

# POLICY BRIEF

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## Indo-Japan Political Interactions through the 1960s: Analyzing the State Visits of Hayato Ikeda and Indira Gandhi

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When India declared its independence from British colonial rule and governance in August 1947, Japan was among the first nations to recognize India's sovereignty. On its part, India declined attending the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951, arguing against the limitations being placed on Japan's sovereignty. New Delhi also pointed out that the United States was failing to give due recognition to the wishes of the Japanese people.<sup>1</sup> Instead, India chose to enter a bilateral peace treaty with Japan in 1952, as part of which the former waived all reparation claims against Japan and went on to become among the first Asian nations to establish diplomatic ties with Tokyo in 1952. It was in the same decade that Japanese prime minister Nobusuke Kishi visited India in 1957 – becoming the first-ever Japanese PM to visit New Delhi – following which he launched Japan's first post-war overseas Official Development Assistance (ODA) to India. Thereafter, Japan provided its first international bilateral yen loan to India in 1958 as part of the World Bank Consortium.

The above notwithstanding, South Asia as a sub-continent remained peripheral in so far as Japan's post-war "Asia vision" was concerned, especially in comparison to Tokyo's far profounder engagement with East and Southeast Asia. During that period, South Asia professedly was the "other Asia" for Japan.<sup>2</sup> The mid-1960s marked the beginning of an era in which South Asia inclusive of

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1 For more details on this see, Monika Chansoria, "Japan-India at 70: The Early Origins of a Relationship that Defines Asia's Future," *Japan Review*, vol. 4, no. 3, Winter/Spring 2022; also see, Monika Chansoria, "Japan's Relations with South Asia," in Sumit Ganguly and Frank O'Donnell, eds., *Routledge Handbook of the International Relations of South Asia*, (London: Routledge, 2022).

2 Ibid.

India was omitted from what Japan considered as Asia.<sup>3</sup> Besides, India's pursuit of an insular economic system during that period was much in contrast to Japan's open market economy, which stymied the development of close bilateral economic ties. A systemic dissection of the Asian continent into its many sub-regions revealed that Japan's presence and influence in South Asia, be it economic, political, or strategic, came nowhere close to the effect it wielded in the other sub-regions mentioned above.<sup>4</sup> To a large extent, Tokyo's post-war foreign policy between 1952 and 1973 followed a *seikei bunri* (separation of economics and politics) strategy whereby involvement in almost all international issues was to be avoided.

The decade of the 1960s was momentous in Indo-Japan bilateral relations, beginning with the historic first-ever visit of Japan's Crown Prince Akihito and Princess Michiko in 1960. In 1958, the first president of the Republic of India, Rajendra Prasad, visited Japan, and Crown Prince Akihito returned the official visit in 1960 as the first Japanese monarch-in-waiting to be welcomed by the inner ring of independent India's leadership.<sup>5</sup> The 1960s was also significant for Japan in that it was this decade in which Japan celebrated the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the accession of Emperor Meiji, who had granted a modern constitution to the Japanese people in 1889. Furthermore, the 1960s saw a transformation in the way Japan perceived India.

The post-war era played out in the shadow of a new kind of imperial development: the Cold War.<sup>6</sup> India sought to remain independent and avoided joining either power bloc during the Cold War, favoring neither the US nor the erstwhile Soviet Union.<sup>7</sup>

Significantly, two successive Japanese prime ministers, Nobusuke Kishi and Hayato Ikeda, visited India in 1957 and 1961, each within three months of taking office. The 1961 state visit by PM Hayato Ikeda to engage India for closer economic ties and that of Indian PM Indira Gandhi to Japan in 1969 became touchstones highlighting the expanding political interactions, inherent changes, and continuity in the India-Japan bilateral relationship during the tumultuous decade of the 1960s in Asia.<sup>8</sup>

Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda (池田 勇人) was a Japanese bureaucrat and later politician who served as the prime minister of Japan from July 1960 to November 1964. Best remembered for being instrumental to the nation's phenomenal economic growth in the post-war years, Ikeda served terms as Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and as the Chairman of the LDP's Political Affairs Research Committee.<sup>9</sup> Upon the resignation of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in July 1960, Ikeda became President of the LDP and began his tenure as Japan's prime minister. With a stated goal of doubling Japan's national income in a period

3 Hiroshi Sato, "A New Relationship between Japan and India in the Post-war Period," in Toshio Yamazaki and Mitsuru Takahashi, eds., *A History of India-Japan Relations*, (Institute of Developing Economies, 1993), p. 165.

4 Chansoria, *Japan Review*, n. 1.

5 Monika Chansoria "The Role of the Monarchy in Expanding Japan's Diplomatic Reach: Tracing Emperor Akihito's Visits to India in 1960 and 2013," *Policy Brief*, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, September 12, 2022, available at [https://www.jiia-jic.jp/en/policybrief/pdf/PolicyBrief\\_Chansoria\\_220912.pdf](https://www.jiia-jic.jp/en/policybrief/pdf/PolicyBrief_Chansoria_220912.pdf)

6 K. Hara, *Cold War Frontier in the Asia-Pacific: Divided Territories in the San Francisco System*, (New York: Routledge, 2007).

7 See, Monika Chansoria, "Blending Japan's Robust Economics with Foreign Policy Pro-activism in the 1960s: The Hayato Ikeda Years," *Policy Brief*, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, December 12, 2022, available at [https://www.jiia-jic.jp/en/policybrief/pdf/PolicyBrief\\_Chansoria\\_20221212.pdf](https://www.jiia-jic.jp/en/policybrief/pdf/PolicyBrief_Chansoria_20221212.pdf)

8 For further details see, Chansoria, "Role of the Monarchy ..." *Policy Brief*, n. 5.

9 Masaya Ito, *Ikeda Hayato, sono sei to shi* [Hayato Ikeda, his life and death] (Tokyo: Shiseido, 1966), as cited in Chansoria, "...The Hayato Ikeda Years," *Policy Brief*, n. 7.

of 10 years, Ikeda launched his famous *Gekkyu Nibai Ron* (Income Doubling Plan) during a speech in his native Hiroshima Prefecture in March 1959. Ikeda's thinking on policy affairs started from his conviction that rapid economic growth was a kind of all-purpose remedy – a policy that would provide solutions to nearly all of Japan's internal and external problems.<sup>10</sup>

### ***Hayato Ikeda's Foreign Policy Thinking and Approach***

In fact, none of Ikeda's positions on foreign policy can be understood unless one comprehends his desire to achieve a high rate of economic growth.<sup>11</sup> In Ikeda's mind, domestic economic objectives and general foreign policy strategy were interlinked by a close causal connection. In particular, the *Sanbon bashira* ("Three Pillars") theory can be considered a cornerstone of Ikeda's vision concerning Japanese diplomatic relations with Great Powers. Although the *Sanbon bashira* theory was based on contingencies determined by the Cold War, it seemingly drew support from Japan's noteworthy economic success of those years.<sup>12</sup> During his four-year tenure as prime minister, Ikeda maintained a comparatively low profile in the realm of foreign affairs, though he did make quite a few high-profile speeches, including to the US Congress in 1961. The position expressed by Ikeda at the time was that

Japan's policy of non-recognition of the People's Republic of China represented a core interest and had to be preserved. Moreover, as far as Taiwan was concerned, any diplomatic initiative that could promote its return to Communist China was to be seen as a threat to the peace and prosperity of Japan.<sup>13</sup>

The various stages of Japan's post-war Asian policy characterized during the Kishi period saw the country as a middle power whose goal was to establish an economic base in Asia. Under Ikeda, Japan began to consider itself, at least in economic terms, as a Great Power whose goal was to integrate its economy as an equal partner with the advanced industrial economies of the Pacific beyond Asia.<sup>14</sup> Given that aid was vital in promoting Japan's export-based growth, its ODA loans were closely linked to Ikeda's Income Doubling Plan. This plan encouraged exports of Japan's heavy industrial products to Asia.<sup>15</sup> Led primarily by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), ODA became an important tool to assist Japanese heavy industry firms in finding large markets in Asia. As a result of the strong governmental support and backing, Japanese aid within and beyond Asia increased rapidly in the 1960s.<sup>16</sup> The core of Japanese foreign aid rested on three primary policies: 1) war reparations from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s; 2) aid to promote Prime Minister Ikeda's Income Doubling Plan; and 3) "resource

10 Ibid.

11 For details see, George W. Waldner, *Japanese Foreign Policy and Economic Growth: Ikeda Hayato's Approach to the Liberalization Issue*, (Princeton University: Department of Politics, March 1975), p. 182, as cited in Chansoria, "...The Hayato Ikeda Years," *Policy Brief*, n. 7.

12 Oliviero Frattolillo, *Reassessing Japan's Cold War: Ikeda Hayato's Foreign Politics and Proactivism During the 1960s*, (London: Routledge, 2019), p. 122, as cited in Chansoria, "...The Hayato Ikeda Years," *Policy Brief*, n. 7.

13 For further details see, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères Français, *Compte rendu de l'entretien entre Monsieur Georges Pompidou et Monsieur Hayato Ikeda*, Tokyo, April 7, 1964, Ohira\_Ikeda\_Pompidou 1964, MAEF, vol. 6, no. 32; also see, Frattolillo, n. 12, p. 43.

14 James W. Morley, "Japan's Position in Asia," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 17, no. 2, 1963, p. 154, as cited in Chansoria, "...The Hayato Ikeda Years," *Policy Brief*, n. 7.

15 For more details see, I.M.D. Little and J.M. Clifford, *International Aid*, (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), as cited in Chansoria, "...The Hayato Ikeda Years," *Policy Brief*, n. 7.

16 For further details and references see, A. Rix, *Japan's Economic Aid: Policy Making and Politics*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), as cited in Chansoria, "...The Hayato Ikeda Years," *Policy Brief*, n. 7.

diplomacy” in the 1970s. These policies, including war reparations, were designed to promote Japanese economic development in the post-World War II era. By the 1960s, Japan had achieved post-war recovery and double-digit economic growth rates. Economic assistance to developing countries was by then no longer limited to reparations programs.<sup>17</sup>

Although becoming an economically advanced country was a post-war achievement, Japan’s ‘new reality’ had yet to be defined and confirmed by the 1960s. It would therefore perhaps have been premature to expect an outward-looking attitude in international affairs from Japan, which chose to adopt a “low-posture diplomacy”. However, once Ikeda became prime minister, Japan began to adopt a slightly “higher posture”<sup>18</sup> as the “dynamic leader of an economically awakening Asia.”<sup>19</sup> Under Ikeda, Japan sought cooperation with free Asia and partnership with the free world, and Japanese representatives became particularly active in the UN Economic Commission for Asia and Far East [ECAFE].<sup>20</sup>

### ***Ikeda’s 1961 State Visit to India***

Prime Minister Ikeda’s political rhetoric during his state visit to India in 1961 identified

Tokyo and Delhi as the ‘natural pegs’ of a security system in Asia. This posturing spoke volumes about India’s evolving diplomatic and strategic importance to Japan at the time,<sup>21</sup> even though Ikeda regarded India as part of undeveloped Asia.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, while the two nations became strategically inclined to each other, the reasons for their mutual inclination remained somewhat out of sync, a fact that soon became apparent post-1961. Japan kept its focus on Asia during this period, but Tokyo did not appear to regard India as part of its Asia strategy. Studies and archival records of Japan-India relations through this period have noted the apparent apathy and low-level interaction<sup>23</sup>; research on Japan’s interactions with Asia in that era have not found/included any analysis of Japan’s relations with India.<sup>24</sup>

During the periods when Kishi and Ikeda visited India, economic relations between Japan and India were expanding on a stable basis. While Japan’s exports to India came to a temporary standstill after peaking at \$144 million in 1957, they recovered to the \$112 million mark in 1960, aided by the progress of economic cooperation between the two countries.<sup>25</sup> Even in the most unfavorable year, 1958, the two-way Indo-Japanese trade surpassed the \$150 million mark, thereby proving that Japan and

17 T. Yanagihara and A. Emig, “An Overview of Japan’s Foreign Aid,” in S. Islam, ed., *Yen for Development: Japanese Foreign Aid and the Politics of Burden Sharing*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), pp. 37–69, as cited in Chansoria, “...The Hayato Ikeda Years,” *Policy Brief*, n. 7.

18 As cited from, Frattolillo, n. 12, p. 115.

19 Ibid.

20 Chansoria, “...The Hayato Ikeda Years,” *Policy Brief*, n. 7.

21 Sourabh Gupta, “Article 9 Reinterpreted: Can Japan and India Collaborate in a ‘Broader Asia?’” in Shihoko Goto, ed., *The Rebalance within Asia: The Evolution of Japan-India Relations*, (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2014), p. 47.

22 For further details see, Purnendra Jain, “Twin Peaks: Japan’s Economic Aid to India in the 1950s and 2010s,” *JICA-RI Working Paper*, no. 139, February 2017, (Tokyo: JICA Research Institute), p. 14, as cited in Chansoria, “...The Hayato Ikeda Years,” *Policy Brief*, n. 7.

23 For further details and references on this see, Toshio Yamazaki and Mitsuru Takahashi, eds., *Nihon to Indo: koryu no rekishi*, [Japan and India: A History of Their Interaction] (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1993).

24 Akihiko Tanaka, *Ajia no naka no Nihon* [Japan in Asia], (Tokyo: NTT Shuppan, 2007).

25 *State Visit to India: Hayato Ikeda, Prime Minister of Japan*, Dispatch by Embassy of Japan, (National Archives of India, New Delhi: Digitized Document) November 1, 1961, available at <https://indianculture.gov.in/archives/pamphlet-containing-details-hayate-ikeda-japanese-prime-ministers-visit-india>

India would remain important to each other as markets.<sup>26</sup> While development assistance and aid ideally should be separated from foreign policy objectives, India tends to focus on the security concerns of developed nations in the politically fragile regions where aid is to be granted. Specifically, the geo-strategic importance and vulnerabilities of South Asia made it almost impossible for a donor country to keep politics out of its development aid agenda to further the politico-diplomatic goals of the donor while ensuring the developmental objectives of the recipient nation.<sup>27</sup>

Following his November 1961 tour of India, Burma, Pakistan, and Thailand, Ikeda changed his focus and worked hard to resolve two outstanding issues that had refused to stay settled: the Thai special yen account and Burmese reparations.<sup>28</sup> Ikeda also continued the policy of modestly expanding the overseas loan program beyond the requirements of reparations. In November 1960, a year before this South Asia and Southeast Asia tour, Japan extended a credit of \$20 million to Pakistan; in December of that year it added \$10 million more to its loans to India, and donated two million yen for relief to Laos.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, a semi-governmental Overseas Technical Cooperation Corporation (*Kaigai Gijutsu Kyōryoku Jigyōdan*) was formed in July 1962 following this Asia visit to conduct an expanded technical cooperation program formerly entrusted to the Asiatic Society (*Ajia kyōkai*).

### ***India, Japan, and Asia's Foreign Policy Focus in the 1960s***

Indo-Japan ties began some 1,400 years ago and have never been adversarial throughout the various phases of history; bilateral ties have been singularly free of any kind of dispute, be it ideological, cultural, or territorial. In the post-World War II years, however, the momentum of bilateral ties was not adequately sustained. Following PM Kishi's 1957 and PM Ikeda's 1961 visits to India, the next Japanese prime minister to visit the country was Yasuhiro Nakasone, but not until 1984. In between, Indian PM Indira Gandhi undertook two official state visits to Japan in 1969 and 1982.

During the 1960s, India was either unwilling, or unable, to establish its presence in Southeast Asia.<sup>30</sup> India's contribution to the ending of the Indochina conflict and the independence of the Indochina states went on to earn for it the chairmanship of the three-nation International Commission of Control and Supervision. However, India subsequently limited its role in the solution of the Vietnam problem.<sup>31</sup> Between 1966 and 1968, India's vice-president, prime minister, and foreign minister visited many Southeast Asian countries, though it remains debatable whether India did in fact manage to make much/any headway in becoming 'a factor' in Southeast Asian affairs at that time. On her visit to Southeast Asia during this period, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi emphasized promoting economic and technical co-operation

26 Ibid.

27 For details on the subject see, A. Estache, "Emerging Infrastructure Policy Issues in Developing Countries: A Survey of the Recent Economic Literature," *Background Paper*, Meeting of the POVNET Infrastructure Working Group, October 2004; also see, S. Jones, "Contribution of Infrastructure to Growth and Poverty Reduction in East Asia and the Pacific," *Background Paper*, Oxford Policy Management, October 2004; and see, Stephen Jones, "Infrastructure Challenges in East and South Asia," *IDS Bulletin*, vol. 37, no. 3, May 2006, Institute of Development Studies, p. 29.

28 Morley, n. 14, p. 150, as cited in Chansoria, "...The Hayato Ikeda Years," *Policy Brief*, n. 7.

29 Ibid., p. 151.

30 For further details see, M.S. Rajan, "India and World Politics in the Post-Nehru Era," *International Journal*, vol. 24, no. 1, Winter 1968-1969, p. 153.

31 Ibid.

with Singapore and Malaysia. Specifically, while delivering a speech in Kuala Lumpur on May 30, 1968, PM Gandhi observed that India was willing to ‘participate in and support’ a broad regional association in Southeast Asia ‘on the basis of equality and mutual benefit’<sup>32</sup>, thus indirectly ruling out a ‘power’ role for India in Southeast Asia.

***Address by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to the 23<sup>rd</sup> UN General Assembly Session in October 1968***

Diplomacy and influence are no substitute for real economic and military strength. On the contrary, diplomatic strength and influence is largely a reflection of the latter.<sup>33</sup> It has long been maintained that, unless and until India achieves real economic and military strength, it would be presumptuous to make its presence felt, much less to manage a balance of power – assuming that India would ever want to play that role.<sup>34</sup> It was against this backdrop that PM Indira Gandhi addressed the 23<sup>rd</sup> Session of the United Nations’ General Assembly (UNGA) on October 14, 1968. Archival documents suggest that Indira Gandhi’s 1968 address ‘reintroduced the spirit of India into the UN’ after many years.<sup>35</sup> Referring to the need for greater international cooperation amid rising international disputes, PM Gandhi said:

... Peaceful coexistence alone could enable the post-war world to solve its disputes rationally. Every now and then violence erupts. Sheer power seemingly prevails over principles, seeking obedience and demanding respect instead of commanding it. Indeed, those who have

attempted to eschew the use of force have had to pay the price of restraint. Implicit faith in the efficacy of and unquestioning dependence on military alliances, as well as the rigidities of the bipolar world, are in a state of flux. Every nation, regardless of size, is endeavoring to establish its own identity... there has been [no] notable advance in international cooperation in the political sphere. The reasons for this failure are obvious and many: economic and military power continue to dominate politics. The carving out of spheres of influence still motivates policies and action.<sup>36</sup>

While addressing complex international issues, including those relating to the continued use of force to attain political ends and to the promotion of national/global interests as well as to the ongoing conflicts in Southeast Asia and the remaining last vestiges of colonialism, Mrs. Gandhi stated:

The principles of non-interference by one State in the internal affairs of another, of scrupulous respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all States are essential to the principle of peaceful coexistence. If the use of force in international affairs is not renounced, and the rights of nations and the equality of races are not respected, how can tensions be reduced or the dangers of conflicts avoided? While there is search for a more equitable and humane world order, the continuance of the tragic conflict in Vietnam is a source of constant anxiety. The Vietnamese

32 Ibid., p. 155.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 For details see, Ibid., p. 138.

36 As cited from United Nations General Assembly, 23<sup>rd</sup> Session (1693<sup>rd</sup> Plenary Meeting), Speech by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, October 14, 1968; text of the entire speech available at <https://pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/uploadpdf/79878lms20.pdf>

people must be assured of their inherent right to shape their destiny peacefully and without outside interference... We must also firmly resist the last vestiges of colonialism...<sup>37</sup>

The above political thought and approach reverberated again during PM Gandhi's 1969 state visit to Japan, when both nations welcomed the talks underway in Paris on the Vietnam question. Tokyo and Delhi expressed hope for a just and lasting solution to the Vietnam question to be found soon, consistent with the wishes of the Vietnamese people. PMs Indira Gandhi and Eisaku Sato stressed the need to ensure respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, hoping that suitable arrangements to this end would be made on an adequate international basis within the broad framework of the Geneva Accords.<sup>38</sup> Further, they recognized that the broadest possible international cooperation would be required to assist in the economic recovery and progress of this region, following the restoration of peace in Vietnam.<sup>39</sup>

Subsequently, during PM Gandhi's Japan visit, both countries expressed concurrence on the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control that would make a lasting contribution to the maintenance of world peace and security.<sup>40</sup> Further, PM Sato appreciated India's support for Japan's membership in the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee and called for closer cooperation in the future work of this Committee.

All in all, Japan and India have consistently respected and reiterated their faith in the principles of the United Nations Charter. Unsurprisingly, in 1969, too, Tokyo and Delhi stressed that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states should be respected and that there should be no external interference in the internal affairs of any state, whether through direct or indirect means. In the 1960s, there was a further emphasis on the need to resolve all international disputes without resorting to force or threats of force, and without endangering international peace and justice.<sup>41</sup> In this regard, India's attitude toward and relations with Southeast Asia were described as being "between two worlds."<sup>42</sup> Ton That Thien, a Vietnamese scholar, further observed that "... one should expect the long-term destiny of this area to be determined by India [and China] more strongly than by any other power." Interestingly, Thien wrote in 1963 that India had influenced the area in the past and might do so greatly in the future.<sup>43</sup>

### ***Indira Gandhi's 1969 State Visit to Japan***

It was against the above-mentioned international political backdrop that Mrs. Indira Gandhi's state visit to Japan as India's prime minister took place from June 23 to 28, 1969, upon the invitation of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato. Her 1969 state visit followed the earlier visits of 1957 and 1964 and provided Gandhi with another opportunity to witness Japan's remarkable achievements in the fields of technology, industry, and economy. Gaining commendable impressions, she paid tributes to

37 Ibid.

38 Archived Documents, *Joint Communique on Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Visit to Japan*, June 28, 1969 (Tokyo), Indian Ministry of External Affairs (External Publicity Division), Government of India.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 As attributed by Tibor Mende, *Southeast Asia Between Two Worlds*, (London: Turnstile Press, 1955), p. 153.

43 For more details see, Ton That Thien, *India and South East Asia 1947-1960: A study of India's policy towards the South East Asian countries in the period*, (Geneva, 1963).

the enterprise, industry, discipline and, above all, the dedication of Japan and its people that contributed to their phenomenal progress.<sup>44</sup> During her visit, PM Gandhi was received in audience by Their Majesties the Emperor and the Empress at the Imperial Palace on June 24, 1969, and she later exchanged cordial views with Japan's PM Sato on a wide range of subjects of bilateral interest to both nations.

Interestingly, these included the international situation at that time, particularly that within the Asian region, international peace and cooperation, and Indo-Japan bilateral relations with special reference to the growing scope for economic cooperation between the two countries. In the said reference, it would be vital to take note of what PM Gandhi mentioned during her UNGA address a year prior, more so since Japan's economic aid to India was a noteworthy aspect of the bilateral relationship in Japan's post-war years. In her 1968 UNGA speech on the subject, PM Gandhi had alluded:

In India, aid accounts for only a fifth of our total investment in development. Economic progress is not possible without investment. Not all the investment for Europe's progress came from the sweated labor of European workers and farmers. It came also from the people of Asia, Africa, and South America who were denied a fair return for their work and their produce. Empires have ended, but the colonial pattern of economy remains with us in one form or another... Aid is only partial recompense for what the superior economic power of the advanced countries denies us through trade.<sup>45</sup>

PM Gandhi appreciated the economic assistance received from Japan, and valued the reaffirmation expressed by PM Sato that Japan would continue to play an active part in the India Consortium organized by the World Bank. There was also an agreement on a greater scope and variety of cooperation in India's economic development.<sup>46</sup> By the end of the 1960s, Japan and India had held many discussions at the official level in addition to the Annual Consultative Meetings. Close attention was paid in reviewing the economic developments in Japan and India, especially the steady recovery of the Indian economy during that decade and the brighter prospects for its future.

PM Sato complimented the determined efforts of the Indian people to realize social and economic progress. He particularly welcomed the launch of India's Fourth Five Year Plan in April 1969, meant to provide an effective framework for its economic growth.<sup>47</sup> PMs Sato and Gandhi approved of the progress achieved over the preceding years in bilateral economic and technical cooperation. In particular, Japan had agreed to resume its project aid to India, beginning with that for oil exploration and the development of an outer harbor at Visakhapatnam.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, given the progressive increase in trade between the two countries, there was acknowledgement in 1969 of the potential for further long-term development of trade relations based on greater diversification and complementarity.

**Conclusion**

It would only be reasonable to argue that, while evaluating the various determinants in foreign policymaking, it is perhaps individuals

44 *Joint Communique...* n. 38.

45 As cited from PM Gandhi's UNGA Address, n. 36.

46 *Joint Communique...* n. 38.

47 *Ibid.*

48 *Ibid*; Vishakhapatnam is a port city and industrial center in the south Indian state of Andhra Pradesh on the Bay of Bengal.



and personalities that end up being most profound in terms of outcomes. The impact of personality in foreign policy decision-making may not necessarily be exclusive. It hinges on cognitive processes, including perceptive reasoning that defines the behavior of nation-states based upon the existential constraints of the international system as well as the compulsions of domestic political structures.<sup>49</sup> It is the flexibility in the political environment that tends to create variable boundaries in decision-making, even more so in the realm of foreign policy.

During the 1960s, the trajectories of the respective political environments in Japan and India well depict the internal and external determinants that shaped the corresponding foreign policy thinking, approaches, and strategies adopted by Ikeda's administration in Japan and Gandhi's government in India. Prime ministers Ikeda and Gandhi remained cognizant of the domestic political environment prevalent in their countries while being simultaneously sentient of the international security environment, which played a key role in shaping their external politics and foreign policies. Culturally, the historical and traditional ties binding the people of Japan and India go back centuries – and this remained consistent through the 1960s, when greater emphasis was given to the pursuit of cultural agreements on education and scientific cooperation.

Though Ikeda resigned in November 1964 on grounds of ill health, his subtle and conciliatory

posture and politics managed to bring relative stability in Japanese politics. Ikeda's trademark Income Doubling Plan proved to be a landmark success and went a long way in extending the lifecycle of Japan's post-war economic marvel. In fact, the *Gekkyu Nibai Ron* managed to enshrine 'economic growth' as Japan's economic and foreign policy pivot and gospel goal for nearly all successive post-Ikeda governments and leaderships.<sup>50</sup> While Japan took a long time to modify the parameters of its foreign and security policies in the post-war period, Ikeda's economic policies did influence the nation's foreign policy conversations and approaches rather significantly. Japan successfully managed its foreign economic policy flows across borders to become predominantly influential in the global economy during this era. The economic success chart generated confidence, which in effect transformed the way Japan began to craft its re-engagement within and beyond Asia.

For India, the 1960s was a decade when its modern economic development and the cornerstone of its foreign policy the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) took centre stage. According to India's former president Pranab Mukherjee, the NAM had become a crusade against colonialism and a cry for liberation for many Asian, African, and Latin American countries, thus positioning India as the leader of the third world.<sup>51</sup> For that matter, India had not had a strong prime minister to deal with recalcitrant elements since the pre-1960 Nehru era, and Mrs. Gandhi proved adept and adaptable in using her power base to formulate

49 As cited in Monika Chansoria, "China-India-Japan: Dissecting Complexities of the Asian Triangle," *Manekshaw Paper* (Centre for Land Warfare Studies), no. 54, 2014, p. 15, available at [https://www.claws.in/static/MP54\\_China-India-Japan-Dissecting-Complexities-Of-The-Asian-Triangle.pdf](https://www.claws.in/static/MP54_China-India-Japan-Dissecting-Complexities-Of-The-Asian-Triangle.pdf)

50 Ikeda declared that Japan sought to develop its own distinctive role in foreign affairs during the 1960s; for further reading on this subject see, Timothy P. Maga, *John F. Kennedy and the New Pacific Community, 1961-63*, (University of Maryland, Asian Division), 1990, as cited in Chansoria, "...The Hayato Ikeda Years," *Policy Brief*, n. 7.

51 For further details see, Pranab Mukherjee, *The Dramatic Decade: The Indira Gandhi Years*, (New Delhi: Rupa Publications India Pvt. Ltd., 2015), p. 22.

and implement policy, especially foreign policy, in the context of regional developments.<sup>52</sup>

Indo-Japanese relations have evolved as a tangible outcome stemming from commonalities of culture, shared interests, and complementing ideologies that critically shaped the course of this key Asian bilateral relationship. Despite the post-war reality of Indo-Japanese ‘distance’ – not just that of geographic location but also that of dissimilar histories as well as political and socio-political experiences – India and Japan inched closer in successive decades. India was no longer the ‘other Asia’ set afar from Japan in contrast to East and Southeast Asia. The state visits undertaken by Ikeda in 1961 to India and Gandhi in 1969 to Japan made valuable contributions towards strengthening the friendly and cooperative relationship between Tokyo and Delhi as well as promoting mutual understanding on key and common issues concerning Asia.

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52 Ibid., p. 41; for related information, further reading, and references on the subject, see, Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh*, (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1990).