

Turbulence in the Post-war Order and Issues in Japanese Diplomacy*

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Abstract

Few would deny that a sense of insecurity is growing across the world today. One might say that, at the root of such sense of insecurity, there exists a turbulence in the post-war order, which has been the basis of the peace and prosperity that the world has enjoyed for more than 70 years. We have a tendency to focus on particular individuals and phenomena. However, distinctive individuals and events are the signs—and also the results—of changes that are both structural and long-term. In this paper, the author presents an overview of the trajectory of changes in the post-war order and points out three factors that have hollowed out the post-war order from the inside: emergence of a risk society, the rise of the rest, and decline in the political leadership of the democratic system. The author also suggests that Japan should enhance the ability to make strategic judgments that determine the allocation of limited resources in order to maintain its peace and prosperity in such a turbulent world.

Introduction

Few would deny that a sense of insecurity is growing across the world today. Of course, this is a question of perception, and one might also say that compared with the terror of nuclear war between the US and USSR during the Cold War era, there are presently no huge threats and the modern world has escaped from the danger of major disaster. However, the fact that there is no clear object of fear is itself amplifying the present sense of uncertainty. At the time this is being written (the end of November 2017), the world is facing multiple unpredictable political risks including tensions regarding North Korea's nuclear missile program, developments in Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, and the outlook for the administration of Angela Merkel in Germany. On the other hand, the global economy is favorable and stock markets continue to post record highs. Does this mean that the world's investors anticipate that the impact of such political risks will be limited, and that has resulted in such a situation? Or should it be interpreted as an indication that investors are closing their eyes to political risks and concentrating on financial speculation alone? The source of the anxiety today is that our fundamental conceptual framework itself for understanding and interpreting the current situation is being shaken. To quote the famous words of US President Franklin Roosevelt's inaugural address, "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself." Nevertheless, this undefined fear is what makes us most afraid.

One might say that at the root which has led to such global conditions lies an upheaval in the post-war order, which has been the basis of the peace and prosperity that the world has enjoyed

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for more than 70 years. We have a tendency to focus on particular individuals and phenomena such as the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (EU), the election of President Trump, and the North Korean nuclear missile tests. However, distinctive individuals and events are the signs—in other words, the superstructure—of changes that are both structural and long-term. In this paper, I present an overview of the trajectory of changes in the post-war order, and also touch on issues in Japanese diplomacy.

1. History of the Post-war Order

The framework of the present international order was formed during and just after the end of WWII. At its core are universal international institutions such as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions. Following two world wars, which caused tens of millions of casualties during the first half of the 20th century, as well as the horrors of the development and use of nuclear weapons toward the end of WWII by a project which gathered the best of modern science, humanity has spent more than 70 years without experiencing large-scale war.

So, from a long-term perspective, one might conclude that the continued peace brought about by the post-war international order was actually founded on the long-term and large-scale destruction and violence experienced prior to that time. Then, why did such destruction and violence occur? One interpretation is that the changes sparked by the Industrial Revolution, which developed full-scale from 19th century Europe, had burst apart the 19th century order, and that these horrors occurred in the process of seeking a new equilibrium.

(1) Formation of the post-war order

From the 19th century forward, the Industrial Revolution promoted industrialization throughout the world. Industrialization brought multiple huge changes to human society. These changes may be summarized as (1) a dramatic increase in production capacity, (2) an expansion of the state's administrative ability to control society, (3) a rapid increase in population, and (4) the diffusion of power from Europe to the rest of the world.

From the end of the 19th century through the beginning of the 20th century, these changes created nations with robust state bureaucratic systems, including large-scale military forces, in the advanced nations where industrialization had progressed, and also rapidly deepened cross-border exchange. Meanwhile, the empires of the Qing Dynasty, Spain, Ottoman Turkey, British India, and Russia, which had ruled over most of non-European world up until that time, could not bear military rivalry with and economic penetration by the advanced nations which had industrialized, and they gradually weakened.

Such changes led to the wars such as the First Sino-Japanese War, the Spanish-America War, and the Boer Wars, as well as the revolutions and anti-government movements such as the First Russian Revolution, the Young Turk Revolution, the Xinhai Revolution, and self-government by the Indian National Congress. In WWI, a terrorist incident in the Balkans at the border of the weakened Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires triggered war among European industrialized countries, and eventually spread into a global war in which Japan and the US also participated. The Russian, Austro-Hungarian, German, and Ottoman empires were forced to collapse one after another.

After WWI, efforts were made to restore the international order with the formation of the League of Nations and the reconstructed gold standard, but with the beginning of the Great Depression (1929), the capitalist economies led by the US and the UK were at the brink of failure. The USSR and fascist nations adopted planned economies or controlled economies, and the acceptance of market intervention by the state rose in the free market countries as well. In the course of political and economic crises, the advanced nations proceeded along the path to becoming administrative states with large-scale bureaucratic organs responsible for wide-ranging

functions such as national security and social security, and with the tax collection systems to support them.

WWII provided another opportunity, especially for both the US and the UK, to shape a new international order. As presented in the Atlantic Charter, which was issued in August 1941, that international order was fundamentally one to pursue liberal ideals. Having said that, national power was also emphasized to facilitate the achievement of those liberal ideals and to uphold them. The solid foundations of the post-war international order were established by combining liberal ideals with practical elements of power.

Specifically, the post-war order had four main pillars. The first was the realization of the “politics of productivity” (Charles Maier), which enabled both industrialization and stable popular government. The second was the founding of a universalistic United Nations with mechanisms for the great powers to maintain the international order. The third was the multilateral free trading system, which mostly promotes trade in industrial products. And the fourth was a progressivism that affirms industrial civilization, along with a sharing of anti-war sentiment transcending regions and systems, based on the tens of millions of victims of the two world wars.

These four pillars underwent revisions as the Cold War began and the advanced industrialized world was split into the two camps of East and West shortly after the end of WWII. The security order was mainly maintained by mutual restraint between the two camps rather than by collaboration among the great powers, and the free trade system was shared exclusively among Western industrialized nations as a hegemonic framework for which the US carried the burden. Regardless, through the early 1970s, these four pillars continued functioning to a substantial extent as the basic framework of the international order.

Japan, which was defeated in WWII, also walked the path to reconstruction within this post-war order. Japan lost its regional hegemony in Asia and its military, but the Western open economic system resolved the lack of resources and markets that had troubled pre-war Japan as a newly industrializing country. Japan was able to advance rapid industrialization under this system. With the “politics of productivity” as the foundation, Japan was also able to construct the stable political framework known as the “1955 System.”

On the other hand, Japanese foreign policy was facing two issues up until the early 1970s. The first concerned Japan’s security policy. Under the Constitution of Japan enacted just after the war, the security of Japan, as a former enemy nation, was prescribed assuming it was under the control of the United Nations. In the subsequent transition to the Cold War regime, however, Japan accepted US forces as an ally, concluded the Japan-US Security Treaty, and began rearmament within certain limits without revising its Constitution. This torsion did not generate any specific problems as long as the mutual deterrence structure between East and West avoided actual wars among the industrial powers, but a fundamental vagueness remained in Japan’s national security structure.

The second issue was that the post-war Asian region became the focus not only of the Cold War regime, but also of decolonization, which was another global-scale transformation. While Japan positioned itself as “a member of Asia,” an interaction between the Cold War and post-decolonization politics prevented Japan from establishing formal relations with divided China and Korea, with which it had deep ties as former war theaters and colonies, were postponed. As a result, the emphasis of Japan’s foreign policy was placed overwhelmingly on its relations with the US, Europe and their post-colonies.

(2) Changes in the post-war order

The post-war order reached a turning point in the 1970s. While the industrialized nations were suffering from skyrocketing resources prices, reduced economic growth rates, high inflation, and rising unemployment, the East-West framework of the Cold War could no longer grasp the whole

of international politics, including changes such as an intensification of the North-South divide and shifting relations among the US, China, and the USSR.

The basis of these changes was the undercurrent that subsequently came to be called globalization, that is, technological advances made it possible for various actors in society to greatly amplify their capabilities, and the quality and quantity of transnational activities rapidly expanded. Such phenomena had begun gradually progressing from the 1960s. While advances in transportation and telecommunications technologies enabled the movement of people, goods, and money eluding the net of government regulations, new communication networks, such technological developments also awakened an awareness of identity based on ethnicity and religion. One might say that the strengthening domestic solidarity and increased cross-border interdependence which had progressed centered on the state from the 19th century through the first half of the 20th century emerged at this time with a focus on social actors.

Yet, in the 1970s, the Cold War framework was still steadfast, and the Western capitalist nations were able to maintain solidarity. The Western countries stepped up their vigilance over the advance of the USSR and other communist countries such as Cuba into developing nations, and collaborated to strengthen defense capabilities and maintain free trade to avert protectionism and division into bloc economies.

Then from the 1980s, new political coalitions that would lead the West were formed in the US and the UK. In contrast to the liberal and Labour Party forces that had led politics since the end of the war, political conservatism and market-oriented liberalism fused into new political alliances which attacked large government, labor unions, and other vested interests. US President Ronald Reagan and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher brought together conservative political alliances while also establishing market-oriented economic policies.

In this way, the post-war order was maintained, overcoming the crisis of the 1970s. Nevertheless, the post-war Cold War framework was weakened. The mutual deterrence between East and West by nuclear weapons morphed into competition in high-tech weapons, and the confrontation between capitalism and socialism, which shared industrial civilization, turned into a moral battle of good against evil between democracy and despotism. The deregulation line led by the US and the UK transformed into a globalization policy of removing all economic barriers from free trade centered on the manufacturing industry, and as the relocation of manufacturing overseas advanced, the stable middle class and organized interest groups such as industrial societies or trade unions gradually broke down, and the trend whereby public relations and image strategies determine election results intensified. Manufacturing firms relocated to developing countries, which had started moving away from their former closed development policies and begun adopting market economy policies, and rapid industrialization was achieved in the East Asian countries, in particular.

Mikhail Gorbachev, who became the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, eased the USSR's tense foreign relations and worked toward the revitalization of its domestic society. He achieved some measure of success at the former, but failed at the latter, which ultimately brought about the separation of Eastern Europe from the Communist Bloc as well as the eventual dissolution of the USSR and its withdrawal from communism. In foreign relations, his "new thinking" diplomacy eased East-West tensions and was well received, but the domestic revolution became frustrated, and ultimately this approach allowed Eastern Europe to abandon communism, leading to an attempted coup d'état by communist party members and the collapse of the USSR. In a nutshell, , whose efforts ultimately failed

As the Cold War was coming to an end, when Saddam Hussein of Iraq attempted to annex Kuwait by force, miscalculating the US reaction, the US and USSR collaborated to confront this by restoring the pre-Cold War UN collective security mechanism, and the multilateral forces dispatched based on a UN Security Council resolution won an overwhelming victory with the full

use of US high-tech weaponry. The images of the war broadcast live across the globe gave the impression that the liberal international order originally conceived in the aftermath of WWII had been realized under US initiative. While happenstance, it was also symbolic that it was President George H.W. Bush, the last president to have fought in WWII, who proclaimed “a new world order.”

During this period, Japanese diplomacy followed a path of growth and setbacks. From the 1960s through the 1970s, Japan had overcome its prior restraints for the time being and constructed a foreign policy framework as the second largest economy in the free world. First, this was a comprehensive security policy whereby, while keeping self-defense capabilities within a certain range, economic influence was used as a means for diplomatic security policy for the purposes of international cooperation and development assistance, instead of linking economic power to building up military capabilities overseas. Second, it succeeded in setting Japan’s relations with Asian countries including China and South Korea, with economic relations as the foundation, and promoted Asia-Pacific regionalism by combining free trade among advanced nations around the Pacific rim with development assistance to Asian countries. These became systematic during the Masayoshi Ōhira administration in the late 1970s, which called for Pan-Pacific regional cooperation and established the Pacific Economic Cooperation Caucus (PECC) in 1980. Based on this foundation, in the 1980s the administration of Yasuhiro Nakasone worked to solidify Japan’s ties with the West, reinforce the US-Japan security alliance, and improve relations with China and South Korea, under the slogan of Japan as an “international state.”

However, the direction of such successes changed in the late 1980s when the Japanese economy became bloated from an economic bubble and Japan became viewed as an outlier mercantilist power by other Western countries. Moreover, in the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Gulf War, Japan presented no clear policy on the potential use of force, and in the end could only share the burden with a financial contribution of \$13 billion. Coming on top of the collapse of the bubble economy, this experience made Japan feel a deep sense of frustration and begin seeking reforms to catch up with the new post-Cold War world order.

2. The Dissolving Post-War Order

However, expectations of the new world order rapidly fell by the wayside. Looking back today, one cannot help but see the Western world’s euphoria and pride, as well as its failures. This period gave rise to the two theses: Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 “The End of History?” and Samuel Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?”¹ Reading these again today, while they naturally have some defects because of the limitations of the times, one notes how the world, and the Western world in particular, failed to take seriously the warnings voiced by these two authors. While stressing the victory of liberal ideology, Fukuyama points out that contemporary liberalism is limited because of its inability to give people aspirations which transcend utilitarianism and everydayness. Meanwhile, Huntington argues that while for the time being Western civilization should work at reinforcing its own influence versus non-Western civilization, especially Confucian and Islamic civilization, over the long term it is necessary to anticipate the emergence of non-Western civilization, transcend cultural differences, and reach a deep understanding. Despite the debates sparked by both of these essays, the West did not earnestly respond to such reservations

¹ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *The National Interest*, Vol. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–18; Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22–49. Both of these papers were subsequently published as books: Francis Fukuyama (Shōichi Watanabe trans.), *Rekishi no Owari—Rekishi no “Shūten” ni Tatsu Saigo no Ningen* [The End of History—The Last Human Standing at the “Destination” of History] (Vols. 1 and 2), Mikasa Shobo, 1992 [original text 1992]; Samuel P. Huntington (Chikara Suzuki trans.), *Bunmei no Shōtotsu* [The Clash of Civilizations], Shueisha, 1998 [original 1996].

or warnings. The conditions today nearly 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in which walls that separate people are being built in all parts of the world, including cyberspace, must be seen as the consequences of the complacency of the advocates of liberalism. More specifically, three factors overlapped to gradually hollow out the post-war order from the inside, just as termites destroy buildings by consuming their pillars.

(1) Emergence of a risk society

What manifested in the 1990s following the conclusion of the Cold War was the risk society² that accompanies globalization. While globalization greatly expanded the scope of activity of social actors, by removing various boundaries and linking them as a network it also caused new risks that had been buried during the Cold War era to emerge.

The rapid advance of identity politics was one of the sources of these risks. Through examinations of historical relics and records, the information technologies that enabled globalization also made it possible for the masses to gain awareness of memories that had been forgotten in the past. In contrast to the post-Cold War liberal world view which tended to deny a communitarian sense of belonging to certain groups, groups which rallied for particular ethnicities and religious interpretations provided identity awareness and gained a strong ability to mobilize.

What is more, with the progress of globalization which made it possible for people, money, goods, and information to move across national boundaries, society approached a complex system (chaos) of multifaceted spider web-like networks linking various and diverse factors. In complex systems, local phenomena gain the potential to exert large-scale changes and influences going beyond the range that can be controlled based on technological causal inference (the butterfly effect). Such conditions were demonstrated time and again, as typified by the financial crises of Black Monday (1987), the East Asian monetary crisis (1997), and the Lehman crisis (2008). What is more, the power of entities which devote themselves to destroying the existing order at the local level gained force relative to that of systems managers responsible for overall stability, such as the major powers. Small-scale challenges and disruptions of order by terrorists and rogue states came to cause risks for overall systems.³

In that sense, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US were an epoch-making event. A terrorist group using just the low-level technology of hijacking airplanes struck a blow in the heart of the US, which apparently took pride in being invincible. The psychological impact of these attacks was far greater than the physical damage.

Following the 9/11 attacks, the administration of President George W. Bush placed the “war on terror” at the center of US foreign policy, and not only invaded Afghanistan which had become a base of Al-Qaeda and toppled the Taliban regime, but also designated Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the “axis of evil” and went to war to overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The administration of Tony Blair in the UK mediated in assembling cooperation from the international community for the “war on terror,” and ultimately exercised force together with the

² This term is based on the concept suggested in Ulrich Beck (Ren Azuma and Midori Itō trans.), *Kiken Shaka—Atarashii Kindai e no Michi* [Risk Society—Towards a New Modernity], Hosei University Press, 1998 [original 1986].

³ Early works which attempted to apply the concept of chaos to international politics include Yōnosuke Nagai and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (eds), *Chitsujo to Konton (Chaos)—Reisengo no Sekai* [Order and Chaos—the Post-war World], Ningenno Kagakusha, 1993, and Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*, Princeton University Press, 1997. Taleb’s work stressed this concept once again just before the Lehman crisis: Nassim Nicholas Taleb (Mamoru Mochizuki trans.), *Black Swan—Fukakujitsusei to Risk no Honshitsu* [The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable] (Vols. 1 and 2), Diamond, Inc., 2009 [original 2007].

US.

Overtaking the Hussein administration was easily achieved given the US military capabilities. However, the failure to make any preparations for government after the collapse of that administration reflected the simple optimism of liberal democracy as the historical winner, and the US and UK which took the initiative in the war paid a high price for their excessively optimistic outlook. The confusion of the post-war governance pulled down the international prestige of the US and UK, and insufficient attention was given to the development of nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea.

Because the burden of the “war on terror” turned out to be much heavier than initially anticipated, the Bush administration then had to give particular attention to upholding domestic economic conditions. Because a real estate bubble had been tolerated and those loans were turned into financial products, when the real estate bubble collapsed, that spread into a general financial crisis. The emergence of the Lehman crisis in September 2008 reconfirmed the fragility inherent in globalization.

(2) The rise of the rest

The “rise of the rest”⁴ progressed in parallel with the prolongation of the war on terror and concerns about a global depression starting from the US caused by the collapse of Lehman Brothers. A 2003 report by the largest US securities company Goldman Sachs used the term “BRICs” to refer to Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and hinted at the potential that these countries could surpass the industrialized nations in the future global economy, drawing a great deal of attention.⁵ These four countries plus South Africa subsequently came to be called the BRICS, and various other terms were proposed to refer to the BRICS together with other emerging nations.

At that point in time, the West mostly viewed the emergence of the newly industrializing economies not as a challenge to the international order, but rather as a demonstration that the cooperative framework would be maintained because these countries also benefitted from the open order created by the West.⁶ To be certain, up until the 2008 Lehman shock, the basic policy in these countries as well was to pursue economic growth within the international order led by the industrialized nations. For example, in the case of China, the administration of Hu Jintao which came to power in 2002 initially called for a “peaceful rise” of China, and emphasized the stance that the emergence of the Chinese economy was not a threat to the existing order but was rather in line with that framework.

Just after the 2008 Lehman crisis, there were growing calls for the industrialized nations and the newly industrializing economies to reinforce the international cooperation framework with new foundations. The strengthening of the G20 is a representative example. The G20 Summit first held at the invitation of the US in November 2008 was made into a regular event. After the crisis settled down somewhat, however, cracks emerged between the advanced nations and the emerging economies, and the stagnation of the G20 became conspicuous. The background to this included a sense among the emerging economies that Western leadership was in decline as they gained confidence in their own economic power, along with an emphasis on strengthening authoritarian systems to avert domestic social discontent over growing economic disparities and

⁴ Fareed Zakaria (Kōichi Nirei trans.), *Amerika-go no Sekai* [The Post-American World], Tokuma Shoten, 2008 [original 2008].

⁵ Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050,” *Global Economics*, Paper No. 99 (Oct. 2003) [<http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf>].

⁶ As a representative advocate, see G. John Ikenberry (Yūichi Hosoya trans.), *Riberaruna Chitsujo ka Teikoku ka—Amerika to Sekai Seiji no Yukue* [Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and International Order] (Vols. 1 and 2), Keiso Shobo, 2012 [original 2006].

over control over freedom of speech. Consequently, albeit only partially, the newly industrializing countries began to make clear their critical stance toward the existing order led by the West.

The trends in China and Russia were particularly important. The Beijing Olympics were held just before the Lehman crisis, and in China from this time there were growing calls among the leadership to switch from the line of “keeping a low profile and biding time” to a policy of actively “striving for achievement,” and a struggle for power emerged in relation to the succession of power to Xi Jinping. Once Xi took power from 2012, China turned increasingly proactive in its foreign policy. Under the banner of “the great revival of the Chinese nation,” while strengthening its voice within the existing international economic order through such initiatives as including the renminbi as one of the currencies that comprise International Monetary Fund (IMF) Special Drawing Rights (SDR), China launched its “great maritime power” and “Belt and Road” initiatives, established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and otherwise began building up a framework to compete with the existing framework led by the West. Meanwhile, domestically, the Chinese government tightened its stance toward controlling the spread of outside influence, and stepped up its control over free speech, which had been tolerated to some extent under the reform and opening-up policy.

Glorification of nationalism and regression of freedom have also proceeded in Russia under the administration of Vladimir Putin, which has suppressed the opposition, placed the media under control, and grasped the foundations of power of the *siloviki* (persons related to the security or military services) and of energy and other industrial conglomerates. Furthermore, the Putin administration has strong suspicions regarding Western penetration of Russia and nearby regions, and has taken stances opposing the West in its territorial dispute with Georgia (2008), and in the Russian military intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea (2014).

However, the newly emerging economies are not strongly united: India was absent from the 2017 Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, and there is some overlap between the Belt and Road initiative and the Eurasian Union advocated by President Putin. At least for the time being, the effect from the rise of the newly emerging economies will likely be limited to eroding and weakening the post-war order, and the construction of an opposing order will not be straightforwardly pursued.

(3) Decline in the political leadership of the democratic system

While the newly emerging economies began to distance themselves from the post-war order led by the West, domestic politics were destabilized in the Western nations, especially in the US and UK which had served as the core leaders of the post-war order, and their international leadership declined. This trend, which had been noted just after the end of the Cold War⁷, rapidly accelerated after the Lehman crisis. While the recurrence of a global depression has been averted since the Lehman crisis by non-traditional financial policies and a large-scale expansion in fiscal spending, the fracturing of society has deepened over that time, and the political support for anti-globalism can no longer be ignored. While the anti-globalism movement does not have a systematic world view, it does embody the sense of the downfall of the middle class, which enjoyed prosperity during the period when the post-war order was fixed, and this movement has also become mixed with a backlash against the elite who pushed globalization forward, animosity toward immigrants, ethnic and religious chauvinism, and fear of terrorism. Although the majority of people do not actively support anti-globalism, its influence in democratic politics is rising from

⁷ A political analyst who proposed the “southern strategy” to the Republican Party in the past drew a picture of the political deterioration of Anglo-Saxon society. See Kevin Phillips (Hisayoshi Ina trans.), *Amerika de “Kakumei” ga Okiru—Washinton Kaitai o Semaru Shin Popyurizumu* [Arrogant Capital: Washington, Wall Street, and the Frustration of American Politics], Nikkei Publishing, Inc., 1995 [original 1994].

its ability to mobilize politically since the use of social networking services (SNS) and other new communications means outside the mass media has become widely available.

In 2016, such political changes brought about major shifts in the foreign policies of the US and the UK, which had been in charge of the post-war order. Barack Obama, who became the first black president of the US in 2009, declared that the US is not the world's policeman, and pursued a diplomacy without relying on military power and an emphasis on multilateral cooperation. While Obama's idealistic vision calling for a "world without nuclear weapons" had the power to appeal to public opinion, he failed to completely bridge the gap with China and Russia which stepped up their challenges against the West and were becoming increasingly authoritarian, and while he did achieve the withdrawal of US combat units from Iraq, that invited the rise of the Islamic State (IS). Non-military response to the mountain of problems, including the governance of Afghanistan, North Korean nuclear missile development, and Iraqi nuclear development, had its limits and conversely led to a decline in international prestige and intensification of domestic opposition. In the 2016 US presidential election, Hillary Clinton who inherited the Obama line lost to Donald Trump who called for an America First policy, which implied destroying the post-war international order based on American liberal leadership. In the UK as well, Prime Minister Tony Blair who had a middle-of-the-road line resigned amid criticism regarding the Iraq War. The Labour Party lost its cohesiveness, and after the brief administration of Gordon Brown, the government switched to the Conservative Party administration of David Cameron. However, in order to achieve unity within his own party, Cameron rather capriciously proposed a national referendum on Britain leaving the EU. To the shock of the British and the world, the "Leave" vote narrowly outnumbered the "Remain" vote in the referendum of June 2016.

The Brexit referendum under the Cameron administration and the selection of real estate agent Donald Trump as the Republican Party candidate and then as president revealed cracks in the alliance between neoliberalism and conservative patriotism that had been central to US and UK politics since the 1980s. Neoliberalism and conservative patriotism had been united under the great causes of criticizing the administrative state and confronting communism, but after the end of the Cold War internal tensions intensified with a sense of the downfall of the conservative middle class and debates regarding war leadership. As a result of this split among the conservatives, Prime Minister Cameron was forced into holding the Brexit referendum. While in the US, the split within the Republican Party enabled the selection of Trump as the Republican candidate. Of course, turmoil in domestic politics is not limited to the US and the UK: the emergence of anti-EU factions and separatist movements can be seen in other European countries as well.

It should be possible to argue from a logical and utilitarian viewpoint against President Trump's assertions that the present international order places excessive burdens on the US, allows free-riding by other countries, and harms US interests. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the US and the UK, and the US in particular, have borne an asymmetrical burden (admittedly with certain privileges) in the post-war international order, and a utilitarian counterargument based on profit-and-loss arithmetic will not resonate with the feelings of those who seek more than utilitarian value. In addition to the emergence of the risk society and the rise of the newly emerging economies, the post-war order is now being challenged from inside the states that have served as its main axis. This is the greatest trial the post-war order has ever faced.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have reviewed the developments in the post-war order from its formation up until the present time. Although the post-war order has provided peace and stability for more than 70 years, its shaking is gradually growing stronger. The post-war order is a system that was conceived at the peak of industrial civilization, and there is no question that it has become

a presence which no longer matches the age of post-industrialization. The issue is whether the transition to a new order will take place peacefully and gradually, or if we shift to a new order by passing through devastating shocks including war. Of course, the former is clearly desirable, but we cannot overlook the reality that this path is gradually narrowing.

Japan, which has received great benefits from the post-war order, has a particularly great interest in a peaceful transition. Even though Japan lacks the power to determine the fate of the international order by itself, the decisions of Japan may have a large influence on important aspects.

In that regard, what will be most important is the ability to make strategic judgments that determine the allocation of limited resources. The environment surrounding Japan includes potential conflict areas such as North Korea and the Taiwan Strait and is a region where US, Chinese, and Russian influences intersect, and where it is becoming increasingly difficult to project the future overall. Consequently, Japan's efforts to reinforce its security system should be prioritized to enhance Japan's own safety and also as a means of diplomatic influence. Yet considering the present level of the technologies, there are clearly limits to Japan's own resources that can be devoted to defense, and Japan should allocate substantial resources to its diplomatic capabilities and information collection and analysis capabilities. In particular, in this age of fake news and conspiracy theories, accurate information analysis capabilities may determine the fate of nations.

Also, geopolitically, the Indo-Pacific region may gain importance as a region where US and Chinese interests compete, and Japan may also need to build up its own network of influence in this region as well. That may require a dramatic expansion of people-to-people exchanges, including the acceptance of immigrants from this region.

From a longer-term perspective, as the world transitions to an information civilization, the decision on whether the unit that comprises a stable order will be the nation state or takes some other form is important. The modern nation state framework is presently the most rational and universal political order. Nevertheless, it is also certain that areas where the modern nation state system, which is premised on the demarcation of strict national boundaries and on ethnic integration, cannot be applied occupy a substantial part of the world. In the international order that will be formed from now, a choice will have to be made on whether to greatly reform the nature of the 20th century nation state, or to find new principles of order that differ from the sovereign state, or to adopt some mixture of both. Even if the territory of Japan, which is surrounded by the sea, remains unchanged, the type of principles of order to be adopted will have decisive importance on Japan's living environment.

Devising and implementing long-term strategies is an area where Japan has not been strong. But if we do not deal with this issue amid the intensifying upheaval of the post-war order, the danger that Japan's peace and prosperity may be lost will only grow stronger.