling effort to counter North Korea’s decoupling attempt.

Admittedly, if North Korea judged that ICBMs would allow it to prevent military intervention, the threshold for the use of force by North Korea against the South would be lowered. To prevent this kind of subjective and asymmetrical stability-instability paradox, the US-South Korean alliance must demonstrate its superiority on all rungs of the escalation ladder, from conventional weapons to nuclear weapons, in response to a use of force by North Korea against the South. The dismantling of the Cold War structures that North Korea seems to be pushing for can be seen also as an attempt to neutralize this escalation ladder. If the US-South Korea alliance were to lose rungs on this ladder, or take measures climbing up to the top of the ladder to use nuclear weapons, the deterrence structure would be destabilized, opening the way to an all-out war that nobody wants.

Strengthening alliances and providing security assurances are parts of solving a difficult equation. In the past, agreements with North Korea allowed the United States to skillfully balance both its security assurances and alliance commitments. The attempt by the Trump administration to work out a “deal” with North Korea that touches only on its ICBMs is being watched with concern by Japan. South Korea, whose security is assured by Cold War structures, is concerned about how the United States will react to North Korean demands for the dismantling of these structures.

“Long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment” are the words George F. Kennan used in his proposal at the start of the Cold War for containing the Soviet Union. A new type of deterrence similar to Kennan’s containment is being attempted in Northeast Asia. Unlike the US-Soviet relationship in the Cold War, this deterrence is asymmetrical, lacks a means for communication or for controlling arms, and above all seeks to deter a nation that illegally possesses nuclear weapons. On the front lines of this unprecedented deterrence structure are Japan and South Korea.
References


North Korea has recently crossed important technological thresholds in its nuclear-weapon development program and has now (almost) achieved the capability to strike the US homeland with nuclear-tipped missiles, putting American cities at risk and complicating Washington’s ability to defend its South Korean and Japanese allies. In response, the White House has conducted a “maximum-pressure” campaign characterized by the strengthening of sanctions and the adoption of a more assertive deterrence posture to compel Pyongyang to disarm. Some US officials have also considered using force. Of late, however, following a bold diplomatic initiative led by South Korean President Moon Jae-in during the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, and in an unprecedented turn of events, US President Donald Trump has agreed to meet with North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un sometime before the end of May.

This paper does not discuss the possible or probable outcomes of the potential upcoming Trump-Kim meeting, nor does it address what might happen next. Rather, it looks over the horizon and asks what comes after the longstanding standoff with North Korea ends once and for all. The paper assumes that, sooner or later, and with North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program being a catalyst either directly or indirectly, major change is unavoidable on the Korean Peninsula. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to unpack what that major change might be, how it could take place, and what it would mean. In other words, this paper mulls over what the next stage of enduring stability might be for the Korean Peninsula, which has been divided between North and South since the end of the Second World War, with the two Koreas technically at war since the Korean War broke out in 1950.¹

This is an important exercise because, as Henry Kissinger stated shortly after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 amid growing unrest across southern and eastern Ukraine, “the test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins.”² Kissinger’s argument was that, to settle the Ukraine crisis, the United States and the West should start with a reflection on where they want to go, not on what their next move should be. Put simply, he stressed that asking “how does the crisis end?” mattered more than asking “what do we do next?”

How, then, does the current standoff with North Korea end? Or more accurately, what comes after? This paper discusses three possible and diametrically different futures: one where the Korean Peninsula is reunified under Seoul’s leadership, one where it is reunified under Pyongyang’s leadership, and one where there is peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, as a first step toward concerted reunification. Not surprisingly, the conditions for, and pathways to, each future differ significantly, as do the outlook and prospects for enduring stability on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia more generally.

¹ The Korean War ended with an armistice agreement in 1953. The armistice restored much of the boundaries between North and South Korea established after the Second World War. No peace treaty was signed, however.

Future #1: A reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul’s leadership

One possible future is a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul’s leadership. That suggests a takeover of North Korea by South Korea, assisted by the United States, and reunification on Seoul’s terms, which would translate into a South Korean (and US) win against North Korea. Reaching that future assumes that China and Russia, despite strong concerns, and possibly following coordination efforts by the United States and South Korea, would calculate that it was in their interests to accept or acquiesce to such a development. China, which intervened on North Korea’s behalf during the Korean War, has a stake in its survival for ideological and especially geopolitical reasons: Beijing does not want a reunified Korea led by Seoul with (presumably) a US military presence on its borders, nor does it not want an influx of North Korean refugees, which is likely to occur following Pyongyang’s fall. Russia, too, has ties with North Korea dating from the Soviet years and a similar geopolitical stake, albeit at a less importance than that of China, in its survival.

What are the pathways to such a future? There are two: force or absorption. Reunification by force could happen following retaliation to North Korean aggression. Pyongyang has conducted numerous provocations and sometimes outright aggressions against South Korea. With a more sophisticated nuclear arsenal, Pyongyang may become more aggressive, calculating that its ability to strike the United States with nuclear-tipped missiles would break the US-South Korean alliance and deter Washington from responding. Seoul and Washington may respond nonetheless and, in coordination with Tokyo, which provides a critical base of support for US forces on Japanese territory during a conflict with Pyongyang, decide to defeat North Korea completely and reunify the Peninsula.

Reunification by force could also happen following a preventive attack against North Korea, which Washington would lead, presumably with consent from Seoul and in coordination with Tokyo, and presumably over the deadlock surrounding North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program. As Pyongyang is becoming capable of striking American cities with nuclear-tipped missiles, Washington has been considering disarming it preventively in recent months. If Washington did so, that could lead to a broader conflict and to North Korea’s elimination and reunification of the Peninsula under Seoul.

Another pathway is reunification by absorption, following a collapse of the North Korean regime. Such a collapse could be indigenous. Pyongyang could fall on its own due to economic troubles or political infighting. Kim Jong-un’s recent purges suggest that there are enemies of the regime who one day could spark a revolution and plunge the country into chaos, leading to its absorption by South Korea. Alternatively, North Korea’s collapse could be fomented by Seoul and Washington in an overt or covert destabilization campaign, which would add to current sanctions.

What are the outlook and prospects for enduring stability in such a future? Much would depend on the road taken to get there—the pathway. In theory, if reunification resulted from an aggression by Pyongyang or its indigenous collapse, it would be regarded as legitimate, both by the South Korean, American, and Japanese publics, and internationally. Assuming their interests were safeguarded, China and Russia would have a hard time arguing that the decision to reunify were illegitimate. So would others. The use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by Pyongyang, or by elements of the regime in the event of a collapse, would reinforce the idea that the US-South Korean decision to intervene was correct. If, however,
reunification took place after preventive attacks or a destabilization campaign against Pyongyang, there would be criticisms from the South Korean, American, and Japanese publics, especially if that led to nuclear or WMD use by North Korea. China, Russia, and many others would denounce the decision. Some could refuse to engage with the reunified Peninsula and the United States would be regarded, rightly or wrongly, as a predatory power.

The outlook and prospects for stability would also depend on the scope and scale of the problems that Seoul (and Washington) would face post-takeover. Four problem areas stand out. First is the death and destruction toll, which could be limited but could also be massive, especially in the event of nuclear use. Second is the humanitarian crisis and refugee problem in the north, which could be overwhelming. Third is North Korea’s WMD arsenal, which would need to be neutralized; most experts have assessed that this would be challenging. Fourth is the task of integrating the two Koreas politically and economically, which could range from smooth to painful but, if past (read: German or Vietnamese) experiences are any guide, is likely to be difficult, and costly.

Accordingly, the outlook and prospects for stability would depend as much on the scope and scale of these problems as on the decisions Seoul and Washington make to address them, and, relatedly, their ability to gain support and assistance from other states, notably from Northeast Asia. That means Seoul and Washington would be well-served to take Chinese and Russian interests into consideration by, for instance, guaranteeing that US military presence would neither increase nor be permanently stationed in the former North Korean geographical space. Failure to do so, or a decision by Seoul to keep North Korea’s WMD arsenal, for instance, would likely complicate the outlook and prospects for enduring stability.

Japan, too, would want Pyongyang’s WMD arsenal to disappear and it would probably also require special assurances from Washington (and Seoul). This is because Tokyo, on the one hand, would welcome the elimination of the North Korean nuclear threat and see reunification of the Peninsula as an opportunity to resolve the abductee issue and open new economic opportunities for Japanese businesses, yet on the other, it would be concerned that, down the line, a reunified Korea under Seoul could become a strong economic competitor or, worse, that it end up siding closer to China (and Russia).

Future #2: A reunified Korean Peninsula under Pyongyang’s leadership

Another possible future is a reunified Korean Peninsula under Pyongyang’s leadership. That second future is the mirror image of the first. It suggests a takeover of South Korea by North Korea and reunification on Pyongyang’s terms, which would translate into a North Korean win against South Korea and the United States. Reaching that future assumes that Washington would be either defeated in defending its South Korean ally or that, for strategic or domestic reasons, it would calculate that it was in its interests not to intervene and, instead, accept or acquiesce to such a development, despite its defense commitments to Seoul. The US-South Korea alliance, which include the presence of nearly 29,000 US military personnel in South Korea, has been in place since the end of the Second World War to deter North Korean aggression (and was part of the US network of alliances designed to ring the Soviet threat during the Cold War).

What are the pathways to such a future? As in the previous scenario, the two pathways are force or absorption. In theory, reunification by force could happen following a US (and South Korean) attack on Pyongyang. If it managed to counter the offensive and compel Washington (and Seoul) to back down and concede defeat by, for instance, conducting limited nuclear use,

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Pyongyang could push its luck, strike key targets in South Korea, and take it over militarily, bringing the Peninsula under its control.8

Reunification by force could also happen after an attack by North Korea against South Korea. Pyongyang could get away with striking, invading, and taking over the South if Washington calculated that its interests were better served by inaction rather than by risking that Seattle or Los Angeles be struck by North Korean nuclear-capable missiles if it acted.

Another pathway is reunification by absorption, following a collapse of the South Korean regime. While considerably less likely than Pyongyang’s fall, Seoul’s fall cannot and should not be dismissed. Such a collapse could be indigenous. Democracy, which is still new and has been traditionally fragile in South Korea, could break down, plunge the country into disarray, and give Pyongyang an opportunity to reunify the Peninsula. Alternatively, Pyongyang could foment the collapse of South Korean democracy in an overt or covert destabilization campaign.

What are the outlook and prospects for enduring stability in a future where the Korean Peninsula is reunified under Pyongyang? In that scenario as in the first, much would depend on the pathway. In theory, if reunification resulted from an attack by Washington (and Seoul) or from an indigenous collapse of the South Korean regime, it could be regarded as legitimate. China and Russia, which would welcome the ousting of the United States from the Korean Peninsula, could see it that way. Many others—especially Japan—would not, however, because North Korea is—and always has been—considered a rogue state that engages in illegal activities, notably WMD development and proliferation. Relatedly, if Pyongyang resorted to nuclear/WMD use, the odds are that it would receive a considerable share of the blame. Meanwhile, if reunification took place following a preventive attack or a destabilizing campaign by Pyongyang against Seoul, there would be an international outcry, especially if these attacks included nuclear or WMD use. China, Russia, Japan, and many others in the international community would denounce the decision and many would refuse to engage with the newly reunified Peninsula.

As in the first scenario, the outlook and prospects for the newly reunified Korea would depend on the scope and scale of the problems that Pyongyang would face in post-takeover. Except for the neutralization of a WMD arsenal, Pyongyang would be confronted with the same problem areas as Seoul and Washington if the situation was reversed: the death and destruction toll, a humanitarian crisis, and the task of integrating the two Koreas politically and economically. The magnitude of these problems is likely to be higher, however, because Pyongyang, being both weaker than Seoul and heavily militarized, is more likely to resort to higher levels of violence to reunify the Peninsula. In the event of a takeover of the Peninsula by Pyongyang, therefore, the death and destruction toll is likely to be high and the humanitarian crisis severe. Moreover, leading the integration of the two Koreas is likely to be extremely challenging for Pyongyang, given how backward the North is in comparison to the South.

Accordingly, the outlook and prospects for enduring stability in that scenario would depend on Pyongyang’s ability to gain support and assistance from China and Russia, not only to manage the problem areas just mentioned, but also to keep other powers at bay. That means Pyongyang would need to make nice, and possibly conclude special assistance and defense arrangements, with Beijing and Moscow.

In these circumstances, Tokyo would find itself alone in a highly hostile environment and would, for good reasons, fear an attack or an invasion. While that may drive them to seek a tighter deterrence relationship with the United States, Japanese officials could be tempted to resort to self-help and develop an independent nuclear arsenal, especially given that Washington would have just demonstrated its inability (or unwillingness) to prevent Pyongyang from defeating the

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South (a US ally) and taking over the Korean Peninsula.

**Future #3: Peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas**

A third possible future is peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. That suggests the development of good relations and a modus vivendi between North and South Korea through the establishment of a federation or confederation on the Peninsula, ideally as a first step toward concerted reunification. Reaching that future would translate into a win-win for Pyongyang and Seoul (and could result from an attempt by both capitals, and potentially others, to resolve the deadlock surrounding North Korea’s nuclear-weapon program). It assumes that the North Korean and South Korean governments (and public opinion in the South) undertake profound changes in attitudes and beliefs about each other and that they overcome and forgo the traditional zero-sum thinking they have held since the 1950s. Another assumption is that major powers, notably the United States and China, give North and South Korea space to engage in such a reconciliation.

Such a scenario clashes significantly with the current realities of the Korean Peninsula. Seoul and Pyongyang are all too familiar with the idea and its logic, however. The South and North Korean leaders first subscribed to it in the “July 4 Joint Communiqué” of 1972. Subsequently, other measures paralleling or extending the rationale behind this accord include the 1991 “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Cooperation, and Exchange Between North and South,” the 1992 “Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” and the “June 15 North-South Joint Declaration” of 2000. Reference to the goal of establishing peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas also appears in multilateral documents, such as the “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks” of 2005.

What are the pathways to such a future? There is only one: negotiations. The emergence of a modus vivendi between the two Koreas, and a fortiori of concerted reunification of the Peninsula, can only be achieved through slow, incremental change and, therefore, a sustained and in-depth dialogue and negotiation process. Therefore, while peaceful coexistence may be one of the next stages of enduring stability on the Korean Peninsula, it is likely to take a long time to get there, and in any case longer than the scenarios envisioned in the two previous sections.

The outlook and prospects for enduring stability of a future characterized by the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas would depend on the general and specific requirements of the arrangement concluded by Pyongyang and Seoul (and the norms that govern bilateral political relations at the time). For instance, would that arrangement exist in the form of a confederation or a looser type of federation? Traditionally, South Korea has preferred the former, while North Korea has favored the latter. Moreover, would Pyongyang and Seoul have reunification be as a goal? In other words, would they regard peaceful coexistence as an end-state or a stepping stone to achieve a reunified Korea? While North and South Korean proposals for reconciliation have always included reunification of the Peninsula as a goal, and while any future arrangement is likely to do the same, there is no longer any guarantee that it does or that reunification through negotiations would be achievable in the foreseeable future given how much the two Koreas have drifted apart, especially over the past two and a half decades.

Notwithstanding these important considerations, enduring stability of a Pyongyang-Seoul modus vivendi would depend on several factors. First is the willingness of the two governments to accept and treat each other as equal legal entities and trusting partners over the long term, especially given that disagreements on both major or minor bilateral issues are likely to occur as negotiations advance. Second, if reunification were a goal, enduring stability would depend on

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the ability of the two governments to find agreement on a specific “formula” or “comprehensive institutional structure” to reunify the Peninsula and to conduct dialogue and take concrete actions to advance political, economic, social, cultural, and even military integration to get there. Third, because under no circumstances could there be peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas without the replacement of the 1953 armistice agreement signed between the United States (as head of the United Nations Forces), China, and North Korea by a permanent peace treaty, respect by Pyongyang and Seoul for the letter and spirit of that treaty would be paramount. Practically, that suggests there would need to be, among other things, implementation of inter-Korean confidence-building measures and major threat reduction activities, agreement from Pyongyang to constrain and eventually rollback its nuclear/WMD arsenal, and, relatedly, a reassessment of the purpose, scope, and scale (and perhaps even utility) of, on the one hand, the US-South Korea alliance, the United Nations Command, the Combined Forces Command, and other subcommands and, on the other, North Korea’s military arrangements with China (and Russia).

The bottom line is that, to succeed over the long term, peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas would require a fundamental transformation of current inter-Korean strategic and political relations and the associated relations that Pyongyang and Seoul have with major powers, notably the United States and China. Tokyo, in that scenario, would likely find itself in a situation close to the one described in the first—a reunified Peninsula under Seoul’s leadership. In theory, Japanese officials would welcome the development of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas if that meant that the North were no longer a threat (and that its WMD arsenal were eliminated) and that the abductee issue could be resolved and Japanese businesses could have new opportunities on the Peninsula. Yet Japanese officials would also fear that the two Koreas become a strong economic force that would ultimately compete with Tokyo or, worse, that both increasingly gravitate closer to China over time.

Conclusions

The three scenarios described in this paper are in no way the only possible outcomes for the next stage of enduring stability on the Korean Peninsula. Many others can and should be envisioned. Nevertheless, a takeover of the Peninsula by South Korea (and the United States), a takeover by North Korea, and the advent of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas as a first step toward reunification appear to cover the broad spectrum of possibilities.

This paper has provided only a brief description of each scenario, as a starting point. More work is needed to flesh out the benefits, risks, and costs of each, as well as the potential variations in development. This is an essential initiative because it will help policymakers decide what they should do today to reach the most desirable outcome, and avoid the worst.
Essay: Sino-US Strategic tensions under Xi and Trump: Old Issues, New Approaches

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Introduction

In 2012, a few months after he came to power, President Xi Jinping launched the idea of building with the United States, a “new type of great powers relationship” (新型大国关系), to try to attune the “rebalancing strategy”, or pivot towards Asia, of President Obama.¹ The idea, albeit officially denied, was to build a G2 with Washington, thus confirming the emergence of the PRC as second power in the world, taking the place of the former Soviet Union as most important partner/adversary of the United States. An essential element of this new type of relationship was “respect for mutual interests”, i.e. Chinese “core interests” in Asia, and no interference. The objective was to achieve a gradual retreat of the US security presence from the region.

This ambition was based on a simple analysis that has dominated the Chinese strategic community since the end of the 2000s: the financial and economic crisis that the world had known in 2008 led to the end of the legitimacy of the Western model or “Washington consensus” and, a contrario, the success of the Chinese counter-model or “Beijing consensus”.² Following this line of thinking, weakened by the crisis the United States and western style democracies could only acknowledge and adapt to the inevitable surge of China.³ In October 2017, in his opening speech at the XIXth Communist Party Congress President Xi Jinping also declared that “China’s international position has grown like never before” and that China must take advantage of the “period of opportunity” that is still opened to its ambitions to assert itself and be recognized as a great power. This position has been reflected in analysis published in the West, that do concur to the opinion that the US must indeed “recognize the regional and global change in the balance of power”.⁴

However, after a few years of euphoria that followed the 2008 crisis, Chinese leadership seems to be more focused on the challenges the PRC is facing. Economic growth has been slowing down since 2010. China is indeed the second largest economy in the world, however, in terms of per

¹ This concept was mentioned at the Sunny Land Summit Between US President Barak Obama and Xi Jinping in June 2013.
² Huang Yufan, “Yan Xuetong Urges China to Adopt a more Assertive Foreign Policy”, Sinosphere, 09-02-2016. Yan Xuetong is a close adviser to the Chinese leadership, director of the Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University.
capita GDP it still lags behind at the 74th position. Meanwhile, social needs remain colossal and any strategy for rebalancing growth, based on new rules, reallocation of resources and resulting in a further slowing down might endanger the regime’s stability.

This mixture of overconfidence and a fear for the future led to more assertive strategic choices at the regional and global levels, around the themes of the “Chinese dream,” (中国梦) and the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (中国民族伟大复兴). In order to secure his power and that of the Communist Party, Xi Jinping launched an more offensive foreign policy, both at the strategic and ideological level. The increasingly sprawling projects of OBOR, as a counter-model to the West, have been added to previous irredentists’ ambitions and activities in the South and East China sea.

After a few months of uncertainties, the Donald Trump presidency has shaken these ambitions. Contrary to initial hopes, a feeling of disillusion prevails both in Washington and in Beijing. For Beijing, disappointment comes from the fact that despite its lack of interest in ideological principles such as human rights, President Trump has proved more complex to manage than the PRC leadership hoped for. Donald Trump is now criticized in the Chinese press as “unreliable” (不靠谱).

For Washington, the refusal or the inability of China to deliver on the two major topics of trade and the nuclear crisis in North Korea, resulted into further doubts regarding the effectiveness of an “engagement” strategy toward China. Beijing’s mistake was to underestimate Donald Trump’s will to obtain concrete results beyond dialogue.

The April 2017 summit at Mar-A-Lago between President Trump and Xi Jinping was marked by this ambiguity. Xi Jinping was received with all honors, but the rather cavalier announcement, during the official dinner, of US missile strikes on a Syrian air forces base also had the effect of demonstrating US strength and determination. Similarly, during the grand reception of President Trump in Beijing in November 2017, Donald Trump compliments towards China’s ability to defend its own interests at the expense of others was ambiguous at the least.

However, the growing tension between the PRC and the United States is not the result of an unavoidable confrontation, the “Thucydides trap”, between an emerging power, China, and a declining power, the United States. Despite its limitations, the United States is still perceived as best able to preserve the regional balance of power and, conversely, despite the endless opportunities it seems to offer, China remains potentially destabilizing and unable to resolve regional tensions, even when they involve its closest North Korean ally. More serious for Beijing, as demonstrated by the North Korean crisis, China is not perceived anymore, including by its closest allies, as an “all-weather” security provider against resolutions adopted by the United Nations security council. One of China’s major instruments of influence, in and beyond the region, has been thus challenged.

**The end of certainties**

For Beijing, the election campaign and the first months after the election of Donald Trump both opened a period of uncertainty and the hope of being able to “manipulate” a president who also had the merit of not being the author of the pivot to Asia, considered by Chinese strategists as a

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7 Susan Shirk, op.cit.
major challenge to their interests in the area.

Initially, and despite the already obvious tensions on trade and the Taiwan issue, Beijing may have believed that Donald Trump’s pragmatism, the idea that everything was ultimately negotiable, would offer the PRC new opportunities to build a relationship based on “dialogue, coordination and cooperation.”  

For Beijing, “America First” could only result in a greater withdrawal from the international scene, including the Asian theater, leaving the field open to Chinese ambitions. China may also have thought that Washington - like other administrations - remained sensitive to Chinese pressure. After tweeting twice that he was not necessarily bound by the “One China policy” that had been the basis of the US position on Taiwan and its relationship with Beijing since 1979, Donald Trump agreed to backtrack after a telephone conversation with President Xi Jinping on February 10, 2017.

However, in June 2017, Donald Trump also agreed to sell arms to Taiwan for $ 1.40 billion and, in March 2018, he did not hesitate to take the risk of “provoking” Beijing by signing the Taiwan Travel Act voted by the Senate. Similarly, the establishment of new dialogue formats between Beijing and Washington, decided at the Mar-A-Lago summit in April 2017, was oriented towards concrete results and the few concessions offered by Beijing on bilateral trade, with a 100 day action plan, soon proved insufficient, even with the promise to lift the embargo on US beef.

Beijing had initially hoped to be able to rely on the new administration pragmatism, and to open channels of direct communication with the president through Henry Kissinger, who always remained very close to Chinese authorities since the 1970s, and the Chinese ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai, both playing a role of intermediary with Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner, thus establishing a Chinese style of guanxi (关系).

The Russian crisis and the marginalization of Jared Kushner, as well as several departures in the entourage of Donald Trump have however questioned this strategy of influence. On the contrary, over the last few months, personalities known for their opposition - at the strategic level as well as at the economic level - to Chinese ambitions remained in power or were chosen to replace more moderate officials.

This is the case of Mike Pompeo, appointed Secretary of State in March 2018, which could weigh on that of Susan Thornton, closer to Rex Tillerson, as Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs, denounced by some as “too soft” on China. The appointment of John Bolton as National Security Adviser confirmed that choice.

In economic matters, Peter Navarro, Assistant to the President, director of Trade and Industrial Policy, and the Director of the White House National Trade Council, as well as director for Economic Affairs and US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer are also representative of the most hostile currents to Beijing mercantilism. Gary Cohn, director of the National Economic Council, who resigned in March 2018 has also been replaced by Larry Kudlow, also known for his

11 Idem.
12 Idem.
14 The four dialogues are the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue, the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue, the Law Enforcement and Cyber Security Dialogue and the Social and Cultural Dialogue.
15 Wu Xinbo, op.cit.
strong positions hostile to the PRC’s “economic nationalism”.  

In 2010, Robert Lighthizer declared in a hearing before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission that “China’s Economic and Political System is incompatible with our conception of the WTO”. He has been a strong proponent of punishing tariffs on Chinese imports that have been decided in March 2018.  

**Limited common interests and a lack of common vision**

At the strategic level, the stress on common interests, on the North Korean issue, Iran, the environment and energy issues or even terrorism has been severely curbed since Donald Trump came to power. In 2017, Susan Thornton insisted on the need to “strengthen cooperation wherever possible”, today, the requirement of concrete outcomes seems to prevail.  

**The Korean Issue**

The Korean question is the most emblematic in this respect. After expecting more active support from Beijing in solving the nuclear crisis in North Korea, Donald Trump has chosen a much tougher strategy of maximum pressure, with threats of military strikes, rejecting the principle of “strategic patience” defended by his predecessor. After the latest most powerful DPRK nuclear test in 2017, followed by two tests of intercontinental missiles with the potential to hit the US territory, the United States increased their pressure on Chinese companies accused of not complying with sanctions voted by the UN Security Council unanimously. The spectacular turnaround of 2018, which saw the North Korean president accept the principle of a meeting with Donald Trump, on the basis of a possible denuclearization, has taken Beijing off-guard. Afraid of being seen as marginalized, after a phone call between president Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, the Chinese side stressed that the US were ready to coordinate with China. The hasty invitation of Kim Jong-un, who had never been received in Beijing since he came to power in 2012, had the same objective, to try to put the PRC back at the center of the game.

However, behind these initiatives, there is the failure of Chinese ambiguous positions, unable to abandon its North Korean ally, anxious to preserve the existence of a buffer state and more interested in a withdrawal of the United States from the region, including through with the support of resumption of a dialogue based on the “double-freeze” of DPRK nuclear test in exchange for “security guarantees”, including less US military presence in the region.

Even now, China would like to revive some kind of dialogue, in a 5 or 6 party talks format, in spite of the fact that, since the first round of talks that took place in 2003, no concrete results were achieved apart from the full nuclearization of the North Korean regime.  

**Maritime Issues**

In the South China Sea, although the tensions were less acute in 2017, as China did not seize new

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16 Peter Navarro is the producer of, *Death by China*, a documentary that denounces China’s trade unfair practices, http://deathbychina.com/  
17 https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/6.9.10Lighthizer.pdf  
features, the United States resumed FONOP operations in May 2017, to better support the will of the United States to contest Beijing’s challenges to international law and the freedom of maritime operations on the high seas. Washington also reasserted its support for the 2016 International Hague Tribunal ruling, that rejected China’s claims in the South China Sea and denounced any coercive action aimed at changing the status quo by force. Finally, in the face of the rise of the Chinese navy - and its coast guard units - the United States also choose to go on with the strengthening of its military presence in the Asia-Pacific, with the dispatch of two aircrafts carriers groups in 2017, in the context of the crisis with North Korea, but also of tensions with China.

Beijing denounces the proliferation of FONOP operations in the South China Sea, as well as the support given to Japan - and Taiwan - faced with the incursions of the Chinese navy, as the main factor that would destroy the “strategic trust” between the US and China. And in the Spring 2018 the Chinese navy organized its largest exercise in the region.

Another element, very important for Tokyo that may fear a lack of US engagement in “grey zones” crisis scenarios with China, US President confirmed in his talks with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in April 2017 - as his predecessor had done on several occasions - that the Senkaku islands, whose sovereignty is contested by Beijing with multiples intrusions into contiguous or territorial waters with fishing fleet militia, cost guards and PLA navy, were covered by Article 5 of the Japan-US Cooperation and Security Treaty.

Conflicting strategic vision
At a larger level, the strategic vision of the United States with respect to China has toughened. Published in early 2018, the new US National Security Strategy denounces China as a “revisionist” power that aims to drive the United States out of the Asia-Pacific and weaken Washington’s allies in the region by “predatory” economic strategies.

With regard to the alliance system and the rebalancing towards Asia, continuity seems to prevail, with even greater commitment, particularly in terms of military capabilities. This also counters China’s hopes to see the United States turn back from the Asian theater to the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The importance of alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, but also the Philippines as well as cooperation with Thailand or Singapore - denounced by China as “obsolete and inherited from the cold war” - was reasserted on several occasions by James Mattis, Secretary of State for Defense, Henry McMaster, President of the National Security Council and by President Trump himself during his long trip to Asia in November 2017.

As a concrete manifestation of the concept of Indo-Pacific - which echoes Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s concept of “security diamond” put forward in 2012 - a first quadrilateral meeting (QUAD) bringing together the United States, Japan, Australia and India took place in November 2017 during President Trump’s visit to Asia. An Indo-Pacific power with territories in both oceans, France expressed its interest, following the visit of President Macron to India in March 2018. The objective is to improve the safety of sea-lanes of communication in the Indo-Pacific region, to better enforce respect for the law of the seas and to promote capacity building and cooperation in logistics and access to ports, in order to answer Chinese conception of a “maritime silk route” as

22 On this issue, regional powers as well as the European Union do share the same position.
23 Peter A. Dutton, Isaac B. Kardon, op.cit.
part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) grand strategy.  

**A network of alliances based on common values**

Even if, in appearance at least, it is China that is today the champion of multilateralism, and in spite of its lack of stress on Human rights, Donald Trump’s alliance system in Asia is based on shared “Common values” perceived to be best suited to economic and strategic stability. In a speech in Danang in November 2017 at the APEC Summit, Donald Trump defended a “free and open Indo-Pacific” as an alternative to the “Chinese dream” of BRI founded on a very hierarchical vision of relations between States. To this Sino-centric conception of the world - or at least of the region - the United States and its allies oppose a more egalitarian web-like notion, that also implies a higher level of shared responsibilities.

This alliances and partnerships network found a new vitality by including India, that faced weeks of tensions with China in 2017 in the Doklam area in spite of growing economic interdependence between the two countries.

It also responds to China’s new naval strategy “on two oceans”, whose objective is to strengthen the PLAN’s projection capabilities towards the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The opening of a logistics base in Djibouti in 2017, and the development of cooperation with Sri Lanka, Pakistan or the Maldives, through port infrastructures building, are also strong signals of the PRC’s enlarged maritime ambitions.

Similarly, beyond strictly naval capabilities, China is continuing to develop its anti-access capabilities, designed to limit US intervention in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s ongoing development of its military capabilities - with a budget increase of 8.2%, reaching $ 175 billion in 2018 – as well as the more immediate North Korean threat, the United States continues to support the deployment of anti-missile systems in Asia. This includes South Korea despite the election of President Moon Jae-in, known for his more cautious position on US military presence.

Despite strong Chinese pressure, which took the form of a trade war in 2017, South Korea maintained the deployment on its territory - decided in 2016 - of the THAAD anti-missile system. Japan, for its part, is also strengthening its defense cooperation with the United States, acquiring the capabilities to better meet Washington’s expectations in terms of arms procurement, technological cooperation and collective defense.

**Ready for a full-fledged trade war?**

Finally, the trade issue has become one of the major litigation issues between Beijing and Washington. The candidate Trump had built his election on a protectionist posture, to protect the American industries and jobs, and accuse “predatory” states that benefit from the open economy of the United States, including China. A “45%” taxes hike on Chinese imports was one of his campaign promises.

If in the first months of the presidency, Donald Trump seemed eager to “make a deal” with

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Beijing, especially under the pressure of certain interest groups - including the consumer electronics industry and mass retailers - which developed in synergy and thanks to the specificities of the Chinese regime, disillusionment in this area as in that of North Korea, took the upper side and Donald Trump chose to take the risk of launching a trade war with Beijing.

Initially, the most visible measure, since it also affected major Washington partners, was the decision by the United States to apply tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum imports.\(^{31}\)

But the most significant consequence for Beijing is undoubtedly the reactivation of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 on the Protection of Intellectual Property, which directly aims at the PRC’s “techno nationalism” whose authoritarian nature makes it possible to mobilize all necessary means to achieve the objectives detailed in the “Made in China 2025” plan.

This plan, announced in 2015, focuses on technological “great leaps” in high-tech industries, including telecommunications, cyber, and artificial intelligence, including through technology transfers from foreign companies that want to invest in China.\(^{32}\) The plan, as all research and development plan in the PRC also do possess an important dimension of dual development of military as well as civilian technology.

As a consequence, Donald Trump also announced new taxes on imports of Chinese products in the high-tech and telecommunications sectors, at the risk of impacting the interests of large US companies whose main production base remains in the PRC.\(^{33}\)

Despite the importance of these measures, the Chinese response has initially been rather measured. China - which is far from having completed the rebalancing of its economy - continues to depend on exports to major developed markets, foremost among which the US market which absorbs 18.3% of Chinese exports.\(^{34}\)

Beijing therefore advocated the solution of tensions “through negotiations”, avoiding a trade war. The Chinese authorities sent two important emissaries to Washington, both members of the central committee’s political bureau, Yang Jiechi, State Councilor, and Liu He, economic adviser to President Xi Jinping.\(^{35}\) For Chinese analysts, the decision to send such high level emissaries were a sign of the PRC’s willingness to make concessions in a sector vital to its economy and social stability, and where China, a major exporter, is a lot more vulnerable than the United States.\(^{36}\) This expectation relied also on the fact that, since its adhesion to the WTO in 2001, China’s was never really tasked about delivering on promises made and might hope this situation to go on.

However, with new declarations by Donald Trump to consider additional tariffs taxes up to an amount of 100 billion dollars on Chinese imports, the Chinese leadership reacted more strongly. The “strong man” strategy of president Xi Jinping, his personal prestige and that of the regime cannot allow not to react to this US “humiliation”. In spite of the fact that its own economy, and the most vulnerable (but less visible) agricultural sector might be heavily impacted by the decisions, China announced a series of 25% tariffs hikes on imports of US Pork, nuts, fruits and wine but

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\(^{31}\) The main exporters to the US of these products are Canada and Brazil. China accounts only for 3% of steel imported by the US.


\(^{34}\) According to the WTO, the United States, European Union, Japan and South Korea represent 55% of the PRC’s exports, Hong Kong excluded. http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Country=CN

\(^{35}\) “Beijing Must Still Focus on Trade as Partners Despite Trump’s Tariffs”, South China Morning Post, 10-03-2018.

\(^{36}\) Shen Dingli in “China Warns to Work with Other Nations to Counter Trump Tariffs”, South China Morning Post, 03-03-2018.
also, a few days later, soybeans.\textsuperscript{37}

It seems however that these declarations and measures are essentially part of a negotiating tactics. On a more martial and wishful tone however, the \textit{Global Times}, in its Chinese edition, called for “unity around the communist party and the State” for China to win this trade war, pitching “force” on the side of the US against “will” on the side of China (一是打实力，一是打意志). It also stressed the fact that “the future is on China’s side” (未来是在中国之边) to conjure any doubts about the PRC’s capacity to win a “world trade war”.\textsuperscript{38}

**Conclusion**

Despite numerous setbacks, Beijing had long chosen to emphasize the common interests between the two first world powers. The issue was also about serving the prestige of the regime, in the face of a Chinese public opinion increasingly fed President Xi Jinping’s great power discourse. However, regardless of the uncertainties surrounding the future of the Trump presidency, what stands out today are major differences between the United States and its allies on one side and the People’s Republic of China on the other.

More preoccupying for Beijing, the dividing line seems also to exclude North Korea, which saw an opportunity to regain some autonomy vis a vis an overconfident China, demonstrating the lack of efficiency of Beijing’s foreign policy choices.

A new “cold war” would not fit the characterization of Sino-US relations, in spite of mounting tensions. the ideological dimension of these tensions has undeniably increased, as two global models are opposed, albeit the fact that China’s power of seduction relies quasi only on its capacity to invest massively, with few questions asked, in fragile and isolated countries.

After years of pragmatism, following the reform policy launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, Xi Jinping has chosen to put the stress again on ideology, and the leading role of the communist party, over the economy and still less so the political reforms. This evolution relates very much to the Leninist nature of the Chinese regime whose first goal - from which all others, including foreign policy objectives, flow - is to stay in power.

However, interrogations do remain about the US strategy in the region. The question of long term engagement remains posed, even if it was partly solved, in a positive way, after Donald Trump’s long tour in the region. As seen in the treatment of the most recent evolutions between Pyongyang and Washington, Beijing will be ready to act in order not to be excluded from any solution on the Korean peninsula. The PRC will try to introduce divisions between allies and to play all levers at its disposal, particularly at the economic level.

Moreover, after the US withdrawal from the TPP – that might be reconsidered by president Donald Trump encouraged by his regional allies – or on the issue of climate change, China has been trying with some successes to establish itself as a “responsible” actor committed to multilateralism, even if this commitment remains limited to the defense of Chinese interests and the construction of a positive image.

At the November 2017 Climate conference in Bonn, China’s representative declared that the PRC would remain “a guardian of the multilateral process”. In Davos, in January 2017, Xi Jinping, despite the increased control of the economy by the communist party, championed globalization against the unilateralism of the United States.

However, the Chinese market remains as difficult to access and on climate change the PRC, in spite of its declarations of support to the COP 21, remains hostile to the principle of a common

\textsuperscript{37} The Tariffs concern 128 products.

\textsuperscript{38} “社评：即使中美贸易归零中国也不会后退 » (Comment : Even if Sino-US trade reaches Zero China Will not Retreat), \textit{opinion.huanqiu.com}, 06-04-2018.
rule and identical checks for all, based on verifiable statistics.

Finally, on the issue of tariffs on steel and aluminum, indiscriminately targeted, even if States like Canada or Australia, will be exempted, China was given a useful tool to try and destroy any united front strategy around the United States by detaching the European countries. In spite of the fact that these countries were tempted by joint actions with Washington on the issues of trade deficit, transfer of technology and investments in sensitive sectors.

If Donald Trump’s strategy in Asia, vis a vis North Korea and vis a vis China can be seen as positive, the results remain fragile, pending on the US president – and his entourage – ability to stick to a broader strategic vision not focused on “America First” only. If insufficient reassurance is given to allies, this uncertainty could only weaken a region that remains dependent on the United States for its stability and security.
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