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Commemorating the Centennial Anniversary of Japan's Racial Equality Proposal: Remaking the International Order after the WWI

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on the Proposal to Abolish Racial Discrimination**
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Japan at the Paris Peace Conference: Focusing on the Proposal to Abolish Racial Discrimination*

Hiroshi Nakanishi**

Abstract

The Japanese proposal to abolish the racial discrimination at the Paris Peace Conference must be put into wider historical context. As Japan saw itself first becoming the leading country of Asia and matching the world's first-class countries such as Britain and the United States, the Hara administration's position at the time was to take this opportunity to remove one of the thorns, the immigrant issue, to enhance cooperation with Britain and the United States. For those against the idea of an international order led by Britain and the United States, on the other hand, the issue of the abolition of racial discrimination was a sort of litmus test, which would prove if the Anglo-US order embraces Japan as fully legitimate partner. The proposal surfaced as a point of domestic compromise, which did not materialize in the diplomatic negotiations. Taking a broader view, the failure of the proposal was not solely the matter of Japan. Japan's racial equality proposal, like the various concepts of the world order presented in the Paris Peace Conference, was the extension of Wilson's Fourteen Points, radical application of the ideology of liberalism. Its failure shows the divergence of liberal ideal from reality. Despite the failure, however, Japan's 1919 proposal was historically significant. Just as the concept of "cunning of reason" by Kant and Hegel's philosophy on history suggests, an idea is realized after following a twisting and turning trajectory of history. Racial equality was later realized through the Second World War and the postwar international relations. In that sense, I believe the Proposal to Abolish Racial Discrimination at the Paris Peace Conference had permanent mark and significance in world history.

Thank you for honoring me with the opportunity to give the keynote speech at this symposium. I intend to introduce one interpretation of the significance of the debate over Japan's diplomacy. In particular, I will focus on the proposal to abolish racial discrimination—often referred to as the "racial equality proposal"—amidst the changes taking place in the international world order during the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference that followed.

There have been only a limited number of individual studies of this theme. As far as I know, the only single-author work on the subject to date is Shimazu Naoko's *Japan, Race and Equality: The racial equality proposal of 1919*, published in 1998, based on her doctoral thesis. Centered primarily on British documents, this book provides a detailed analysis mainly based on the British sources and is a valuable work as an academic diplomatic history.

The study by Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power And Prejudice: The Politics And Diplomacy Of*

* This article is based on the keynote speech made by the author at the symposium "Commemorating the Centennial Anniversary of Japan's Racial Equality Proposal—Remaking the International Order after the WWI—" held by JIIA on November 2, 2019.

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Racial Discrimination published in 1988, is well-known, partly through the Japanese translation, which deals with changes in international political approaches to racial discrimination from the perspective of diplomatic history.

Professor Takahara Shūsuke of Kyoto Sangyo University, in his book on Wilson diplomacy and Japan published in 2006, examines the influence on Japan in the context of Wilsonian diplomacy and discuss the raised equality proposal in that context. But otherwise there is actually very little research into this theme.

Taking those research results into account, my primary intention today is to present one approach to viewing the First World War and explore whether we can understand these pieces of research with a certain degree of consistency.

1. The Nature of the First World War

Several years ago, we witnessed a new tide of historical research, including review works, centered around the centenary of the start of the First World War in 1914. The three-volume collection of the essays in *The Cambridge History of the First World War*, published from 2014 to 2016, provides us a convenient overview. Most of the research carried out after the Second World War and through into the 1950s and 1960s tended to view the First World War from the standpoint of military history. This was subsequently replaced by a gradual shift in perspective to the extent that most research today on the First World War takes more of a socioeconomic and cultural history approach. I also believe the focus of research has moved away from a Eurocentric to a more global approach.

As I read these pieces of research and thought about the theme of today's lecture amidst these trends, I sensed certain uneasiness about the expression "First World War." The ordinal number "First" naturally came after the Second World War happened. The expression "world war" or "Great War" already existed during the time when the war was ongoing. But I began to think that the word "war," implying that there is a neat beginning and end, may cause some misunderstanding of the situation that arose from 1914 onwards.

Very briefly, in August 1914, the main belligerents, Germany, France, Russia, Britain and Austria-Hungary came to be engaged in a major war in Europe for the first time since the Napoleonic Wars of around a century earlier. The fiercest battles between these great powers took place between 1914 and 1916, although the war itself continued for some time thereafter.

This phase of the war in Europe tended to be another round of large-scale wars in the classical sense. At the same time, they had a global impact through alliances and imperial ties. One typical case of this was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan engaged in military activities against German rights and interests in East Asia, specifically in China and at the Pacific Islands.

It is also important to note that Britain was involved in the war as the British Empire from the start. While countries like Australia, Canada and colonies like India took part as semi-independent actors, they did so as part of the British Empire. The war therefore had a global impact even though most of the fighting took place in Europe.

From around 1916 to 1917, however, the Great War's deeper impact began to spread beyond Europe to the rest of the world, although it was felt not so much in the form of a military war but of revolutionary changes arising from social and political upheaval.

The revolutions of February and October 1917 ushered in a socialist system in Russia, but that was not all. In the United States, the Wilson administration put the country on a wartime footing the same year, despite its efforts to remain neutral until then. China, then known as the Republic of China, entered the war in August 1917.

At the same time, as Erez Manela's perceptive work, *The Wilsonian Moment* of 2007, demonstrates, nationalist movements that had been quietly growing from before the First World War evolved into campaigns and struggles with revolutionary, political overtones. These political

movements gained momentum in places that were caught up in the war, such as India, the Ottoman Empire and Egypt.

Naturally, the situations in all these countries varied, and it is impossible to categorize them tidily into their history or period demarcations. However, all these developments from around 1917 onwards meant that the First World War did not have the neat ending as a war but it ended in a messy way, not in the least by the revolutions of the belligerents, especially Germany and its allies. That is the fundamental difference between the First World War and other wars, notably the Second World War.

With the armistice and peace between Russia and Germany at Brest-Litovsk, and the revolutions and systemic changes in Austria, Hungary and the Ottoman Empire a little later, the First World War basically ended with political changes. While the hostilities ceased in 1918, especially for Germany, there are various reasons to say that these political changes did not settle down until sometime later, in the 1920s onwards. In my view, the fact that the Paris Peace Conference took place in the midst of this process is important when interpreting its history from a contemporary perspective.

2. Japanese Diplomacy and its Domestic Background

In Japan, there were three administrations during the First World War. The first was the Ōkuma Shigenobu administration and it was an anti-Rikken Seiyūkai (Constitutional Association of Political Friendship) coalition cabinet. As you probably know, it faced the start of First World War hostilities and joined the war to play the part of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

The Ōkuma administration remained in office through to October 1916 which, as we have already seen, was right in the middle of the war of alliances among the countries of Europe. Japan, alongside Britain, engaged in military diplomacy against Germany.

At the time, Japan focused firmly on establishing its status as a first-class power in East Asia, issuing the famous Twenty-One Demands to the government of the Republic of China. The United States and Britain were involved to some extent in the negotiations that ensued, but as they were in the midst of a war, they applied little pressure on Japan. In the end, China accepted most of Japan's key demands.

However, domestic criticism of the Ōkuma administration, including accusation against its handling of the Twenty-One Demands, increased and, in October 1916, the new administration was formed under Terauchi Masatake who had a military background. As I mentioned earlier, this was the time when the First World War mutated dramatically from a great war among European countries into a period of global revolutionary moments. The Terauchi administration moved ahead with adjustments to its relationships with its allies, Britain, France and Russia. To eliminate the mistrust that had arisen to some extent during the Ōkuma administration, the talks focused on postwar peace terms with Japan, including secret treaties.

At the same time, amidst the revolutionary changes taking place in China around this time, Japan attempted to revive Japan-China relations by supporting the Duàn Qírui administration, which took over in Beijing after the Yuán Shikǎi administration fell. When the Wilson administration moved to enter the First World War, it was somewhat suspicious towards Japan's policies vis-a-vis China and Asia. Japan sent Ishii Kikujirō as a special envoy to the United States with a view to reaching an understanding with Secretary of State Robert Lansing over Japan-China relations and the China issue. I think we can interpret this as an attempt to restructure Japanese diplomacy amidst the changing international situation.

The Siberian intervention by Japanese forces was the final act of the Terauchi administration. Britain and France had demanded Japan intervening in Siberia since the time of the Russian revolution. Japan was cautious because of the possible damage on relations with the United States, but when the United States ultimately decided to act along with Japan, Japan dispatched

troops to Siberia.

Around the same time, the Terauchi administration collapsed in the face of the Rice Riots which started July of 1918 and other growing socioeconomic problems. In September 1918, the reins were handed over to the Hara Takashi administration, a party government rooted in the Rikken Seiyūkai. Almost immediately the Hara administration found itself having to deal with the Paris Peace Conference starting in January 1919, just after the suspension of First World War hostilities.

Though the administration had changed, Japan initially appears to have approached the ceasefire and peace negotiations as basically an extension of the cumulative efforts of the Ōkuma and Terauchi administrations. However, the Hara administration decided to take a more proactive approach. At the Paris Peace Conference, it attached great importance to form the cooperative relationship with the United States, not only with Britain, actively supporting the attempt to conclude a peace treaty based on the Fourteen Points that President Wilson originally submitted and tried to make the basis of the peace negotiation at Paris. In my view, this was the primary reason why Japan put forward the racial equality proposal that serves as the theme of today's presentation.

3. The Paris Peace Conference and the Racial Equality Proposal

(1) Background

President Wilson presented the conditions he proposed as a basis for negotiating the settlement to the war in his Fourteen Points speech to Congress on January 8, 1918. He spoke in terms of well-known fundamental liberal rules based on the general principle “that the world be made fit and safe to live in.” He also talked about freedom of trade and navigation, and while there was no expression of self-determination for peoples, he said that there should be no disposition of colonies without considering the intentions of the populations concerned.

This was basically a unilateral declaration. That said, Point XIV speaks in terms of forming a “general association of nations,” which was tantamount to a proposal that a body like the League of Nations be created.

The implications of fourteen points became important in mid-1918 onwards when the policy was formulated that Germany accept the ceasefire and later peace based on the fourteen points. In the end, the armistice agreement with Germany came into force on November 11, 1918 as Germany agreed to accede to a peace based on the fourteen points. The content of the fourteen points thus became the basis for international treaties and conventions within a very short time.

The newly inaugurated Hara administration was forced to respond very quickly to the likely creation of international organizations such as the League of Nations. As already mentioned, the Hara administration's basic postwar policy was to cooperate with the United States and Britain, more specifically, with President Wilson and the administration of UK Prime Minister David Lloyd George.

The China issue was a particularly big problem between Japan and the United States at the time, but the Ishii-Lansing Agreement and the improvement in Japan-China relations were deemed to have dealt with it, at least provisionally. There was awareness that the anti-Japanese immigrant issue that had arisen since the beginning of the 1900s on the west coast of the United States, especially California was, if anything, an even greater issue. There was much talk about the possibility that the creation of a League of Nations would provide an opportunity to adopt the resolution of the immigrant issue as a fundamental principle.

The Diplomatic Advisory Council was established around the time of the Terauchi administration. In today's parlance, it would be described as being “prime-minister led” ad hoc group. It created a framework that embraced party representatives as well as people from the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs to debate foreign policy. The Hara administration thus needed to ram through this Council with the above-mentioned policy of cooperating with the Britain and the United States.

Conservative politicians and others argued that, though a pro-British or pro-American stance was not a bad thing, it raised concerns that the creation of something like the League would impede Japan's diplomacy towards Asia. Talk of abolishing racial discrimination was picked up as a response to the immigrant issue with the US and the British Empire. The Hara administration put forward its proposals to the Council as a compromise that would give Japan an advantage in its relationships with Britain and the United States. Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai and Makino Nobuaki, one of the plenipotentiaries to the Conference, made comments to this effect.

On the other hand, the politicians who expressed skepticism about the League were encouraged by public opinion within Japan. While there was generally plenty of positive discussion about Wilsonianism and liberalism at the time, there was also a great deal of skepticism about the sudden emergence of the idea of the League. As the discussion on the League became increasingly linked with the issue of racial discrimination, especially the anti-Japanese immigration issue, there was quite a strong sentiment that support to the League depends on whether it would incorporate measures to prevent racial discrimination.

Once the Paris Peace Conference got underway in 1919, media reports from Paris became frequent, amplifying the racial discrimination issue as a matter of domestic politics in Japan. The League to Abolish Racial Discrimination held several mass public meetings from January 1919 onwards, exposing the Hara administration to pressure from public opinion, especially opinions centered on racial discrimination.

The unspoken background to the escalation in the racial discrimination issue lay to some extent in the changes affecting relations between the British Empire and Japan during the First World War. The independence movement in India grew in strength from the 1910s onwards. Japan was also affected by the struggle between those seeking autonomy and those more radical ultimately aiming at independence.

Rash Behari Bose was a well-known Indian activist who fled to Japan during the war. The British, who were cracking down on such people, pressed Japan for his extradition. There was considerable opposition to this from traditional Pan-Asianists, typified by Tōyama Mitsuru, who supported the Indian independence movement from the perspectives of anti-colonialism and anti-racial discrimination. Bose sought shelter among various groups in Japan and was helped by Tōyama and others. He eventually married the daughter of the owners of Nakamura, the bakery that still exists in Shinjuku, Tokyo, and became a Japanese citizen and lived for the rest of his life in Japan.

Until that time, the Asianists' interests were basically concentrated to the places close to Japan, such as China and the Korean Peninsula. However, as a result of the First World War, their view was enlarged by "Greater Asianism" or "Pan-Asianism," which includes colonial Southeast Asia and India, among other things, and adopted a more critical attitude towards Britain as a colonial empire. Together with a certain wariness caused by anti-immigration sentiments in the United States and Britain, the Pan-Asianists used strong demands for the abolition of racial discrimination as a means of putting pressure on the Hara administration.

One reflection of this was the famous article entitled *Reject the Anglo-American-Centered Peace* written by Konoe Fumimaro, who was still a young aristocrat at the time but later became Japan's prime minister. Given the domestic changes taking place in Japan, especially at a time of dramatic global transformation, we can assume that he was critical of the idea that Japan should simply accept a world order based on cooperation with the United States and Britain.

(2) Sequence of Events

Japan's delegation of plenipotentiaries was headed by Saionji Kinmochi, an elder statesman and major political figure who also had studied in France in his young days. Several others handled actual conference matters, led by Makino Nobuaki, with the assistance of Chinda Sutemi and Ijūin Hikokichi, both from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When they first contacted with the American delegates in Paris, the American response to the idea of inserting racial equality clause into the treaty of the League did not seem too negative. The Japanese side did not feel that the Wilson administration was against Japanese ideas on abolishing racial discrimination from the outset. Wilson's special advisor Colonel House especially seemed to take a favorable position.

It may be that the Japanese side was misled by this initial American attitude, but they were encouraged by it and initially proposed ideas that, with the immigrant issue basically in mind, called for an end to discrimination against Japanese immigrants, immigrants from other countries, and minority immigrants.

The situation subsequently changed, however. Because Britain fought under the banner of the British Empire, as mentioned earlier, it could not make decisions on its own as it had to be sensitive to the views of dominions such as Australia and South Africa. One member of the British delegation, Australian Prime Minister William Morris Hughes, was vehemently opposed to the idea.

Australia's well-known "White Australia" policy came into existence only around the beginning of the twentieth century. Basically, it was a Labour Party idea, and was more of a welfare policy than a racist policy with the idea that immigrants should not be let into the country to work for lower wages. Hughes, as a Labour Prime Minister, opposed accepting immigrants for domestic reasons, but he was also wary of Japan. With the combination of those factors resulted in hardline opposition, Britain took the view that it could not compromise on the matter for the sake of preserving unity within the Empire.

Meanwhile, President Wilson encountered extremely strong domestic criticism when he returned temporarily to the United States in February through to March. The Japanese immigrant issue was part of the criticism, though it was not the center of the matter. By around March, both the United States and Britain had adopted an extremely negative stance towards inserting a racial equality clause to the League Covenant.

The Japanese plenipotentiary delegation was caught in a dilemma. Initially, they had thought that the United States and Britain might be open to some sort of compromise, but that possibility suddenly disappeared around March. Within Japan, meanwhile, the abolition of racial discrimination took an extremely symbolic meaning from the perspective of public opinion. In a sense, many people believed Japan's participation in the League should depend on the adoption of the proposal.

The delegation tried hard to find a compromise from March through to April. In April, the Japanese delegation decided to request that a general consideration of "equality of peoples" be included in the preamble to, not in the main text of, the Covenant of League of Nations. When the League of Nations Commission met on April 11 to determine the content of the Covenant, a majority of 11 members voted in favor of the Japan's proposal, but five voted against. Acting as chairman, Wilson rejected the amendment on the grounds that unanimity was necessary for such an important matter.

This was clearly an extraordinary maneuver because numerous other issues had been decided by majority decisions. Wilson had high-handedly brought the decision to a conclusion by bending the rules because he knew that Britain would not accept Japan's proposal, and that there would be strong opposition at home.

I do not go into detail today, but there was considerable wrangling between Japan and China over how to deal with the Shandong Problem, which was no doubt related to the handling

of the racial non-discrimination issue. Basically, Japan's demands on the Shandong Problem were narrowly accepted in the end, and things moved on towards the signing of the Treaty of Versailles.

At the plenary session of the Paris Peace Conference, Makino concluded with a speech to the effect that he would continue working towards the acceptance of racial equality and the abolition of racial discrimination as international principles.

4. Assessment

(1) The Racial Equality Proposal as a Matter of Domestic Compromise

In summary, my assessment of these events is that we cannot really say the Japanese government tried to realize abolishment of racial discrimination as the basic principle at the Paris Peace Conference based on Japan's national consensus. It surfaced as a point of political compromise, and did not materialize in the diplomatic negotiations.

If we take a broader view, however, as portrayed in Shiba Ryōtarō's novel *Clouds above the Hill*, after Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War and the revision of the so-called unequal treaties, the issue in the 1910s was to redefine the strategic objectives of Japanese diplomacy. In my view, Japan saw itself first becoming the leading country of Asia, then ranking itself among the world's first-class countries such as Britain and the United States and cooperating with them. I think such perception had been established during the First World War.

The Hara administration's position of cooperating with Britain and the United States at the time was to take this opportunity to remove one of the thorns in its side, the immigrant issue. From the perspective of anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism and "Greater Asianism," on the other hand, people who were unhappy with the idea of an international order led by Britain and the United States stressed that the issue of the abolition of racial discrimination would be a sort of litmus test of the Anglo-US order, which would prove if that order embraces Japan as fully legitimate partner. I therefore believe the proposal was submitted to the Paris Peace Conference as a compromise.

In the end, Japan's proposal was not at all accepted but ultimately denied. The famous Immigration Act of 1924, including the Asian Exclusion Act, was established in the US, which doubled down disillusionment and discontent among Japanese people towards the Anglo-American order. In that sense, there is dark side of reality in the high-minded proposal.

(2) The Immature Liberal International Order

Taking a more general view of today's theme, however, the instability of international order in the interwar period was not just Japan's problem. It was a problem commonly shared in the various concepts of the world order presented in the Paris Peace Conference, including Wilson's Fourteen Points.

While there is no doubt that the Fourteen Points was a liberal concept of international order, this ideal was betrayed by reality on several different levels. Whether it was a deficiency of collective security, German reparations or the treatment of ethnic self-determination, it triggered many illusions during or immediately after the Paris Peace Conference.

In one aspect, the Fourteen Points was excessively radical, in another, it was insufficient. Japan's racial equality proposal was the same. As an idea, it embraced the ideology of liberalism, but it also diverged from reality too much.

(3) Impact on Posterity: The Second World War and Article 1 Paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United Nations

Despite the various facets, however, we cannot deny that Japan's 1919 proposal was historically

significant. In Kant and Hegel's philosophy on history, there is a concept of "cunning of reason." There are cases where an ideology is realized after following a twisting and turning trajectory and going through various conflicts.

For example, since the Twenty-One Demands, the Paris Peace Conference gave rise to the May Fourth Movement triggered by the handling of the Shandong Problem at Paris. This led to the confrontation between Japan and China that, with admittedly long and winding stretch, resulted in the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. There existed an indirect link, when the Charter of the United Nations was prepared in San Francisco in 1945, Wellington Koo and others representing Republic of China, a member of the United Nations, proposed Article 1 Paragraph 3 against racial discrimination.

Another twist was that, although the mainstream in the diplomacy of Japanese government was opposed to Pan-Asianism, the message of the movement, because of the rejection of the racial equality clause at Paris, increased its influence on Japanese policy and later had influence on the political movement against the colonial system. Thus, one of the intellectual backdrops was formed at Paris for Japan entering into the rivalry with Britain and the United States in the Asia-Pacific.

While Japan waged war against the post-First World War order led by Britain and the United States, the resulting consequence was transformation of the colonial system and the start of a more liberal order after the Second World War. In that sense, I believe the Proposal to Abolish Racial Discrimination at the Paris Peace Conference had permanent mark and significance in world history.

The Racial Equality Proposal and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

Ryoichi Tobe**

Abstract

Who came up with the idea for the racial equality proposal, and what was its objective? It is often said that although the idea was originally based on principle, it later became entangled with real-life political interests owing to the immigration issue. Ultimately, according to this interpretation, it became an issue of national pride. Once Japan had put forward the proposal it became difficult to back down, and there was the worry that it would earn the disdain of surrounding countries, particularly China. But looking over these materials again for this presentation, I have come to think that in fact it was always the intention that this proposal should contribute to solving the immigration problem. I do not think this was incorporated along the way as a reaction to realpolitik interests. At the same time, the theoretical objective based on principle was something that the Japanese side pursued consistently throughout, even if it did not outweigh the practical concerns over the immigration issue. The idea that the national prestige became an important concern in the final stages is not, I think, something that is supported by the documentary materials. This presentation discusses how the idea for the racial equality proposal evolved, organizing the discussion around the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

The questions I want to discuss today are: Who came up with the idea for the racial equality proposal, and what was its objective? I want to organize my discussion around the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Professor Nakanishi has already spoken about the political circumstances related to this issue in Japan, so I would like to add my own remarks as supplementary information that will perhaps complement what we have already heard on the subject.¹

1. The Originator: Whose Idea Was It?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a Peace Preparation Committee in October 1915, around one year after the start of World War I. The committee compiled a report a year later, at the end of 1916. Of course, US President Wilson had not yet issued his Fourteen Points, and there was no discussion about a possible racial equality proposal at this stage. Presumably discussions took place within the ministry after Wilson's Fourteen Points were announced in January 1918, but we know little about the content of these discussions, assuming they took place. We can surmise that serious deliberations began in earnest around October the same year, after Germany

* This article is based on a presentation made by the author at the symposium "Commemorating the Centennial Anniversary of Japan's Racial Equality Proposal—Remaking the International Order after the WWI—" held by JIIA on November 2, 2019.

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¹ For more details on the keynote speech of Professor Nakanishi, see, Nakanishi Hiroshi, "Japan at the Paris Peace Conference," *Japan Review* 3. 3-4 (Winter / Spring 2020), pp. 1-8.

accepted the Fourteen Points and arranged a ceasefire.

In Japan, there had been a change of government not long before this, with a new cabinet led by Hara Takashi replacing Terauchi Masatake at the end of September. A month and a half later, Minister for Foreign Affairs Uchida Yasuya presented a government opinion on the Fourteen Points at the Diplomatic Advisory Council. This comprised five items, one of which related to the League of Nations. This is labeled as Document 1 in the References. In fact, this was submitted on November 13, and on the very same day, the Second Peace Preparation Committee was launched inside the Foreign Ministry. It seems likely that this government opinion was not formulated at meetings of the Peace Preparation Committee within the ministry.

This document is frequently quoted in studies of the period. It suggests a clear connection between the racial equality proposal and the question of joining the League of Nations. The League of Nations was the hardest of Wilson's Fourteen Points to understand. When and where did research and discussions about the League of Nations begin within the context of Wilson's Fourteen Points, and how were these brought together in the form of this document? Unfortunately, the truth is that we do not really know. Who was in charge of the matter within the ministry? Foreign Minister Uchida, Prime Minister Hara, or someone else altogether? Shidehara Kijūrō, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, was responsible for issues relating to the peace, so it is possible that he took the lead in discussions, but the reality is that we do not really know for sure.

2. Objective (For What Purpose?)

(1) The Three Main Directions for Peace Talks

Events developed and preparations got underway for the peace conference in Paris. In December, Japan's Foreign Minister Uchida issued guidelines on the government's basic policy to a delegation of plenipotentiaries to the peace conference. This is Document 2 in the References. In it, the conditions for the peace negotiations were divided into three groups: first, issues on which Japan had its own interests, second, issues where Japan did not have any interests, and third, issues on which it shared interests with other countries. The document said: "... regarding the proposals put forward by the President of the United States, our policy will be decided according to Appendix No. 3." This was a government opinion on the Fourteen Points, part of which you have as Document 1. In other words, the document that Uchida had submitted to the Diplomatic Advisory Council ended up being incorporated more or less verbatim into the government's policy guidelines.

As you will see if you look again at Document 1, the government wanted to put off the question of establishing the League of Nations for the time being and leave as a topic to be addressed in the future. But there was the possibility that it might be approved immediately, and in that case Japan would have no choice but to take part. If that happened, Japan was to work to gain appropriate guarantees to eradicate disadvantages arising from racial prejudice.

On the face of that, perhaps Japan could have been satisfied with the situation: after the peace conference started, Japan was one of the Big Five powers, and was guaranteed—at least formally—a position of equality together with Great Britain, the United States, France, and Italy. And in fact, when Japan argued on behalf of the racial equality proposal, some people did respond by pointing out that Japan was being treated equally as a major power at the peace conference, and wasn't that enough?

(2) Makino's Negotiations

The de facto head of Japan's delegation of plenipotentiaries at the peace conference was Makino Nobuaki, although he was officially second-in-charge. As Professor Nakanishi touched on in his talk earlier, Makino tried to increase the chances of getting the racial equality proposal adopted

as part of the Covenant of the League of Nations by trying to persuade Edward House, the presidential advisor who was sometimes described as the brains of the president. He discussed this approach in his memoirs. Excerpt can be found in the References (Document 3).

Makino's memoirs were published after the war. This part was added later, reprinted intact from his older book that had been written before the war. Reading it now, one is struck by the lofty ideals. What is particularly interesting perhaps is that in his attempt to persuade House to back Japan's proposal, he draws on the idea of what we would now recognize as the logic of collective security. The logic of his argument was that it was unthinkable for a country experiencing racial discrimination to have to shoulder the burden of a military commitment to other member nations while being the victim of racial discrimination itself. In terms of the diplomatic record, this is not sufficient evidence to conclude that Makino actually did say this to House. But Makino did use the argument of collective security in his addresses to the Commission on the League of Nations and at the plenary session of the peace conference, albeit in slightly vaguer terms, to argue on behalf of Japan's racial equality proposal.

House acknowledged what Makino said about wanting to incorporate a racial equality clause into the Covenant of the League of Nations. As we saw in Professor Nakanishi's PowerPoint presentation earlier, House suggested that Makino should remove from the idea he had presented those aspects relating to the immigration issue. Following this, the Japanese government presented to the Commission on the League of Nations a draft proposal, which you can see in Document 4. The wording differs somewhat from that suggested to House. At least the way I read it, however, some of the nuances relating to immigration still can be discerned in this version of the document.

Yoshida Shigeru, who also accompanied the mission, wrote in his memoirs in later years that Makino had experienced great difficulties during his time as foreign minister owing to actions taken to exclude Japanese immigrants from California. This is something that Professor Nakanishi touched on in his presentation. Yoshida speculates that this experience may have lain at the root of what led Makino to write this proposal the way he did. Also, as we heard earlier, there were petitions from people within the country and overseas, particularly from groups representing immigrant interests, and this too may have had an influence.

Again, if we think about this without our usual preconceptions, is it likely that this draft proposal for inclusion in the covenant of the League came directly from the government opinion laid out in Document 1 in the References? I keep referring back to Professor Nakanishi's presentation—once again, it is possible that this relates to something that was discussed at the Diplomatic Advisory Council. We do not know who was responsible for the draft. It does not seem to have been included in the policy guidance from the ministry. It seems likely that Makino or someone close to him wrote it. Since there is no evidence that the government opposed the draft when it received this report, I think it is safe to conclude that this was a kind of unspoken understanding in the Japanese government at the time.

Another interesting point is that Makino and the other Japanese plenipotentiaries did not try to obtain the support of smaller or less powerful countries to make the racial equality proposal a reality. They also did not do anything through the mass media. It might be more accurate to say that they did not do anything very proactive at all. Their efforts were focused on gaining the understanding of the major powers. A little later I think we will hear from Professor Kawashima about the response to the proposal in China.² Essentially, Japan seems to have avoided making any overtures to China or any of the lesser powers. It is enough to make you suspect that they deliberately avoided making efforts in this direction because they felt it would only make matters

² For more details, see, Kawashima Shin, "Chinese and Taiwanese Perspectives on Japan's Racial Equality Proposal," *Japan Review* 3. 3-4 (Winter / Spring 2020), pp. 1–10.

more complicated and more difficult in the long run if they did.

(3) Withdrawal (Abandoning the Proposal)

As you know, Japan's attempt to have a racial equality clause included in the League of Nations covenant ultimately ended in failure. Japan later tried to have the essence of the proposal (Document 5 in the References) included in the preamble of the covenant, but this was not a success either, as we heard in the explanation from Professor Nakanishi.

The question then naturally arose: What should be done about this? The question seems to have prompted fierce debate within the delegation of plenipotentiaries. We know this from an account (Document 6 in the References) in the memoirs of Kimura Eiichi. I'm quoting this at secondhand from another source, but it's quite interesting so I decided to include it anyway. Kimura Eiichi was also a member of the Peace Preparation Committee within the Foreign Ministry I mentioned earlier, and served as deputy secretary within the delegation.

It is hard to grasp just by reading it once, but I think probably the sense of it was this. He seems to be saying that since the attempt to get the proposal included in the preamble was unsuccessful, there was a suggestion that Japan should try again later at a plenary session of the allied nations, or formally the plenary session of the preliminary peace conference. The idea was to try again to get at least the essence of the proposal included in the preamble to the covenant of the League when the preliminary peace conference was held. And when this was not a success, he recalls, there were some people who thought that Japan should reexamine its intentions and put off joining the League.

An opposing argument seems to have emerged from the younger contingent within the group, the younger diplomats and accompanying personnel. These people argued that the wording of the proposal for inclusion in the preamble was sufficiently ambiguous and compromised already. They argued that Japan should abandon ineffectual measures to rehash the issue and resubmit the proposal only to see it rebuffed again. Instead, they said, Japan should move forward positively, join the League and propose the issue in the future from within the League. In response to this opposition, the head of the mission Saionji Kinmochi and his deputy Makino Nobuaki abandoned the idea of resubmitting the proposal at the plenary session of the peace conference.

Unfortunately, we do not have supplementary evidence to support this anecdote, so we cannot be sure to what extent it is factually correct. But if we look at what happened later, elements emerge that match with the account at least to a certain extent. For example, Makino did give a speech at the plenary session, expressing regret that the racial equality proposal had not been approved. In that speech, however, he did not use the phrasing of Document 5, originally proposed for inclusion in the preamble and criticized from within the delegation for being vague and conciliatory. Instead, he again used the wording from Document 4, which Japan had originally tried to get incorporated into the main body of the League of Nations covenant. The government's instructions also seem to suggest that the draft proposal put forward for inclusion in the preamble had been a little vague.

The prime minister when the proposal failed to get passed was Hara Takashi; his decision can be found in Document 7 in the References. This document is often quoted, and will be familiar to many of you. His decision, essentially, was that the situation was not likely to become any worse than it had been up until now, and that the issue was not worth leaving the League of Nations over.

3. Next Actions

What happened on the issue after that? Document 8 was presumably written either immediately after the peace conference or perhaps during it, although it is unclear exactly when that was,

since the document is undated.

It is a handwritten document that explains the decision that Japan should indeed join the League of Nations. It says that although the position with regard to racially discriminatory treatment is sufficiently dangerous today, this tendency would only get worse if Japan did not join the League of Nations. The connection with the immigration issue comes out strongly again here.

On this failure of the racial equality proposal, or at least the failure to turn it into a reality, it is often said that although the idea was originally based on principle, it later became entangled with real-life political interests owing to the immigration issue. Ultimately, according to this interpretation, it became an issue of national pride. Once Japan had put forward the proposal, it became difficult to back down, and there was the worry that it would earn the disdain of surrounding countries, particularly China.

But looking over these materials again for this presentation, I have come to think that in fact it was always the intention that this proposal should contribute to solving the immigration problem. I do not think this was incorporated along the way as a reaction to realpolitik interests.

At the same time, the theoretical objective based on principle was something that the Japanese side pursued consistently throughout, even if it did not outweigh the practical concerns over the immigration issue. The idea that the national prestige became an important concern in the final stages is not, I think, something that is supported by the documentary materials.

Of course, as the account in Kimura Eiichi's memoirs makes clear, even after abandoning the plan to make the racial equality proposal a reality at the peace conference, the idea of trying again in the future after joining the League continued to survive, at least among the younger diplomats at the Foreign Ministry. Makino too, as I have said, made clear Japan's intention to raise the issue again during his speech at the plenary session of the peace conference. In fact, in the lead-up to the first General Assembly of the League of Nations, the Foreign Ministry did start preparations for that direction, but ultimately decided to scrap its plans to raise the issue. It is not clear what the reason was for this. And I am afraid I am not sure whether the Japanese delegation ever raised the issue again at the League of Nations. This is a subject that requires further research.

In the famous "Emperor's Monologue," a transcript of spoken memoirs by the Shōwa Emperor (Hirohito) about World War II, the emperor said that the failure of the racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference was one of the ultimate underlying reasons for the Greater East Asian War. But in the memoirs and other writings we have by diplomats and those who took part in the conference, there are surprisingly few references to this issue. Following the failure at the peace conference, young diplomats within the Foreign Ministry formed a group calling for reforms within the ministry. But these reforms focused on the organization itself, and apparently came to an end without ever tackling the question of how the racial equality proposal should be handled in the future. There is more I could say, and much more work that needs to be done on the subject, but that is where I will leave things for today.

References

1. **Opinion of the Imperial Government on President Wilson's Fourteen Points** (presented by Foreign Minister Uchida at the Diplomatic Advisory Council on November 13, 1918)

[...]

7. Concerning the League of Nations, which is one of the most important issues, the Imperial Government approves its ultimate purpose. However, the fact that racial prejudice has not yet been extinguished among nations means that, depending on the means employed to achieve the League's goals, the possibility exists that its establishment will be gravely disadvantageous to the empire... . Therefore, it is considered advisable to work to delay agreement on a concrete proposal, limiting the scope of discussions to agreeing a draft of general aspiration, and leaving the question of how this will be implemented as an outstanding problem, with a proposal to be discussed at an appropriate future opportunity following careful consideration by the nations. However, in the event that the League of Nations does come into being, it would be unwise for Japan to be isolated outside it. If it appears that a concrete proposal for its establishment is likely to be approved, Japan should work to devise a suitable strategy to ensure as much as circumstances allow the elimination of the disadvantages arising from racial prejudice.

2. **Three Major Policy Directions for the Peace Talks** (sent from Foreign Minister Uchida to Ambassador Chinda in London on December 26, 1918)

First: Peace conditions where the empire possesses interests independently from the allied countries. [...]

Second: Peace conditions where the empire does not possess direct interests. [...]

Third: Peace conditions where the empire has interests in common with the allies.

On peace conditions where the empire has interests in common with the allied countries, and regarding the proposals put forward by the President of the United States, our policy will be decided according to Appendix No. 3; on all other issues, we should watch carefully the general tendency of negotiations and work in step with the other allied countries.

3. **Makino Nobuaki, *Memoirs*** (Chūkō Bunko edition, "On the Paris Peace Conference," originally published in *Shōtō kandan*)

We argued that given the founding spirit of the League of Nations, and with a view to its healthy development in the future, it would be difficult to secure widespread trust unless it were built on a foundation of racial equality. If following an invasion of one country by another the covenant required signatory countries to come together to repel an invasion, this would potentially require nations to use military force to defend the invaded country. This would involve a heavy burden indeed for countries that were subject to racial discrimination, and in the case of joint military operations, might even mean that a country would be required to step in as an ally to even a country that was discriminating against it racially. As things stood, it would be difficult for a country that was being discriminated against to make military sacrifices in the cause of aiding the League, and we therefore submitted a proposal arguing

that it was only natural to recognize racial equality, at least in principle.

4. Racial Equality Proposal Draft (presented by Japan to the Commission on the League of Nations on February 13, 1919)

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible to all alien nationals of states, members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.

5. Draft Proposal for Insertion in Preamble (prepared by Japan on April 11, 1919)

by the endorsement of the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals

6. Kimura Eiichi, *Sekai taisen to Gaiko* [The World War and Diplomacy], (quoted from *Matsuoka Yōsuke: sono hito to shōgai*)

Although the Commission on the League of Nations had initially approved the proposal by a majority, at a meeting the following day the situation changed and a majority voted against the proposal. A nighttime meeting of the plenipotentiaries was immediately called, and opinion settled into two adamantly opposed groups, between a hardline faction who insisted that Japan should refuse to join the League or use a refusal to sign a treaty as a bargaining-chip, if the racial equality proposal were rejected, and opposing them another group who argued that it was unthinkable for Japan to bear sole responsibility for a failure to make the League of Nations a reality for the sake of a compromised and perfunctory insistence on racial issues. In addition, the group of young diplomats felt that pushing ahead with a compromised proposal of this kind would only damage Japan's interests without bringing any advantages, and that therefore Japan should declare its readiness before the world to swallow its pride and abandon the issue for now out of a wish to see the League of Nations become a reality, while leaving room for the possibility of proposing a more thorough-going, purer racial equality clause on another occasion in the future. Opinion divided between the older and the younger members of the delegation, and it seemed impossible to see how any decision could ever be arrived at. Then Prince Saionji, who had been listening in silence all this time, suddenly turned to Baron Makino and said suggestively:

“Makino-san, is it not the case sometimes in *go* that one can have the better strategy but still lose the game.” Suddenly Makino, who until now had been listening thoughtfully, spoke up, saying: “Kimura-san, I want you to write up a clear explanation of the case for giving up the racial issue. And Matsuoka-san, write a statement in English for me to deliver before the committee tomorrow.” And with these straightforward orders the matter was decided in an instant.

7. *The Diary of Hara Takashi* (dated March 30, 1919)

Itō and the others agreed that this issue was not sufficient for us to withdraw from the League of Nations, and that as a result even if we did not press ahead with our proposal, the situation was unlikely to become worse than it is at present. Therefore, if we could maintain our face, that would be acceptable.

8. Report on the League of Nations Problem (Conclusion) (Position of the Empire's Plenipotentiaries with Regard to the Problem)

[...]

3. Seeing that the problem of racially discriminatory treatment is already on a dangerous tendency today, the empire must expect that being isolated outside the League of Nations would only make this tendency even worse than it is at present... .

The Racial Equality Issue and Konoe Fumimaro*

Jun'ichiro Shoji**

Abstract

Konoe Fumimaro served three times as Japan's prime minister in the crucial years before World War II. At the end of World War I, as Japan was preparing to take part in the Paris Peace Conference at Versailles of 1919, Konoe Fumimaro published his famous article titled "Eibei hon'i no heiwashugi o haisu [A Rejection of the Anglo-American-Centered Peace Ideology]." In this article and his observations on post-WWI Europe and the United States, he often praises U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. Konoe clearly was fascinated by and attracted to the American President, and felt a closeness and sympathy with his views. It seems that in some ways the two men had some things in common. The arguments and world views of both men were extremely idealistic. But even Wilson's ideals, in the world of 1919, where the lingering influence of the old regime remained strong, ultimately did not become a reality at that time. Wilson died before he could complete his dream. Similarly, Konoe's ideals stood no chance of being realized, given the changes of the times and the development of Japan's militaristic foreign policy. For both Konoe and Wilson, racial equality in 1919 was a distant ideal. Focusing on Konoe Fumimaro, this article discusses the issues surrounding Japan's racial equality proposal of 1919.

Today I want to discuss some of my own views of the issues surrounding Japan's racial equality proposal of 1919 by focusing on one individual, Konoe Fumimaro.

As you are doubtlessly aware, Konoe served three times as Japan's prime minister in the crucial years before World War II. He had a very close connection with Kyoto, the city where we meet today. At Omuro in the north of this city is housed the Yōmei Bunko archive. The site was originally one of the residences of the Konoe family and the present collection dates to 1938, when Konoe Fumimaro built an archive there to store documents and other items relating to the Fujiwara clan and Konoe family from throughout history to modern times. Today the archive is an important resource for researchers.

I will draw on a number of quotations in my presentation. Most of these are drawn from the book *Saigo no gozen kaigi: Sengo Ōbei kenbunroku* [The Last Imperial Conference: Memoirs of Postwar Europe and America]. This was published four years ago in paperback by Chūōkōron-Shinsha, and is listed at the head of my list of sources at the end of this paper. The book is still

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available and I recommend it highly to anyone interested in learning more about the subject.

Introduction

At the end of World War I, as Japan was preparing to take part in the Paris Peace Conference at Versailles of 1919, Konoe Fumimaro published his famous article titled “Eibei hon’i no heiwashugi o haisu [A Rejection of the Anglo-American-Centered Peace Ideology].”

There has been a tendency to emphasize the radical aspects of this article and underline the ways in which it marked a break from the status quo. This view is based on a focus on what came next, on Japan’s rush to war between Japan and China and the Tripartite Pact, both of which Konoe worked on. Of course, this is indeed one aspect of the article. But I have always felt that the article is much more multi-faceted than this view allows.

1. Three Aspects

Let’s begin, for example, by looking at the article in the context of the racial equality issue. The essay contains the following passage: “Therefore, at the coming peace conference, if we are to join the League of Nations, issues that Japan must raise as priorities include, at the very least, the eradication of economic imperialism and nondiscriminatory treatment for the yellow and white races.” Why did Konoe mention the scrapping of discrimination between the yellow and white races as his second point? My analysis of the background to Konoe’s writings at the time makes me think that three factors played a part.

1) The Universalist Aspect: Possibilities and Limitations

Probably the biggest factor was the universalist aspect. It goes without saying that Konoe was influenced and inspired during his days as a university student by the humanitarian socialism of thinkers like Kawakami Hajime. This was an important influence on him from an early young age, and meant that he saw the issue of racial discrimination from this humanitarian angle. For example, he wrote: “This is a serious humanitarian issue that no person with a sense of justice should overlook, whether he be Asiatic himself or not.” He also wrote: “Surely democracy and humanitarianism essentially stem from a feeling that all human beings are equal. Within the country, this means popular rights and freedom; internationally, it means appealing to equal rights to life of all races and all peoples.”

I use the term “universal” here because there is no suggestion here that Konoe is making these claims to protect Japan’s interests in particular. The target of his article is the arrogance and high-handedness of Great Britain and the other European powers. But he also has criticisms for Japan’s own continental policy, which has followed the example of the Western powers. He writes critically of the policy, and describes it as one of aggressive invasion and militarism. The creation of a new League of Nations, he says, will sweep away this old system and replace it with something new. But he warns that although the idea of a League of Nations is a good thing in itself, it might easily be used as a tool to protect the selfish interests of Great Britain. To ensure that this does not happen, Konoe sets his hopes on the emerging power of the United States, and particularly its President, Woodrow Wilson.

At the risk of seeming to focus on a small detail of usage, I think it is interesting to notice the exact expression Konoe uses: he talks of an *Ei-Bei* (Anglo-American)-centered peace: not *Bei-Ei* (U.S.-British) or *Ei-Futsu* (Anglo-French). I think it is fair to assume that this was no accident and that there was an intentional nuance behind this choice of phrasing.

The historical moment seemed to offer the possibility for spreading universal values in the future. But at the same time, limitations remained due to circumstances of the times. What were these limitations? In his speech outlining the Fourteen Points, President Wilson mentioned national movements and the liberation of the colonized around the world. Konoe felt that the

President's speech had been touched by concern for these groups. Nevertheless, he writes: "Even so, with the exception of the movement in Ireland, these independence movements are hardly worth speaking of. In March last year, Koreans took opportunity of the riots, and joined in calls with the provisional government in Shanghai, talking passionately of independence inspired by the image of the Freedom Bell in Philadelphia. But these passions soon waned and nothing more was heard of them," he writes.

In other words, essentially he is saying that the independence movement in Japan's colony of Korea is hardly worthy of being taken seriously. Of course, this attitude could not be concealed from the other side. In China, Chen Duxiu criticized not Konoe's article in particular but Japan's proposals for racial equality by saying, "If we as Asiatics cannot break through the special positions enjoyed by certain races in China, or the subordination in Korea, how can we hope to demand equal treatment?" He argues, in other words, that without bringing down Japanese control, the proposal amounts to little more than empty rhetoric. I think it is fair to say that although there were universalist elements in Konoe's thinking on these matters, there were certainly also limitations.

2) The Economic Aspect: Immigration

The second element is the economic aspect of immigration. However, as Professor Nakanishi Hiroshi has shown in the paper cited in the reference materials, in 1919 the population issue was not yet an especially critical issue for Japan. Even if this economic aspect was not particularly strong, nevertheless I think we can consider it as one factor.

3) The Ethnic/National Aspect: Opposition to Racial and State Discrimination (State Prestige or "Face")

The third is the question of the dignity or "face" of the state or nation. In particular, as Hashikawa Bunzō wrote, Konoe "had a fierce pride in the nobility of Japan as the highest example within the yellow peoples of Asia." It is likely, as this remark suggests, that Konoe felt a keener sense of anger at discrimination at the hands of whites than most other Japanese.

Eventually, Konoe became the only Japanese prime minister to take his own life. No doubt there were several factors that led him to decide to kill himself, but I think certainly this must have been one of them. He found himself arrested, imprisoned, and tried by the GHQ, by the United States, by white people, and he was quite simply unable to tolerate the disgrace of it—that is more or less what he wrote himself, and I think we should not ignore the racial or ethno-nationalist aspects of this. Nevertheless, I believe that the universalist aspect was the most important.

One thing that is perhaps surprising is the absence of any real evidence of Pan-Asianist thought in his writing at this stage, given the importance this would have for Konoe at a later stage. How to define Pan-Asianism is another matter. But if we define it as the idea of Japanese and Chinese uniting as Asians to resist and oppose the West, then any arguments along these lines are almost totally missing from the article, and I think this is another of the characteristics of his thinking at this stage.

2. Different Responses in Different Countries

1) Foreign Responses

Next, I would like to look at the various responses to the article in foreign countries, starting with *Millard's Review*, the English-language newspaper in Shanghai. The paper took a very critical view, saying that Konoe had not only criticized Great Britain but also shown hints of sympathy with Germany's position, and that his skeptical attitude to the peace created by the allied powers

posed a problem for the conference.

Guy Morrison Walker, the well-known American legalist, read Konoe's article and was astonished by it, saying that it illustrated "Japan's duplicity." What did he mean by this? Walker criticized Japan calling for racial equality while approving of colonial rule and continuing to hold its own colonies. Both of these sources were extremely critical of Konoe's article.

2) Reunion with Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai

After writing the article Konoe met Sun Yat-sen again in Shanghai on his way to the Paris Peace Conference at Versailles. He later remembered his conversation with Sun Yat-sen in the following terms: "I spoke with Sun Yat-sen and our conversation touched on the national awakening of peoples in East and West, speaking with great passion and fervor, our conversation never waning until late into the night." This reference to national awakenings certainly gives the impression that the two men spoke of racial equality and Pan-Asianism. But other historical materials we have suggest that in fact the two men mostly discussed their shared opposition to Great Britain. They agreed that Great Britain represented imperialism, while the United States offered hope as a country of freedom and equality.

And this is an interesting point. Sun Yat-sen told Konoe that the global situation after the Great War was one in which the weaker countries should exploit the gaps between Great Britain and the United States and build a new world together with the United States. But, as Konoe himself wrote later, this prediction of Sun Yat-sen's did not come true. The reason was that the Washington Naval Conference and the system that came into being after it brought the United States and Great Britain together. Konoe wrote that in fact no opportunity presented itself for taking advantage of any gap between the two powers. In any case, racial equality was part of his hope in the United States at the time and I think this was an area in which he and Sun Yat-sen would have been in sympathy.

Later, the political scientist Matsumoto Sannosuke pointed out that Konoe's article was characterized by contrasting elements, partly driven by the idea of expanding the Japanese race but at the same time motivation by anti-imperialism. For this reason, he writes that perhaps one reason why Sun Yat-sen showed interest in Konoe was that he was drawn into Konoe's arguments, which could not be dismissed as mere camouflage for the idea of Japanese racial expansion. They also perhaps contained other possibilities. And this, I think, perhaps suggests something close to what I have argued, namely that Konoe's arguments contained a universalist aspect, and that there were two sides to this: possibilities and limitations.

3. The Paris Peace Conference and Konoe's Memoirs of Postwar Europe and America

1) Disappointment and Hopes for Wilsonian Idealism

Next, I would like to look at the Paris Peace Conference and Konoe's memoirs of postwar Europe and America. Konoe took part in the conference himself. The pamphlet for this symposium had the picture from the time on its cover. Konoe Fumimaro is shown in this picture to the left and diagonally above Saionji Kinmochi, in the center of the photograph. The racial equality proposal failed to be approved, of course—something that Konoe described as "the most naked expression of the principle of the rule by power."

But that was not all. He also argued that it should be viewed positively, in some respects: "At least the principle of self-determination of nations espoused by President Wilson has been the central animating spirit of the peace conference to some degree, and to the many weaker colonized nations who have suffered for many years under oppressive regimes, this has given new hope and light." He also wrote: "It would be premature to claim that the results of the



Paris Peace Conference mark the destruction of idealism. We must not forget that we today are still at a transitional stage in the development of international politics.” Even though the racial equality proposal had been defeated, he said, people should not give up, because this was just a transitional stage, and that the issue would be progress farther in the future in the next phase of developments.

2) Criticisms of Japan: Konoe’s October 1921 Speech titled “Kokusairen’mei no seishin ni tsuite [On the Spirit of the League of Nations]”

Earlier I referred to criticisms of Japan. Already at this time, Konoe was arguing that Japan’s policy of invasion and militarism since the Russo-Japanese War had led to its isolation on the world stage. He said: “Those who looked with disapproval at the hit and grab conduct of our military clique in China and Siberia could not but feel grievous sadness and regret in the face of these attacks.” In other words, at the same time as calling for racial equality, Konoe at this time was ready to direct his criticism at Japan itself for its aggressions on the Asian mainland.

3) Strong Interest in Race Issues

Another aspect that is often remarked on with regard to Konoe in these years is the frequency of his remarks about race issues. Here again I will quote from what he wrote: “There are perhaps various reasons for this (U.S. exclusionary policies against Japan) but racial prejudice is surely one of them.” He also raises the problem of the discriminatory treatment of black people in the United States. In particular, after the Paris Peace Conference he stopped by the United States on his way back to Japan, and writes that he sensed keenly how race prejudice became stronger as he traveled from Paris to London and from London to New York. He specifically mentions the concrete problem of discrimination against black people.

It is interesting that he writes here “the reasons for the exclusionary policies against Japan.” What does it mean? At the time, public opinion in the United States was set tough against Japan for its behavior over Shandong. Konoe gives several reasons for this, and one factor that he mentions alongside racial prejudice is that of Chinese propaganda. There is a sense that his understanding of China and Korea, and his awareness of the issues of racial prejudice, have somehow become tangled and contradictory.

When the movement to exclude Japan from the United States was at its height, Konoe suggested several reasons for it. One of them concerned the poor quality of Japanese students

studying in the United States. This too was in 1919. He says that American society is shaped by the educated classes, and that it is students who have the biggest impact on the intellectuals of a country. If we consider this, he says, the current situation with Japanese students in the United States is really not satisfactory. What about the situation today? I think Japan is around eighth or ninth in terms of the number of students it has studying in the United States. We are quite weak both in terms of quality and quantity. Perhaps Konoe's observations still have pearls of wisdom to offer us today.

4. Prelude to the Greater East Asia War: Changes from the 1930s

1) Emphasis on the Economy: From the Universalist Logic of the "Have-Not" Countries to the Defense of Japan's Continental Policy

Next, I want to look at what we might call the prelude to the Greater East Asia War: a period in which the world shifted from a period of international cooperation in the 1920s, through the Great Depression, into a period of economic nationalism leading up to the war. The world went in a direction other than the one Konoe had imagined, and his thinking and tone also changed over this time.

What we described as the universalist aspect of his earlier discourse disappears in these years, and he begins to plead more strongly on behalf of Japan's position. He starts unashamedly to argue that it is justified for Japan, as one of the have-nots, to encroach onto the continent. For example, he says: "The annual addition of nearly a million people to our population means that the economic livelihoods of the people are placed under extreme pressure . . . since there is no possibility that these two great principles can be made a reality in the near future, we have been forced to chose expansion into Manchuria and Mongolia as our only path to surviving today."

The two principles he refers to here are economic and trade freedom and freedom of immigration. And this is something extremely interesting, I think. In his article "Eibei hon'i no heiwashugi o haisu" which we looked at earlier, Konoe cited two principles: abolishing economic imperialism and equal treatment with no discrimination between the yellow and white races. The idea of abolishing economic imperialism is more or less the same as the idea of economic and trade freedom. But the earlier idea of racial equality has changed, to become "freedom of immigration." And I think this is one place where we can see that the focus of Konoe's interest has shifted. This demand for freedom of immigration is really being driven by Japan's economy, and from the sole perspective of finding a solution to Japan's population problem. I think probably it is fair to say that by this stage the universalist aspects we saw earlier have disappeared.

As an extension of this, in 1937 he formed the first Konoe cabinet. At the time, the main policies of the cabinet were to achieve "true peace based on international justice" and "true peace that goes beyond simply maintaining the status quo." What did this mean in concrete terms? It meant that the current world situation was extremely unfair in terms of the distribution of territory, and that it was necessary to correct this injustice. Specifically, it was necessary to redistribute the colonies. But that was simply a fantasy. And so, as a second-best solution, Japan would have to work to secure resources, to open up markets for Japanese manufactured goods, and to make freedom of immigration and free movement of labor a reality. These policies were central to the direction of the cabinet, and were basically essentially an extension of the two great principles we have just seen.

The critic Kiyosawa Kiyoshi critiqued this policy direction, saying that although Konoe's arguments made a certain amount of sense, it was questionable whether Japan had any right to force other nations to suffer sacrifices simply so that Japan itself could prosper. Japan was a have-not country by comparison with world powers like Great Britain and the United States. But other countries had even less than Japan. Kiyosawa argued that Japan apparently felt no compunction

about exerting control over these weaker countries and taking from them what it could get. I think it is fair to say that this critique sees through to the problems of Konoe's arguments, at least from one angle.

2) The Rise of Pan-Asianism

Then, roughly a month later, war broke out between Japan and China. And just from around this time Konoe's arguments in favor of Pan-Asianism start to become much stronger. Why? Because ultimately the antagonisms between Japan and China will develop through war with China into conflict with the West. And this will give rise to a conflict between the white race and the yellow race of Japan. This means that a resolution has to be found somehow to the war with China. And the appeal to Pan-Asian sentiment was used as a logical explanation toward that end.

In terms of the Pan-Asianism that emerged in the second half of the 1930s, therefore, I think it cannot be denied that at least in part it was something that emerged from the war with China, in the context of Japan as one of the have-not countries. The culmination of this was the declaration of a "New Order in East Asia" in November 1938. It is no exaggeration to say that this declaration lacked almost entirely any of the limitations previously seen with relation to Japan.

Conclusion: Significance and Limitations (Japan and the International Society)

Professor Nakanishi, who gave the keynote address today, pointed out in the conclusion to his paper analyzing Konoe's arguments on racial equality that at the same time as aiming to deepen Wilsonian universalism from the perspective of civilization, they also treated Japan as a special case and was designed to suit Japan's own interests. Even if his arguments did have some justice, there was no way they could ever have become the foundations for a universal international order. At least until the 1920s in particular, Konoe's arguments did have a certain level of universality and reasonableness, but from the 1930s on, with the revolutionary changes and shifts of the times, his arguments lost that aspect of universality. And, as Professor Nakanishi indicated, his arguments from this time on could only really be thought of in Japan-centric terms.

Professor Ōnuma Yasuaki, who passed away recently, wrote about the objective conditions that prevailed when the treaty was signed at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. He says that although Japan had become one of the "Big Five" member countries, among the colored races of the world Japan was still the only one with any say or influence, and most regions of the world were still controlled by racially prejudiced whites. And since Japan could not hope to pursue universal values, it was ultimately forced back on its own national interest. Problems existed both with the state of international society and with Japan's own thinking, and as a result, the idea of racial equality had only a slim chance of ever becoming a reality. It was a "distant ideal," as he put it.

Throughout Konoe's articles on rejecting the Anglo-American-centered peace and his observations on post-WWI Europe and the United States, he often praises U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. Konoe clearly was fascinated by and attracted to the American President, and felt a closeness and sympathy with his views, and it seems to me that in some ways in one aspect the two men had some things in common. The arguments and world views of both men were extremely idealistic. But even Wilson's ideals, in the world of 1919, where the lingering influence of the old regime remained strong, ultimately did not become a reality at that time.

Wilson died before he could complete his dream. Similarly, Konoe's ideals stood no chance of being realized, given the changes of the times and the development of Japan's militaristic foreign policy. For both Konoe and Wilson, racial equality in 1919 was a distant ideal. But with the passage of time, I believe, the ideals that these two men espoused were eventually realized in the years after World War II.

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Chinese and Taiwanese Perspectives on Japan's Racial Equality Proposal*

Shin Kawashima**

Abstract

The issues of racial equality and the eradication of racial discrimination, raised by Japan, became major points of discussion at the Paris Peace Conference. But racial equality was not a particularly important topic for China because China had other priorities. It was interested in regaining its own possessions and sovereign interests, and in finding a solution to the problem of Shandong in the Twenty-One Demands. China used its approval of the racial equality proposal when it was submitted for the second time as a tool to ensure that the bare minimum of its relationship with Japan would be maintained. Giving its approval to the proposal was a way of showing that although China was highly critical of Japan and skeptical of its intentions, it did not intend to risk an all-out confrontation and a total breach of relations. Across Chinese society, most people were extremely critical of Japan's actions and saw its efforts on race as fundamentally connected to Japanese Pan-Asianism.

On the other hand, in Taiwan, the racial equality proposal was viewed within the context of the policies of assimilation and equality. There were some people, both within Japan and Taiwan, who argued that Japan should put its house in order before raising the issue of racial equality or the eradication of racial prejudice with the world. Nevertheless, it did not necessarily mean that the racial equality proposal was at the forefront of what intellectuals were discussing in Taiwan, or that it was part of what inspired them to organize a petition movement to establish a Taiwanese parliament or to debate educational problems.

Comparing and Contrasting China and Japan

We have heard discussions from the Japanese perspective about the country's racial equality proposal. Now the question is, how did the Chinese government and society view the proposal submitted by Japan? How did the issue fit into China's perceptions of history? As well as mainland China, I also want to discuss how Taiwan viewed the proposal. Let me begin by outlining a few background points.

First, it is important to remember that immigration and race had been prominent issues in China for a long time, beginning with the Chinese Exclusion Act passed into law by the United States in 1882. The Act was renewed at ten-year intervals, in 1892 and 1902. The renewal in 1902 came amidst widespread fear of China in the United States, as evidenced by Yellow Peril

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xenophobia, and provoked protests in China and among Chinese students abroad.

At the time, most Chinese immigrants to the United States were Cantonese. The Cantonese in America suffered prejudice and discrimination of various kinds, and this triggered widespread anger among Chinese, including those who were not from Canton. Examples include an incident of suicide by self-immolation in front of the US consulate in Shanghai and a protest movement among Chinese students in Tokyo. The protests went far beyond Canton and involved many people who were not Cantonese. It can be argued that the protestors' identity as Chinese nationals, regardless of their local origin, led to such acts.

Previous discussions on immigration and discrimination had focused on nationalism and particularly on the idea of China, rather than on a universal idea of race or ethnicity. When it came to the racial equality proposal put forward by Japan in response to policies that excluded Japanese immigration to the United States, the Chinese response was that China was already familiar with these issues from its own experience, which went back much further than Japan's. People in China saw things from a slightly different perspective. The way they saw it, the Japanese had enjoyed special dispensation by being permitted into the United States until recently, while Chinese workers had been excluded for decades by this stage.

The second point that should be noted is that China and Japan had different perspectives about World War I. China was initially neutral in the conflict. This was not only because China lacked the strength to take part as an active combatant, but also because troops from most of the major powers were stationed in China. This meant that if China became a combatant, it would be faced with a situation in which troops from both sides, already present within Chinese territory, would start fighting each other. Or worse, China would have to fight a war against foreign troops within its own country. German forces were in Qingdao, and the British had troops in Weihaiwei. This meant that whichever side China chose, it would be forced to fight within its own borders. Chinese territory could easily have become a new front in the war. These were some of the factors that encouraged China to refrain from taking sides.

Japan honored its treaty commitments with Britain by entering the war on the British side. An Anglo-Japanese force occupied the German base in Qingdao and all of Shandong. The German garrison and elements of the Austro-Hungarian military at the base were almost totally destroyed. After the Siege of Qingdao, there were now almost no armed forces from the German side left in China. Japan supported China entering the war even though it had been originally reluctant. From 1917, the United States started to push China quite hard to enter the conflict. So a debate started within China, on the question of whether the country should get involved. In 1917, momentum started to build for China to join the war. At the time, Sun Wen (Sun Yat-sen) was opposed to any Chinese involvement—or at least, did not argue in favor of getting involved.

China ended up joining the Allied Powers in the war. But before doing so, it issued some conditions. These included a moratorium on reparation payments for the Boxer Rebellion and a commitment not to send troops to Europe or anywhere else. So China was free from the obligation to send troops, and Premier Tuan Chi-jui (Duan Qirui) was able to get assistance from Japan when China joined the conflict. The Japanese aid enabled him not only to reunite China but also to strengthen his country's armed forces and reclaim Outer Mongolia, which had been under Russian influence. China sent troops to Ulaanbaatar, and also took part in the Siberian intervention. Eventually, China emerged from the war on the winning side. Germany and Austria held concessions in Tientsin and in Hankow as well, and by joining the war, China not only terminated reparation payments to Germany and Austria for the Boxer Rebellion, but also was able to reclaim these concessions.

While China emerged on the victorious side at the end, the important point was the Twenty-One Demands that were presented on January 18, 1915 to China's Yuan Shih-kai (Yuan Shikai)

by Japan's minister to China, Hioki Eki, as Professor Nakanishi Hiroshi mentioned earlier.¹ Considerable debate remains about the true aim of these demands. It seems likely that Japan's biggest priority was its interests in South Manchuria, though its interests in Shandong were also important, as well as Group Five of the Demands.

China perceived Group Five to be a Japanese negotiating tool and steadfastly refused to negotiate. China was aware that Japan was ultimately seeking to secure its interests in Manchuria. The Chinese side knew that it might have to compromise and give in on Manchuria. China acceded to the demands related to Manchuria and at the last moment also gave way on Qingdao, while succeeding in getting Group Five of the demands removed. Japan added several more articles to make a total of 26 in its ultimatum to China, and on May 9, China agreed to the Japanese terms. In late May, treaties based on the 26 demands were signed by the two countries. The agreements are known in China as the Treaties of the Fourth Year of the Republic.

While China had some success in pushing back against the Japanese demands, these events stirred strong reactions in the country. Around 1915, feelings were running extremely high against Japan. While the May Fourth Movement arose in 1919, after the end of World War I, anti-Japanese perceptions in China had begun to significantly harden right after the start of the conflict. Although Yuan Shih-kai endured criticism for seemingly having caved into Japanese pressure, with the rise of a Chinese ethnic and national consciousness, Japan was perceived as an invader to many people.

In Japan, the governments of Okuma Shigenobu and Terauchi Masatake knew that anti-Japanese sentiment was worsening in China. It was precisely for this reason that Japan sent assistance to Tuan Chi-jui in an attempt to improve Sino-Japanese relations. Even though the Tuan Chi-jui government did depend on Japan, Chinese society started to take an increasingly critical view toward Japan, and Japan could not reverse this trend. The deterioration in the relationship led to fallout such as the May Fourth Movement. Unless you understand these developments, it is impossible to understand why China was never likely to go along with Japan's proposal for racial equality, or any approaches from Japan to join a movement to eradicate racial discrimination.

It is vital to understand that the Twenty-One Demands mark a watershed transition in the history of Sino-Japanese relations, a change even bigger than the First Sino-Japanese War. For example, people who had studied in Japan were made to feel embarrassed, and within the Chinese diplomatic corps, the so-called "Japan school" was exposed to ridicule and criticism before the start of the Paris Peace Conference. Symbolic of this was the famous secret exchange of notes between Chinese Foreign Minister Lou Tseng-Tsiang (Lu Zhengxiang) and the Japanese government. The incident demonstrated that in the lead-up to the Paris Peace Conference, the Japan school had lost much of its influence in Chinese diplomacy. It is important to understand this background before discussing our main subject.

The Response of the Chinese Government and Society to the Racial Equality Proposal; Historical Perceptions

The Racial Equality Proposal and Pan-Asianism

What was the response to the racial equality proposal in China at the time? How does the proposal relate to the awareness of historical issues in China?

Not much research has been done on the proposal in China. I have written a little on the subject myself, but because Chinese diplomatic papers do not contain much on the topic at present there has not been any deep research on the proposal. We can find discussion and debate

¹ For more detail, see, Nakanishi Hiroshi, "Japan at the Paris Peace Conference," *Japan Review* 3. 3-4 (Winter / Spring 2020), pp. 1-8

in the media of the time, of course. It is possible to engage in research based on such discussion and debate, but such research may be fragmentary or lead to only tentative findings.

The norm in most Chinese-language scholarship is to understand the racial equality proposal through the prism of Pan-Asianism. This provides a paradigm for research. Since Japan ultimately drew connections to Pan-Asianism in its racial equality proposal, it has become common to understand the proposal as a steppingstone to the development of what became a Japanese strategy of Pan-Asianism.

China's understanding of Pan-Asianism is generally negative in general, unlike in Japan, where attention is paid to the different stages of the development of Pan-Asianism. Japanese scholars tend to differentiate the phases Pan-Asianism went through. They see quite a lot of variation over time among individuals in their interpretation of the concept as well. For example, Konoe Fumimaro's essay published in 1918 that called for the elimination of racial discrimination was an early example of Pan-Asian thinking. In research on Chinese history in China, there is a tendency to look at concepts made up of different events and individuals from a holistic or general perspective.

The Paris Peace Conference and the Chinese Response

There was a major argument among the five Chinese plenipotentiaries about who would represent their country at the Conference. In the end, as is well known, it was decided that Lou Tseng-Tsiang and Koo, Wellington (Gu Weijun) would be China's representatives. Wang, C.T. (Wang Zhengting) and the rest lost out.

In his memoirs, Koo wrote, "When [Baron] Makino [Nobuaki] of the Japanese delegation raised the issue of racial discrimination, he looked in my direction. But I remained silent and did not respond." That is to say, Koo did not react at all, not even with a nod of his head. In other words, he did not disagree with the proposal either. Of course, there is no reason why he would have been opposed to the content of the proposal, or to the idea of opposing racial discrimination. Japan's sponsorship of the proposal was what China found difficult to accept. So when the proposal was put forward in February 1919, Koo refrained from committing himself to a response. In April, he decided to lend his support after changes were made to the content of the proposal. The vote count was 11 in favor of the proposal and 6 against, and the Republic of China came around to supporting the motion. This was done to signify that although it was not pleased with the motion, China could not oppose the proposal on principle. Japan had two votes, and the Republic of China represented one-eleventh of the votes in favor of Japan's proposal.

The aims of the Republic of China at the Paris Peace Conference were to resolve the disputes over possessions and foreign interests in the Shandong Peninsula, to find a solution to the Twenty-One Demands problem, and to achieve a comprehensive resolution of the unequal treaties. As is well known, China ended up not signing the Treaty of Versailles. China's refusal to sign the Treaty was not prompted by the May Fourth Movement. The decision not to sign the Treaty was initially made in the latter half of April 1919, before the May Fourth Movement. In fact, as a result of the Movement, the government in Peking (Beijing) instructed its plenipotentiaries to sign the Versailles Treaty. But the plenipotentiaries in Versailles refused.

The chief sticking point was the idea that Germany's former possessions in Shandong were to go to Japan. The complications did not end there. The situation was difficult because China knew that unless it signed the Treaty, China would not be able to join the League of Nations. Article One of the Treaty declared that the "original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant." One interesting aspect here is that in Japan, there was apparently discussion about possibly not joining the League if the problems surrounding the racial equality proposal could not be cleared. But there

was no similar debate in China. China was extremely eager to enter the League, whatever it took.

From the Chinese perspective, the founding of the League of Nations was seen as a continuation of international movements that dated back to the Hague Peace Conferences held in 1899 and 1907. China saw joining the League as an extremely important step for increasing its international prestige. By becoming a founding member of this group, and as one of the victorious powers, the League offered an opportunity for China to project itself on the international stage and boost its prestige as a nation. The influence of Wilsonianism also led many people to dream of the world-changing potential of the League of Nations, and expectations were high within Chinese society that the Chinese people's aspirations for a fairer system of international justice would be realized under the League.

Koo and the other young diplomats who attended the Paris Peace Conference soon realized that these ideals would not be easily realized. Originally, they had great expectations of Woodrow Wilson, and Wilson himself was extremely friendly toward the Republic of China. Secretary of State Robert Lansing and other members of Wilson's brain trust were also well-disposed to China, leading to hopes that China would succeed in getting its demands approved at the Conference. But these hopes were to be dashed. It is likely that the Chinese delegation understood that getting all of its demands accepted would probably be difficult, but decided to make joining the League its top priority.

Before the question of the Versailles Treaty came to a head, a similar clause was inserted into Article One of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, signed between the victorious powers and Austria, stating that the signatory countries would be considered founding members of the League of Nations. China was delighted to understand that it would be able to join the League by signing the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, and this led to its decision not to sign the Versailles Treaty with Germany in June 1919. By signing the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, China became a founding member of the League of Nations and a party to the negotiations on the Covenant of the League. It was during the voting that arose as part of those negotiations that the events about the racial equality proposal described earlier by Professor Nakanishi transpired.

The League of Nations and China

Even after becoming a League member, China continued to be active on a number of fronts. The thing it was most insistent on was that China should become a non-permanent member of the League's Council. China proposed that the members of the Council should be selected on a geographical basis to represent the different regions of the world, such as Europe, South America, and Asia. Because the Covenant of the League of Nations had no stipulations about the geographical composition of the Council, China would raise this issue at every election, and take on the role of representing Asia. Since Japan was already a permanent member, there were not many other Asian countries left over: China, Siam (Thailand), and Persia. This meant that the likelihood that China would be selected was high. China managed to become a non-permanent Council member on several occasions.

Another matter concerned payments of contributions to the League. China initially proposed shouldering a financial burden commensurate with that of Japan, in other words on the level of a permanent member of the Council. This was based on the logic that payments should be proportional to population; since China's population was so large, it should pay for a larger part of the League's expenses. China's aim was to expand its influence by volunteering to shoulder a large part of the financial costs in this way.

But at the end of 1922, the Republic of China became more or less bankrupt. One of the reasons was the end of the five-year moratorium that started in late 1917 on Chinese indemnity payments for the Boxer Rebellion. The moratorium was one of the conditions offered by the Allied Powers as an incentive to urge China to take part in World War I. Of course, once China

declared war on Germany, its payments to that country would no longer be applicable. The payments to Germany were the largest of any of the indemnities China was compelled to pay. This was because of the death of the German minister to China, Clemens von Ketteler during the uprising. But the payments to other countries were also large. By joining the war, China escaped having to make payments to Germany and Austria, and payments to Japan, Great Britain, France, and the United States would be suspended for five years. The prospect of a moratorium on reparations was one of the major factors that induced China to become involved in the war. When the moratorium expired five years later at the end of 1922, China's government finances collapsed, and it became impossible for it to pay the large indemnities it owed the Allied Powers. This led to a further erosion of trust in China.

The Racial Equality Proposal and Sino-Japanese Relations

The question of racial equality was not seen as particularly important from China's perspective. Nevertheless, the racial equality proposal does come up time to time in the history of relations between China and Japan. For example, there is a record of questions and answers between Obata Yukichi, the Japanese minister in Peking, and Chinese Foreign Minister Yen, W. W. (Yan Huiqing) on December 15, 1920. In a passage where China says it cooperates with Japan, the proposal is mentioned, Yen says "Japan made the proposal, and China supported it." The proposal often comes up in this kind of context, as an example of cooperation between the two countries. So even if the proposal was not a particularly important diplomatic issue between the countries, China's support for Japan's second attempt to submit its proposal is cited as evidence of bilateral cooperation on the diplomatic level.

There was considerable animosity toward Japan in some quarters in China. But partly because of the slightly more moderate approach that Japan's Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro adopted in his country's China policy, there were still elements of a more conciliatory attitude in diplomacy on both sides, as seen in this type of language.

The Racial Equality Proposal and Pan-Asianism

At a different level, that of society, people in China continued to be skeptical and critical of the opinions put forward on racial equality by Japan. We heard earlier about Chen Duxiu, one of the founding members of China's Communist Party. Li Dazhao, a colleague of Chen, was also sensitive to Japan's Pan-Asian discourse, as can be seen in Li's piece on "Greater Asianism and New Asianism" that was published in 1919 in the *Guomin* magazine.² Li insisted that the ideas put forward by Japan on Asia were based on putting Japan's own interests first. Of course, he wasn't talking specifically about racial equality, but nevertheless his skepticism about Japan's Pan-Asian rhetoric was clear.

This kind of discourse frequently appeared in newspapers and other forums for debate in Shanghai and other cities. The notion of racial equality and the idea of "same script, same race" even now can be heard in the discourse on Sino-Japanese relations. An article in the *Shen Bao* newspaper dated July 24, 1926 argued that "Japan was using a pretense of friendship as a tool to deceive and demean China." So any mention of "same race" in the context of Sino-Japanese relations was met with some skepticism in China.

The speech on Pan-Asianism delivered by Sun Wen in 1924 is extremely well known in Japan. At the end of the speech, Sun Wen talks about a conflict between "the rule of right and rule of might," and asks whether Japan will "be the hawk of the Western civilization of the rule of might, or the tower of strength of the Orient." But these words did not appear in the Japanese text of

² Li Dazhao (李大釗), "Da Yaxiya zhuyi yu xin Yaxiya zhuyi (大亞細亞主義與新亞細亞主義)" ["Greater Asianism and New Asianism"], *Guomin* 1.2 (February 1, 1919). Also see, *Li Dazhao Xuanji* (李大釗全集) [*Selected Writings of Li Dazhao*] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1959), p. 127.

the speech. They were added later when the speech was printed in Chinese in the *Minguo ribao* newspaper. So a little more caution is needed in how we look at and interpret the words of Sun Wen.

In China, this strong distrust of Japanese Pan-Asianism started around the end of the 1910s, and the discourse on racial equality or racial solidarity tended to be understood in this context of distrust. But within diplomatic circles, China's support for Japan's second attempt to pass its racial equality proposal in 1919 was sometimes invoked as a symbol of cooperation between the two countries.

Japan and China at Cross Purposes over Anti-Japanese Immigration Laws

I would like to raise another important point concerning immigration. As Japan's conflict deepened with the United States over legislation that excluded Japanese immigrants, the Chinese side took a detached and often critical view of Japan's actions. Just because Japan and China were on the receiving end of the same treatment did not mean that the two countries became friends. The truth was rather the opposite. A significant factor explaining why Japan was so offended by the United States policy, in addition to the race issue, was a sense of outrage at the idea that the Japanese should receive the same treatment as the Chinese, whom many people in Japan tended to look down on and disparage. Hirobe Izumi discusses this in his book *Japanese Pride, American Prejudice*.³ The restrictions imposed on Japanese migrants in 1924 by the United States were basically the same as the treatment given to Chinese people since 1882. Naturally, many Chinese people were upset by this kind of Japanese thinking, and it is not surprising that China's stance against Japan hardened in response. The Immigration Act of 1924 might have brought about a shift in Japan-China relations, since immigrants from Japan and China were now being treated the same. But in fact, we see that the reverse was true.

Similar examples of lost opportunities for improving ties can be seen in a number of other areas. Immediately after the Great Kanto Earthquake that struck the greater Tokyo area on September 1, 1923, the Chinese expressed a great deal of sympathy over the disaster. But in the chaos and lawlessness that followed the tremors, more than 400 Chinese people were massacred in Japan. When news of these deaths reached China, it caused a backlash and put an end to any chance that the disaster might be used as an opportunity to improve relations between the two countries.

The Empire of Japan's Racial Equality Proposal from the Perspective of its Colonies

Let us turn to Taiwan. We heard earlier about the Japanese journalist Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, who questioned how Japan could discriminate against other ethnic groups for the sake of its own national survival. People did not object to Japan's raising the problem of race in the international community. But at the same time, using logic that was similar to Kiyosawa's, they asked questions about the situation within the Japanese empire. Was Japan trying to suggest that racial discrimination was not an issue within its own empire? Around the time of the government of Hara Takashi in Japan, and particularly when Den Kenjiro was Governor-General of Taiwan, there was a steady shift toward a policy of bringing Taiwanese systems more closely in line with those in place in Japan. A specific example of this was in education. Under the Taiwan Education Act, which was codified in January 1919 and put into effect in April that year, enthusiasm for education surged, including among the Taiwanese.

³ Hirobe Izumi, *Japanese Pride, American Prejudice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). For Japanese language publication, see 廣部泉, 『人種戦争という寓話』 (名古屋大学出版会、2017) .

At the same time, the basic policy of separating Japanese from the mainland who lived in Taiwan from the native Taiwanese, which was called *naitaibunri*, still continued. In response, a movement started among the young elite, who were the writers and audience of a magazine called *Taiwan Seinen* (台湾青年 / Taiwan youth), which was launched in 1920, calling for assimilation and equality. There were some moves in favor of independence too, but by and large the focus was on campaigning for assimilation and greater equality.

Although Taiwan became a Japanese possession in 1895, Taiwan and mainland Japan were administered separately in legal terms, as illustrated by the Law Relating to Laws and Ordinances to Be Enforced in Taiwan (Six and Three Law). By World War I, as part of the growing tendency to bring the two systems closer together, we start to see movements in Taiwanese society.

Numerous texts exist on the subject. Lin Seisen, who wrote a piece for *Taiwan Seinen* called “What We Want of Japanese in Taiwan” in August 1920, said that regardless of how hard a person from Taiwan worked, he would be consigned to the bottom rungs of society.⁴ “Even if he may have talent to surpass the world and skills that surpass those of the ordinary crowd, the depressing fate of a person from this island will be always to occupy the lowest level of society,” Lin wrote. Greater access to educational opportunities tended to increase the frequency with which people expressed feelings such as this. This was true in government bureaucracies and also in the professions.

Another famous example is the piece contributed by Sai Baika called “Our View of Assimilation” for *Taiwan Seinen* in August 1920.⁵ “Merely having a small understanding of practical concerns is of no use except to work in slavish service at a low level. Under such a situation, I cannot be anything but hopeless about realizing the aimed assimilation” Sai wrote, in expressing his disappointment at Japan’s assimilation policies. Shimada Saburo wrote an item for the October 1920 edition of the same magazine called “On the Issue of Harmony between Japanese and Taiwanese.”⁶ “If the Japanese intend to spread this idea around the world, they should practice racial equality at home first, and then announce what they have achieved and call on the rest of the world to follow; only then will the argument carry any persuasive proof behind it,” said Shimada. In other words, Japan should put its ideas into practice at home first and only then start to preach to the rest of the world.

While there was considerable discussion in Taiwan on educational issues, the question of racial equality was not a major topic of debate in the Taiwanese media, or in *Taiwan Seinen*. The focus in the local media tended to be questions of equality with the mainland Japan, especially with regard to education.

An unusual case occurred when an article was carried in the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shimpo* on December 9, 1920 with the title “On Not Submitting the Race Proposal.”⁷ This was to do with the report that Japan had decided not to submit the proposal. Although the piece was only a reprint of an article that had originally appeared in the *Osaka Asahi Shimbun*, the article said:

The speech by Ambassador Ishii [Kikujiro] is attracting attention for having broken the silence of the Japanese delegation at the General Assembly of the League of Nations. . . . This

⁴ Lin Seisen (林濟川), “Zai tai naichijin ni nozomu (在内地人に望む) [What We Want of Japanese in Taiwan],” *Taiwan Seinen* 1,2 (August 1920).

⁵ Sai Baika (蔡培火), “Gojin no dokakan (吾人の同化観) [Our View of Assimilation],” *Taiwan Seinen* 1,2 (August 1920).

⁶ Shimada Saburo (島田三郎), “Nитай yuwa no konpon mondai (内台融和の根本問題) [On the Issue of Harmony between Japanese and Taiwanese],” *Taiwan Seinen* 1,4 (October 1920).

⁷ “Jiron Ippan: Jinshuan Futeishutsu (時論一斑: 人種案不提出) [On Not Submitting the Race Proposal],” *Taiwan NichiNichi Shimpo*, December 9, 1920.

reference to the race proposal was perhaps unavoidable given the sequence of events since last year, but if Japan's representatives are really determined to raise the subject, surely it would be better to do so with "clean hands," so to speak, having implemented racial equality within Japan; one would wish at least that Viscount Ishii might have noticed the logical contradiction that necessarily arises if this is not the case.

To summarize, people in Taiwan did not generally treat racial equality as a major issue. The subject did come up in smaller ways, often in connection with education or some other problem with Japanese rule in Taiwan, but the main points of concern in public debate were generally related to achieving assimilation and equality between mainland Japanese and Taiwanese.

The *Taiwan Nichinichi Shimpo* was essentially a Japanese-language newspaper for Taiwan, and was read by many Japanese residents in Taiwan. If we ask ourselves to what extent the Japanese living in Taiwan were concerned with the question of racial equality, it may be that they were not that interested. When the Japanese in Taiwan thought about how they were seen by the local population, to what extent were they aware that the racial equality question could come back to bite them? This is an important question to ask. Since the subject was raised infrequently in the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shimpo*, it is likely that either people simply lacked awareness of the issue, or discussion of the subject was avoided. It is difficult to evaluate what does not remain in the written record, but since some articles like this reprint do exist, my view is that the relative paucity of such pieces is probably not caused by a simple lack of awareness.

Conclusion

We have seen that Japan raised the issues of racial equality and the eradication of racial discrimination at the Paris Peace Conference, and the subjects became major points of discussion. But racial equality was not a particularly important topic for China, if we look at it from the perspective of why the Republic of China took part in World War I, what it was looking for at the Paris Peace Conference, and what it expected from the League of Nations. China had other priorities. It was interested in regaining its own possessions and sovereign interests, and in finding a solution to the problem of Shandong in the Twenty-One Demands.

One way of viewing China's actions is to conclude that it used its approval of the racial equality proposal when it was submitted for the second time as a tool to ensure that the bare minimum of its relationship with Japan would be maintained. Giving its approval to the proposal was a way of showing that although China was highly critical of Japan and skeptical of its intentions, it did not intend to risk an all-out confrontation and a total breach of relations.

Across Chinese society, most people were extremely critical of Japan's actions and saw its efforts on race as fundamentally connected to Japanese Pan-Asianism. On the issue of immigration, China had long received basically the same treatment, and the more Japan protested about being treated the same way as the Chinese, the more likely it was that China would look askance at Japan's moves.

Professor Nakanishi spoke earlier about the United Nations and the UN Charter and touched on the fact that China raised issues of race and religion and other matters in the Charter. This reflects the position of China at the time when the United Nations was being formed. China declared war on Japan on December 9, 1941, and in January 1942, became one of the four major Allied powers. When the United Nations was being formed in 1944 and 1945, through a series of conferences from Dumbarton Oaks to San Francisco, China was responsible for submitting numerous suggestions that were incorporated into the UN Charter. Among the suggestions made by China was the idea that non-permanent members of the Security Council should be selected by region, with members to represent Asia and the other regions of the world. China also submitted

a number of other proposals, including one on racial equality. You could say that China made the content of the original racial equality proposal a reality in the UN Charter, in Japan's place.

Of course, when we discuss China in this period, we are talking about a time when Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) traveled to India in 1942 and 1943. This is when Chiang Kai-shek was trying to position China as the leader of Asia. Ultimately, he had to flee to Taiwan and lost his position, but in 1943, at the Cairo Conference, and as late as 1944 and 1945, Chiang Kai-shek believed that he would be the leader of Asia after the end of World War II. Chiang Kai-shek took quite seriously the question of how to think about Asia and what Asia meant. In this context, it is easy enough to understand why China put forward proposals regarding racial equality and representation for an Asian bloc during the drafting of the UN Charter in 1944 and 1945.

In Taiwan, the racial equality proposal was viewed within the context of the policies of the Hara government and Den Kenjiro, as well as the policies of assimilation and equality. But there were already some people in Japan, who argued that if Japan was going to make proposals about racial equality or the eradication of racial prejudice, it would be better to put its own house in order before preaching to the world.

Similar things were said within Taiwan as well. This does not necessarily mean that the racial equality proposal was at the forefront of what intellectuals were discussing in Taiwan, or that it was part of what inspired them to organize a petition movement to establish a Taiwanese parliament or to debate educational problems.

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A “Winter Phase” for Arms Control and Disarmament and the Role for Japan*

Masahiko Asada**

Abstract

It appears that arms control and disarmament have entered a “winter phase” at least for the time being. This conclusion seems unavoidable given the outlook for the performance of arms control and disarmament measures not only in terms of existing bilateral treaties between the United States and the Russian Federation but also in terms of multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament measures under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It does not appear this situation will change for the better any time soon. In light of such realities, what sort of role might Japan be expected to play? There is a limit to any role Japan might pursue toward fostering improved bilateral relations between the US and Russia. On the other hand, Japan conceivably has a role it should fulfill multilaterally. From that perspective, it established a Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament (EPG) in 2017. After two years of intensive discussions, it proved unable to substantively alter the entrenched pattern of rivalry separating two factions that could be referred to as the “disarmers” and the “deterriers.” Yet even as it failed to close the gaps in fundamental perspectives, the EPG did succeed in fostering a certain shared awareness of the actions that should be pursued over the near and intermediate term. That accomplishment is likely to have positive value in aiding efforts to predict the future course of government-level negotiations.

It appears that arms control and disarmament have entered a “winter phase” at least for the time being. This is despite the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in July 2017 and the conferral of the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the nongovernmental organization instrumental in making that treaty.

This conclusion seems unavoidable given the outlook for the performance of arms control and disarmament measures not only in terms of existing bilateral treaties and negotiations on new treaty arrangements between the United States and the Russian Federation, but also in terms of multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament measures such as those under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It does not appear this situation will change for the better any time soon. In light of these realities, what sort of role might Japan be expected to play?

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1. Stalled US-Russian negotiations on nuclear disarmament

Bilateral US-Russian negotiations on nuclear disarmament have been stalled for quite some time. The treaty most recently concluded and still in force between the two states is the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which was signed in Prague in 2010.

Among post-Cold War agreements aimed at reducing strategic nuclear arms, immediately before the New START was the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) signed in 2002. The SORT was to remain in force until 2012, but it was superseded by the New START of 2010. The SORT accord was reached in 2002 as a new initiative aimed at moving forward with reductions agreed under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which had been signed in 1991 and was set to expire in 2009.¹

As this review of relevant historical details should show, until recently US-Russian talks and agreements on strategic nuclear arms reductions had followed a process marked by the launch and conclusion of negotiations on a new treaty while the previous treaty was still in force. However, the situation is now different. Brought into force on February 5, 2011 with a duration of 10 years, the New START is scheduled to expire in February 2021. Although this treaty contains provisions (Art. XIV, para. 2) that allow it to be extended for a period of up to five years, the prospects for such an extension, let alone the start of negotiations on a new treaty, appear dim.²

The problems are not limited to strategic nuclear weapons alone. To the contrary, one of the most pressing issues right now has to do with nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Signed in 1987, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty provided for the elimination of the two states' entire arsenals of ground-based ballistic missiles and cruise missiles with ranges from 500 up to 5,500 km. The INF Treaty represented a breakthrough in that it not only eliminated one category of nuclear weapons entirely, but also was the first treaty under which the Soviet Union consented to accept statutory on-site inspections. Furthermore, it helped set the stage for the subsequent START I accord of 1991 and also led to the extremely intrusive inspection regime under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993.

However, the US in recent years has cited Russia for violating the INF Treaty, namely, for testing and deploying a new type of ground-launched cruise missile (the SSC-8 or 9M729) with a range prohibited by the Treaty.³ Russia in turn has criticized the US for INF Treaty violations of

¹ The history of US-Russian strategic nuclear arms reduction is far more complicated as follows. START I was signed in 1991 and entered into force in December 1994, and was to remain in force for 15 years. In the interest of achieving further strategic weapons reductions, the US and Russia signed the START II treaty in 1993, even before START I had been brought into force. The US ratified START II in 1996. In 1997, agreements were reached on a modified reduction schedule for the START II in the form of a Protocol and on the clarification concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in the form of Agreed Statements, and integrated into START II. Russia ratified START II in its entirety in 2000 but set the condition that the US ratifies the 1997 Protocol, etc. and reserved its right to withdraw from START II should the US exit the ABM Treaty. However, because the US did not ratify the Protocol, etc. and in 2002 went on to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, START II did not enter into force and Russia declared in 2002 that it would not be bound by the provisions of START II.

² Ryan Fedasiuk, "U.S., Russia Meet New START Limits," March 1, 2018, at <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-03/news-briefs/us-russia-meet-new-start-limits>; Julian Borger, "US and Russian Nuclear Arsenals Set to be Unchecked for First Time Since 1972," *The Guardian*, April 17, 2018.

³ Since 2014, the US has considered Russian tests of ground-launched cruise missiles to be in violation of the INF Treaty. In 2016 it convened a meeting of the Special Verification Commission (SVC) established under Article XIII of the INF Treaty and communicated its concerns. US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, "Fact Sheet: INF Treaty at a Glance," December 8, 2017; Amy F. Woolf, *Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress*, CRS Report (Congressional Research Service, December 2017), pp. 14–16.

its own.⁴ Ultimately, on February 2, 2019, the US issued a declaration of its intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty pursuant to the provisions of Article XV.⁵ Under those provisions, the withdrawal notice takes effect six months after the date of declaration. The operation of the INF Treaty was thus terminated on August 2.⁶ Soon thereafter, on August 18, the US tested a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile of the type banned by the INF Treaty.⁷ Regarding the expressed intention by the US to deploy its intermediate-range missiles in Asia, China has expressed its concern that it would severely undermine the international and regional security.⁸

The impact of this development has had implications that extend beyond the INF Treaty itself. Linton Brooks, a former Administrator of the US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), has stated that it would be difficult for the US to conclude a new strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia unless the INF Treaty noncompliance issues are resolved.⁹ Not only that, but relations between the US and Russia have taken on a seriously confrontational tone since the latter annexed Crimea in March 2014. Moreover, Russia is suspected of being behind the March 2018 nerve-agent poisoning of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military intelligence officer, in Salisbury, England. This triggered a massive wave of expulsions of each other's diplomats by the US and Russia. Additionally, in UN Security Council deliberations, Russia exercised its veto power three times in succession to block renewal of the mandate for the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) established to identify those involved in the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Since then, this confrontation has moved to the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In this way, tensions between the US and Russia are taking a steadily worsening course.

2. Widening divisions over the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The US and Russia are not the only two states that have been engaged in disputes over nuclear disarmament. The atmosphere of confrontation has become global in scale.

On July 7, 2017, the United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading towards Their Total Elimination adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) with 122 member states in favor, one against (Netherlands), and one abstaining (Singapore). From this fact alone, one might gain the impression that a revolutionary treaty banning nuclear weapons had been agreed upon, reflecting the general consensus of the international community. The reality is somewhat different. The

⁴ Russia has asserted that the use of intermediate-range missiles as targets for US missile defense system tests, the use of armed drones, and plans (Aegis Ashore) for land-based deployment of the US Navy's MK-41 missile launcher are violations of the INF Treaty, but the US has rejected those claims. *Ibid.*, pp. 23–26.

⁵ US Department of State, “Press Statement: U.S. Intent to Withdraw from the INF Treaty,” February 2, 2019. See also “United States Initiates Withdrawal from Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,” *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 113, No. 3 (July 2019), pp. 631–634.

⁶ For the Russian response to the US withdrawal, see “Statement by the President of Russia on the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,” August 5, 2019, at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61271>

⁷ Shannon Bugos, “U.S. Completes INF Treaty Withdrawal,” *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 49, No. 7 (September 2019), p. 25. To counter treaty violations by Russia, in 2017 the US reportedly began the early-stage research and development of new intermediate-range missiles within limits that would not violate its treaty obligations. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 20, 2019, evening edition.

⁸ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Remarks,” August 5, 2019, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1686226.shtml

⁹ Interview with Ambassador Linton Brooks, former Administrator, US National Nuclear Security Administration, November 27, 2017.

122 states that voted in favor did not include any of the nuclear-armed states (nuclear-weapon states under the NPT and other states considered to possess nuclear weapons) or any of the non-nuclear-weapon states allied with the nuclear-armed states. Accordingly, concern arises that this treaty could spark or aggravate troubling divisions within the international community.

This fragmentation of international community has emerged (and begun to grow) not only between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states but also between the non-nuclear-weapon states allied with the nuclear-armed powers and the non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon states. To be more precise, this trend was in fact already under way prior to the adoption of the TPNW. In 2014, only five states (the US, UK, France, Russia, and Israel) were opposed to the UN General Assembly resolution titled “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations,” a yearly adopted resolution which ultimately led to the convening of the treaty negotiating UN conference. However, by 2016, the year in which a decision was made to convene the UN conference, that number had expanded seven-fold to 35 states that included almost all of the nuclear-armed states and their non-nuclear allies.¹⁰ Although the non-nuclear-weapon states allied with the nuclear-armed powers had sought to coordinate with the non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon states (at least superficially) on the quest for nuclear disarmament, the TPNW (negotiations) ultimately compelled them to shift from the non-nuclear camp and side with the nuclear-armed states by pressuring them to abandon the idea of extended nuclear deterrence.

As of August 2019, after slightly over two years since its adoption, the TPNW has been signed by 70 countries and ratified or acceded to by only 25, apparently to the disappointment of its proponents.¹¹ Nevertheless, it will probably enter into force eventually, once the required 50 states ratify or accede to it. Under the TPNW provisions, the treaty process is to begin with meetings of its States Parties within the first year following the entry into force of the treaty and every two years thereafter. It seems only natural that many of the non-aligned countries involved in the making of the TPNW consider it important. That view, together with the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament made through the NPT process, readily supports the prospect that these states will pivot away from the NPT process and toward the new TPNW process. The first meeting of States Parties of the TPNW will have the task of (unilaterally) setting a deadline for the elimination of nuclear weapons despite the (likely) non-participation of NPT-designated nuclear-weapon states and other states presumed to possess nuclear weapons (Art. 4, para. 2). Should that scenario materialize, the fractures dividing the nuclear-armed and nuclear-allied non-nuclear-weapon states on the one hand and the non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon states on the other will likely deepen. From a nuclear disarmament perspective, it will be unfortunate if many of the non-aligned states lose interest in the NPT process, transforming it into an empty formality as a universal forum that enjoyed the involvement of the nuclear-weapon states, while the nuclear-armed states themselves continue to view the TPNW with hostility or complete disregard.¹²

¹⁰ See UN Docs. A/RES/69/41, December 2, 2014; A/69/PV.62, December 2, 2014, pp. 12–13; A/RES/71/258, December 23, 2016; A/71/PV.68, December 23, 2016, p. 17.

¹¹ Aside from the number of ratifying states, the number of signatories is only a little more than half the number that voted in favor of the treaty when it was adopted, notwithstanding that the executive branch can sign the treaty without parliamentary approval. This fact raises doubts about their actual level of commitment to the treaty.

¹² The five nuclear-weapon states have declared before the UN General Assembly that they are opposed to the TPNW and will not support, sign, or ratify it. India and Pakistan have also announced that they cannot be parties to this treaty. “Joint Statement by China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States,” United Nations General Assembly, First Committee, Thematic Debate (Nuclear Weapons), October 22, 2018; Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Response by the Official Spokesperson to a Media Query regarding India’s View on the Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons,” July 18, 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, “Press Statement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty),” August 7, 2017.

3. The role for Japan

Given this state of affairs, what role can or should Japan fulfill? There is a limit to any role Japan might pursue toward fostering improved bilateral relations between the US and Russia.

Multilaterally, on the other hand, Japan conceivably has a role it should fulfill with regard to the mounting tensions spurred by the TPNW. That role was laid out at the first session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2020 NPT Review Conference in May 2017 by former Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida with his proposal for the establishment of a Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament (EPG), a group of experts in nuclear arms control and disarmament that had its inaugural meeting in Hiroshima in November that same year. (The author participated in it as an EPG member.)

The second EPG meeting assembled in Tokyo in March 2018 and prepared a proposal for submission to the second session of the NPT Preparatory Committee scheduled for the following month.¹³ Bridge-building was its primary focus. Specifically, the EPG called for the start of what it considered to be an essential dialogue aimed at promoting mutual understanding of different standpoints and perspectives based on recognition of the divisions that existed within the international community. This was an exceptionally realistic proposal that focused directly on the reality of the global rifts that had developed over the issue of nuclear disarmament.

Afterward, the EPG held three more meetings (in Nagasaki, Kyoto, and Tokyo). In February 2019, the US announced its withdrawal from the INF Treaty. Against that backdrop, the EPG at its Kyoto meeting that March adopted a “Kyoto Appeal,” which urged the international community to adhere to nuclear arms control and disarmament treaties and agreements and fulfill all treaty obligations and commitments, called on the nuclear-weapon states to explain and share information on their nuclear policies, and appealed for the restoration of civility and respect in discourse and a return to the traditional practices of cooperation.¹⁴

At its fifth meeting, held in Tokyo in July 2019, the EPG conference began the process of finalizing its findings and proposals. However, it proved unable to substantively alter the entrenched pattern of rivalry separating two factions that could be referred to as the “disarmers” and the “deterriers.” Of course, it may have been unrealistic to expect that five meetings for dialogue would eliminate differences in the opinions and views that individual EPG members had developed and maintained over some decades as elements of their respective belief systems. Yet even as it failed to close the gaps in fundamental perspectives, the EPG did succeed in fostering a certain shared awareness of the actions that should be pursued over the near and intermediate term.¹⁵ That accomplishment is likely to have positive value in aiding efforts to predict the future course of government-level negotiations.

The present author has articulated within and outside the EPG meetings his brief that making nuclear disarmament the primary objective as an unconditional, absolute good is not necessarily the correct choice. Disarmament is a means, not the ultimate objective. The ultimate objective is security: security at the national and international levels. If measures in disarmament threaten to harm the fundamentals of security, security has to be given priority over disarmament.

Of course, it is true that some people consider it fantasy to expect nuclear deterrence to

¹³ Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, “Building Bridges to Effective Nuclear Disarmament: Recommendations for the 2020 Review Process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000349264.pdf>

¹⁴ Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, “Kyoto Appeal: Appeals for the 2020 Review Process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” at <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000469293.pdf>

¹⁵ Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, “Chair’s Report for the 2020 Review Process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” at <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000529774.pdf>

work or contribute to security. On the contrary, others still believe that nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantor of security and the primary reason for no major war having been fought since World War II. These diametrically opposing perspectives are directly linked to the differing stances on nuclear disarmament, and are arguably at their root. Moving forward, the EPG is scheduled to gain expanded scope that includes participation by government officials. It is the author's earnest hope that it will help to ease, and ultimately open the door to the elimination of, dissent over these issues.

Emergence of “State-Centrism” in Cyberspace*

Takahisa Kawaguchi**

Abstract

There was a time when cyberspace was regarded as a utopia. The emergence of cyberspace centered on the Internet and the expansion and deepening of digital space were expected to greatly change the established system of sovereign states. Because cyberspace was to have no national boundaries, it would relativize the power of sovereign states and lead to a decrease in international conflicts. Today, however, as there are clear national boundaries in the “flow” and “stock” of digital information, it is sovereign states that have the most sophisticated cyber capabilities, and the major powers are engaged in conflict in cyberspace and regarding cybersecurity. The ongoing conflict between the US and China over technological superiority and the dispute regarding Russian interference in US elections are problems borne from the expansion and deepening of cyberspace. “State-centrism” is expanding in cyberspace in the sense that sovereign states exercise power centered on their national security and strategic competition.

Introduction

Cyberspace—that is, networks to transmit, exchange, and share digital information—is continuing to expand.¹ In this process, cyberspace has penetrated every aspect of society and daily life, and brought about changes in communications, industries, the formation of social consensus, and all other fields.

Then, what types of changes is the expansion and deepening of cyberspace causing in global politics and international relations? How should we grasp global politics and international relations in cyberspace?

In its earliest stages, cyberspace was perceived as a utopia; because cyberspace was to have no national boundaries, it would relativize the power of sovereign states and lead to a decrease in international disputes. Today, however, there are clear national boundaries in digital space, it is sovereign states that have the most sophisticated cyber capabilities, and the major powers are engaged in conflict in cyberspace and also regarding cybersecurity. The ongoing conflict between the US and China over technological superiority and the dispute regarding Russian interference in US elections are both confrontations that emerged because of the expansion and deepening of cyberspace.

In the sense that sovereign states exercise power centered on security issues and disputes

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¹ Regarding the deepening and expansion of cyberspace, see Takahisa Kawaguchi, “Kawariyuku saiba kukan de no senso” [Changing war in cyberspace], in *“Gijutsu” ga kaeru senso to heiwa* [War and peace being changed by “technology”], ed. Narushige Michishita (Fuyo Shobo Shuppan, 2018), pp. 27–39.

between major powers sometimes arise, “state-centrism” is emerging in cyberspace. Cyberspace “is moving from its halcyon days as an ungoverned stateless commons with only technical supervision into a geopolitical arena of intense complexity.”²

Such conditions may be called “a reversion to the world of classical realism.”³ In the world view of classical realism, the most influential actor is the sovereign state, and the state acts to survive and maximize its power. The most important issue is national security, and international politics is regarded as a power struggle.⁴

This does not apply only to cyberspace. The present international environment has been described as “the revenge of geography” (Robert D. Kaplan) and “a revival of Westphalian sovereignty” (Ian Bremmer): a world where the power game among sovereign states is being fully pursued.

This paper first summarizes cyberspace as a utopia, notes the misunderstandings and realities regarding national boundaries, power, and disputes in cyberspace, and lastly describes ongoing disputes in cyberspace among the major powers.

1. Cyberspace as a Utopia

There was a time when cyberspace was grasped as a utopia.

This cyberspace is comprised, at the very least, of (1) the Internet, (2) closed networks that are not connected to the Internet, and (3) computer terminals, servers, storage media, and other electronic devices that are (or can be) connected to the Internet and these other networks.

The Internet is the core element comprising cyberspace, but its history spans half a century at most (ARPANET, which is the predecessor to the Internet, established packet-switching links in 1969). The history of commercial use of the Internet is just 30 years long, and during that time cyberspace has transformed into a backbone supporting social infrastructure, home electronic devices, and the realm of speech.

It has been noted that the Internet was developed by the US Department of Defense, but that is not an accurate description. While the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA; renamed later the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency [DARPA]) certainly did have a major role in the development of the Internet, the operation of ARPANET was actually initiated by researchers at four universities centered on the west coast of the US.

The design concept for the Internet characterized as “autonomous,” “distributed,” and “collaborative” differed from traditional rule by government.⁵ The emergence of cyberspace centered on the Internet, which has no national boundaries or central authority, demanded a re-evaluation of the roles of state and of government. John Perry Barlow, the founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, criticized legislation to regulate the Internet in the US (the Communications Decency Act) and published “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” on February 8, 1996. Barlow argued that cyberspace is a sovereign space where governments

² Parag Khanna, *Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization*, (New York: Random House, 2016), p.331.

³ Jun Osawa, “The Reversion of Cyberspace to the World of Classical Realism,” *Japan SPOTLIGHT* (May/June 2018), pp. 22–24.

⁴ Anthony J. S. Craig and Brandon Valeriano, “Realism and Cyber Conflict: Security in the Digital Age,” in Davide Orsi, J. R. Avgustin, and Max Nurnus eds., *Realism in Practice: An Appraisal* (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2018), pp. 85–101. However, while military power is emphasized as a constituent factor of power in classical realism, that characteristic does not apply in cyberspace.

⁵ Motohiro Tsuchiya, “Saiba supesu no gabanansu” [Governance of cyberspace], in *Gurobaru komonzu ni okeru nichibei domei no atarashii kadai* [Rising challenges for the Japan-U.S. alliance in the global commons], analysis report under the Japan Institute of International Affairs’ fiscal 2013 investigation and research project on diplomacy and security for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (March 2014).

could not interfere.

Subsequently, Richard Barbrook noted that the development of the Internet and its culture have a temporal and geographical bias. He stressed that the Internet was created on the west coast of the US during the 1960s, and this bias is characterized by “the Californian ideology” of optimism toward the future, belief in the ability to solve problems using technology, and the counterculture.⁶ This geographical and temporal background made cyberspace “utopian.” In cyberspace, there were to be no national boundaries, the state would be relativized, and hence there would be no international disputes. Even if there were cybercrimes, technology would resolve all the issues.

In addition, the expansion of cyberspace was in line with the trend toward globalization following the end of the Cold War. In the “flattened world” depicted by Thomas Friedman, not only enterprises but also individuals participate in global competition, and the state is relativized. Many of the factors that cause this flattening—including telecommunications technologies, general-use office software, and remote access—are related to the expansion of cyberspace.⁷

2. The “Hype” regarding Cyberspace and International Politics

However, the viewpoint of cyberspace as a “utopia” must be said to have been based on a lack of understanding and exaggerated premises regarding cyberspace and international politics: that is, it was based on “hype.”

(1) Are there no boundaries in cyberspace?

The first “hype” is that there are no national boundaries in cyberspace. It is certainly true that digital information flies back and forth across national boundaries. Companies disperse their data centers all over the world, and users can utilize cloud services from anywhere on earth. The victims of cyberattacks, the servers that send attack orders, the transit points, the actual origins of the attacks, and the nationalities of the attackers all transcend national boundaries.

Nevertheless, each nation claims sovereignty and territoriality in cyberspace (or parts thereof), and in fact the “flow” and “stock” of digital information is being restrained by national boundaries.

As for the “flow,” the fragmentation and Balkanization of the Internet is advancing. This is also called the “splinternet” in the sense that the original single Internet has become split.

China’s Golden Shield Internet information censorship and blocking system constitutes a cyber Great Wall rising between the domestic Chinese and global Internets. Internet users have utilized the encryption technology of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to avert censorship and blocking by the authorities, but regulations on the use of VPNs have been reinforced since 2017. In May 2019, legislation was passed which makes it possible to cut off the Internet in Russia (Runet) from overseas. The Russian government asserts that this legislation is to protect the Runet from overseas cyberattacks and otherwise secure its continuity.

According to the report “Freedom on the Net” published by the US think tank Freedom House, a growing number of countries are imposing restrictions on user access and contents. Eric Schmidt, director of Alphabet, the holding company for Google has expressed concerns that if such regulations advance, then the global Internet may be transformed into a connected series

⁶ Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, “The Californian Ideology,” *Science as Culture*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 44–72.

⁷ Thomas Friedman, *Furattoka suru sekai: Keizai no daitenkan to ningen no mirai*, trans. Iwan Fushimi (Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 2006). Originally published as *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*.

of nation-state networks.⁸

The regulation of “stock,” that is, of where information will be stored, is also clear. According to one survey, countries are prohibiting the transfer of financial and settlement data, personal data, communications data, corporate confidential information, and various other data outside of their borders.⁹

This issue is not a simple structure of opposition between liberalism and authoritarianism (as discussed below). The Europe Union and Brazil, for example, prohibit the transfer of personal data outside their territories in order to protect privacy. China, Vietnam, and other countries require foreign enterprises conducting business in their countries to locate servers that store communications data, logs (records), and other important confidential information domestically, mostly for security, law enforcement, and the promotion of domestic industry. While the purposes for obstructing data transfer vary from country to country, this trend is referred to as “data localization.”

Why can the state exercise sovereignty and territoriality in cyberspace (or parts thereof)? This is because cyberspace depends on physical infrastructure, and most physical infrastructure depends on territory and territorial seas. Digital information is stored on servers and at data centers, which exist within the soil of some country (recently, it is also being considered to locate data centers in territorial seas). More than 99% of international telecommunications on the Internet is via undersea cables which connect to land at the coastline of each country. Undersea cables themselves are laid on the seabed in international waters and are frequently jointly owned by companies in multiple countries, but their landing points and terrestrial sections at least lie within the territory of one country or another.

These observations are by no means new. Already in 2006, Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu argued it is an illusion that cyberspace has no national boundaries, and noted that the state’s mandatory power functions in cyberspace.¹⁰ The fact that cyberspace depends on physical infrastructure is the basis whereby states exert (or can exert) sovereignty and territoriality in cyberspace; cyberspace fragmentation and data localization are the results of the exercise of state power.

(2) Is the power of the sovereign state relativized in cyberspace?

The second “hype” is that the power of the sovereign state is relativized in cyberspace. The state’s monopoly on information and technology is destroyed, with individuals, enterprises, criminals, and terrorists all gaining power. Joseph Nye calls this development the “diffusion of power.” He argues that the asymmetry of power between states and non-state actors is shrinking from the advance of technology.¹¹

The combined sales of Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple (GAFA) total more than ¥70 trillion, surpassing the annual tax revenues of Japan, which is the world’s third largest economy.¹² It is private-sector enterprises that operate the Internet and cyberspace.

⁸ Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, *Daigo no kenryoku: Google ni wa mieteiru mirai*, trans. Yuko Sakurai (Diamond-sha, 2014), p.129. Originally published as *The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, Nations and Business*.

⁹ Nigel Cory, “Cross-Border Data Flows: Where Are the Barriers, and What Do They Cost?” The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (May 2017).

¹⁰ Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, *Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Wu is famous for coining the term “network neutrality.”

¹¹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Cyber Power*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (May 2010).

¹² “Bocho GAFA: Kokka ga gyakushu (bundan no sakini)” [Expanded GAFA: State counterattacks (after the division)], *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (March 10, 2019).

Cyberattacks are not the exclusive purview of nation states: they can be carried out by criminals, terrorists, and ultimately by individuals. By using encrypted messaging applications such as *Signal* and the encrypted network technology *Tor*, telecommunications contents and connection routes can be concealed, averting government surveillance (or so it is believed).

However, it is sovereign states which hold the most refined cyber capabilities, and looking back over the past 10 years, states were involved in most of the cyberattacks that had the greatest impact. It is highly likely that there was state involvement in Stuxnet (2010) which destroyed centrifuges at Iranian nuclear facilities, wide-ranging power outages in Ukraine (2015, 2016), interference in the US presidential election (2016), and the global spread of the ransomware WannaCry and NotPetya (2017), as well as the cyberattacks and big data collection that targeted the Japan Pension Service (2015),¹³ the US Office of Personnel Management (2015), a leading US hotel chain (2018), and the Singapore government’s medical database (2018).

Richard Bejtlich, who worked as the chief security officer at the US cybersecurity company Mandiant, notes that signal intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities are “one of the differentiators between nation state groups and other hacking units” in cyberspace. SIGINT capabilities that can intercept a large volume of Internet communications are an asset held only by nation states.¹⁴

Law enforcement is also a feature held only by the state. Under the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, Washington can access data held by enterprises across national boundaries, and under the Cybersecurity Law, Beijing can access information stored on servers inside mainland China. GAFA and other enterprises “stock” massive data, but the sovereign state has superiority from the standpoint of “access” to data.¹⁵

While the asymmetry of power between states and non-state actors in cyberspace is certainly narrowing, the superiority of the sovereign state in sophisticated and continuous cyberattacks, data access, and other fields should not be overlooked.

(3) Does the expansion and deepening of cyberspace decrease international conflicts?

The third “hype” is that the expansion and deepening of cyberspace reduces international disputes. There are a few arguments regarding this point. One is that information technology itself will analyze social dynamics and the causes of disputes, predict the escalation of violence, and be helpful at times in conflict resolution and peace building. In a discussion with UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jane Holl Lute, Vint Cerf, who is recognized as one of the fathers of the Internet, suggested the potential contribution of technology because insight into the origins of conflicts is essential for conflict resolution.¹⁶

Another argument is that the expansion and deepening of cyberspace and the spread of the Internet in particular will promote the democratization of society and that if the number of democratic states increases, then wars will decrease. While this paper does not address the pros

¹³ Although the government of Japan has not attributed the attacker in the Japan Pension Service case, according to the Macnica Networks report, it’s obvious that the source of the attack was somewhere inside China. Macnica Networks, *Hyoteki gata kogeki no jittai to taisaku apurochi: Nihon wo osotta daikibo na saiba supai katsudo no jittai chosa* [Advanced Persistent Threat: A Survey of Large-Scale Cyber Spy Activities against Japan], 1st ed. (June 2016).

¹⁴ Richard Bejtlich (@taosecurity), tweets at 00:50, October 5, 2018.

¹⁵ However, there is also the opinion that big-tech companies have superiority in “access” as well. For example, the US government probably does not have a full grasp of what types of data are being collected and stored by enterprises and where the data are located. Without that information, the data cannot be accessed. This was noted by Koichiro Komiyama of the Japan Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (May 7, 2019).

¹⁶ Laura Ralston, “Can the Internet Solve Conflict?” *The World Bank Blog* (August 10, 2014); “Entrepreneurs Hunt for ‘Peace Tech’ to Defuse Conflict,” *United States Institute of Peace* (September 24, 2014).

and cons of the democratic peace theory, even if one hypothetically accepts that wars do not break out among democratic states, it is questionable that the spread of the Internet advances democratization.

The Internet and other technologies do not always resolve conflicts and do not necessarily democratize society. That is because technologies are value neutral. In areas that seek freedom and democracy, they become tools for their pursuit, but authoritarian governments use the Internet and other information technologies as means for social control.¹⁷ China's facial recognition and tracking technologies which it uses domestically and exports to European and other countries and its Social Credit System are typical examples. The Internet and related information technologies can be used as means of conflict resolution, but they can also be used to incite conflict and for mobilization, as demonstrated by the use of websites and social media by the "Islamic State" extreme terrorist organization to instigate terrorism in foreign countries and recruit "foreign fighters." How the expansion and deepening of cyberspace reduces international disputes is merely one aspect of the technology.

3. Great Power Competition in Cyberspace

Today, sovereignty and territoriality are being claimed even in cyberspace, and sovereign states are maintaining superior power in that realm. The expansion and deepening of cyberspace is not necessarily decreasing international conflicts, and is actually sparking new disputes in some cases.

(1) The US-China dispute regarding 5G and trade secrets

The US and China are presently in conflicts regarding cybersecurity issues. Specifically, these are the issue of excluding Chinese enterprises from the construction and operation of the fifth generation mobile telecommunications system (5G)—which is characterized by high speed and large capacity, low latency, and multi-connectivity—and the issue of the theft of trade secrets, intellectual property, and other assets of private enterprises via cyberattacks, etc. The US position is that the problems are (1) the Chinese government is collecting confidential information via Chinese enterprises, and (2) the Chinese government is engaged in cyberattacks targeting US private-sector enterprises. Moreover, the targets of cyberattacks by the Chinese government to steal confidential information overlap with China's "strategic emerging industries" (12th Five-Year Plan) and "10 key industries" (Made in China 2025).¹⁸

In 2018, the Donald Trump administration began to criticize Beijing, claiming that China was conducting ongoing cyberattacks on US private-sector enterprises. On October 4, Vice President Mike Pence criticized Beijing from start to finish in a nearly hour-long speech at the Hudson Institute. In addition to cyberattacks, Pence's speech covered a wide range of topics including election meddling, religious oppression, land reclamation in the South China Sea, and overseas investment that lacks transparency.

Throughout 2018, US authorities filed charges against officers of China's Ministry of State Security (MSS) and regional organizations under the MSS, the hacking group "APT10" which is linked to the MSS, and other Chinese enterprises and entities one after another for stealing trade secrets and intellectual property from US enterprises.

On January 28, 2019, the US Department of Justice announced charges against Huawei Device and its US subsidiary. The two firms were suspected of stealing trade secrets related to

¹⁷ Ian Bremmer, "Democracy in Cyberspace: What Information Technology Can and Cannot Do," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 6 (November/December 2010), pp. 86–92.

¹⁸ Mandiant, *APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units*, February 2013; *Operation Cloud Hopper: Exposing a Systematic Hacking Operation with an Unprecedented Web of Global Victims*, PwC & BAE Systems (April 2017).

the quality testing robot Tappy owned by T-Mobile US, which is the US subsidiary of a leading German telecommunications firm. On that same day, in a separate case, the Department of Justice announced charges related to sanctions on Iran against Huawei Technologies, its Chief Financial Officer and Deputy Chairwoman Meng Wanzhou, Huawei Device’s US subsidiary, and Skycom Tech.

But what gave an even greater shock than Pence’s speech or the criminal charges was the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which was passed into law with President Trump’s signature on August 13, 2018. Section 889 of this Act excluded specified Chinese enterprises. Specifically, it excluded from US government procurement (1) specified Chinese telecommunications equipment manufacturers, (2) finished products assembled from components manufactured by these companies, and (3) companies using products manufactured by these companies. The five Chinese companies specified were Huawei Technologies, ZTE, the world’s largest surveillance camera manufacturer Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, the leading facial recognition technology manufacturer Dahua Technology, and the leading mobile radio systems firm Hytera Communications. With the exclusion of these enterprises from US government procurement, many corporations will be forced to greatly revise their supply chains.

Furthermore, Washington expanded the powers of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to review and regulate the foreign investments in the US more broadly than in the past.

Beijing criticized these responses by Washington as baseless. At the Mobile World Congress held in Barcelona in February 2019, Huawei Technologies Rotating CEO Guo Ping criticized the US. Borrowing from the famous lines about the magical mirror in the fairy tale *Snow White*, Guo said, “Prism, prism on the wall, who is the most trustworthy of them all? It is a very important question and if you don’t answer that, you can go and ask Edward Snowden.” PRISM is a surveillance program operated by the US National Security Agency (NSA) that was disclosed illegally by Snowden whereby NSA employees can search and collect metadata (data pertaining to data) from the Web mail and other services of US Internet companies.

The conflict between the US and China in 5G construction and procurement is deeply rooted. The National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China (in effect from June 28, 2017)—which stipulates in Article 7 that any organization or citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with the state intelligence work in accordance with the law, and keep the secrets of the national intelligence work known to the public¹⁹—is believed to be one reason for the concerns held by Washington and its allies regarding Beijing. Vice President Pence’s speech at the Munich Security Conference (February 16, 2019) explicitly and the Australian government’s decision on 5G procurement policy (August 23, 2018) implicitly showed deep concerns regarding Beijing’s access to confidential information via Chinese enterprises.

However, it is overly simplistic to say that Washington’s response changed because of China’s National Intelligence Law. Information theft by Chinese entities is not a problem that suddenly arose after the start of the Trump administration. There was bipartisan support in the US Congress for making a strong response to Beijing and the alarm had already been sounded back in 2012.²⁰

The US-China cybersecurity problem which emerged from 2013 is the background to the

¹⁹ Shigako Okamura, “Chugoku no kokka joho ho” [National Intelligence Law of China], *Gaikoku no rippo* [Foreign legislation], no. 274 (December 2017), pp. 64–75.

²⁰ The October 8, 2012 report by the US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence warns that the equipment provided by Huawei Technologies and ZTE poses a national security risk to the US, and that the US government should not use equipment from either of these companies.

exclusion of Chinese enterprises over 5G.²¹ This issue is that a government steals trade secrets and intellectual property from foreign private companies for the purpose of gaining commercial advantages. In September 2015, Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping agreed “that neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.”²²

Thereafter, however, cyberattacks from China targeting US enterprises did not decline. From the US side, this remains an unresolved issue despite the September 2015 agreement, that is, despite the commitment expressed by President Xi.

(2) The US-Russia dispute regarding elections and democracy

A dispute in cyberspace has also emerged between Washington and Moscow. US-Russian relations had grown tense over the Ukraine crisis (2014–), the Russian intervention in Syria (2015), the use of a Novichok nerve agent in the UK (2018), and other issues, but these were conflicts that occurred in American allies or third countries. It was the Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election that directly harmed present US-Russian relations and occurred on American soil.

The Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election can be broadly divided into three methods: (1) the theft and strategic disclosure of confidential information regarding candidates and political parties via cyberspace, (2) the distribution of false information and political advertising on social media and other channels, and (3) disruptive cyberattacks on voting and other election infrastructure.²³ Incidentally, suspicions of collusion between the Russian government and the Trump camp were not confirmed in the investigative report by special counsel Robert Mueller (March 2019).

The report (declassified version) by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) stated, “We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. We have high confidence in these judgments” based on classified information and open source information.²⁴ Furthermore, the governments of the UK, Australia, the Netherlands, and Canada all concluded that the Russian government was responsible for the cyberattacks against Clinton’s campaign and the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in 2016.

²¹ For details, see Takahisa Kawaguchi, “Saiba sekyuriti wo meguru beichu tairitsu: Chiseigaku risuku ni kigyo wa do taiji subekika” [US-China confrontation over cybersecurity: How should enterprises handle geopolitical risk?], *Risuku manejimento today* [Risk management today], no. 113 (March 2019), pp. 4–8.

²² The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States” (September 25, 2015).

²³ For details, see Takahisa Kawaguchi and Motohiro Tsuchiya, *Gendai no senkyo kainyu to nihon deno sonae: Saiba kogeiki to SNS jo no eikyo kosaku ga kaeru senkyo kainyu* [Contemporary election interference and our preparedness in Japan: The impact of cyber attacks and influence operations on social networks], Tokio Marine & Nichido Risk Consulting (January 28, 2019), appendixes 1 and 2, <http://www.tokiorisk.co.jp/service/politics/rispr/pdf/pdf-rispr-01.pdf>.

²⁴ “Background to ‘Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections’: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence (January 6, 2017), p. ii.

Thereafter, three indictments²⁵ charged the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), its cyber espionage group Fancy Bear (also known as APT28), the Internet Research Agency (IRA), which is a company located in Saint Petersburg, and other organizations and individuals, and they were subjected to economic sanctions by the US Department of the Treasury.

Among the acts of interference in the 2016 US presidential election, the Obama administration was aware of the cyberattacks on Democratic Party organs and election infrastructure from a relatively early stage during the presidential campaign. However, the awareness of the threat of the distribution of political propaganda and disinformation via Russian media outlets (RT, Sputnik, etc.) and via social media during the campaign was insufficient.²⁶

As Facebook, Twitter, and other social media came to be recognized as venues for electoral activities and consensus formation, intentional obstruction and manipulation of elections on social media and other platforms by foreign governments were positioned as a national security issue. This situation is named “LikeWar” by P. W. Singer.²⁷ What Russia hacked was not only Democratic Party organs and election infrastructure but also the sentiment and voting behavior of the American citizen, and ultimately their democracy.

Following the 2016 US presidential election, interference by foreign governments was confirmed in the November 2018 US mid-term elections as well. The US intelligence community investigated interference in the mid-term elections based on Executive Order 13848. They concluded that while they were unable to confirm “any compromise of our nation’s election infrastructure that would have prevented voting, changed vote counts, or disrupted the ability to tally votes,” they did confirm that “Russia, and other foreign countries, including China and Iran, conducted influence activities and messaging campaigns.”²⁸ These influence operations are becoming the “new normal.”

(3) US-Europe confrontation

The axes of confrontation in cyberspace run not only between the open liberal societies and closed autocratic societies. While the US and European countries fundamentally share the same standpoints regarding cybersecurity, they are in confrontation in several fields. Alec Ross, who served as the principal Internet policy advisor for the Department of State in the Obama administration, said that while “the great struggles of the 20th century were between left and right, the conflict of the 21st century will be between open and closed.”²⁹ The US and Europe are in conflict with different positions on “open” and “closed,” depending on the field.

²⁵ U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Virginia, *Indictment*, Case 1:18-MJ-464 (September 28, 2018); U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, *Indictment*, Case 1:18-cr-00032-DLF (February 16, 2018); U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, *Indictment*, Case 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ (July 13, 2018).

²⁶ For example, while election interference by Russia was first publicly mentioned at the October 7, 2016 joint press conference by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, this only referred to cyberattacks on the Democratic Party organs and election infrastructure. For details, see Kawaguchi and Tsuchiya, *Op. Cit.*, appendixes.

²⁷ P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, *LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media* (New York: Eamon Dolan / Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018).

²⁸ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “DNI Coats Statement on the Intelligence Community’s Response to Executive Order 13848 on Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election” (December 21, 2018).

²⁹ Will Englund, “Russia hears an argument for Web freedom,” *The Washington Post* (October 28, 2011). However, what Ross had in mind was the opposition between open societies such as in Europe and the US and the closed societies of China, Russia, etc.

The US and Europe, and Japan as well, are in agreement that the existing international law applies in cyberspace. They have confirmed that stance at the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and at the Group of Seven (G7) leading industrialized nations, and in bilateral and multilateral agreements.

However, the US and Europe have clear differences regarding the regulation of personal data. In light of the collection of vast amounts of personal data by Facebook, Google, and other platform companies and the surveillance programs whose existence was revealed illegally by Edward Snowden, the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) entered into force in May 2018. In this regard, it would be appropriate to say that the EU, which prohibits the transfer of personal data to outside the region in principle, is “closed,” while the US, which has no such restriction, is “open.”³⁰

What is more, the US has warned its European allies that it will no longer be able to share classified information with them if they allow Huawei Technologies to participate in their 5G procurement activities. Regarding this issue of excluding Chinese enterprises from 5G, while the US has designated specific Chinese companies, the UK’s policy is apparently that the risk can be acceptable and managed even if Chinese firms participate. More precisely, the UK seems to consider that because the security of 5G cannot be ensured by excluding certain companies, a combination of various methods such as monitoring and countermeasures is effective. Here, we can see an axis of opposition between a “closed” US and an “open” Europe.

Of course, “open” does not always mean “good.” In national security and other fields, there are cases where “closed” is appropriate.

Conclusion

There was a time when the appearance of cyberspace centered on the Internet, and the expansion and deepening of cyberspace, were expected to greatly change the established system of sovereign states. However, cyberspace proved to be no great exception to the existing sovereign state system from the perspectives of national boundaries, asymmetry of power, and international disputes in cyberspace. The emerging disputes between major powers are disputes regarding the theft of confidential information in cyberspace and interference in elections via cyberspace: they are problems arising from the expansion and deepening of cyberspace.

“State-centrism” is expanding in cyberspace in the sense that sovereign states exercise power centered on their national security, and there are cases where disputes and confrontations between major powers are occurring.

³⁰ But the state of California, where many US information technology companies are located, passed the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, which takes effect from January 2020. Moreover, there are frequent discussions regarding a comprehensive privacy bill at the federal law level.

China's Foreign Policy Objectives and Views on the International Order

Thoughts Based on Xi Jinping's Speech at the 19th National Congress*

Shin Kawashima**

Abstract

In the three-and-a-half-hour-long speech at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in the fall of 2017, Xi Jinping portrayed the outline of the long-term direction that the Chinese Communist Party will take domestically and internationally until the middle of this century. Based on the remarks delivered in the speech, and theories and concepts on foreign policy Xi has presented previously, this article analyzes China's foreign policy objectives and Xi's view on the international order. This article also argues the prospects for China's foreign policy in some specific areas such as the policies toward the United States, neighboring countries, the maritime domain, North Korea, Taiwan and Japan.

1. End of the Era of Reform and Opening up

It is important to note that the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in the fall of 2017 not only served to outline the Chinese Communist Party's long-term direction for regime management, but also indicated that it would mark the start of a "new era." While the statement constituted no more than a formalistic composition aimed at conveying the fervor and interpretations of the leadership of the Communist Party, it cannot be set aside as a mere "composition" because it was promulgated by a party that rules over a nation that is not a Western democracy. Thus, the statement must be analyzed and understood to represent the Chinese Communist Party's "official" statement on its own positions and future directions.

President Xi Jinping's speech took three and a half hours to deliver and contained a number of critically important points that differed from the report presented at the previous National Congress held in 2012. First of all, the report recognized a new principal contradiction facing Chinese society, which since 1981 had consistently stated, "Production cannot keep pace with the people's material demands." Addressing this principal contradiction had formed the core of various policies of the era of reform and opening up that prioritized economic development. But in 2017, this was changed to the "contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's ever-growing need for more beautiful and better lives." This effectively signaled the end of the era of reform and opening up.

The era of reform and opening up—particularly under the leadership of Jiang Zemin and during the earlier half of the presidency of Hu Jintao—more or less overlaps with the period of "*tao*

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guang yang hui,” roughly translating to “keep a low profile.” In its foreign relations, China focused on its economy and nurtured cooperative overseas ties in order to attract foreign investments. At times during this period, China prioritized the economy over issues of national sovereignty and territory. Adjustments began to be made during the latter years of the Hu Jintao administration as equal importance was assigned to sovereignty and national security. Moreover, it is notable that Xi Jinping has never used the expression “*tao guang yang hui*” in his speeches. In this sense, it can be said that the first changes to be made appeared in the area of foreign policy. In any case, what is clear is that a new era has dawned on China.

In his 2017 speech, Xi Jinping emphasized that the party’s leadership would be further strengthened in the new era. No doubt, it will be up to the party to determine what constitutes “more beautiful and better lives.” Furthermore, it is likely that the scenario for resolving the problems of economic disparity and environmental challenges that stand in the way of achieving “more beautiful and better lives” will involve the tightening of internal party control and reinforcing law enforcement in society. On this point, it is quite possible for an inversion of objectives and methods to occur so that the tightening of internal party control and law enforcement emerge as immediate objectives.

2. The Goal of Building a Great Modern Socialist Country

In attempting to understand China’s view of the international order, it is important to note that Xi Jinping in his 2017 speech outlined a long-term vision for a new era extending to 2050. During the first fifteen years—that is between 2020 and 2035—China will strive to build a “modern socialist country with Chinese characteristics.” The goal of this period is to resolve the various problems that stand in the way of realizing “more beautiful and better lives.” It is interesting to note that at this stage, China is not expected to have reached the status of a “great country.” It can be assumed that “great country” implies standing on par with the United States, which in turn implies that China anticipates it will take thirty years or longer to catch up with the United States.

It is during the second half of the era—the fifteen years between 2035 and 2050—that China is expected to emerge as a great country and realize the “great dream of the Chinese people.” It goes without saying that the Communist Party would lead the way in building a great country, thus once again underscoring the legitimacy of the party.

Observers paid considerable attention to predictions of who would be appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). In particular, it still remains unclear who will be placed in charge of foreign affairs. That being said, newly appointed PSC member Wang Huning is an international political scientist, and high-ranking diplomat Yang Jiechi has been elevated to the Politburo to serve concurrently as the Secretary-General of the Leading Small Group on Foreign Affairs and Director of the Office of Foreign Affairs of the Communist Party. Ultimately, the leadership of the party has come to be populated by more individuals with backgrounds in foreign affairs than in the past.

Moving into its second term, the Xi Jinping administration has maintained the systems of collective leadership and mandatory retirement in personnel management. At the same time, members of the Xi Jinping faction dominate not only the Central Committee and the PSC but also the top regional positions. This can be seen to represent the centralization of power under Xi. A number of Xi’s close allies, such as Li Zhanshu and Zhao Leji, have been appointed to the PSC and are expected to take charge of the national legislature and internal control of the party, respectively. It would appear that technocrats and practical executive types have been appointed to ensure effective policy implementation. For Xi Jinping, foreign affairs can provide an excellent opportunity for displaying the “correctness” of the directions that the Chinese Communist Party has adopted in governance. On the other hand, this is a form of display that cannot be easily manipulated or controlled. Over the next five years, or all the way through 2050, it will be

necessary to continue displaying the achievements of foreign relations while coordinating with domestic propaganda.

The goals identified by Xi Jinping will not be easy to achieve. Given that China's labor force will begin to shrink rapidly in the second half of the 2020s, emerging as a great country by 2050 will prove extremely difficult for China. The slogan of "more beautiful and better lives" sounds good, but the transition to a post-modern society will not be easy in a country that is not democratic. Will it be possible to realize "more beautiful and better lives" in a space where there is no assurance of a diversity of values? Indeed, China is engaged in an immense experiment whose future outcome is unclear.

3. The Theory of Chinese-Style International Relations

In his speech, Xi Jinping also referred to foreign policy and the international order that he envisions. Needless to say, China itself will opt for realistic actions that rely heavily on power. However, it is important to note that starting around the time of the Hu Jintao administration, China has been endeavoring to develop a full-fledged Chinese style of international relations, and these efforts have been sublimated by the Xi Jinping administration into the heading of "a new form of international relations." Although these have merely been words up until now, they can no longer be ignored when they are being employed to explain China's foreign policy and when policies are being implemented within the scope of what these words can explain (even if they do not go beyond rhetoric and sophistry). In the case of China, inconsistency between words and actions certainly exists. The inconsistencies in China's foreign policy are clearly visible when seen from abroad, but that does not change the fact that a certain level of consistency must be maintained at home for purposes of domestic politics (and propaganda). For this reason, the government enforces control over the press and regulates the inflow of information from abroad.

"A new form of international relations" differs from the pursuit of international peace and stability as envisioned under the framework of U.S. alliances and the spread of democratic institutions and practices as anticipated by the advanced democracies. China is particularly critical of U.S. alliances as being a vestige of the Cold War. What China envisions is the nurturing of win-win relations based on economic ties, which will then gradually develop into partnerships. Ultimately, China expects that these chains of partnerships will lead to the emergence of a global community with a shared future for mankind.

This rhetoric appears to cover up and hide the fact that China opts for foreign policy that relies heavily on power. On the other hand, it is obvious that China is exploiting its economic superiority as a critical resource in the spheres of politics and diplomacy. It can be readily appreciated that if China succeeds in realizing its "new form of international relations," this achievement would "result" in establishing China's superiority in such areas as politics, diplomacy and national security. For the present, China's greatest resource is its economic and financial might. Considering the various gaps that separate China and the United States, the gap is smallest in terms of economics, while still dauntingly wide in the areas of military power and technology. As such, it is easy to understand why China envisions using economics as a lever in pursuing international relations.

4. Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics

China's foreign policy is explained in the context of "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics." What this seems to mean is that, as a major developing country, China seeks to play a leadership role in finally building a global community with a shared destiny for mankind. China intends to accomplish this, not through a series of alliances as developed by the United States, but by using its economic power as the key resource. Given that the goal of becoming a "major country" is set to be achieved by 2050, the objective of building a global community with a

shared destiny for mankind can be interpreted to be a long-term one.

China views itself as a major developing country (although this expression does not appear in Xi Jinping's speech). This means that China stands apart from the advanced countries belonging to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Group of Seven (G7). Probably at some time in the past, China envisioned that it would ultimately join the ranks of these advanced countries. However, it can be argued that Xi Jinping denies this possibility in the new form of international relations that he has described. But this does not imply that China completely refutes the present world order or that it intends to challenge all that already exists. It is for this reason that Xi Jinping has stated on various occasions that China will uphold the global free trade regime and contribute to maintaining international peace and security.

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence defined by Mao Zedong and the principle of self-reliance formulated under Deng Xiaoping were carried forward by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Similarly, Xi Jinping continues to use these two fundamental prescriptions, and it is from them that policies against alliances and promoting the mutual respect for sovereignty and independence are derived. But China's self-identity has shifted to where it now sees itself as the global promulgator of "a new form of international relations." In this sense, it can be said that a new vitality has been breathed into China's long-standing principles. On the other hand, certain expressions, such as "*tao guang yang hui*," that were adopted and used by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, have fallen into disuse under Xi Jinping.

The international order as envisioned by China and the direction of its foreign policy face many serious obstacles and difficulties. It may be easy to criticize the U.S. framework of alliances, but as seen in the case of Djibouti, bearing the full cost of building and managing military bases abroad places a huge financial burden on China. As for acquiring the rights to operate ports and other facilities when a host country proves unable to service its debt, it remains unclear to what extent the international community and host countries are prepared to accept and tolerate this practice.

5. Relations with the Existing World Order

China is a beneficiary of the organizations and frameworks developed under such systems as the United Nations and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Moreover, as a country that has successfully developed in an environment of globalization, China does not seek to negate the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the global trade regime. To export its products, China needs the assurance of free international trade, and it is thanks to the assurance of free capital flows that investments flow to China. Notwithstanding the inconsistencies that remain in place between the world order and China's domestic regulations, it would be mistaken to think that China is antagonistic toward the existing world order. China refers to the existing US-centric order as a "world order," one which it criticizes in part but does not reject entirely, and uses the term "international order" to describe a UN-centric order it supports that reflects the perspectives of developing countries.

Nevertheless, two points require special attention. First, it must not be forgotten that China continues to view itself as a major developing country. From this derives the Chinese belief that the existing world order—particularly in the areas of international trade and finance—is the handiwork of advanced nations of the West and therefore disadvantageous to developing countries and their interests. It is exactly for this reason that China is anxious to join the ranks of the rule makers. It therefore actively dispatches its personnel to organizations and venues engaged in developing the international order. Through this participation, China aims to make "appropriate" revisions to existing rules and systems. The second point to bear in mind is that because China is not a democratic nation in the Western sense, it is possible that its understanding of the same treaties and systems fundamentally differs from the understanding of the advanced countries. For

instance, its definitions of “freedom,” “safety” and “openness” are at variance with the definitions current among advanced countries. Maybe it is only natural for differences in definition to exist. On the other hand, such differences may necessitate adjustments to commonly understood basic concepts affecting international relations.

For the time being, China as a major country can be expected to maintain a cooperative stance in its diplomatic relations with other major countries. It can also be expected to at least superficially adopt the same use of words and expressions. As for its relations with developing countries, China will present itself as a major country representing the developing world and will in this way seek to obtain the support of these nations. In the immediate future, China's pursuit of power will be expressed more in East Asia and the regions that lie east of the central areas of Eurasia than in the forums of global governance.

6. The Future of U.S.-China Relations

China assigns singular importance to the United States as the world's most powerful nation and gives the United States special treatment in its foreign policy. Basically, Xi Jinping's speech exhibits a very strong awareness of the United States. While never explicitly naming the United States in his speech, Xi Jinping lays out the path to becoming a major country with “Chinese characteristics” that differs in style to that of the United States. However, it is necessary to note that by saying that China will catch up to the United States by 2050, Xi Jinping is in effect stating that China lags behind by thirty years. For this reason, China's policies toward the United States are in a class of their own and consistently differ with policies aimed at other countries. At the same time, China's U.S. policy can be said to reveal the very core of its foreign policy.

The importance of Russia cannot be overlooked when considering Chinese policies toward the United States. Though the two countries have not forged a comprehensive alliance, Russia is at all times a “strategic” partner for China and has a critical role to play in keeping the United States in check with China.

From the perspective of U.S.-China relations, the current situation is unusual. When President Trump visited China in 2017, he was given the highest possible welcome at the Palace Museum in Beijing. Going a step further, China presented him with a proposal for massive purchases of U.S. products, although a considerable portion of the purchases had previously been completed. It seems this has succeeded in preventing, for the time being, a critical deterioration in bilateral economic friction. Regarding the North Korean problem, the Trump administration has on the one hand applied pressure on China while on the other hand assigning special importance to the role of China. It is feared that Trump may at some point attempt to use tensions over the Taiwan Strait as a tool to make a deal with China on North Korea and economic issues.

The situation remains fluid at this point, and it appears that in certain respects the Trump administration has yet to finalize its policies toward China and Asia. A case in point is the appointment of personnel to critical posts. There are those who predict that the U.S. bureaucracy will not be able to implement its Asia policy until 2018. Of course, the possibility of the current situation continuing for another five years is not nil. The fact of the matter is that the outlook remains opaque.

What kind of relationship does China desire to have with the United States? The severity of U.S. policies toward China is not the crux of the issue. More importantly, China is interested in knowing whether the United States will continue to intervene in world affairs without giving up its status as the single superpower, or whether it will instead move toward forging cooperative relations and partnerships with other major countries. For China, it would be preferable for the United States to opt for the latter path because this would make it much easier for China to act in East Asia and the central and eastern regions of Eurasia. While Trump's advocacy of “America first” may essentially apply to the arena of domestic American politics, it should be noted that

depending on how the Trump administration chooses to formulate its foreign policy, China may find itself in an ideal international environment.

7. Regional Order and Relations with Small and Middle Powers

Regardless of the intentions of the United States, the age of America as the single global superpower is gradually waning. It can be argued that this is why the Obama administration was so eager to pursue multilateral frameworks in the fields of both national security and the economy. In the area of security, Obama sought to strengthen the ties between allies by making adjustments in the hub-and-spoke security system consisting of a bundling of bilateral security agreements. In the area of economics, initiatives were undertaken to form a new order as represented by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This can be viewed as an effort on the part of the United States to involve small and middle powers (whether Japan constitutes a middle power requires further debate) in building a new order.

As a result of these initiatives, notable progress was made in bilateral security cooperation between Japan and Australia, Japan and India and others, and steps were taken toward ultimately forming a network of security agreements. The TPP in turn foreshadowed the emergence of a new regional economic and trade order. These advances in involving small and middle powers were based on American leadership rather than on American hegemony. Nevertheless, from the Chinese perspective, these may have appeared to be elements of a general scheme for Chinese containment. In any case, what is important is that the United States stood behind these frameworks and that the presence of the United States as the world's largest military and economic power cannot be overlooked.

The Trump administration today appears to be headed in directions that are at variance with the policies of the Obama administration. Trump has shown no strong interest in multilateral frameworks, and while he may have mentioned the importance of the "Indo-Pacific," there is no clear indication of what that entails. Regardless of his final direction, U.S. policies will play a critical role in determining whether China is able to realize its foreign policy goals.

8. Chinese Leadership in Forming a Regional Order

As previously noted, the Xi Jinping administration is pursuing a new order in East Asia and the central and eastern regions of Eurasia and is exploiting its economic superiority as a vital and strategic resource in this process. While the experiences of Sri Lanka and Cambodia indicate that the economic lever can give way to political and security objectives, it is true that in certain respects small and middle powers find interaction with China to be desirable. It is very likely that small and middle powers are weighing their own domestic conditions and making their individual choices while comparing China and the United States or Japan and the United States.

Against this background, China is penetrating all parts of the region while being very upfront about its own intent in certain respects. At the same time, it is responding to the requests and desires of counterparties in other respects. It can be said that what was no more than peripheral diplomacy under the Hu Jintao administration is now being gradually sublimated into a framework of coherent policies. In several significant ways, the measures adopted by Xi Jinping differ from those previously taken by Hu Jintao.

First of all, Xi Jinping has begun to present a vision for the future regional order. This is symbolized by China's "New Asian Security Concept," which posits that Asian countries should be responsible for Asian security and that China will lead the Asian countries in this undertaking. In the past, Japan and Australia had expressed their thoughts on an Asian order, but China is now beginning to verbalize related concepts.

Second, it is notable that China itself has started to provide the region with international public goods. Such initiatives go beyond the construction of ports, railways, expressways and

other elements of transportation infrastructure and have come to include a Renminbi settlement network and the provision of satellite-based global positioning systems (GPS) services. Looking to the future, it is possible that political and economic styles will also proliferate in the region as public goods, such as systems of governance and cashless purchasing methods.

China has not stopped at presenting a vision for the future order and providing a range of public goods. Specifically, it is using the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation to visualize the path ahead. In the area of international finance, the Export-Import Bank of China and the Silk Road Fund are playing an active role in financing infrastructure construction, more so than the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). As previously explained, China's vision for a regional order and the provision of international public goods will at some point in the future be transformed into power.

Countries of the region have already begun to express their suspicions regarding Chinese policies. A case in point is the refusal of India's Prime Minister Modi to attend the Belt and Road Forum on the grounds that China's construction of railway systems in Pakistan goes beyond the scope of economic construction and touches on the realm of national security. By regularly participating in BRICS summits and meetings of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Prime Minister Modi has shown that he is willing to cooperate with China on economic matters while rejecting Chinese initiatives in military and national security areas.

Countries seeking a separation of politics and economics are not rare in this region. On the other hand, China assumes an eventual transition from economics to politics. Herein lies the contradiction that separates China from the other countries of the region. Will this provide the small and middle powers of the region with a cause to unite around? Or will Japan and the United States be able to formulate concepts and mechanisms that can suppress this transition? These will certainly emerge as focal questions for the region.

9. Consequences of China's Maritime Expansion

The Xi Jinping administration is reforming the military with the intent of fielding military forces that can be deployed throughout the world. At the same time, China is endeavoring to gain military superiority in the central and eastern regions of Eurasia. However, compared to its advances in the economic sphere, Chinese initiatives for establishing military superiority in this region lag behind. This can be attributed to the deployment of U.S. forces and the presence of U.S. allies in the region. What China hopes is that the United States will steadily lessen its involvement in the region and weaken its support for allies. At the same time, China will seek to sever the networks that were beginning to take form among U.S. allies under the Obama administration. Finally, as a country that has no allies, China will endeavor to find military bases and ports that it can use in the region.

This begs a critical question. To what degree will the United States remain engaged in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, and to what degree will it remain interested in the regions that lie between the West Pacific and the Indian Ocean?

There is no doubt that China will continue to strengthen its security policies and maritime expansion over the long run. But the road ahead will be affected by choices made by the United States and the responses of peripheral countries. For example, during 2017, China did not necessarily resort to hardline measures in its maritime strategy. It is true that unusual actions were observed in the East China Sea where bombers flew over the Nansei Islands to emerge over the Pacific and head in the direction of the Kii Peninsula. On the other hand, the events that occurred around the Senkaku Islands in August involving Chinese fishing boats, the China Coast Guard and naval vessels were relatively muted. In the South China Sea, bases that were already under construction were expanded and reinforced against the backdrop of cooperative relations with the Philippines. On the other hand, China refrained from undertaking new projects for the

reclamation and construction of bases in the Scarborough Shoal and elsewhere. This cautious attitude can be attributed to a couple of factors. First, because U.S. policies remained uncertain, the situation was considered to be too unpredictable to move forward. Second, as 2017 was a year of critical personnel appointments in China's domestic politics, actions that could lead to unforeseen outcomes and actions that would incite nationalistic reactions were avoided.

Such issues involving sovereignty and security will pose major obstacles to China's efforts to "transform economic superiority into political superiority." As seen in the previously mentioned case involving India, if China adopts hardline policies in the areas of national sovereignty, military and security, all its talk of win-win relations, partnership and a global community with a shared destiny for mankind will ring hollow. Until now, countries—including Japan—with outstanding sovereignty, military and security issues with China were all located in the periphery of China. However, the same type of problems will crop up in other parts of the world if China moves to deploy its forces globally. By contrast, in the American case, the United States has obtained the consent of counterparties by entering into alliances. This gives rise to the question of how China intends to build consensus. Xi Jinping did not fully explain this matter in his speech.

10. The North Korea and Taiwan Problems

By advocating a "new form of international relations" and "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics," the Xi Jinping administration has broadly defined the direction of China's foreign policy. But what stand immediately before China are the problems of North Korea and the Taiwan Strait. Established during the Cold War, the 38th parallel and the Taiwan Strait have been maintained as borders to the present. The fate of these borders is of extreme significance in considering the future of China and East Asia. From the Chinese perspective, the treatment and resolution of these two problems will prove to be a critically important touchstone.

The treatment of the North Korea problem is important for three reasons. First among these is the geopolitical aspect. Suppose the Korean Peninsula were to be united under South Korean leadership. China would still benefit greatly if unification were to result in the withdrawal of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea and the weakening of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. As hinted by this outcome, support for North Korea is not the sole conclusion that China subscribes to. In other words, the decisive factor for China is the maintenance of a buffer zone at its border and—if at all possible—the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Needless to say, any scenario involving turmoil in North Korea and the influx of large numbers of North Korean refugees is undesirable.

Second, the handling of North Korean relations is very likely to provide a highly significant demonstration of China's transition from its traditional diplomacy to a new diplomacy. In the past, China-North Korea relations were labeled a "blood alliance." Even today, as this remains a bond between two socialist nations, bilateral relations are maintained and nurtured by the Chinese Communist Party and the North Korean Workers' Party more so than by the respective foreign ministries. Because this is such a special and old relationship, China finds it especially necessary to bring it under its "new form of international relations" and to resolve any problems in accordance with its construct of "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics." However, this also will prove to be a difficult challenge to surmount.

The third point is that the Six-Party Talks during the 2000s were particularly important for China in that they afforded an opportunity for China to exercise leadership and to engage with the United States in a joint undertaking. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was the principal premise of the talks for all of the participating countries, including the United States. Furthermore, the international community pinned its hopes on China specifically because all countries recognized that China held the greatest influence over North Korea. What this means is that China would lose this diplomatic resource if the application of excessive sanctions on North Korea were to rob it of its influence.

Turning to Taiwan, China is operating under the assumption that the Taiwan problem will have been resolved (implying the unification of Taiwan with the mainland) by the time the "Chinese dream" is realized in 2050. The U.S.-China rapprochement and the end of the Vietnam War during the 1970s changed the distance separating the United States and Taiwan. Ultimately, the United States and China normalized their relations on January 1, 1979, and U.S. forces stationed in Taiwan were withdrawn. Taiwan frequently is placed on the table when a deal is being forged in U.S.-China relations, and there are those who point to the possibility of this being repeated in the current situation. However, for the time being, there are no concrete signs of this happening. Even if a deal were to be negotiated, it is likely that what the United States could do would be limited to changes in the sales of weapons to Taiwan as provided under the Taiwan Relations Act. It should be noted however that any such change in U.S. weapons sales would not immediately lead to unification.

11. China's Positions on Japan

Japan stands out as a contradiction in China's "new form of international relations." That is to say, even if China succeeds in transforming its economic superiority to superiority in the areas of politics and security, that superiority will not be able to fully influence Japan as the world's third largest economy. For China, which continues to criticize alliances centered on the United States, the Japan-U.S. alliance is one of the most troublesome realities that it faces. For this reason, it can be said that Japan-China relations will continue to be burdened with certain structural problems, and Japan will remain an unwelcome presence for China as it endeavors to identify new goals and objectives leading up to 2050. Moreover, the likelihood of China making any concessions on territorial issues is low.

Nonetheless, as of now, Japan-China relations are relatively good. The year 2017 marked the 45th anniversary of the normalization of Japan-China relations, and the following year marks the 40th anniversary of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty. While these milestones may be of some significance, the greatest factor promoting closer relations between the two countries is the continued unsettled state of U.S. policies. It appears that the two countries are gradually and strategically drawing closer to each other in an effort to reduce the number of variables that they are exposed to in their respective foreign policies. Looking at the situation from a long-term perspective, if the United States to a certain degree withdraws from the region and makes room for China to exercise greater influence and leadership, Japan will definitely not be able to maintain its "singular reliance on the United States" and will be forced to seek a new balance with China.

However, the road to improved relations will not be an easy one. Japanese and Chinese diplomats frequently mention the fourth paragraph of the Japan-China Four Point Agreement reached in 2014. The wording in question states that the two countries will "gradually" resume summit talks and dialogue in the political and security fields. Both sides are emphasizing the expression "gradually" and are cautiously moving forward one step at a time. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that there is room for the development of new possibilities in bilateral relations. As previously explained, Xi Jinping altered the principal contradiction the Chinese society was facing in his 2017 speech. The contradiction that exists between "more beautiful and better lives" and "unbalanced and insufficient development" naturally contains a number of challenges that include such matters as social security systems, health and medical services and the environment. New opportunities for Japan-China cooperation may open up if Japan were able to effectively work with China on these challenges. The previous change in China's principal contradiction was announced in 1981 and was instrumental in pushing the country in the direction of economic development. At the time, Deng Xiaoping identified Japan as the "economics teacher." The situation today is completely different from the situation in 1981, but that does not mean that there are no new possibilities. However, it is unclear to what degree the change

in the principal domestic contradiction will affect China's foreign policy. Similarly, the content and implications of "a new form of international relations" and "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics" remain unknown. The directions that these concepts take will not only be determined by China's domestic conditions, but more importantly by the actual foreign policy that China implements. Over the coming several years, various opportunities and possibilities will arise for providing input to these policies. Should Japan be able to work with China during this critical period, partial changes and improvements in bilateral relations would be possible to achieve.

12. Domestic Factors

Needless to say, China's foreign policy is strongly influenced by domestic politics. While the same can be said for all countries, domestic political developments play a particularly important role in the case of China. In contrast to the earlier years of the Hu Jintao administration, the Xi Jinping administration can be seen to have made an effort to maintain consistency in the "voice" of its domestic politics and the "voice" of its foreign policy. In this environment, it can be easily imagined that the logic of domestic affairs may flow over into the external world to be applied to foreign policy. For example, the domestic logic of the "security of the state" is acting to suppress "freedom" inside China, including Hong Kong. This same logic of "security" can become directly linked to external national security policy. In particular, this tendency can be expected to be conspicuously manifested in Chinese policies toward its neighbors.

In the area of economics, it hardly bears repeating that domestic policies for reforming state-owned enterprises and stimulating the economy will become increasingly linked to the Belt and Road Initiative. By the same token, domestic financial regulations may come to generate friction with foreign policy. With regard to society, in such issues as democracy, freedom and human rights, domestic conditions may become directly linked to foreign policy.

On the other hand, domestic politics also plays an important role in the decision-making process for foreign policy. Actors from the fields of politics, the military and the party are not the only ones to affect the direction of foreign policy. Various other domestic entities, including interest groups and the central and regional governments, can influence the process. While it may be tempting to speak of the international order envisioned by "China," the view differs from one sector to another. Thus, any examination of China's view of the international order and its own foreign policy must be predicated on a full understanding of the nation's internal conditions.

Territorial Revisionism via Belt and Road Initiative: Implications of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on South Asia's Conventional Deterrence

Monika Chansoria*

Abstract

The fluctuating strategic environment in Southern Asia is witnessing enhanced interactivity between politico-military-strategic and operational issues, by virtue of many projects. This includes, most prominently, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—a part of China's grand project, the *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI), which seeks to consolidate the China-Pakistan strategic relationship. As far as regional geo-strategic calculations are concerned, the CPEC has emerged as a vital lynchpin among the variables of deterrence that India will seemingly have to cater to, ranging from conventional deterrence in the Indo-China border areas, to campaign planning for developing flexible deterrent operations (including joint operational planning). India is facing the growing complexity and pressure as it strives to ensure continuing and survivable deterrence at varying levels. The presence of China and Pakistan is becoming progressively compelling in so far as planning and achieving deterrence at operational levels is concerned. Recurring Chinese transgressions in the border areas in India's north-eastern and western theatre could well be part of a plausible military strategy to keep both fronts tactically active and build up tactical pressure on the Indian Armed Forces—thereby placing the existing conventional deterrence equations in South Asia under considerable strain. In wake of the violent clashes between the Chinese and Indian armies on 15–16 June 2020 in India's eastern Ladakh sector that caused casualties for the first time in nearly 45 years, India's shift from a dissuasive deterrence posture, to one of credible deterrence is gaining traction.

The foundation of conventional deterrence theory espoused by John Mearsheimer hypothesized that war is most likely to break out during a crisis when the aggressor firms up on belief and capability by means of which, he is sure to achieve rapid results in terms of a victory or decisive outcomes in its favor. In the chain of crises events, deterrence is most likely to fail if a potential attacker thinks that it is possible to win a quick and decisive victory.¹ Mearsheimer states that conventional deterrence is a subset of deterrence that seeks to prevent the outbreak of conflict during a crisis by maintaining the ability to deny an opponent its goals on the battlefield through the use of conventional forces.²

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¹ For an extensive discussion on conventional deterrence see John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, Chapter 2, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

² Conventional deterrence described by John J. Mearsheimer, p. 15.

The fluctuating strategic environment in Southern Asia is witnessing enhanced interactivity between politico-military-strategic and operational issues, by virtue of many projects. This includes, most prominently, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—a part of China's grand project, the *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI), which seeks to consolidate the China-Pakistan strategic relationship.³ The BRI comprises of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Route, thereby aiming to connect Asia with Europe and Africa by means of a widespread infrastructure network along the routes of the ancient Silk Road. The Silk Road Economic Belt focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic) so as to link China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Route stretches from China's coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean on one route, and from China's coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific on the other.

Conventional Deterrence and the Southern Asian Milieu

The CPEC project running through Pakistan in a linear fashion was launched in 2015 with the objective of linking northwestern China to southern Pakistan's Arabian Sea coastline through a network of roads, railways, and pipelines. Pakistan's Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform confirmed that construction of 650 km-long road linking the port city of Gwadar in Baluchistan to Sorab (a main town in the province). This road will link Gwadar with Quetta (the provincial capital of Baluchistan). The rest of the western route will link Gwadar with the Chinese city of Kashgar through Baluchistan and the northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, covering a total distance of 2,517 km.⁴ Pakistan's Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform describes the CPEC as "a framework of regional connectivity... enhancement of geographical linkages having improved road, rail and air transportation system... a journey towards economic regionalization in the globalized world."⁵

As far as regional geo-strategic calculations are concerned, the CPEC has emerged as a vital lynchpin among the variables of deterrence that India will seemingly have to cater to, ranging from conventional deterrence in the Indo-China border areas, to campaign planning for developing flexible deterrent operations (including joint operational planning). India is facing the growing complexity and pressure as it strives to ensure continuing and survivable deterrence at varying levels. The presence of China and Pakistan is becoming progressively compelling in so far as planning and achieving deterrence at operational levels is concerned. All this comes in the midst of a looming question—in a potential conflict/war scenario between India and Pakistan, would China open up a second front, even if it were to be restricted to a limited zone? Recurring Chinese transgressions in the border areas in India's northeastern and western theatre could well be part of a plausible military strategy to keep both fronts tactically active and build up tactical pressure on the Indian Armed Forces—thereby placing the existing conventional deterrence equations in South Asia under considerable strain. Not surprisingly, India's shift from a dissuasive deterrence posture, to one of credible deterrence is gaining traction.

The spate of developments in India's western theatre with Pakistan and eastern theatre with China has added newer variables to the regional deterrence milieu. The deterrence relationship

³ For related references see, Daniel S. Markey and James West, "Behind China's Gambit in Pakistan," *Council on Foreign Relations*, May 12, 2016; also see, Daniel S. Markey and T.C.A. Raghavan, "The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor," Discussion at Carnegie India, July 2, 2016, available at <http://carnegieindia.org/2016/07/02/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-event-5328>

⁴ As cited in a *Xinhua* news agency report, "Pakistan says works on key route of CPEC underway," October 9, 2015.

⁵ For more details see the CPEC Secretariat, Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, Pak-Secretariat, Islamabad, Pakistan, available at <http://cpec.gov.pk/introduction/1>

between India and Pakistan has proven to be conventionally complex. In contrast, the deterrence relationship between China and India remains hard to be described in tangible terms at present and, therefore, far more difficult to evaluate in terms of stability/instability.⁶ Both China and India are aware that the other would be no “pushover” militarily and that clear deterrent signals (both conventional and nuclear) operate both ways.⁷ Amid the above two equations, the politico-military equation between Pakistan and China can best be described as strategically complimentary. In the cases of both, China and Pakistan, the role of the military in the affairs of the state remains vital. The authoritarian political-military partnership is found predominantly in communist states or countries with authoritarian political control. Power is concentrated in a single party, or in an individual, or group of people, who dominate the political system – as in China, where the People's Liberation Army (PLA) represents instruments of power, coercion and extraction, argues Ayesha Siddiqi.⁸ China's civil-military relations have rendered it a “political party-authoritarian military partnership” structure. In case of Pakistan, the military has assumed deep involvement in the politics of the state, at the cost of dominating all other institutions.⁹

With India, China shares a relationship of *constrained cooperation*.¹⁰ This description is significant while raising the question—will China play a pivotal role in preventing the total breakdown of status quo during any future military crises in the region? More so, since, China has a direct stake in the stability of deterrence in South Asia. The Chinese policy towards South Asia's deterrence today appears to be guided by its primary consideration—to “prevent South Asia from any possibility of conflict escalation.”¹¹ China has high stakes in ensuring that the India-Pakistan deterrence stays operational and potent, given, what appears that any debate on nuclear weapons' usage could draw/impact upon China's own stability. This was clearly visible in many Chinese commentaries that have emphasized the threat to stability of the entire region, of which, China too, is an integral part.¹² Since the outbreak of the Kargil conflict, China has increasingly been aware of the danger of a potential large-scale conflict that would deal a severe blow to China's strategic goal of maintaining a stable periphery.¹³

These interdependent variables render South Asian deterrence to be at a far more critical stage. A possible deterrence model for extended Southern Asia, keeping in mind all three primary players, i.e., India, Pakistan, and China, could be based on opacity on the ground. Propelling an informed debate is deterrence by generating credible and unidentifiable ambiguity about the expected response, which is deftly matched by a certain transparency of intentions and capability, as deterrence theory assumes. However, the triangular and unequal equation, respectively,

⁶ WPS Sidhu, “Operation Vijay and Operation Parakram: The Victory of Theory?” in E. Sridharan, ed., *The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations*, (New Delhi: Routledge, 2007) p. 209.

⁷ K Sundarji, *Vision 2100: A Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, (New Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2003) p. 81.

⁸ Ayesha Siddiqi, *Military Inc. – Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, (London: Pluto Press, 2007) p. 41.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹⁰ For more on the Indian and Chinese relationship being one of “constrained cooperation” see, Monika Chansoria, “India and China: Constrained Cooperation,” *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, vol. 6, no. 3, July-September 2011, pp. 327–336; also see, Monika Chansoria, “India-China Border Agreement: Much Ado about Nothing,” *Foreign Policy*, January 13, 2014.

¹¹ Zhang Guihong, “US Security Policy towards South Asia after September 11 and its implications for China: A Chinese Perspective,” *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 27, no. 2, 2003, pp. 145–71.

¹² Shao Zongwei, “Call for Talks to End Fight,” *China Daily*, June 30, 1999, p. 1; also see, Jin Zeqing, “War Never Ends Disputes,” *China Daily*, June 5, 1999, p. 4.

¹³ The author's meeting and interaction in Shanghai in 2012 with Zhao Gancheng Director of South Asia Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, Shanghai, China.

among China, Pakistan, and India, makes mutual understanding of their respective deterrence far more challenging.¹⁴

While deliberating upon the conceptual and operational aspects of India's national strategic doctrine, former Air Commodore, Jasjit Singh, maintained that India's future military capabilities would need to be situated in the strategic framework of an appropriate politico-military doctrine based on national aspirations—with the prevention of war, and removal of threat of war, becoming important constituents in the said framework. Thus, *deterrence* would have to be a central factor in the doctrine, while *détente* (at the ideal level) and *peaceful co-existence* (as the optimum framework) are pursued vigorously in a sustained way.¹⁵ Therefore, the primary strategic doctrine for India in the coming two decades (i.e., until 2025) would be *prevention of war*, whether that war is conventional or sub-conventional, regular or irregular, full-scale or limited. This requires adequate and credible deterrent capabilities—and, if deterrence fails, then to prosecute the war, conclude it, and disengage with maximum advantage to India's national interests at minimum costs, in the shortest possible time.¹⁶

Deterrence, therefore, has been the central pillar of India's defense strategy playing a major role in preventing war, as well as, in fighting a limited war, which could lead to success in the event of deterrence failure. While all components of military power are capable of providing deterrence through denial, the real challenge for defense strategy is the method of application of military power to achieve the desired levels of success militarily, and consequent political advantage. All along, the focus has to be keeping the war below a rationally credible scenario of nuclear weapons' use.¹⁷ China remains integral to the changing realities of the South Asian deterrence framework. Given China's centrality to the evolution and nature of the India-Pakistan deterrence relationship, the Southern Asian framework—consisting China, India and Pakistan will gradually replace the narrow South Asian (or India-Pakistan) framework of analysis, as the three states, are evolving a deterrence architecture that is three-sided.¹⁸

Historical Connect in South Asia's Territorial Disputes

Military strategists, classically, have at least three considerations in adopting a strategy for a war, or, military campaign. These include political objectives, opportunities, and constraints; conflict with the hostile forces; and the effect of physical features.¹⁹ A most-suited reference could be the limited war between India and Pakistan in Kargil in 1999. Among the many lessons that emerged from the Kargil war for India, the most significant one was that although the chances of a full-scale conventional war between India and Pakistan were bleak, however, as long as there are territorial disputes rooted in history—a continued proxy war (by Pakistan), or a limited border war (with China), cannot be ruled out entirely. The patrolling and other activities of the Chinese PLA on India's northern border during the Kargil war have been chronicled by General VP Malik, who was the Chief of India's Army Staff during the conflict. Malik narrates in *Kargil*:

¹⁴ For more details see Michael Quinlan, "How robust is India-Pakistan Deterrence," *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 4, 2000/01, p. 146.

¹⁵ Views articulated by Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (Retd) during many conversations with the author; for similar arguments see, Jasjit Singh, "Army 2020: Synchronizing Military Power with National Aspirations," in Vijay Oberoi, ed., *Army 2020: Shape, Size, Structure and General Doctrine for Emerging Challenges*, (New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2005).

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Sidhu, n. 6, pp. 305–06.

¹⁹ For more see, Archer Jones, *Elements of Military Strategy: An Historical Approach*, (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1996) p. 197.

From Surprise to Victory, how the Joint Intelligence Committee's (JIC) April 1999 review had predicted that the long-standing cooperation among China, North Korea, and Pakistan was likely to continue. Among the many tasks for the military, the immediate ones included maintaining alertness on the border with China.²⁰

Long-standing territorial and boundary disputes do not exist just between India and Pakistan, but also between China and India. Following the war with India in 1962, China negotiated and obtained a boundary settlement on the Karakoram with Pakistan. This settlement was finalized in March 1963, and with it, China obtained for itself, a new boundary. China secured the Shaksgam Valley and this pushed the Chinese territory further south towards Jammu & Kashmir. In hindsight, it would seem that the Chinese were willing to be involved in negotiating for territory²¹ as part of their larger South Asia strategy. In fact, the remarks of Pakistan's former Chief of Army Staff, Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, on the impact of the Siachen conflict on Pakistan, point towards such complicity when he stated, "India had foiled Pakistan's attempts to have a common border with its ally China... (For which) Pakistan had in the past ceded territory in Karakoram to China, in order to realize this objective."²² The prominence of geopolitics in the policy chosen by a state, and the strategy it adopts to obtain those policy objectives, cannot be minimized. The actions of China and Pakistan in the Karakoram illustrate this precisely. The actions also depict how political exploitation of geographic realities for security demands skill, and a long-term perspective.²³ The CPEC, discussed in the subsequent section of this paper comes off as the latest variant of the long-standing China-Pakistan partnership and collusion.

During the Kargil conflict, the Chinese PLA had enhanced its level of activity and presence along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh and opposite Arunachal Pradesh—indicating a demonstrative posture. Reports in 1999 indicated deployment of additional PLA troops opposite Arunachal Pradesh, and major Chinese patrolling activities at Demchok in eastern Ladakh; Trig Heights in Ladakh; Pangong Tso (in Ladakh); and Chantze (in the West Kameng district of the north-eastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh). In his memoirs, Malik defines how the Indian army had, in fact, received intelligence reports that the PLA's director in the Department of Armament (handling the conventional weapons and equipment of the Chinese Army) visited Islamabad during the time of the Kargil conflict to help the Pakistan Army overcome its critical deficiencies in conventional armament, ammunition and equipment.²⁴

India traditionally adopted a strategy of conventional deterrence, based on strong offensive capability vis-à-vis Pakistan, and dissuasive deterrence vis-à-vis China—supported by limited out-of-area projection capability for the security of India's far flung island territories. India's long-term aim is to build capabilities and gain decisive competitive advantage in core areas of the spectrum of conflict.²⁵ Succinctly describing conventional deterrence, General K Sundarji, former Indian Army Chief (1986–1988) articulated that it consisted of two components: 1) a defensive posture that dissuades; and 2) a counter-offensive capability, which deters. A viable defensive posture, should, therefore, consist of strong defenses that are capable of extracting a high price before the aggressor achieves the almost inevitable penetration at points of its choice. A strong and credible conventional counter-offensive capability capable of inflicting heavy losses on the

²⁰ VP Malik, *Kargil: From Surprise to Victory*, (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2006) p. 139.

²¹ Y.Y.I Vertzberger, *China's Southwestern Strategy: Encirclement and Counterencirclement* (New York: Praeger, 1985); also see, VR Raghavan, *Siachen: Conflict Without End*, (New Delhi: Penguin Books India (P) Ltd, 2002) pp. 24–25.

²² As cited in, "Keeping Pakistan Army out of Politics," *The Times of India*, September 18, 1989.

²³ Raghavan, n. 21, pp. 27–28.

²⁴ Malik, n. 20.

²⁵ Jasjit Singh, n. 15, pp. 108–113.

aggressor remains ideal. This threat of a riposte is likely to deter the aggressor from trying to change the status quo. Dissuasion alone, argue many, will not do without deterrence.²⁶ India's military strategy for 2020 should possess credible deterrence at the conventional level, given that conventional warfare places a premium on dispersion, mobility and the ability to regroup and disperse rapidly. While wars are likely to be of shorter duration, they will be intense with heavy casualty rates and attrition of men and material.²⁷

CPEC and BRI:

The Depth and Correlation of Geopolitics, Policy Objectives, and Strategy

According to the *Pakistan Economic Survey 2013-14*, "...gigantic collaboration extended by the Chinese government in construction of infrastructure projects like the China-Pak Economic Corridor and High Priority Early Harvest Projects will pave the way for multi-dimensional socio-economic and geo-political benefits to both the countries."²⁸ CPEC's framework enhancing geographical linkages with improved road, rail, and air transportation system²⁹ and frequent joint military exercises, such as well-advertised joint patrolling is likely to impact the operational military realities in the region substantially. The joint exercise undertaken by the frontier defense regiment of the PLA and Pakistan's border police along the stretch of the border connecting Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir and Xinjiang in July 2016 remain of particular concern from an Indian standpoint.³⁰

The CPEC starts from Kashgar in China and subsequently passed through the 1,300 km-long Karakoram Highway (National Highway 35/N35), with 887 km falling in Pakistan and 413 km in China. Its endpoint is the Chinese-funded Gwadar Port (south of Baluchistan) in the Arabian Sea. China has invested in construction of breakwaters, dredging of berthing areas and channels, and overall infrastructure development of the Gwadar Port.

The Governments of Pakistan and China began construction of the Karakoram Highway comprising 85 bridges in early 1959. It was opened to the public two decades later in 1979, connecting the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China and Gilgit-Baltistan, across the Karakoram mountain range, through the Khunjerab Pass.³¹ In the midst, Pakistan established the Frontier Works Organization (FWO) in 1966 to construct the initially 805 km-long Karakoram Highway. Even after the completion of the Karakoram Highway, the organization was not disbanded. The new all-weather road, i.e., Karakoram Highway, connecting Rawalpindi/Islamabad with China's Xinjiang Province runs through what Pakistan calls the "Northern Areas."

²⁶ Sundarji, n. 7, p. 154; for related readings and references on deterrence and debate on changing of status quo, see, Eric Heginbotham and Jacob L. Heim, "Deterring without Dominance: Discouraging Chinese Adventurism under Austerity," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 1, Spring 2015, pp. 185–199 and Keith L. Shimko, *International Relations: Perspectives, Controversies and Readings* (Fourth Edition) (Boston, MA: Wadsworth Publication, 2011), pp. 69–74.

²⁷ As articulated by former General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (Eastern Command) Lt Gen KS Brar, and former Director General (Military Operations) Lt Gen VK Singh, cited in Oberoi, ed., n. 15, pp. 33, 68.

²⁸ Transport and Communications, *Pakistan Economic Survey 2013-14*, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, available at http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_14/13_Transport_and_coms.pdf p. 215

²⁹ Pakistan government's official information release on the CPEC available at <http://cpec.gov.pk/introduction/1>

³⁰ "Joint patrol along China-Pakistan border," *People's Daily Online*, July 21, 2016; also see, Monika Chansoria, "China not neutral on Kashmir, anymore," *The Sunday Guardian*, August 13, 2016.

³¹ Details of the Karakoram Highway, as stated by the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and National Heritage, Government of Pakistan.

According to Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation, the 805 km dual-carriage metaled road starts from Havelian 100 km from Islamabad and winds through Abbottabad–Mansehra–Thakot–Besham–Pattan–Sazin–Ghils–Gilgit–Hunza to the Chinese Frontier across the 4,733 meter high Khunjerab Pass.³²

In 2006, the Pakistan Highway Administration and China's State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) agreed to widen the highway from 10 to 30 meters and upgrade it to make it accessible by motor vehicles during extreme weather conditions.³³ This was later confirmed in a January 2016 documentary that ran on China Network Television (CNTV)—a national web-based TV broadcaster. In the broadcast, Ye Chenyin, general manager, China Road and Bridge Corporation stated:

The Karakoram Highway is often seen as a symbol of the Sino-Pakistani friendship ... built in the 1960... with 24 main bridges, 70 small bridges, and more than 1,700 culverts... In 2008, the China Road and Bridge Corporation began KKH's extension... The Karakoram Highway line-change project was completed after five years of hardships...³⁴

The widening of the strategic roads by three times its initial specifications indicates that it is customized for rapid and smooth movement of heavy military machinery, troops, and material. The network of Pakistan's National Highway Authority (NHA) comprises 39 national highways, motorways, expressway, and strategic roads. Among all the ongoing projects of the NHA, priority is given to the re-alignment of the Karakoram Highway at Attabad.³⁵ Further, the completed projects also include the Raikot–Khunjerab section (335 km) of the Karakoram Highway. The *Pakistan Economic Survey 2013–14* listed “prioritized infrastructure projects” in collaboration with China, which included improvement/up-gradation of the Karakoram Highway (Phase-II) from Raikot to Islamabad (487 km) through credit financing.³⁶

In addition, the ongoing China-Pakistan Optical Fiber Cable (OFC) project is scheduled for completion in 2017. According to Pakistan's official information release, the CPEC Fiber Optic Project in Gilgit–Baltistan runs 466.584 km (making for 56.7 percent) of the total length 820 km between Khunjerab and Rawalpindi.³⁷ The OFC network provides a quantum jump in Chinese and Pakistani military capacities in order to connect ground-surveillance to their command-and-control. The OFC project allows for sharing information in a secure manner. The advantages of OFC include:

- 1) Tremendous capacity to carry digital data (including satellite imagery data)
- 2) OFC can be dug deep underground in the war zone area and, therefore, no amount of

³² More details on the Karakoram Highway, as per Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation, available at http://www.tourism.gov.pk/northern_areas.html

³³ For more details see, Vijay Sakhuja, “The Karakoram Corridor: China's Transportation Network in Pakistan,” *China Brief*, vol. 10, no. 20, October 8, 2010.

³⁴ CNTV report, “Karakoram Highway benefits Pakistan remote area,” cited in *Xinhua News*, January 18, 2016.

³⁵ For more on the Karakoram Highway see, “China-Pak relations: Sweeter than honey?” *The Pioneer*, March 29, 2014; also see, Peerzada Ashiq, “China has established its presence across PoK,” *The Hindu*, September 3, 2015.

³⁶ As per Ministry of Planning, Development and Reforms; also see, *Pakistan Economic Survey 2013-14* on Transport and Communications, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, available at http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_14/13_Transport_and_coms.pdf pp. 196–99.

³⁷ For more on Pakistan government's official information release on the CPEC, see, <http://cpec.gov.pk/map-single/3>

artillery shelling can interrupt/disrupt the smooth flow of information

- 3) Since OFC does not emit any electronic signals, it's not likely to be prone to any jamming or electro-magnetic interference; and
- 4) End-to-end connectivity provides multiple options to connect large number of surveillance, display, steep-up, and transmitting/receiving devices.

Additionally, it is known that all Chinese PLA Air Force units present in the Tibet Autonomous Region are connected by satellite communication and that fiber optic communication is being steadily extended towards military installations along the Indian borders, with military regions being inter-connected through secure communications. This in turn ensures enhanced real-time command and control.³⁸ On the eastern front, India's strategic situation remain grave with China's increasing military presence and capabilities in Tibet that adjoin the eastern sector of India's borders. Moreover, projects funded by China in the Gilgit–Baltistan region, which include construction of dams, bridges, roads (including the construction, maintenance and expansion of the Karakoram Highway, with military specifications), along with an estimated 7,000–11,000 soldiers of the Chinese PLA Construction Corps reportedly deployed in the Gilgit–Baltistan region of Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir, make a “two-front war” scenario for India not unimaginable. The Chinese foothold in the Gilgit–Baltistan region provides a credible backdrop for China to ensure Pakistan's security—given its critical stakes inside Pakistan's territory.

India has officially raised objections to a specific section of the CPEC since China's growing connectivity with Pakistan is being linked through the illegally occupied territory of the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir. This objection by India has been placed on record in the 2008-09 Annual Report (declassified) of the Ministry of Defence (submitted in the Upper House of the Parliament, *Rajya Sabha*) and states, “... enhancing connectivity with Pakistan through the territory of Jammu & Kashmir, illegally occupied by China and Pakistan will have direct military implications for India.” Further, commenting on the China-Pakistan relationship, India's Ministry of Defence stated the following on record:

China's stated objectives, in [the] White Paper, of developing strategic missile and space-based assets and of rapidly enhancing its blue-water navy to conduct operations in distant waters, as well as the systematic upgrading of infrastructure, reconnaissance and surveillance, quick response and operational capabilities in the border areas, will have an effect on the overall military environment in the neighborhood of India... [China's] military assistance and cooperation with Pakistan and other countries in our neighborhood, as well as the possibility of enhancing connectivity with Pakistan through the territory of Jammu & Kashmir, illegally occupied by China and Pakistan and with other countries will also have direct military implications for India. India will engage China to seek greater transparency and openness in its defense policy and posture, while taking all necessary measures to protect the national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of India.³⁹

Infrastructure build-up facilitates the rapid deployment of integrated forces and the concentration of field formations in comparatively shorter time-frames and, consequently, over shorter warning periods. The overall conventional operational capability of the Chinese and Pakistan army will directly impact conventional deterrence in the strategic context amid the emerging spectrum of conflict, which is becoming far more asymmetric and which, requires

³⁸ Monika Chansoria, “China's Infrastructure Development in Tibet: Evaluating Trendlines,” *Manekshaw Paper*, no. 32, 2011, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, p. 31.

³⁹ Ministry of Defence, Government of India, *Annual Report 2008-09*, p. 6.

a range of capabilities. By deciding to construct major civil, energy and military infrastructure projects in the CPEC, which runs through Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, India's strategic-security context faces the collusive presence and challenge of China and Pakistan. The environment is edging past the existing deterrence setting, especially under the nuclear shadow.

Conclusion

Given the latest upgrades to the CPEC and developments in the wake of its expansion, the possibility of China securing its investments and trade routes constructed in Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir has increased. Growing Chinese stakes by virtue of heavy economic investments and presence of Chinese personnel (civilian workers, paramilitary and Construction Corps of the PLA) makes Beijing as a vital player in the conventional deterrence situation in South Asia. The latter might not remain virtuously "neutral" in the quintessential sense, both diplomatically, and militarily, in the event of a limited or protracted India-Pakistan conflict in the near or, distant future.

South Asia's conventional military balance needs to be viewed from a prism that highlights the collusive nature of China's security partnership with Pakistan and its impending military portends. The CPEC has played a vital role in strengthening the strategic alliance between Pakistan and China, not merely in economic terms, but more so, in military terms, thereby placing pressure on the existential conventional deterrence status in South Asia. The spectrum of threat in South Asia is becoming far more complicating and challenging for India—especially when it comes to maintaining a balance of power owing substantially to the China-Pakistan equation today.

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