

## **Postscript:**

### **On U.S. Government Aeronautical Charts Published in 1953 and 1954 Indicating that Takeshima Is a Japanese Territory—Rebuttal to the October 23, 2020 Reporting by South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency**

Rikinobu Funasugi  
Associate Professor  
Faculty of Law and Literature  
Shimane University

As with the material I prepared for the press release on October 23, 2020, this postscript reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

## **1. Introduction**

At 18:53 on October 23, 2020, South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency distributed a news article (in the Korean language) that reads as follows:

Japan bulldozes through its argument that Korea has unlawfully occupied Dokdo by disclosing previously unknown aeronautical charts published by the U.S. government in the 1950s (General News): Japan insists on its territorial right on Dokdo on the grounds of a dotted line drawn between ULLŬNG DO and Dokdo on the charts . . . On the charts, Dokdo belongs to the Korean Aviation Identification Zone [*sic*]. The Korean government states, “These charts do not endorse Japan’s unjustifiable territorial claim . . . we must take decisive actions.”<sup>1</sup>

This postscript aims to examine whether the press release on October 23 was indeed a far-fetched argument or ravings as the Korean news agency insisted. The analysis herein relies on historical maps, cartography, and international law.

## **2. On the Air Defense Identification Zone**

The Yonhap News Agency’s article describes the air defense identification zone as follows:

Comparing the air defense identification zones (ADIZ) of Korea and Japan shown in the aeronautical charts published by the U.S. Air Force as they were presented

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20201023118251073?input=1195m>

by this institute [Japan Institute of International Affairs], it is revealed that Dokdo is included in Korea's air defense identification zone (KADIZ). While ADIZ is a different concept from territorial air, it is a means to facilitate national defense by identifying information on every aircraft approaching the national territory. Because the range of a country's Aviation Identification Zone is set up on the basis of national territory and radar's detection range, it can provide grounds for Korea to claim Dokdo as its own territory.

To begin with, it is not altogether clear whether this view is that of the Yonhap News Agency's reporter, that of the South Korean Air Force member quoted in the article, or that of the South Korean government, particularly its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also, it has to be pointed out that ADIZ usually stands for Air Defense Identification Zone, usually translated in Japanese as "*bōkū shikibetsu-ken*"; in Korean "*hanguk banggong sikbyeol guyeok*" is the translation. "Aviation Identification Zone" which appears in said article, is not used.

Under international law, ADIZ is a different concept from territorial air. ADIZ is an air zone set up to identify the nationality of approaching aircraft and assess the possibility of their encroachment of air space. It is used to judge whether to scramble fighter jets to intercept the intruder. In short, an air defense identification zone is designated by a country as a domestic measure for aerial defense purposes. It is not considered to define the limit or range of territorial air or land space. Therefore, the inclusion of Takeshima in KADIZ does not provide grounds for South Korea to assert its territorial claim on Takeshima in the eye of international law.

Incidentally, it should be pointed out that Socotra Rock,<sup>2</sup> a submerged rock 4.6 meters (15 ft) below sea level located in the Yellow Sea, which had once been a subject of territorial dispute between South Korea and China and, more recently, was a point of contention in the Korea-China dispute over designation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), is located at 32°07'22.N/125°10'56.E.

The USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION, published in 1954 shows a boundary drawn on the 33rd parallel north between the Korea ADIZ and the Japan ADIZ to the south of Jeju Island. Socotra Rock is included in the Japan ADIZ in this chart (see chart 1). In December 2013, the South Korean government designated its KADIZ to include the airspace above the south of Jeju Island. It is believed that, prior to this, all South Korean aircraft were required to notify the Japanese authorities when they flew over Socotra Rock.<sup>3</sup> Even though a submerged rock is not defined as a territory under international law, Socotra Rock must be a Japanese territory if, as the South Korean side argues in the article, an ADIZ can provide grounds for territorial claim

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<sup>2</sup> Suyan Islet in Chinese and Ieodo in Korean. In 2003, the Korean government established a general maritime science station on the Rock, reinforcing its effective control.

<sup>3</sup> "What is Ieodo, which is included in the defense identification zones of Korea, China, and Japan, like?" in the daily *JoongAng Ilbo* (in Korean) (uploaded on December 8, 2013 and revised on December 10, 2013). <https://news.joins.com/article/13340335>

on an island.




Chart 1: USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION, September 1954 (Vicinity of Jeju Island)

(From the collection of the National Archives of the United States)

※ The boundary between the KOREA ADIZ and the JAPAN ADIZ is drawn on the 33rd parallel north to the south of Jeju Island.

※ The location of Socotra Rock (32°07'22.N/125°10'56.E) is not shown in this chart. It is included, instead, in chart JN-38 to the south of this chart (JN-25).

In USAF NAVIGATIONAL FLIGHT CHART, NF-15, MANILA, PHILIPPINES TO TOKYO, JAPAN, 3rd EDITION Revised, published in April 1954 (map scale: 1:500,000), a boundary between the Taiwan ADIZ and the Okinawa ADIZ is drawn on the eastern part of Yonaguni-Jima, one of the Sakishima Islands in Okinawa (see Charts 2 and 3).<sup>4</sup> While Okinawa, which included Yonaguni-Jima, was under the jurisdiction of the United States at that time in accordance with the Treaty of San Francisco (effective April 1952), the western part of Yonaguni-Jima had never been under the jurisdiction of Taiwan (Republic of China). This proves that ADIZ has nothing to do with a country's territory or territorial airspace. Therefore, the Yonhap News Agency's argument – "Because the range of a country's Aviation Identification Zone [*sic*] is set up on the basis of national territory and radar's detection range, it can provide grounds for Korea to claim Dokdo as its own territory" – is clearly wrong. Consequently, our press release on October 23 was not a far-fetched argument or ravings as the Korean news agency insisted.

<sup>4</sup> It shows that Okinawa was under U.S. jurisdiction at that time.





Chart 3: USAF NAVIGATIONAL FLIGHT CHART, NF-15,  
MANILA, PHILIPPINES TO TOKYO, JAPAN, 3rd EDITION Revised, April 1954  
(Vicinity of Yonaguni-Jima)

(From the collection of the National Archives of the United States)

※ In this chart, Yonaguni-Jima is misspelled as Yonakoni-jima.

### 3. On National Boundary

The Yonhap News Agency article introduces the interpretation of national boundary by an expert, a member of the South Korean Air Force, as follows:

However, experts point out that Japan's territorial claim on Dokdo on the grounds of a short, dotted line on the aeronautical charts itself is an act of arm-twisting. A Korean Air Force member pointed out, "If the dotted line is indeed the national boundary as Japan insists, then ADIZs must be wrongly represented," and "It would be unjustifiable to base one's territorial claim on this kind of aeronautical chart." On the short, dotted line between ULLŬNG DO and Dokdo, this Air Force member observed that "Putting all the various factors together, it can be interpreted as a simplified designation of the right side of the dotted line to be the Japanese territory while the left side belongs to Korea," and refuted the Japanese argument by stating, "the dotted line simply points directions toward Korean territory and Japanese territory and is by no means a national boundary." The same Air Force member explains that, "If it were a demarcation line between two national territories, it should have been more clearly marked with coordinates and

no breaks.”

First, on the remarks “If the dotted line is indeed the national boundary as Japan insists, then ADIZs must be wrongly represented” and “It would be unjustifiable to base one’s territorial claim on this kind of aeronautical chart,” I would like to argue that the author of the Yonhap article must present the grounds for his argument that “. . . ADIZs must be wrongly represented.” An argument without grounds is mere conjecture. As I wrote above, “It should be pointed out . . . that an ADIZ is generally designated by each country as a domestic measure for aerial defense purposes. Under international law, an ADIZ is not considered to define the limit or range of a country’s territorial air or land space.”

It should also be noted that on this chart, separate from the ADIZ lines, national boundaries are drawn not only between Ulleungdo (ULLŬNG -DO) and Takeshima (Liancourt Rock) but also between South Korea’s Jeju Island and the Gotō Islands, Nagasaki Prefecture, Japan (see chart 4), as well as between Busan, South Korea, and the Tsushima Islands, Nagasaki Prefecture (see chart 5). Needless to say, Jeju Island is a Korean territory while the Gotō and Tsushima Islands belong to Japan.

Second, the article stated, “Putting all the various factors together, it can be interpreted as a simplified designation of the right side of the dotted line to be Japanese territory while the left side belongs to Korea” and rebutted the Japanese argument by stating, “The dotted line simply points directions toward Korean territory and Japanese territory and it is by no means a national boundary.” It should be pointed out that the article does not cite any grounds to support the assertion that “the dotted line simply points directions . . .” As previously indicated, an argument without grounds is mere conjecture. Generally speaking, from the viewpoint of cartography, a map is based on a set of rules such as mode of map projection, symbols, and scales, and in many cases these rules are indicated in the map’s legend. In the case of USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION published in 1954, the AERONAUTICAL LEGEND is found in the middle of the extreme left of the chart (see Chart 6). Among MISCELLANEOUS of the AERONAUTICAL LEGEND is ADIZ (see Chart 7). Included in the LEGEND at the bottom of the extreme left of the chart is “Division of Insular Sovereignty (land areas only)”, as I had included in the “Summary of Findings from U.S. Government Aeronautical Charts Published in 1953 and 1954 Indicating that Takeshima Is a Japanese Territory” as appendices 1 and 4 (see chart 8). In other words, this dotted line represents the national boundary between islands and it is identical with the dotted line between Ulleungdo (ULLŬNG -DO) and Takeshima (Liancourt Rock).






Chart 4: USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION,  
September 1954 (Vicinity of Jeju Island and the Gotō Islands)  
(From the collection of the National Archives of the United States)




Chart 5: USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION,  
September 1954 (Vicinity of Busan and Tsushima island)  
(From the collection of the National Archives of the United States)




Chart 6: USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION,  
September 1954 (AERONAUTICAL LEGEND ①)  
(From the collection of the National Archives of the United States)






Chart 7: USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION,  
September 1954 (AERONAUTICAL LEGEND ②)  
(From the collection of the National Archives of the United States)




Chart 8: USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION, September 1954 (LEGEND)  
 (From the collection of the National Archives of the United States)

Incidentally, it should be pointed out that explicit references to “insular sovereignty” and “land areas only” in the definition of the dotted line in the legends indicate that the sea area where the dotted line in question is placed does not represent the exact location of the national boundary. Under international law, territorial sea at that time was defined to be within three nautical miles (approximately 5.6 kilometers), and the concept of an exclusive economic zone or EEZ (within 200 nautical miles or about 370.4 kilometers

from the land) simply did not exist. The distance between Ulleungdo (ULLŬNG -DO) and Takeshima (Liancourt Rock) was approximately 87 kilometers. While it was possible at that time to claim three nautical miles off Ulleungdo (ULLŬNG -DO) and Takeshima (Liancourt Rock) as South Korean and Japanese territories, respectively, the sea beyond these territorial seas was open sea. Therefore, it was not proper to draw a national boundary on this sea area. It should thus be concluded that this dotted line merely indicates sovereignty over Ulleungdo (ULLŬNG -DO) and Takeshima (Liancourt Rock). It does not indicate sovereignty over the sea area nor does it show the range of territorial seas. It merely indicates insular sovereignty of land areas.

Additionally, it has been confirmed that, in relation to the blue dotted line on the chart, which is not found in the legend, a South Korean netizen argued the blue line should have been a demarcation of military districts between Imperial Japanese Army 17th Area Army stationed in Korea and the Imperial Japanese Second General Army that the United States Armed Forces designated immediately before the end of the Pacific War. It hardly seems necessary to point out that this is a gray-colored dotted line drawn on blue sea. The dotted line itself is not blue but gray-colored (see chart 9; the color of the dotted line on the map corresponds to the color of the dotted line in the legends, where it is identified as “Division of Insular Sovereignty (land areas only).” Neither the color of the two country names (Korea and Japan) sandwiching the dotted line nor that of the names of the islands is blue; they are either gray (an island’s name) or black (elevation) (see chart 9). Also, no rational reason is given as to why an aeronautical chart published by the United States Air Force in 1954, after the dust of war had already settled, carries “a demarcation of military districts between Imperial Japanese Army 17th Area Army stationed in Korea and the Imperial Japanese Second General Army which the United States Armed Forces designated immediately before the end of the Pacific War,” when said demarcation is not included in other U.S. government aeronautical charts published before 1954. Taking all the above into consideration, one should conclude that this argument by a South Korean netizen is based on layers of conjecture. While it is essential for a democratic society to allow citizens to argue freely, it has to be said that to make an argument not based on historical facts—in the case of a map, its legend—is a highly irresponsible act. In short, it is obvious that the second argument from the Korean side was nothing short of a misguided insistence based on conjecture stemming from a failure to follow one of the principles of map reading: study the legend.



Chart 9: USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION, September 1954 (Vicinity of Ulleungdo (ULLUNG -DO) and Takeshima (Liancourt Rock))

(From the collection of the National Archives of the United States)

The third Korean argument was that “If it were a demarcation line between two national territories, it should have been more clearly marked with coordinates and no breaks.” Although this might sound reasonable from the viewpoint of contemporary concepts of territorial land, territorial sea, territorial air and exclusive economic zones, it has to be said that, given the prevailing concepts in those days, this argument is not grounded in fact.

In the USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION of 1954, the two-dot chain line in the legend represents “International Boundaries,” which is chiefly applied to land areas, including China, Mongolia, the U.S.S.R. and Korea on this chart. The international boundaries are clearly seen between Mongolia and the U.S.S.R. in northern Mongolia (chart 10), between Mongolia, China, and the U.S.S.R. in eastern Mongolia (chart 11; in the vicinity of Manzhouli of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, which is entered as LU-PIN (Man-chou-li) in the aeronautical chart), and between Mongolia and China in southern Mongolia (chart 12).

As chart 11 shows, however, the international boundary between China and the U.S.S.R. is broken at around the 50th parallel north along the Argun River to the northeast of Manzhouli. The rivers Amur and Ussuri function as the boundaries between China and the U.S.S.R. in the northeast region of China. Although the U.S.S.R. and China are seen

on both sides of the boundary on the river Amur to the west of Khabarovsk, the two-dot chain line is broken here and there (see chart 13). The area around the rivers Amur, Ussuri, and Argun witnessed a long-standing border conflict between China and the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, the China–U.S.S.R. boundary to the west of Voroshilov (renamed Ussuriysk in 1957) near Korea border to the north of Vladivostok is also broken (see chart 14).




Chart 10: USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION, September 1954 (Mongolia/U.S.S.R. border region)  
(From the collection of the National Archives of the United States)






Chart 11: USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION, September 1954 (National boundaries between Mongolia, China, and the U.S.S.R.)

(From the collection of the National Archives of the United States)




Chart 12: USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION, September 1954 (Borders between Mongolia and China/U.S.S.R.)

(From the collection of the National Archives of the United States)




Chart 13: USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION, September 1954 (China–U.S.S.R. border near Khabarovsk)  
(From the collection of the National Archives of the United States)






Chart 14: USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION, September 1954 (China–U.S.S.R. border near Voroshilovgrad)  
(From the collection of the National Archives of the United States)

As for the boundary between China and Korea it generally runs along the Tumen River in the east and along the Amur River in the western and central regions. However, in the eastern part, the two-dot chain line is broken in two places: first, between the south of Paektu Mountain on the China–North Korea border, which is entered in the aeronautical chart as 9003 ft (2,744 meters) to the west of Hun-Chun and south of Tumen, China, and HYESANJIN, North Korea; and second, between HYESANJIN and Linjiang, China (the name of Linjiang does not appear in the chart, and it is represented by “○”, a “Town and Village” according to the legend; see chart 15). Other places the national boundary line is broken are, third, between Linjiang and Chasong, North Korea, in the vicinity of Uppong-dong, North Korea, to the south of Chasong along the Yalu River (not in the aeronautical chart except for “○” to signify the presence of a Town and Village); fourth, between North Korea’s Chasong and Wiwon County (no name or “○” on the chart) to the west of KANGGYE (KOKAI); fifth, between Wiwon and the Sui Ho Reservoir on the China–North Korea border; and sixth, between the Sui Ho Reservoir and Sindo County (no name on the chart) to the south of SINUIJU on the estuary of the Yalu River. On the other hand, a national boundary is drawn in the west of Hyesan and from Sindo County to the West Korea Bay, sandwiched by CHINA and KOREA (see chart 16). In short, international border lines are broken here and there even inland in this aeronautical chart.

Incidentally, the Office of Japanese Governor-General of Korea published a Map of Korea on a scale of 1:1,500,000 in 1920 (9th Year of Taishō), which was revised in 1924 (13th Year of Taishō). It was one of the small-scale maps based on the topographic maps, including a 1/50,000 map, that the Office of Governor-General had produced on the basis of its own topographical surveys. It was designed to show the entire Korean peninsula on a single map. It should be pointed out that the boundary between China and Korea is broken in places even on this map (see charts 17 and 18). From these facts, it can be confirmed that the argument of the quoted South Korean Air Force member — “If it were a demarcation line between two national territories, it should have been more clearly marked with coordinates and no breaks” — was completely off the mark as far as the U.S. Air Force aeronautical chart in question is concerned.

My next task is to examine international boundaries on the sea. As introduced earlier, international law at the time defined the sea area within three nautical miles (approximately 5.6 kilometers) of the land as the country’s territory. There was no such concept as today’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) within 200 nautical miles (approximately 370.4 kilometers) off the land. In other words, it was possible for countries in those days to claim the sea area within three nautical miles off the land as their territorial waters, but anything beyond that was open sea. Therefore, when one had to draw a national border on the sea at that time, the line of territorial water three nautical miles off the land was the only thing that could be drawn. Under these circumstances, when Japan’s Geographical Survey Institute in 1955 (30th Year of Shōwa) published a map of the main portion of Japan on a scale of 1:2,000,000, reflecting the content of the

Treaty of San Francisco (effective April 1952, the 27th Year of Shōwa) as well as the return of the Amami Islands to Japan in 1953 (28th Year of Shōwa), it drew international boundaries (called “gaikokukai,” literally meaning a boundary with a foreign country) between Tsushima Island and the Korean peninsula, and at the midpoint between Ulleungdo and Takeshima (See chart 19). It should be noted that these lines are not national boundaries on the sea but mere indications of sovereignty over nearby land areas such as peninsulas and islands.

Although I have not conducted an exhaustive search, I am aware of a Map of the Entire Territory of the Republic of Korea compiled and published by the South Korean Ministry of Education in 1972 which defines the entire Korean peninsula including North Korea as the Republic of Korea’s own territory. In the 1:27,000,000-scale “Map of Republic of Korea’s Location,”; maritime national borders are drawn to the east of Dokdo (Takeshima) in the East Sea (Sea of Japan), contrary to the position of the Japanese government, as well as between Busan and Tsushima Island, between the Sakishima Islands and Taiwan, south of Taiwan, and between Sakhalin (South Karafto) and Hokkaido (see chart 20).

It should be noted that, to begin with, postwar Japan does not have any inland international borders. All of Japan’s international borders are drawn on the sea. Again, without an exhaustive search, I know of a map in which the entire Japanese territory is surrounded by an unbroken border line. This directive contains both a map attached to SCAPIN-677, a directive issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in January 1946 (see chart 21) and a map indicating interim administrative zones in Japan and Korea as well as a map attached to the British Foreign Office’s first draft peace treaty with Japan issued on April 7, 1951.<sup>5</sup> It is noteworthy that both maps included Takeshima in Korean territory. However, there is no map for general purposes in which Japanese territory is entirely surrounded by an unbroken border line. In most cases in maps for general purposes, national borders are drawn between peninsulas and islands. It was stipulated in Article 6 of SCAPIN-677 that, “Nothing in this directive shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration.” suggesting that this directive was of a tentative nature and the decision on territory would be finalized by the peace treaty.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> South Korean online news website OhmyNews (Korean language version) carried a photo of the draft map on March 28, 2012. See [http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS\\_Web/View/img\\_pg.aspx?CNTN\\_CD=IE001418755&tag=%EC%98%81%EA%B5%AD+%EC%99%B8%EB%AC%B4%EC%84%B1&gb=tag](http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/img_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=IE001418755&tag=%EC%98%81%EA%B5%AD+%EC%99%B8%EB%AC%B4%EC%84%B1&gb=tag) (last visited on November 23, 2020)

<sup>6</sup> In a talk with the Japanese government on February 13, 1946 (21st Year of Shōwa), in reference to SCAPIN-677, General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers replied, “The decision on the range of Japan’s territory indicated by this directive is unrelated to the territorial issue, which should be settled by the San Francisco peace conference.”





Chart 15: USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION, September 1954 (Eastern borders between China and Republic of Korea/North Korea)  
(From the collection of the National Archives of the United States)




Chart 16: USAF JET NAVIGATION CHART, JN-25, YELLOW SEA, 1st EDITION, September 1954 (Western border between China and Republic of Korea/North Korea)

(From the collection of the National Archives of the United States)




Chart 17: Map of Korea on a scale of 1:1,500,000, published in 1920 and revised in 1924 (Eastern border between China and Republic of Korea/North Korea)

(From a private collection)






Chart 18: Map of Korea on a scale of 1:1,500,000, published in 1920 and revised in 1924 (Western border between China and Republic of Korea/North Korea)  
(From a private collection)




Chart 19: Map of Main Portion of Japan on a scale of 1:2,000,000 published in 1957  
(Border between Japan and Republic of Korea)  
(From a private collection)

※ The difference from the Map of Main Portion of Japan published in 1955 is attributable to municipal mergers that were carried out in the latter half of 1950.




Chart 20: Map of Republic of Korea's Location, a part of Map of Entire Territory of Republic of Korea, published in 1972  
(From a private collection)

As for the British Foreign Office's draft treaty, it should be pointed out that, on May 3, 1951, a U.S.-UK joint draft was produced declaring that "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet." This clause was succeeded by the Treaty of San Francisco. Also, on August 10, 1951, Dean Rusk, the U.S. assistant secretary of state, sent what came to be known as the Rusk documents to inform the South Korean government that the United States had turned down its request to include Takeshima in the territories to be renounced by Japan.<sup>7</sup> Given

<sup>7</sup> For the connection between the Treaty of San Francisco and the Takeshima issue, see works by Tsukamoto Takashi and Fujii Kenji, including Tsukamoto Takashi, "Takeshima ryōyū funsō no shōten—kokusaihō no



this history, it is utterly unthinkable that the British draft was given precedence over the Treaty of San Francisco and the Rusk documents that supplemented it. Thus, it can be concluded that the insistence of the South Korean Air Force member that “If it were a demarcation line between two national territories, it should have been more clearly marked with coordinates and no breaks” was mere conjecture and clearly a misguided argument. This person’s argument was not in compliance with the basic rules of history pertaining to maps or cartography, which are essential when analyzing a map. This person’s method of map interpretation was also exceedingly slipshod. For these reasons, this person’s argument failed to constitute a viable rebuttal. All in all, it should be concluded that the October 23, 2020 article of the Yonhap News Agency was an erroneous accusation. At the same time, it is also confirmed that the press release of October 23, 2020, which the South Korean side repudiated, was by no means a far-fetched sophism.




Chart 21: SCAP Administrative Areas (Japan and South Korea) attached to SCAPIN-677 of January 1946 (21st Year of Shōwa)  
(Wikipedia, Japanese version)

kenchi kara” (Focal point of the Takeshima territorial issue—from the viewpoint of international law), lecture notes from the convention of the study group on geography, history, and civics taught in Shimane prefecture high schools, 2007, and Fujii Kenji, “Igirisu to Takeshima mondai” (Britain and the Takeshima issue), a reference document prepared for the first meeting of the lecture on the Takeshima issue, 2019.



#### **4. View of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Finally, this Yonhap News Agency article introduced a view expressed by a South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, who said, “The reported documents, including the aeronautical charts, cannot be grounds for Japan’s territorial claim.” This same Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs official went on to say, “I intend to prove that Dokdo has been our inherent territory from the viewpoints of history, geography, and international law and stress that any attempt by Japan can exercise no affect whatsoever on our solid territorial sovereignty over Dokdo.” He/She then declared, “The Korean government shall continue to decisively respond to Japan’s unjust insistence, while at the same time appealing persistently to the international community the legitimacy of our territorial claim on Dokdo and the fictionality of Japan’s argument.”

In sum, the South Korean foreign ministry apparently insists that the newly released aeronautical charts cannot be grounds for Japan’s territorial claim. However, the South Korean foreign ministry failed to clarify with sufficient reasoning based in fact what is unjust and fictional in Japan’s argument. It is also not clear whether the South Korean foreign ministry shares the same view as the South Korean Air Force member cited in the Yonhap News Agency’s article. If the South Korean foreign ministry denounces Japan’s argument as unjust, then it must present evidence that such is indeed the case under international law.

#### **5. Conclusion**

As I have written in Appendix 1, it can be concluded that the unearthing of the two U.S. Air Force aeronautical charts has now invalidated the South Korean government’s claims since the 1950s that Takeshima is an islet attached to Ulleungdo and that Article 2 (a) of the Treaty of San Francisco on renouncement of Korean territories should also cover 3,000 islands including Takeshima. South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency reports that the South Korean foreign ministry still insists that Dokdo (Takeshima) is Korea’s inherent territory from the viewpoints of history, geography, and international law. Now that the press release on October 23, 2020 has nullified South Korea’s arguments heretofore, South Korea must present new grounds on which it can still claim that Takeshima is indeed a Korean territory in accordance with international law or that the South Korean government has not unlawfully occupied Takeshima in the postwar era.

Given the obvious difference in interpretation of international law concerning Takeshima between Japan and the Republic of Korea and the ongoing dispute over this issue between the two countries, this issue should be brought to the International Court of Justice. When two countries themselves are unable to settle such a matter, an objective judgment on the more appropriate interpretation by the Court’s judges is warranted to settle the dispute.