China’s “Territorial Sovereignty” and Its Origins*

Takashi Okamoto**

Abstract
The roots of the Chinese concept of “territorial sovereignty” can be traced back to the concepts for tributaries or dependencies: *shudi* and *fanbu*. Moreover, these concepts can also be replaced by the word *fanshu*. Since the word *fanshu* was also used for lost *shuguo*, such as Korea, Vietnam, and Ryukyu, the fear of losing territory came to be embedded in the Chinese psyche from early on. Territory is a concept that implies sovereignty. This is in line with conventional theory. However, the notion that territorial sovereignty is always at risk of being lost, must always be protected, and must never be yielded comes across as a very Chinese way of thinking. The historical process by which territory was lost can be said to have been imprinted in the Chinese understanding of the legal concept of “territorial sovereignty.” Since this is the starting point of some of the demands and claims of modern China, we might suspect that the roots of certain ongoing disputes can also be traced to this historical background.

Paul Reichler, the lead counsel for the Philippines in its arbitration case with Beijing over claims in the South China Sea, has said it should be possible to have a dialogue with China using a common language and the language of law. Put differently, this means that we are currently not speaking the same language and that we are not having a dialogue with China. While what China says and what the West and Japan say might appear to be the same on the surface, their messages have entirely different content.

My mission as a historian specializing in China is to look to the past and analyze why and where this situation came about. I will focus on the notion of “territorial sovereignty” as a typical example of terms and concepts that have different meanings, depending on the user. The term “territorial sovereignty” gained currency in China no more than about a century ago. The concept did not exist prior to that, and it may not have been required by the order of things. I would like to start by discussing this background.

1. The Qing’s World Order and the Fanshu Concept
What was China’s world order prior to the 20th century? I have tried to give an explanation by way of an illustration. There is no limit to how much detail I can get into about the Qing’s world order, so I will break it down into four broad categories.

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Fig. 1 Four Categories in the Qing's World Order

Table 1 Transformation of the Qing's World Order Except China Proper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>early 19C</th>
<th>late 19C – 20C</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tributary chaogong (朝貢)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Korea</td>
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<td>Ryukyu</td>
<td>Ryukyu</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Burma</td>
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<td>Sulu</td>
<td>Laos</td>
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<td>fanbu (藩部)</td>
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<td>Xinjiang</td>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
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<td>Tibet</td>
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<td>Mongolia</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
<td>Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade hushi (互市)</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>France</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Britain</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
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</table>

1 Table prepared by the author based on Okamoto Takashi, Chugoku no tanjo [The Birth of China] (University of Nagoya Press, 2017), p. 413, Table 5.
First, we have countries linked by trade relations, or hushi, represented by the green arrows in Fig. 1. The areas marked with light blue lines were tributaries, meaning countries taking part in tributary relations, and were referred to as shuguo in the Chinese terminology of that time. These were countries such as Korea, Ryukyu, and Vietnam. Then there were the fanbu, areas in the northwest indicated with blue lines. The fanbu were Tibet, Mongolia, and present-day Xinjiang. Finally, there was so-called China proper, in the southeast of the map, which was where the Han Chinese lived. The term for this area was zhi-sheng.

The Qing’s relationships can be classified in four categories based on original sources from that time, and be summarized in Table 1. And Fig. 1 is the map on which the relationships have been diagrammed.

Western countries and Japan had hushi relationships with the Qing. This means that there were no formal relations between governments, just local trade. These relationships generally changed into treaty-based ties, beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century. These countries entered into diplomatic relationships with China at a relatively early stage.

What can we say about the other categories of shuguo and fanbu, which are marked in blue on the map? This question has to do with the concept of “territorial sovereignty.”

First, we have the expression shuguo. Shuguo refers to countries surrounding China that gave tribute to the Qing. We talk about shuguo (tributary) and shangguo (superior country) because when countries offer tribute to the Chinese emperor, this creates a hierarchical relationship of sovereign and subject. Since tribute and the sovereign-subject hierarchy were based on Confucian concepts and rituals, such relations were formed with neighbors that understood the Chinese language and Confucianism.

Conversely, other countries could not enter into shuguo or tributary relations. While a country such as Japan ended up in the hushi category rather than shuguo because of historical circumstances, it would not be an exaggeration to say that ultimately this was because Japan did not understand Chinese and Confucianism.

Likewise, fanbu was another category where Chinese and Confucianism did not apply. Fanbu specifically referred to Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. They were similar in that they geographically belonged to an inland world of steppes, did not use Chinese as their language, and did not follow Confucianism. Xinjiang was Muslim and Turkic, while Mongolia and Tibet adhered to Tibetan Buddhism. They differed quite markedly from the countries in the other categories in terms of social organization, manners, and customs.

This is why I differentiate between shuguo and fanbu here. Yet, looking at Chinese sources from the time, the two are often jointly referred to as fanshu, which is a relatively uncommon Chinese word.

2. From Fanbu to Shudi
Map 1 on Fig. 2 shows the situation on the Korean peninsula following the First Sino-Japanese War. After this conflict, as was stipulated in the first article of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Korea became “independent” as the Great Korean Empire. That is, Korea ceased to be a Chinese shuguo. Many sources at that time described Korea’s “independence” as the termination of Korea’s status as a Chinese shuguo and fanshu.
Meanwhile, sources of the time commonly treated *shuguo* and *fanbu* as being more or less equal and interchangeable terms. Even though the Korean peninsula and Tibet were governed completely differently, they were frequently referred to using the same terms and Chinese words. Not only was Korea sometimes called *fanshu* like Tibet and Mongolia, but Tibet and Mongolia were also called *shuguo* by some sources.

Vietnam, Ryukyu, and Korea had all ceased being *shuguo* of the Qing by the end of the nineteenth century. It goes without saying that this was because they were annexed by the Western powers and Japan. This is why the word “loss” has been used in Table 1. The loss of the *shuguo* became a major issue.

In 1897, Korea became the last *shuguo* to lose its ties with the Qing. At around the same time, the Western powers began to obtain rights in China in a process called “the scramble for concessions,” which lasted until the end of the nineteenth century. The Chinese at the time called this process *guafen*, meaning a melon being taken apart and eaten, which is illustrated in Fig. 2—Map 2. Qing and Chinese officials of this time and beyond became extremely worried about the potential partitioning of China.

The Qing became obsessed with the idea that while the *shuguo* were lost, they had to retain the remaining *fanbu* or they would have a real crisis on their hands.

Even before this, from the 1880s into the 1890s, Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang—which had been referred to as *fanbu*—increasingly came to be referred to as “colonies,” especially by late-Qing era Chinese diplomats stationed in the West, as well as by Han Chinese who had absorbed Western scholarship and concepts.

This identification of *fanbu* as colonies seems to have started with the translation of Western terms, such as “colony” and “colonial office,” into Chinese. The opposite, of Chinese terms being used for Western concepts, also started to happen, so *fanbu* finally came to be seen as dependent as colonies, regardless of the actual facts. These dependencies or colonies came to be called *shudi* in contemporary Chinese.

Yet looking at the word *shudi*, the Chinese characters representing this word are similar to the previously mentioned *shuguo*. The characters and meaning also have things in common with

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fanshu, so when seen from the perspective of other countries, such as the Western powers and Japan, it appeared as if the shudi were no different from shuguo, and that the areas remained the same as before. In fact, the English translation for all of these words were the same: “dependencies.”

3. “Territorial Sovereignty”
During the final years of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, China’s sense of crisis with regard to the country’s partitioning by the Western powers reached its climax. Especially in the early twentieth century, the areas that were fanbu were caught between Russia in the north and British India in the south. The fanbu became a site of competition among the imperialist powers in the so-called Great Game. The Chinese devoted greater efforts to keep these areas inside China and prevent the fanbu from being taken by other countries.

We should pay special attention to 1905. Even before that year, calls for China to become a homogenous nation-state and to be unified, as if all of the Qing’s territory was homogeneous and painted in one color, as shown in Map 3, had become extremely frequent among the Han Chinese. We might perhaps call this the start of nationalism. This was the result of going through the process depicted in Maps 1 to 3 of Fig. 2, during the decade after the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895.

At a time when such nationalism was growing, how could Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang, called shudi or fanbu, be defined? It was then that the concept of “sovereignty” first appeared in Chinese political discourse. Other countries had previously used the term suzerainty in place of sovereignty. Suzerainty is an unclear and ambiguous concept, but it was likely its ambiguity that gave it its versatility. All of the Qing’s shudi, shuguo, and fanbu were given the same English designation of dependency. The meaning was simply that these areas were dependent, regardless of the actual facts, and this dependency was coupled with the concept of suzerainty. It must have been a convenient term for indicating a hierarchical relationship without having to consider the facts of the matter.

Yet at this late hour, leaving Tibet and Mongolia as they were risked having them suffer the same fate as the shuguo—Ryukyu, Vietnam, Burma, and Korea—which had also been perceived as dependencies. Han Chinese elites and officials came to fear not only the separation of these areas from China and their loss, but also that this might trigger the guafen of China proper. Suzerainty became insufficient as a safeguard, so the Chinese started invoking the concept of sovereignty instead.

If so, fanbu, fanshu, and shudi also became unusable terms since they were coupled with the concept of suzerainty. The Chinese needed a new lexical concept that could be paired with sovereignty and could replace shudi, but what could it be?

The answer was lingtu, the Chinese translation of territory. The word “territory” in Chinese was likely a legal concept that was formulated based on the Japanese ryochi, but the concept started to be used in China as well. The emergence of the concept of sovereignty neatly coincided with the rise of nationalism in China.

The concept of territory became widely known and established in 1911–1912, that is, during the 1911 Revolution, when the Qing Dynasty gave way to the Republic of China. The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China states, “The territory of the Republic of China shall consist of twenty-two xing-sheng [provinces], Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, Tibet, and Qinghai,” explicitly using the word “territory” and defining its extent. As part of this political transition, the concepts of “territory” and “sovereignty” in China came to be established with meanings similar to their modern-day usages.
Conclusion: The Origins and Development of “Territorial Sovereignty”

The roots of the Chinese concept of “territorial sovereignty” can be traced back to the concepts for tributaries or dependencies: shudi and fanbu. Moreover, these concepts can also be replaced by the word fanshu. Since the word fanshu was also used for lost shuguo, such as Korea, Vietnam, and Ryukyu, the fear of losing territory came to be embedded in the Chinese psyche from early on.

Territory is a concept that implies sovereignty. This is in line with conventional theory. However, the notion that territorial sovereignty is always at risk of being lost, must always be protected, and must never be yielded comes across as a very Chinese way of thinking.

The concept of “territory” in Chinese language started out as a designation specifically for Tibet and Mongolia, but it then became a concept applicable to other places because they were originally fanbu and fanshu.

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3 Chart prepared by the author based on Okamoto, Chugoku no tanjo, p. 424, Figure 7.
Fig. 4 Chinese Nation in the Republican Era

Fig. 4 is a map used in China during the Republican period. China's territory at the time is indicated in orange. There were nonetheless some maps in circulation that showed, inside a dotted line, lost territory that had to be recovered.

The historical process by which territory was lost can be said to have been imprinted in the Chinese understanding of the legal concept of “territorial sovereignty.” Since this is the starting point of some of the demands and claims of modern China, we might suspect that the roots of certain ongoing disputes can also be traced to this historical background.

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